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Summary of thesis
Various publications have focussed attention on the building
trade unions, usually with the aim of presenting an account
of the history of an individual union.
	 In most of them it
has been assumed that one union for the building industry was
the real and realisable objective of many of the actors in
that history.
	 The object of this thesis is to assess the
validity of that assumption in the light of discussions on
structural change within and between the unions concerned.
The work takes the form of a historical account spanning the
years of the twentieth century. It is based on surviving
documentation and interviews with former officials of the
unions concerned.
Firstly it is argued that changes in the labour process were
a necessary pre—requisite for changes in trade union structure.
The labour process is defined according to its specific
social form, that is as a capitalist process of production
and emphasis is placed on capital formation, on government
policy, on the level of technology and on the division of
labour within the construction industry, as factors which
explain the long survival of a craft form of trade union
organisation.	 Attention is directed to changes in the form
of engagement of labour, to the emergence of labour—only
sub—contracting, and its significance for trade union organi-
sation in construction.
Secondly it is suggested that there is a close relationship
between trade union government and trade union structure.
Adjustments to the shape and size of trade unions are used
by their leaders to foster their own authority and status
within the emergent organisation.
It is concluded that these factors were more important in
motivating changes than any commitment to a particular form
of trade union organisation.
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Introduction
"If an official of a building trade union today were offered
the choice between the organisation of the trade in 1833 and
its organisation in 1923, he might well prefer the former with
all its immaturity, to the muddle and chaos of the many unions
of today, still suspicious and disunited, linked only by a
Federation whose powers are limited."
R. Postgate The Builders History
p.102
"One union for the building industry. It was the vision which
had inspired the men who had createdthe short-lived Operative
Builders Union ... Within the industry and on the sites, it was
recognised that the men of the A.U.B.T.W. were primarily dedi-
cated to this ideal. Some in fact might believe that it had
become almost a mania to the exclusion of other objectives.
This view, however, ignores the significance behind the urge
to create one vast, powerful building union."
W. Hilton Foes to Tyranny
p.283
"At the 1959 conference (of the ASW) a resolution proposing
l one union for the building industry' was overwhelmingly
rejected.	 Carpenters and joiners were not yet prepared to
end the existence of their century-old organisation."
T.J. Connelly The Woodworkers 
p.116
One union for the building industry. It is a theme which has
been developed and endorsed in the various histories of the
building trades unions. 	 From Raymond Postgate's classic study,
published in 1923 (1), through to the most recent 'house history'
written by W.S. Hilton, then Research Officer to the AUBTW in
1963 (2) one union for the building industry has been identified
as the objective in trade union re-organisation - from "muddle
and chaos" to "one vast powerful building union." The intention
of previous commentators - Postgate (3), Higenbottam (4),
Connelly (5) and Hilton (6) was to provide a historical account
of the growth and development of trade union organisation. In
every case the publication has been issued by the union (or the
National Federation of Building Trades Operatives in Postgate's
case) and the institutional bias has been readily apparent.
With the exception of Postgate's analysis of the years before
the outbreak of the Great War, there has been little attempt to
delve beneath the explanations and directives of national reports
and journals.
	 And since these accounts are centred (again with
the exception of Postgate) on only one of the many unions
recruiting within the area of building production there has been
a tendency to avoid a serious and critical discussion of union
structure in the light of existing arrangements and the profound
commitment by many union leaders to the status quo.
The origins of one national organisation are located by the
Webbs, Postgate and Hilton at least in the Operative Builders'
Union, a body which was founded around 1831 or 32 and which
survived only until 1834. Just as the Bible tells us that in
the beginning the whole earth had only one language and few
words, so it seems there was created after the repeal of the
Combination Acts only one union with a few trades sections for
the whole of the building industry.
	 There has been no serious
attempt to evaluate the account which we have inherited from
the Webbs (7) which stresses the unity of the building trades
during the 1830 1 s.	 Obeisance is duly made to their version
of the formation and disintegration of the OBU both in published.
and unpublished (8) accounts.
	 It was the "solitary example,
prior to the present century, in the history of those (ie
building) trades of a federal union embracing all classes of
building operatives, and purporting to extend over the whole
country." (9)
An elaborate account is given by the Webbs of the grand rules
and constitution of that organisation, of initiation ceremonies
and resistance to the 'document'.
An evaluation of the scale and extent of implantation of the
OBU would provide the scope for another research project and
cannot be undertaken here. But doubts must be raised concern-
ing the accuracy and value of the assertions made by the Webbs.
Some of the documentation described by them as containing
rituals ascribed to the Builders' Union must more properly be
attributed to the Operative Stonemasons Society.
	 There is no
evidence that the making parts book, which has survived with
the archive of that union has any connection with the Builders
Union (10). And accounts of the OBU rely heavily on the
Pioneer a journal which was associated with the OBU, from 1832
but which subsequently became the organ of the Grand National
Consolidated Trades Union (11).	 James Morrison, editor of the
Pioneer had,according. to Postgate a 'religious respect and
deference' for Robert Owen and it is not impossible that his
enthusiasm forOwen's ideals coloured his judgement concerning
the strength and the long-term potential of the Builders'
Union.	 It is apparent that there was a concerted campaign
initiated outside of the ranks of trade unionists in building,
designed to persuade the Builders' Union to endorse Owents
ideals.	 Two employers, Hansom and Welsh 'set out to work'
the Builders Union with this end in view (12). Our accounts
of that union and its significance have derived mainly from these
sources outside of the ranks of the organised working class.
The origins of the OBU are usually placed in 1831/2. At the
first of its delegate meetings held in Sep 1833, attracting 275
- delegates who it was claimed represented more than 30,000 mem-
bers Owen spoke in favour of a Grand National Guild of Builders,
but only one year later in 1834 it seems that the union had
collapsed following defeats in a series of major disputes. (13)
It is hard to believe that a genuine union organisation was
constructed according to the detailed and sophisticated consti-
tution outlined by the Webbs pin the space of little more than a
year. And it is still more difficult to give credence to this
idea in a period when trade unionism was just emerging from the
Combination Acts, when national trade union organisations were
few in number and with only a limited membership (14), when
communications were difficult and the radical press still con-
strained by Stamp Duties. (15)
	
The account of the OBU given
by the Webbs conflicts strangely with their own famous definition
of a trade union as a "continuous association of wage earners
for the purpose of maintaining or improving the conditions of
their working lives." (16) Whatever else the OBU may have been
it was certainly not continuous, since it survived for two,
or at the most three years.
There are doubts too as to the extent to which it could justi-
fiably be maintained that the Builders' Union was national in
its scope. Even the Webbs claim only that the OBU purported
to organise throughout the country, but their account suggests
that the Builders' Union was based most strongly in Lancashire
ettA4,
andLparts of the North-West.
It was in this area that the battle against the 'contract system'
was most advanced. In earlier years building work had been
organised by a customer requiring work ordering it directly
through small masters. Under the contract system a single
-contract was reached with a 'general contractor' who then either
employed tradesmen directly or through a form of sub-contract
to the working masters. This system was opposed by craftsmen
since it tended to undermine established rates of pay and con-
ditions which would have been observed by the small masters.
It was a problem which was general to the building trades and it
provided a reason for co-operation between trades since small
masters in all trades were subjected to the same general con-
tractor. It was in Lancashire that the major struggles against
the contract system were waged during the summer of 1833 and it
was the defeats there which prefaced the downfall of 'universal'
organisation soon after the creation of the OBU. (17) Other
cities had organised to the same end - Postgate suggests that
London and Birmingham apart from Manchester were the most impor-
tant centres of the OBU, but it is clear that there was consi-
derable regional variation and that support was centred on the
cities especially in the industrialising centres of North
Western England.
The OBU can most reasonably be described on the basis of existing
evidence as a loose federation of developing trade societies,
joining together in a common movement against the contracting
system.	 Far from being a 'great union , with a programme
which had 'many affinities with modern Sovietism', it was a body
which was constrained by the weakness and autonomy of its affilia-
ted trade societies.	 R. Postgate, who elaborated on the Webbs)
account of the 'Great Operative Builders Union' is obliged to
concede that it is improbable that the OBU preceded the forma-
tion of individual trade societies. And in two important
instances - the GUC&J and the OSM it is clear that a distinctive
national identity was retained despite the existence of the OBU
-(18).	 Postgate's assertion that
"Many relics of autonomy had been left to the various societies
that had made up the union, and we may presume that the effect • • .
was to remove these and to centralize these powers in the hands
of the Grand Committee." (19)
does not bear close examination.
	
'Exclusive' government was
never renounced by the affiliated trade societies and, following
Postgate's own account ) universal government' was not associated
with 'universal' arrangements for contributions and funding of
strikes.
The emphasis of the Webbs, and following them of Postgate on
the strength and unity of the OBU relates more to the problems
of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries than it
does to the question of trade union organisation in the 1830's.
The perspective of the Webbs was informed by opposition to the
sectionalism associated with the older trade societies. Their
objective was to highlight the alternative organisational
possibilities associated with the 'New Unionism', confronting
the craft conservatism of trade union leaders from the older
trade societies. In consequence of this approach they under-
lined in their History the novel unity of the Builders Union by
contrast with the craft sectionalism which dominated the British
trade union movement from the middle of the nineteenth century.
They refer to the OBU as a 'federal union' or a 'federal organi-
sation' but they stress the integration and the unity of these
years as a counter to the dominant influence of the craft leaders
in their own time. Their views were absorbed by Postgate who
identified the OBU as a forerunner of the syndicalist movement.
A precedent for the l one big union' of the syndicalist campaign
provided a useful fillip for the amalgamation movement. Postgate
real intention was revealed in the comment cited at the beginning
of this chapter. It was to highlight the value of complete unity,
by contrast with the newly established Federation of his own
period. A more accurate account of the limited nature of the
association of 1833 might have seemed to vindicate, rather than
to question the authority and value of the NFBTO. But evidence
runs counter to his assertion that officials might prefer the
unity of 1833 to the muddle of 1923.
	
The unity of 1923 allowed
a formal liaison between trades under the control of the leading
officials of the individual trade societies. There is little
justification for the claim that they wished to sacrifice this
for a more integrated and unified structure.
The accounts of the Webbs and of Postgate concerning the OBU
passed into the folklore of the building trade unions. The
existence of the OBU was frequently used as proof both of the
possibility and the potential of full amalgamation, by its
advocates.	 What had been done in the 1830's could be done
again on a permanent basis. Hilton's comment is just one example
of the way in which this account was given credence by later
writers.	 The OBU was evidence of a 'vision' which inspired
men on the sites - 'almost a mania to the exclusion of other
objectives.'	 It will be argued that the views which prevailed
within the AUBTW were far less certain than Hilton suggests by
this comment.	 But the intention at this stage is not to question
the validity of his claim. 	 It is cited here simply as evidence
of an ideological tradition within the left of the building trades
unions which has not to date been seriously questioned.
Implicit in Postgate's account of the OBU was the conflict
between the 'exclusives' and the 'syndicalist revolutionary'
-approach of universal government. 	 The 'exclusives' were the
forerunners of those leaders of the craft societies who opposed
the principles of industrial unionism.
"We will give them a new name, we will call them the Pukes -
it is a sickening idea - and will remind us that we are looking
upon something that is filthy." said the Pioneer (20).
It was the 'dead hand.' of the exclusives - and later of the
leaders of the craft societies-which held back the movement for
one big union. Fundamental to the campaign for an industrial
union in the years before 1914 was the notion that it would be
opposed by the vested interests, at the official level)within
the existing craft organisations. The movement for democracy
was allied with the movement for amalgamation in a critique of
officialdom which seemed to be fuily vindicated by the opposition
of leaders in all of the building trade unions with the exception
of the OBS to proposals for a broad amalgamation. Questions of
the internal government and control within existing unions were
related in this account to the problem of trade union structure.
The aim of this work is thrcefold. 	 Firstly it is intended to
explore the impact of an ideological tradition which stressed
the significance of the l one Big Union'. What implications
did it have for the building trades unions? The Webbs stated
that:
"Within the order of what is usually called a trade, there are
often smaller circles of specialised classes of workmen, each
sufficiently distinctive in character to claim separate consi-
deration. The first idea is always to cut the Gordian knot by
ignoring these differences and making the larger circle the unit
of government.	 So fascinating is this idea of 'amalgamation'
that it has been tried in almost every industry." (21)
Was the question of amalgamation broached because it was a
'fascinating idea'? Were amalgamations accepted because of
popular enthusiasm for the l one Big Union'? It will be argued
that the long-standing ideological tradition had little relevance
to negotiations concerning amalgamation.	 The One Big Union,
cited so often, was not the real aim of most of the participants
in discussions on amalgamation.
Secondly it is aimed to evaluate the significance of changes in
the labour process in building production for.the structure of
trade unions.
	 The labour process is construed not merely as
the physical activity of labour in relation to the means of
production. Rather it is considered within its specific social
form, that is as a capitalist process of production. As Marx
stated:
"In the labour process regarded also as a capitalist process of
production, the means of production utilize the worker, so that
work appears only as an instrument which enables a specific
quantum of value, i.e. a specific mass of objectified labour, to
suck in living labour in order to sustain an increase in itself."
(22)
In this context attention will be given to the process of capital
formation within an industry which remains notoriously 'under-
capitalised', where 'cash-flow' remains the bugbear of the small
employer. The impact of changes in the political sphere have
been of profound importance for an industry which has been used
so often as an 'economic regulator' to adjust the economy as a
whole. Shifts in government policy form a continuing theme
against which industrial developments are placed. Innovations
in the organisation and technology of building production are
drawn against this background. Changes as fundamental as the
ratification of payment by results within the national working
rule agreement in 1947 and the encouragement given to less official
arrangements for the engagement and payment of labour in subse-
quent years with the development of labour-only sub-contracting
are set in the broader context of political and industrial
changes affecting building production. A simple causal connec-
tion between the change in payment systems in the post-war years
and the deterioration of trade union organisation in this area
is not in itself a sufficient explanation for adjustments to
trade union structure. Labour-only sub-contracting must be
seen as part of a particular and deliberate policy pursued by
employers in the post-war years. It will be argued that it was
only one facet - indeed a very important one - in the policies
which were adopted. Other factors which must be taken into
account include the adjustments which were made to the physical
elements of the labour process, to the materials and the instru-
ments of labour. What effect did such changes have on the
organisation of labour within building production? How far
should adjustments to trade union structure be attributed to
changes within the labour process itself?
Finally it is planned to survey the relationship between trade
union government and structure. The problem is posed in the
first instance through the question of control of negotiation
and formulation of projects for structural change. Who is
primarily responsible for initiatives in this area? How are
decisions arrived at? And who benefits from them? Attention
will be given to the issue identified by the Webbs concerning
the relations between the central executive body and the local
unit of government in each society. (23)
	 As Les Wood, current:
GS of UCATT has put it, the question is one of 'Who leads the
union?' (24)
	 The response derives from the continued tension
between central authority and local autonomy. Questions of
finance have proved to be a critical indicator of the balance of
internal power.
	
It will be suggested that there is, in the long
term, a trend towards the concentration of power in the hands
of the general secretary of the major craft societies and
especially of the largest of them, the Amalgamated Society of
Woodworkers (ASW).	 This trend has been actively fostered by
successive leaders of that union and adjustments to union struc-
ture have been employed as a means of furthering the central
control of union organisation.
The work which follows takes the form of a historical account
spanning the years of the twentieth century. It is clearly
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impossible to give detailed attention to each of the many unions
which were based) or claimed membership pin the building industry.
And attention has been directed generally to the largest and
most important of the unions concerned. As a consequence of
this approach there has been little detailed attention to many
unions which played a distinctive part within the industry.
Concern is primarily with the ASW,the Amalgamated Union of
Building Trade Workers (AUBTW) and the Amalgamated Society of
Painters and Decorators (ASP&D) for whom unfortunately, no
-official history has been written. Reference will be made to
many other organisations some of them based almost solely on the
building industry, others recruiting within that area, but with
their roots in other sectors.
	 The Electrical Trades Union,
the Plumbing Trades Union, the Heating, Ventilating and Domestic
Engineers and others are outside of the scope of a discussion
concerned with structural change in the building trade unions.
And smaller societies which are more properly within the
boundaries of the building industry, the Plasterers, the Slaters
and Tilers, the Building and Monumental Workers Association
receive less attention than might be jastified if this project
were not concerned specifically with the question of trade
union structure. It should also be noted that it is the
societies with a craft tradition which have provided the focus
for this work. Unions of builders' labourers and two large
general unions, the T&GWU and the NUG&IDIU have played an impor-
tant part within building production, although their role has
been largest within that area which is now defined by the terms
of the Civil Engineering Agreement. These organisations are
discussed only insofar as they affect inter-union relations.
There is no intention here of assessing their contribution to
building trade unionism more generally.
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The historical account is broken into three distinct parts.
The first is concerned with the craft tradition and with the
organisation of craft based societies before the Great War.
1914 was a critical year for the building trades unions. It
was marked by one of the longest disputes to affect the building
trades unions during the twentieth century. It was marked by
the formation of a ! breakaway' union, the Building Workers
Industrial Union, which countered the craft base of trade union
organisation. And it was marked by the outbreak of the Great
War which had a profound impact on the labour movement generally
and on the building trade unions in particular. It was in 1914
that moves were first made towards a permanent liaison between
the building trade unions. And so it is that this year marks
a break in the narrative. The second part is concerned with
the federal organisation set up to co-ordinate the activities of
the individual unions. The National Federation of Building
Trades Operatives (NFBTO) dominated inter-union relations for
more than fifty years.	 Between 1920 and 1959 its existence
was almost unquestioned. Consolidated during the inter-war
years it played a key role in national negotiations. It was
recognised both by employers and government as the voice of the
building trade unions. And it was only with its decline
towards the end of that period that more far-reaching structural
changes became possible.	 The third part of this account is
concerned with the period 1960-71, during which time the question
of amalgamation was of increasing relevance. It was a period
characterised by declining trade union organisation and the
increased use of labour-only sub-contracting. It was a decade
of deepening crisis which ended with the formation of UCATT.
A rationalisation of union structure was eventually effected
in 1971.
Since the building trade unions recruited almost entirely
amongst men for most of this period, references to members
and officials of these unions assume the masculine gender.
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Pt.1.	 The Building Trade Unions Before 1914.
The period before 1914 is characterised by a fragmented union
organisation, with craft divided from craft, and district from
district in an industry which was noted for its local identity.
A recent study by Richard Price entitled Masters, Unions and
Men: work control in building and the rise of labour, 1830-1914
(CUP 1980) has stressed the significance of informal practices
and local work group authority for job control in the building
trades.
By 1914 it was clear that this local perspective was being by-
passed, both in the realm of tradeunion organisation and
collective bargaining.	 The outbreak of the Great War marked
a turning point.	 The focus, after that date shifts to national
issues and national organisation.
In this, the first part of the thesis, attention is directed to
the nature of union organisation during the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. Which were the major unions in building
production and how were they organised? What was the state of
the industry and how was it evolving? The study then points to
the existing relations between employers and unions as the local
basis of negotiations was modified by the establishment of
national conciliation machinery. Finally the question of trade
union government is raised, again with the objective of stressing
the high degree of local autonomy permitted within all of the
unions. Amalgamation discussions were already underway, and
this progress is traced, in the bricklayers: the carpenters'
and the painters' trade societies, before these negotiations
were superceded by initiatives in favour of 'One Big Union'.
-CHAPTER 1 
THE BUILDING- TRADE UNIONS BEFORE 1914
The Building trade unions before 1914
Introduction
Building trade workers in 1914 were organised into 72 unions,
both local and national (1). They ranged in size from the
Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners (ASC&J) a body
which claimed 69,036 members in 1914, to tiny trade societies
which recruited purely on a local basis. Many of these bodies
had their origins in the craft societies organised in the late
eighteenth, or early nineteenth century. Whether or not their
lineage can be traced directly back to the craft guilds of
earlier periods is a matter for debate, but it is certainly the
case that, by the 1830 1 s, there were many flourishing trade
societies which could thereafter claim an unbroken history (2).
These early unions, in building as in most other sectors of
production, were formed by artisans, engaged predominantly on
handicraft work (3). Each society was based on one trade or
group of related trades and members cultivated a pride in their
craft skills which encouraged the exclusivity of many of these
unions. Membership was a privilege which was confined to the
time—served craftsman or to workers who could claim a com-
parable level of skill.
The function of these early craft societies was twofold.
Firstly they were organised to defend the trade interests of
their members.
	 The tactic adopted was the control of the
supply of skilled labour. Provided that their skills were in
demand it was likely that craft workers would be able to
command high wages and reasonable working conditions. There
were three major features associated with the craft control of
labour supply, which were taken up by societies of stone-
masons, carpenters and joiners, bricklayers, painters and
others. Firstly the ratio of apprentices to fully trained
craftsmen was stricly controlled.	 Tasks which were
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designated as craft work were to be undertaken only by the
skilled worker, that is someone with an appropriate period of
training and experience. The demarcation of an area of craft
operations was vital to craft identity and control of entry
into the trade was designed to limit the employer's capacity
to draw on an alternative supply of skilled labour. Secondly
it was intended to control the number of hours for which an
operative might work. The normal working hours would be
decided within each locality and arrangements for overtime
-working were severely restricted.
	 Thirdly the control of
labour supply was effective only because Output too was con-
trolled. Fundamental to craft organisation was opposition to
payment by results. Payment was made, at least within the
respectable areas of the trade, in accordance with time worked,
rather than with output achieved. The principle was periodi-
cally subject to attack by the building employers and, as in
engineering, the method of payment often provided the battle-
ground over which the wider issues of industrial control were
fought. (4)
Secondly they undertook to provide friendly benefits, payments
for accident, sickness and old age, as well as insurance against
loss of tools and for funeral payments.
	 This reinforced con-
trol over the supply of labour insofar as it kept men off the
labour market who might otherwise accept work below the price
set by the union. Moreover it provided a measure of insurance
against the adverse circumstances which could wreck the lives
of even the most skilled of working men. Craftsmen who were
distinguished from the mass of workers by their high earnings
could afford to pay the high affiliation fees and the regular
contributions which were required of the trade unionist in
return for these benefits. They formed an elite which was
able, by virtue of its organisation into trade unions, to
expect its high and regular income to be maintained. Member-
ship was a privilege which was confined to the time-served
craftsman or to workers who could claim a comparable level of
skill. The right to friendly benefits both reflected and
reinforced the superior standing of the craft worker. (5)
Craft organisation was associated then with an elite of workers -
which was concerned to defend its privileged position and to
restrict access, both to jobs and to trade union membership.
If politically and socially it often represented a conservative
force, it was because the recognised abilities of this elite
gave it a standing which encouraged caution in respect of
changes and an allegiance to many aspects of the existing
pattern of social relations. (6)
Towards the end of the nineteenth century the supremacy of
the craftsman was challenged by the emergence of a 'new
unionise involving the unskilled or semi-skilled worker.
Labourers could not afford the high contributions required by
the craft societies and their less regular employment pre-
cluded the possibility of providing a wide range of benefits
if the new societies were to become viable. They subsisted
on lower contributions made for trade and funeral benefits
alone and relied on strike action to achieve their aims. Their
organisational style was more aggressive than their craft
predecessors, since their objects necessitated the extension
of trade unionism to as many workers as possible and their
political stance, like their industrial organisation, was
more radical. (7) Four major unions catering specifically
for navvies and builders' labourers had been established by
1914. (8)	 But the organisation of this category of workers,
with their fluctuating employment prospects was no easy task.
Workers were often obliged to move, not only from one employer
to another, but from one industry to another in order to main-
tain regular employment. Although the extent of such mobility
ought not to be exaggerated, for many men regarded themselves
specifically as builders' labourers rather than simply as
labourers, it was a tendency which boosted membership amongst
general unions which did not confine their recruitment to the
building world. By 1914 both the National Union of General
Workers and the Workers Union could claim a base in this area.
(9)
Within the two broad categories of trade unions in construction -
the craft and the non-craft, there was then a wide diversity
in the level and types of organisation which existed by the
beginning of the twentieth century. Even where national (and
even international)societies operated, there was still occasion
for conflict between two unions each organising the same class
of workers.
	 The ASC&J was subject to competition from its
parent organisation, the General Union of Carpenters and
Joiners (GUC&J), which numbered only 8,505 members in 1914.
There were two major societies of bricklayers, the Operative
Bricklayers Society (OBS), the larger of the two, claiming
26,363 members in 1914 compared with the 1,604 members of the
Manchester Unity Operative Bricklayers Society. And for
painters and decorators there were two major societies in
England & Wales until 1904, but neither of them could claim
to be national in scope. Although the Webbs, writing in 1897,
suggested that the proper unit of government for a trade
union should be the whole area of the British Isles, there
were, for the most part, separate national organisations for
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building trade workers in Scotland, and a variety of local
trade societies in Ireland, as elsewhere, complicating the
overall picture. (10) The Operative Builders Union of the 1830's
has been claimed as a model for a unified structure for all
of the building trades, but seventy years after it was devised,
the organisation of building workers was characterised by
diversity rather than by unity. (11)
The Building Industry pre 1914 
Building activity before the first world war was conducted by
a large number of firms each of which had very few workers.
The 1907 Census of Production does not provide details for the
building industry concerning the size of firms, according to
the number of employees, but it has been estimated that the
average labour farce for each firm was less than 12 men. (12)
Certainly it is the case that building work was on the whole
undertaken by small organisations, most of which were locally
based. Firms of medium size, employing around 200 men were
common in and around the bigger cities and in London a few
large organisations were already operating - for example
Holland, Hannen and Cubitts. But it was the small, often family
based firm which predominated, operating in the local situation
in relation to the opportunities provided by local enterprise.
In Manchester for example, the building industry must be
understood in relation to the textile industry, just as in
South Wales it was related to the coal trade. Various factors
operated at national level to affect the operations of building
all over the country. Fluctuations in the interest rate, or
the impact of war are perhaps the most obvious examples. But
in the last resort building responded to local conditions,
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and was carried out by firms which were for the most part
based in that locality. (13)
The structure and organisation of building work had been
modified during the last half of the nineteenth century as
the direct contacts between the customer and the master crafts-
man, common in earlier periods, had broken down. It was
replaced, in many areas, by an arrangement whereby a general
builder, often an estate developer co-ordinated the activities
of several tradesp . either through employing tradesmen direct,
or on a sub-contract basis, sometimes to specialist firms (14).
It followed from this system of contracting for work that
employment was predominantly casual as workers would be taken
on for a particular contract, with a likelihood of being laid
off when that project came to an end. The larger firms would
be more likely to retain a nucleus of regularly employed
operatives, and it seems probable that the more skilled the
worker, the greater his chances of continuous employment (15).
Employment was subject to seasonal interruption, ostensibly
because of the problems associated with winter weather. But
it has been argued that the winter decrease in activity was
due as much to economic calculations as to factors which were
strictly climatic. Winter work was more costly because it
was likely to be interrupted by bad weather, and daylight
working hours were shorter. Painters, bricklayers and carpen-
ters were affected by the prevalence of seasonal unemployment,
although it was the painters who suffered most (16). So the
building worker was subject to unemployment or underemployment,
both because of the system of contracting which situated a
worker only in accordance with the demand for his labour on a
particular job, and because of seasonal fluctuations in
building activity.
Building activity was affected by severe cyclical fluctuations,
marked by a longer periodicity than fluctuations in the
business cycle and this had a dramatic effect on the over-all
prospects of employment. Building booms overlapped with
upturns in the economy generally. Activity in building would
rise during the upswing and continue to expand even when the
- boom had broken in other sectors. When the boom finally broke,
the reaction was a strong one and slumps often persisted for
many years. (17) The effects were mediated by the variation
in local experience and it was possible for a town or region
to remain reasonably active, whilst other parts of the country
were experiencing a slump. Conversely there were some areas,
where there was little manufacturing industry and a low
demand for new housebuilding, where the 'boom , had only a
limited impact. The prospects of employment in another town
or another region only partly alleviated the severe effects
of the building cycle on the earnings and security of the
building operative.
If unemployment was a regular experience because of seasonal
fluctuations and the system of contracting, it was endemic
during the years of slump. The effects could be catastrophic.
They are vividly portrayed in Robert Tressall f sclassic account
of the Raged Trousered  Philanthropists (18). The painters,
who form the subject of the novel, are the trade most vul-
nerable to fluctuations in building activity. The hardship
and degradation of their lives are exposed and explained in a
volume which relies, in essence, on Tressall's personal
experience as a housepainter. The scene is set during the
winter months, in a coastal town in the South of England.
Far removed from the manufacturing centres of the country,
the building trades are reliant on housebuilding and repair
for their employment. This source of demand for their work
is unreliable; sweating is common and unemployment a constant
threat. Not surprisingly trade union organisation is scarcely
mentioned although Owen and his comrades struggle to put over
a socialist message. (19) Casual and seasonal fluctuations
in work, together with the vagaries of the political and
economic climate dominated the work experience of the building
trades operative, defining and limiting the prospect for
trade union organisation.
The 1890's saw an upswing in the building cycle from the slump
at the end of the previous decade. Activity was at its peak
in 1898 and housebuilding continued to boom until 1903. It
was in estate development that the demand for labour was
particularly high. Developers put up the capital for suburban
housebuilding in anticipation of rising demand and their
profits were made, as much from rising land values as from
the sale of houses. (20) Activity was at its height around
London, where the extension of the suburbs was associated with
the movement of families of modest means away from the inner
city areas. The upper classes had made this move in the
middle years of the nineteenth century and their example was
followed by the lower orders, with a pattern of outward
migration which provided new scope for housebuilders. (21)
The London suburbs spread rapidly during the 90's —
Walthamstow, Enfield, Edmonton, Tottenham, Willesden, Ealing,
Acton, Wimbledon & Croydon all grew by more than 30% (22).
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Cheaper transport costs encouraged a trend which enabled
skilled artisans as well as the middle classes to move to the
outskirts of the city. Workmen's trains were run from the
1890's and to the East and South of the city speculators looked
to the production of housing which was cheap enough to be
taken up by the respectable working class, even when new (23).
The scale of operations associated with estate development and
the type of housing which was required pointed the way for
economies of scale through standardisation of certain features
of these houses. Custom-designed houses were possible only
for the rich. For the estate developer concerned with hous-
ing for families of middling income standardisation was a
necessity.	 This is not to suggest that the traditional
handicraft basis of housebuilding was eliminated. Rather it
is to point to the impact of repeating the design and many
features as a means of reducing costs. As a contemporary
noted:
"Multiplication of the same pattern is to the builder of
suburban houses what it is to the manufacturer. They can be
built cheapter and quicker of the same plans and templates,
window frames and sashes, the same stone dressings, the same
fastenings and iron-mongery are used, than if each of these
things undergoes modification to suit individual taste
The builder knows exactly the width and number of bricks and
closers required for each pier; he can tell the number of
bricks required for each house; he can order ornamental
stringcourses and cornices wholesale, as he can his iron
guttering and his railings... All this multiplication of
the same detail and fittings enables a considerable reduction
to be made in the cost of erecting a few hundreds of
houses." (24)
The boom of the 90's was followed by a severe slump during
the first decade of the 20th century. There was a decline
in building around London after 1903 which was associated with
rising site values in the city centre and delays in the provi-
sion of adequate suburban transport facilities. (25)
Unemployment rose as building activities were curtailed.
- Matters were worsened by innovations in materials which under-
mined the value placed on some traditional craft skills. The
introduction of the fully load-bearing steel frame and the
use of reinforced concrete were probably the most notable.
Steel framed buildings were put up in the USA as early as
1883, but it was not until 1904 that the first British example,
the Ritz Hotel, was erected. (26)	 Concrete had been used in
foundation works from the early 19th century, but it was not
until the invention of reinforced concrete that it could be
applied to whole structures. Buildings of concrete became
more common in Britain from the beginning of the century and
although it was not much used for housing, it replaced masonry,
and to a certain extent brickwork, on many large buildings. (27)
Its use on floors and roofing meant that carpenterspas well as
bricklayers and masons, were adversely affected by the cut in
employment prospects. But it was the last two groups who
suffered most, for both the steel frame and the introduction
of reinforced concrete tended to lower the demand for their
skills. (28)
	 The other major innovation during this period
concerned the introduction of woodcutting machinery which had
an impact on the demand for carpenters and joiners. By 1906
it was argued that: "These machine joinery workers are now
established in almost every district... With trade drifting
in this direction, and the substitution of iron and concrete
and other materials in place of wood in the construction of
buildings accounts to a large extent for the number of
unemployed." (29)
These changes were no doubt important ones for the men who
were displaced by new materials and machines. They often
struck contemporaries as typical of mass production methods
and yet it must be recognised that at no time were the effects
as far reaching as the innovations which were made at about
the same time in engineering production. The technical
revolution in that area which had begun as early as the 1880's
Involved larger units of production with increased speciali-
sation, the application of machine tools and the emergence of
mass production. It enabled employers to dispense with
tradesmen who previously had been highly valued for their
manual dexterity, and to replace them with semi-skilled assem-
blers. (30)
	 It had widespread implications for engineering
production, but it was not paralleled in building where
changes were more limited. Whilst 'skill-displacing techno-
logical change was an important source of grievance for some
workers' (31), this was by no means generally the case. New
materials and methods were most commonly used on large public







application was less common in the housebuilding
Only the larger firms would be likely to take up
materials and methods in building, and given the
of the small firm, which has already been shown,
that large numbers of building workers would not
although of course competition for work, already
result of the slump, was intensified.
Manufacturing industry had developed in conjunction with the
investment of the social overhead capital essential to its
operation. Canals, railways, bridges and embankments, roads,
footpaths, harbours and docks all provided employment for
some of the operatives who might otherwise have sought work
in building itself. Whilst these large—scale projects made
less call on the skilled operative than they did on the labour
of the navvy, they relied in some measure on the skills of the
traditional building trades. As the population was concen-
-trated in towns, so attention was turned to questions of public
health and safety. The construction of sewers and sewage
disposal work,	 surface drains, waterworks, reservoirs, wells,
aquaducts and conduits was followed by the application of
power supplies, gas and electricity, further extending the
scope for the employment of the building and contracting
trades. (33) Whilst the value of output, in construction
work other than building was lower, at the time of the 1907
Census of Production, than the value of output in building
itself, it represented a significant proportion of the whole,
both in terms of the proportion of total value, and because of
the scale and innovation suggested by some construction work.
(34) Some firms, which previously had confined their activities
to building work, turned their attention to the possibilities
opened up by the new types of construction. The Cumbrian firm
of John Laing's, who were masons, father to son from the 18th
century, broadened the scope of their operations in response to
the opportunities in this field. Their first major contract,
outside of their traditional area, was for the erection of
the central electric lighting station in Carlisle in 1898;
said to be the first electricity power station in the North
West of England (35). From this they ventured into other
related contracts, for a reservoir and for sewerage works.
Alongside the traditional forms of production for building,
there was developing a type of production which was generally
large-scale, and which attracted mostly the bigger firms
which were operating on building work. But the new construc-
tion played a lesser part for the building trades than might
be suggested by its value, since it recruited its workers
primarily from the ranks of the navvies and labourers, some
of whom would be drawn from outside of the industry altogether.
And in building work itself, it was the traditional forms of
manufacture which predominated, despite the innovations in
respect of the mass production of some features. Unlike
engineering, it cannot be claimed that building production
was revolutionised in these years although some processes were
standardised and larger scale works undertaken, in response to
the new opportunities available.
Building activity picked up again after the slump, and in the
years immediately preceding the outbreak of war employment
prospects brightened. Only for masons, who relied more than
the other trades on the large-scale building projects, was
there a dramatic decline in employment opportunities, and
this grade of craftsmen, formerly the elite of the building
world, found their status and their bargaining position sadly
eroded.
Collective Bargaining before 1914
Relations between employers and unions were rooted in local
conditions before 1914. More than most other industrial
activities building was part of a local labour market which
varied in accordance with geological, economic and social
factors and it is not therefore surprising that there was a
considerable difference, not only in the standard of wages
and conditions, but also in the way in which these factors
were regulated. The importance of local conditions was
emphasised within the Report of the Inquiry by the Board of
Trade into the earnings and hours of labour of workpeople in
the UK in 1906 (36).
	 The average earnings of men working
full-time were highest in London, it was suggested, higher
in the North of England than in the Midlands, and higher in
both these districts than in the rest of England and Wales.
They were generally higher in Scotland than in England, with
the exception of London and were lowest in Ireland. Rates of
wages were in general higher, and hours shorter in the larger
towns and cities than in the smaller towns and country districts.
Weekly hours of labour varied too, from an average of about
51 hours in London, the North of England and Scotland to
averages of 55-56 hours in the Midlands and other parts of
England and Wales. (37) In many areas collective agreements
were reached between representatives of the employers and
the operatives and by 1899 there were nearly 500 such agree-
ments covering 260 different localities (38). Whilst the
craft controls built up in earlier decades were not abandoned,
the trend was towards the joint regulation of wages and
conditions on a local or a district basis.
The local basis of negotiations lent a particular importance
to the question of local trade union organisation. It was
the local branch or Management Committee (where there was
more than one branch) which was responsible for the establish-
ment with the employers of a common working rule agreement to
cover the locality or district. Within the OBS it was
stipulated that where there was more than one trade working
under the same code of working rules, there should be a
central committee of up to 7 members to deal with all trade
matters (39). Similar provision was made in the GUC&J where
a district committee might be formed to consider trade matters
generally and 'where advisable to take joint action with
kindred societies on matters of dispute' (40) Within the
Amalg. Soc. of House Decorators and Painters it was the
District Trade Management Committee which had the power to
regulate the rates of wages, hours of labour, overtime and
-general conditions affecting their members (41), although
they had no authority in respect of ordinary branch business.
And in the ASC&J there was a similar rule to permit the for-
mation of a Managing Committee for the purpose of conducting
negotiations and implementing local working rules (42). The
ASC&J rulebook also specified the arrangements which were to
govern relations between two societies of carpenters and
joiners both operating in the district, allowing the forma-
tion of a United Trades Committee. When the question of a
standard rate of wages for carpenters and joiners of 7id an
hour was proposed in Norwich in 1899, it was the Management
Committee who led the discussions with employers, and who
initiated action on the question. It was the District or
Management Committee which was central to the settlement and
observation of the working rule agreement on behalf of the
individual unions.
The employers' organisation, the National Association of
Master Builders was founded in 1878 on the basis of affilia-
tions from local associations, especially in the North and
the Midlands.	 Its functions were defined both as a means
of securing unity and mutual support against combinations of
building operatives and as a means of regulating contracts
between builders and their customers. During the early
1890's the Association was faced with a growing militancy on
the part of some workers, especially in the London region,
where the increased demand for building labour associated with
suburban development combined with a more widespread unrest
amongst London workers to boost trade union organisation. (43)
Building operatives in London had suffered in the preceding
period, from the fact that public works were often allocated
to "underpaid firms". Building trade unions in the metropolis
had not previously been strong, but moves to extend organisa-
tion during 1890-91 were combined with representation over
unfair wages, piece rates and sub-contracting. (44) The
increased travelling time associated with London's suburban
development often meant that, in practice, the working day
was lengthened, and at a time when the question of the eight
hour day was receiving wide acclaim within the labour move-
ment a reduction in the length of the working day was a high
priority for building workers (45). It was the carpenters
and joiners who were at the forefront of this move to improve
conditions. A United Trades Committee was formed in London,
bringing together the Amalgamated Society, and the General
Union and smaller societies, and notice was submitted to the
employers of a demand for 10d per hour and a 47 hour week, to
come into effect in May 1891.
	 The employers failed to respond
to this demand and consequently the men struck work on three
large firms from that date. The employers retaliated with a
lock-out affecting around 80 firms, and over 3,000 men. (46)
The dispute had clear implications for other trades in London,
in that a defeat for the carpenters would weaken a move for
improvements in the conditions of other workers and financial
support was proferred as a means of strengthening the stand
which had been made. (47) The dispute was a long and bitter
one and every effort was made by the employers to intimidate
the strikers. Attempts were made to bring in blacklegs, from
overseas as well as from the provinces. Large numbers of
police confronted pickets and men were encouraged to pledge
themselves not to join a trade union (48). After twenty six
weeks the matter was referred to the Royal Institute of
British Architects for arbitration. The Master Builders
argued from the outset that whatever decision was reached in
-regard to the carpenters and joiners should also be applicable
to the other trades, so that the dispute should not be revived
during the following year, since it was known that the other
trades were planning to submit demands similar to those cur-
rently under consideration. (49) The award, which was
announced on Nov 19 1891 conceded the claim for a reduction
in working hours in view of the 'abnormal size' of London
and the great distances which workmen were obliged to travel.
The working week was reduced to 51- hours for 36 weeks in
summer and to 47 for 16 weeks in the winter, an average of
50 hours per week.
But on wages there was no concession, with the standard rate
of wages maintained at 9d per hour, with a provision for
higher rates for overtime where this was worked at the request
of the employers. (50) The award met with dispproval from
the London Building Trades, especially in view of the satis-
factory state of trade which prevailed. Demands for a building
trade federation were a direct outcome of the experience of
of the strike and disillusionment with the award of the
arbitrator. An improved organisation was necessary, it was
. argued, in order to obtain more reasonable terms at an early
date, and the London Building Trades Federation was brought
into being in 1892 for this purpose. (51) Communication
between the London building trades had previously been main-
tained by a Building Trades Committee, but the LBTF was
established with the more ambitious object of securing 'unity
of action amongst the various organisations connected with
the building trade and to raise funds which shall be available..
to assist any trade connected with the Federation.' (52)
This new militancy was matched by an extension of trade
union organisation in building during the 1890's. Member-
ship of the major trade societies grew significantly during
this decade and far from being 'years of silence and mental
stagnation' as represented in Postgate's gloomy account, they
were years of steady expansion which laid the basis for sub-
sequent discussions on structural change. (53) Just as the
trade union movement more generally found a new base within
parts of London where organisation had previously been limited,
so the building trades unions consolidated their hold in the
capital. The GUC&J, which was centred on the North and
North West of England made rapid gains in the South, and
especially in London, from 1889. Recruiting took place in
the developing suburbs, with branches established in such
areas as Hackney, Hoxton, Islington, Hammersmith and West
Ham, as well as in the city and central areas. Branches of
the OBS were opened in Brixton (1890), Edmonton (1889),
Enfield (1890), Hornsey (1890), Kilburn (1890), Kingston
(1891), Lewisham (1891), Norwood (1891), Stoke Newington
(1891), Woodford (1890), Walthamstow (1890)and many areas
outside of London (54). The number of branches in the
Amalg. Soc. of House Decorators and Painters, whose
membership was located predominantly in the South, increased
from 24 in 1889 to 41 in 1890 and 86 by 1893 (55). The
leadership of the craft societies may have suffered from
the conservatism which Postgate has depicted, but at the
grass-roots they were informed by a buoyancy which inspired
a reappraisal by the employers of their own aims and methods.
The London lock-out of carpenters and joiners in 1891 was
followed just a year later by another campaign for improved
wages and conditions by the other building crafts, which
- lead to an increase of id an hour and a further reduction in
hours (56). But the working rule agreement which was signed
at this time was subjected to discussions in the middle of
the decade when a temporary recession in trade encouraged
attempts by the employers to introduce a 'disability clause',
stating that no workman should be placed under a disability
by reason of being or not being a member of a trade society,
and that no objection should be raised to sub-contracting
work, provided that other rules were observed. (57) The
situation was complicated by a breakdown in the unity which
had been maintained previously by the trades affiliated to
the IBTF. The bricklayers broke off from other trades and
accepted the disability clause, together with a id an hour
increase, whilst the ASC&J called for strike action, and
the GUC&J for a ballot of the membership (58).
From the ensuing disunity on the trade union side emerged the
basis for a new form of relationship with the employers.
Whereas they had previously insisted on receiving represen-
tatives of the non-society men, as well as of trade unionists,
within deputations, in 1896 they accepted for the first time
the rights of trade union officials to represent their
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members and to negotiate on their behalf (59). Procedure
was established which allowed for the reference of issues
concerning objections to the employment of particular work-
men to a Board of Conciliation and it was announced that
'the Master Builders Association, in London, will not in
future look upon the Officials of our Organisations as fire-
brands or promoters of strikes etc., and that they will not
have cause to regret the new departure they have made in
dealing exclusively with the Representatives of Societies.'
(60)
It was not for another decade that procedure was to be clearly
set out for the resolution of disputes which involved nego-
tiation up to and including the national level. Craft controls
continued to be a matter of local concern, as employers and
operatives battled over the admission of apprentices and
learners at a time when booming conditions stimulated the
demand for labour. When in 1898 the National Association
of Master Builders circularised its members to ascertain the
extent of such controls, it became evident that the majority
of respondents had experience of such restrictions operating
in their locality, and in some cases these were confirmed
through the working rule agreement (61). A counter-attack
by the employers on the gains made by labour was apparent by
the end of the 1890 1 s, both in the industrial and in the
juridical field (62).
Building employers were prominent in the legal cases pursued
during that decade, for the law seemed to offer a method
of limiting the extension of trade union strength, by
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restricting the controls which the craft societies applied.
(63) In the case of Temperton v. Russell for example a civil
action for damages was taken against a committee of trade unions
In Hull by a supplier, Temperton, who had refused to .comply
with the union request to cease supplying an employer with whom
they were in dispute. The Court of Appeal found in favour of
Temperton and against the unions who were held liable for
damages. And in 1895, in the case of Trollope v. the London
Building Trades Federation the publication of 'black lists ? of
non-union firms was held to be actionable. Judicial hostility
to picketing was apparent in a number of cases which were
heard in the same period. The case of Charnock v. Court was
one which involved building trades operatives. A firm of
master joiners in Halifax had brought over some Irish men
during a strike to blackleg. They were approached by the
strikers with a request that they should not do so, and for
this action the strikers were found guilty of watching and
besetting. (64)
The stage was set for an industrial counter-attack by the
employers which culminated in the defeat of the ASE in the
engineering lock-out of 1897. Amongst the building employers
it was the National Association of Plasterers which was
singled out for attention. From the late 1890 1 s there was
a growing concern by the employers with what was regarded as
the increasing arrogance of union representatives. A system
of regional organisation was developing, following the
foundation of the Lancashire Fed. of Building Trades Employers
in 1894 (65). When the conflict with the National Association
of Plasterers broke in London in 1898 the new regional fede-
rations of employers supported the London employers, demanding
the end of restrictive practices including an end to the
limitation of apprentices. It was the EC of the ASC&J which
moved to bring all of the trades together in response to the
crisis facing the plasterers and 'to the great astonishment
of all concerned, all the unions except the Stonemasons were
represented, constituting a gathering such as had not been
seen in the memory of living man' (66). Although there was a
lack of unanimity on the tactics to be adopted in the face of
the employers' aggression, the united front was maintained and
a rare occurrence, the trades were jointly represented at
national level in meetings with the employers. Mr. Matkin of
the GUC&J, Mr. Wilson of the ABC&J and John Batchelor of the
OBS were elected as representatives of the operatives and were
instructed to put the case for Boards of Conciliation as a
means of resolving disputes (67). The central control of the
EC of each society over the actions and commitments of its own
members had always been qualified by the fact that a dispute
In any related trade might involve their own members, through
the extension of that dispute across trades. This could
happen in a number of ways. Firstly it was possible that joint
action might be agreed by the trades at local level; secondly
it was likely that action by one trade would disrupt production
and cause lay-offs in another. Finally the employers might
agree to escalate a dispute across trade boundaries. One
section of the industry had the power, at least potentially, to
disrupt the work of others, and it was this power which con-
cerned the leaders of the craft societies. They had no desire
to take on the conflicts of other sections of building trades
operatives, especially where these were heightened as the
result of a forceful intervention by one particular general
secretary, as seems to have been the case in the plasterers'
dispute (68). This was particularly true of the ASC&J, the
most powerful of the craft societies, and the natural pro-
tector for any small trade organisation in building which
might be involved in a dispute. It was in the interests of
the leaders of all the trades, but especially the ASC&J, to
establish a procedure which exempted them from involvement in
the disputes of their craft brothers whilst ensuring that they
did not suffer too much as a result. It was for this reason
that their response, in the plasterers' dispute, was to advo-
_cate the establishment of Conciliation Boards as a means of
processing grievances. The proposal did not meet with the
employers' approval, since it failed to provide them with a
monetary guarantee against a breach of procedure by trade
union members. But if the national conciliation procedure
was not pursued, neither was the national lock-out which had
been threatened. Craft controls remained a central concern
for both employers and operatives, pending the formulation
of a new structure regulating their relations.
By 1901 the employers' organisation was reconstituted to take
account of proposals for organisation across trade lines. A
new scheme was formally accepted in that year and the name
of the association was changed to the National Federation of
Building Trades Employers. By dropping the words 'Master
Builder' from its title, the rights of the associated building
trades to be included in the membership of the Federation
were tacitly recognised. Representatives from employers'
organisations in plastering, plumbing and slating and tiling
were included in regional and local Federations, and the
Master Painters too expressed an interest in affiliation.
These bodies were to retain their independence on matters
which affected them alone, but drew on the Federation for
issues which were of wider concern. The new organisation was
broader in scope and larger in membership than its predecessor.
It provided the basis for new initiatives on the regulation of
relations between employers and operatives at a time when the
capacity of the unions to defend their members was seriously
eroded. (69)
The decade 1901-1910 was one of high unemployment and chronic
insecurity for the building operative. As the building boom
broke, so did opportunities for employment. The percentage
of carpenters and plumbers who were unemployed rose steadily
from 1.8% in July 1900 for both trades to 6.5% and 10.1%
respectively in July 1905, falling to 5.0% and 8.8% in July
1907 but rising thereafter to reach 10.0% and 14.6% in the
same month in 1909. (70) Membership of all of the unions was
cut back by this trend, with the figure for the ASC&J declining
from 61,222 in 1901 to 43,347 in 1910 and for the Plumbing
Trades Union from 11,089 to 10,870 over the same period. (71)
Postgate asserts that the period was one of declining wages
and longer hours imposed by the employers, but this view has
been questioned by Clegg who argues that wage reductions
affected no more than 1% of the labour force in any one year
and that worse conditions had not been accepted by the
unions. (72)
The employers, he argued, did not attempt to take advantage of
the insecurity of the operatives by undermining wages and
conditions. Their genuine desire for peace led to initiatives
which resulted in the establishment of conciliation machinery
for the industry in 1905. Clegg's account seems to be based
essentially on data for the earlier part of the decade. The
Report of Changes in rates of wages and hours of labour in
1908 (73) suggests that there were net increases in wages
during the period 1899 - 1903, but that during the years
1904-6 the changes resulted in net decreases. During 1908
there was again a net advance, but the total number of workers
whose wages were changed represented only 1% of all building
trades operatives. During 1909 there was again an over-all
decrease, but during 1910 wage rates increased slightly,
although the increases affected only 0.5% of the total number
of building operatives employed (74).
Three factors must be taken into account in an estimate of the
conflicting views expressed on the situation of building
operatives during the first decade of the century. Firstly it
should be recognised that official estimates deal on the whole
with wage rates rather than with earnings. No estimate is
made of the effects on earnings of unemployment and under-
employment which was a serious problem during this decade.
It has been noted that the casual nature of employment in
building production makes it difficult to estimate annual
earnings (75) and although allowance is made for seasonal
variations in hours worked in the 1906 Wages Survey, estimates
of earnings are based in all cases on the number of hours
constituting a full working week, and do not therefore repre-
sent a close approximation to actual earnings. Secondly it
seems likely that overtime, although officially discouraged
by the unions, represented a component of earnings for many
workers and one which would be less reliable in a period
of depression. Finally, account must be taken of the
regional variation in experience which was characteristic of
the building trades. In 1908 for example, when a net increase
in wage rates was reported over-all affecting 1% of all
operatives, over half those receiving the increase were located
in the Liverpool and Birkenhead District and all of the remainder
were situated in the North or North-West of England. And in
1910 the only improvement to wages and conditions outside of
this area took place in Swansea (76). In view of the decline
in building activity already noted in London it is not surpris-
ing if Postgate's assessment of the trend during this decade
could be upheld for the London area and the South-East, where
it seems that wages remained stagnant during a period of rising
prices. And by contrast a more buoyant situation seems apparent
in the North, especially in Lancashire and Cheshire, where real
improvements were won.
This variation in the regional situation throws an interesting
light on the formation of the conciliation machinery over the
period 1904-5. Interestingly it was the Lancashire and
Cheshire Federation, cited by Clegg as the group of employers
most determined to show a 'united nation-wide front to the
(trade) societies' (77) who pioneered the procedures for the
Conciliation Boards (78). An interest in conciliation had been
apparent in other industries in earlier years, where employers
were faced with a strong and effective trade union organisation
which could expect to make gains through industrial action.
In this context employers were motivated to establish proce-
dures which minimised disruptive actions and processed union
claims in a context where employer influence could be brought
to bear on union leaders for moderation. In the building trades
it seems, the same processes were at work. The Lancashire and
Cheshire Conciliation Board was formed early in the century
and laid the basis for conciliation machinery for the whole of
the Northern Counties. Following their example, similar
Conciliation Boards were set up for other regions. 	 The
machinery laid down that disputes were to be handled in the
first instance by local joint standing committees of the craft
concerned. At the next stage they moved to a local joint
board of all the crafts and, if unresolved at this level they
were referred to a Regional Conciliation Board, and finally to
a National Conciliation Board (79). At every stage, local,
regional and national, employers and operatives were repre-
sented in equal numbers, and it is not then surprising that on
issues involving a major conflict of interests, resolution of
a problem was unlikely. The building trades, more than many
other areas of employment, relied on the immediacy of their
action when striking as a means of bringing pressure to
bear on the employers. Trade movements were timed to come into
effect in the Spring, when a seasonal upturn in activity could
be expected and the impact of any action would be at its greatest.
The effects of conciliation machinery were to delay consideration
of issues, postponing decisions sometimes until after the moment
when industrial action could be most effective.
Conciliation Boards were brought into being for the whole of
England & Wales with the exception of London, which had its
own scheme. Not all of the trades were included in the main
scheme, for the Plasterers, Plumbers and Painters made separate
agreements with their own master craftsmen, whilst the National
Conciliation Board did not embrace the labourers. Whilst the
Conciliation Boards tended to operate to the advantage of the
employers, there were clear advantages for the trade union
leaders. Firstly participation in conciliation confirmed
their, sometimes dubious position as representatives of the
operatives, in a role which was recognised by the employers.
Secondly, the scheme reduced the possibility of strikes at a
time when union finances had been seriously eroded by a decline
in membership. Demarcation disputes, which had been a regular
feature of the previous decade, could now, very often, be
resolved through the Conciliation Boards, whilst it seemed that
the bitter conflict which had been expected could now be avoided.
Insofar as union members had an obligation to refer issues in
dispute through the conciliation machinery the control of union
leaders over their own members was heightened, since even where
the sanction of a union EC was not essential prior to industrial
action being taken, observation of established conciliation
procedures was now expected. But if the scheme was acceptable
to many trade union leaders, it was by no means uniformly
approved by the members. Opposition to the Conciliation Boards
was not pronounced at the time when they were established (80)
but it seems to have escalated during the years preceding the
outbreak of the Great War, perhaps because experience of the
scheme had taught workers that it did not operate in their
interests, but perhaps too because the improved situation of
labour as unemployment declined after 1911 encouraged the
belief that the established framework posed too many constraints
on the possibility of improvement in the operatives , conditions
of employment.
The effects of conciliation, insofar as trade union organisation
was concerned, was to encourage inter-craft contacts at every
level of union activities. Building unions were already drawn
together in some localities by Federations which provided a
medium for participation in joint organisation and action in a
particular town or city. The establishment of Conciliation
Boards necessitated the consolidation of these inter-union
links, since representatives of the various crafts were now
drawn together as the trade union side of the Conciliation
Board, at regional and national, as well as at local level.
Secondly the Conciliation Machinery set out for the first time
a procedure for contacts between employers and unions at
national level. In doing so it broke with past practices
which centred on the locality and where, only through extra-
ordinary measures, could representatives from the national level
on either side come directly into contact with one another.
Trade union government in the building craft societies,
pre-1914
The building craft unions, prior to 1914, had not moved on
significantly from the stage of development described by the
Webbs as 'primitive democracy'. (81) Members, being qualified
craftsmen or at least capable of commanding the wage rate paid
to craftsmen were recruited to the local branch or lodge which
formed the basic unit of organisation in each town or locality.
It was there that contributions were paid, and each branch was
responsible for distributing and accounting for the benefits
which were paid out. Lodges had a considerable measure of
autonomy in the conduct of local trade affairs and were
entitled to maintain funds of their own in most cases. (82)
Where there were two or more branches in a district a Manage-
ment Committee might be formed for the purpose of conducting
and carrying out local rules (see above). And where there was
more than one society recruiting in the same trade, a United
Trades Committee could be formed, including representatives
of the different societies to deal with the management of
trade affairs.
Policy making was the prerogative of a general or aggregate
meeting — the General Council in the case of the ASC&J, the
GUC&J and the NAS of H&SP&D (83) and the Annual Moveable
General Council in the case of the OBS (84). The General Coun-
cil would meet every year or every other year, and was
empowered to consider the rules of its society, and to give
decisions on issues which may have been referred to them by
their Executive Council or on other issues affecting the working
of their society on which the rules Were not explicit. Its
representation was generally organised according to district
or region, and in the case of the ASC&J, which had members
overseas, places were reserved for members from the USA, from
Canada, Australasia and South Africa. (85) The ultimate power was
accorded to the General Council to suspend the EC from office
and to arrange for government of the society on an interim
basis in the event of unsatisfactory behaviour by the EC. In
between meetings of the General Council policy questions might
be submitted to the members of the societies for decision by a
ballot vote, taken within the branches.
General control of the societies would be vested with the EC in
each case, although the powers and responsibilities of the EC
varied from one organisation to another. In the ASCU' the EC
were empowered to transact the ordinary business of the society,
but not to alter its rules. They were under the control of the
GC and on a request from that body they were to hand over books
and money which was within their control. They could grant
payment of benefits and trade privileges, but they could not
take part in conferences with the employers without first
Informing and consulting the members who were responsible for
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the observation of district rules. (86) In other societies
the responsibilities of the EC were defined primarily in
administrative terms, with reference to office arrangements,
to contact with other societies and to the interpretation,
although not the alteration of rules. The Webbs, writing in
1897 noted the conflict which prevailed between the centrali-
sation of finance (in accordance with the 'amalgamated' principles
which had governed the formation of the ASC&J in 1860, following
the example of the ASE) and the surviving local autonomy of
the branches. Within the ASC&J, which was more centralised than
the other societies, branches required the sanction of the EC
before strike action might be taken and trade privileges accor-
ded. But in other societies the rules were less clear. In the
OBS the right to strike without the prior sanction of the EC
depended on whether the strike was in defence of existing con-
ditions - where strike action might legitimately be taken -
or as part of a forward movement on wages and conditions, when
the sanction of the EC would be required. (87) But the EC had
the power to visit a district where strike action was pending,
to make suggestions regarding the dispute. They had the power
to arrange for delegations to visit to regulate and direct such
strikes and:
"The EC shall have power at any time to settle any strike in
any way it thinks fit after a conference with the branch or
branches affected, and shall have power to order any branch
secretary or treasurer to cease payment of turn-out benefit to
any member or members..." (88)
The authority of the EC was considerable.
Different arrangements prevailed within the OSM where the
rules derived from an earlier and less centralised administrative
structure. In this case major issues of any kind, including
the right to pursue disputes with employers, were subject to
a ballot vote of all the membership, rather than being submitted
to the authority of the EC for decision. And although the EC
did have the power to investigate disputes which were in pro-
gress, the authority for ending them rested with the GC (89).
But in the NASOH&SP&D arrangements followed the pattern estab-
lished by the ASC&J. Hence the EC was responsible — for the
interpretation of the rules t under the authority of the GC.
They controlled the union's funds and had the power to initiate
legal proceedings on behalf of the society as well as to grant
benefits and payments for trade privileges (90). The trend was
towards the centralisation of power in the hands of the Executive
in most cases, especially in respect of the authority to initiate
and to close trade disputes.
The building trades societies had by no means abandoned the
rotating general office which was characteristic of 'primitive
democracy'. It is true that the ASC&J, like the ASE had fixed
the location of its central office building (91), but its
example had not been followed by others of the craft societies,
where the practice was retained of moving the seat of government
• to the area where membership of that society was at its highest.
Not un—naturally this led to altercations about the level and
density of membership in particular regions, the more acute
because members in the area around the general office generally
held the privilege of nominating or electing the Executive
Council for the whole society. The EC of the GUC&J, which con-
sisted of five members (excluding the President) was elected by
lodges situated within a 20 mile—radius from the centre of the
town in which the general office was situated (92). The seven
member EC of the NASOH&SP&D was elected by the members of the
society from candidates nominated by branches within a 50 mile
radius of the general office.
And even in the ASC&J, with its headquarters fixed in Manchester
the seven man EC was nominated from and elected by branches
within a 50 mile radius of the general office. (93)
None of the building unions had adopted the 'administrative
efficiency' advocated by the Webbs, With the appointment of
chief officers and key officials. In each case the General
Secretary and the Assistant General Secretary or the General
President were subject to election and regular re-election by
the whole of the society. The incumbent, in this situation
took up full-time office in the service of his society, and as
one of the only full-time officials he would be in a position
of considerable influence and power. It is not surprising that
Postgate, in writing his classic Builders History devoted so
much attention to the men who held office as general secretary
in the various organisations. Their commitment to their work
and their outlook, as well as their capacity to adapt to office
routine were influential factors for the policies, as well as
the administrative practices of different periods. Men such
as Robert Applegarth and Edwin Coulson, or John Batchelor and
George Hicks at a later date, seemed to personify the organi-
sational developments of their own period in office. And
although it might be argued that Postgate exaggerated the impor-
tance of these leaders at particular moments (94), it is none-
theless reasonable to maintain that the general secretary of
each union, one of the few full-time employees at central level,
wielded considerable power within his own organisation. In
no case within the building unions before 1914 was there an
Executive Council which was paid by the union on a full-time
basis. Union Executives were elected from a relatively email
district precisely because of the problem of maintaining a
regular contact, but even so they met only intermittently -
perhaps monthly - and they could not hope to retain day to day
control over affairs at their own general office.
Whilst full-time officers were elected within the building unions
from the 1890 1 s, they were few in number at national level.
The ASC&J had six national full-time officials by 1895, the
GUC&J had only one, who had been in office since 1892. The
OBS had only two national organisers by 1914 and their functions,
judging by their reports, seem to have been more concerned with
the detail of organising in areas where the society was weak,
than with organising the society's affairs at national level.
(95)	 The casual basis of employment and the geographical
mobility of building labour meant that the recruitment and
retention of trade union members was a difficult task, and one
which could not easily be tackled in the absence of organisers
who were paid for that purpose. In the better organised
localities where funds could be sustained for the purpose a
'walking delegate' might be retained as a local organiser,
responsible for boosting membership, especially on new sites.
Even the local trade societies might have a walking delegate
as is shown by the closure of the 'Mersey Society' of Ship
Joiners, a body which claimed some 200 members in 1900. The
ASC&J and the GUC&J were in competition for the membership of
the 'Mersey Society , but the ASC&J 'adept in the art of
trickery' took over their walking delegate as a means to re-
cruiting their members. (96) The walking delegate was then an
important figure in the better organised areas, particularly
where within one locality there were sufficient members to
sustain finance for such an organiser. But at national level
by contrast, there were few organisers, and their responsibi-
lities were directed towards those regions which could not help
themselves in this way.
Despite the extension in the authority of the National Executive
Council and the General Secretary, there was considerable
independence in the conduct of affairs at local level. Branches
were controlled by their own branch officers, who were subject
to regular re-election. Branch secretaries received and con-
ducted correspondence onInhalf of the branch, sent out notices
of meetings, kept membership records and sent reports to head
office. It was they who dealt with the payment of benefits,
although the branch treasurer was responsible for handling
finances. A branch president presided over meetings, assisted
by the door-keeper who dealt with the admission of members.
Sick-stewards were elected by the branch to visit members in
receipt of sick benefit and to arrange for payment to be made
(97).
One of the most important functions of the union, at the local
level, was the settlement of wages and conditions. Since it
was there that bargaining was conducted, it remained under the
control of branch committees or district/Management Committees
in areas with more than one branch under the same code of
working rules. The Management or District Committee were elec-
ted by and directly responsible to the members in their district.
They might consult withEpecially summoned meetings of the mem-
bers to consider matters affecting wages and working conditions
and it was their responsibility to deal with any violation of the
working rules in the District (98). Based in the locality for
which they were elected, their influence rested on their under-
standing of the local situation and their direct contact with
the membership. Like the District Committees within the ASE,
it was intended that Management/District Committees should pro-
vide for representation of all of the branches in the locality
although Committee members were not responsible for the conduct
of branch affairs. (99) Only in the case of the OSM where the
lodge remained central to the workings of the Society, was
there no provision for a Committee of this kind (100). But in
other societies these Committees were central to the operation of
local agreements. The strengthened Central authority of the
EC was matched at this level by a body which could lead and
direct local initiatives. Particularly in the larger, industrial
centres the measure of local autonomy was reflected in the
strength and autonomy of the District or Managment Committees.
The application of one descriptive phrase cannot adequately
convey the variation in the scope and complexity of government
within the craft societies in building, and attention has been
given here only to a few of the major organisations which were
in existence at the beginning of the present century as a means
of conveying the extent to which these bodies were marked by
'primitive democracy'. The defining features noted by the Webbs
in relation to this level of government were the existence of
the general or aggregate meeting in which delegation rather than
representation was the rule; the provision for a referendum;
arrangements for the rotation of office and for the election of
officers. On all of these counts the building trades unions had
not moved far from the 'primitive democracy' in which they had
their roots. If a trend towards the centralisation of authority
can be identified - for example in the requirement that the EC
give prior approval before strike action is taken, it met, in
practice, with resistance from the local units of organisation,
from branches or from Management Committees, which retained a
considerable measure of autonomy in their control of affairs.
Their right to control their own finance and their own organi-
sers lent them a power which had not been seriously undermined.
For one writer at least, the Management Committee seemed to
provide the basis for government:
'There must be government in all Society -
Bees have their queen, and stag herds have their leader;
Rome had her Consuls, Athens had her Archons,
And we sir, have our Managing Committee' (101)
Local initiatives were encouraged by the foundation of local
federations intended to foster unity between trades within the
district. The Webbs commented in 1897 that such bodies had been
set up in most towns as a means of co-ordinating action between
branches against their common employers since wages and conditions
would be subject to the same, or to similar fluctuations. (102)
The London Building Trades Federation was the most effective
example for it was established on the basis of local funding,
independent of the national Executives of the affiliated unions.
Its 1894 rulebook stated that
"The object of the Federation shall be to secure unity of action
amongst the various organisations connected with the building
trade and to raise funds which shall be available., to assist
any trade connected with the Federation which may become involved
in resisting any aggression on the part of their employers or
in endeavouring to improve their social position..."
Similarly in Manchester the Manchester, Salford and District
Building Industries Federation, founded in 1893 provided that
the objects of Federation were to:
"Promote the federation, amalgamation, joint action and co-
operation of the Trade Unions existing in the Building Industry.
To deputise employers and trade unions in the Building Industry
regarding any matter likely to lead to a withdrawal or lock-out
of members." (103)
Like the London Federation, there was provision for independent
local funding, but in other areas funds seem to have accumulated,
where they existed at all, only during periods of trade disputes
(104)•
Independent funding was unlikely to be encouraged by union
leaders, whether General Secretaries of Executive Members, since
it challenged their prerogative to give financial support in a
trade dispute and thereby to control, in some measure, the
capacity of their own members to take industrial action.
Structural change and the building unions before 1914 
During the decade preceding the outbreak of the first world war
the question of structural change featured prominently amongst
the issues which were of concern to trade unionists. The 'new
unionism' had challenged established assumptions about the form
and objects of trade union organisation, with implications for
craftsmen as well as for unskilled workers. (105) The counter-
offensive which was launched by the employers during the decade
of the 1890 1 s, and which culminated in the engineering lock-out
of 1897 and the Taff Vale Judgement made in connection with a
dispute involving members of the Amalgamated Society of Railway
Servants, stimulated this interest in novel organisational forms.
The question ofvorking class unity was posed with a new
urgency since
'It is evident the employing class have learned all we had to
teach on the question of organisation and have gone one better
by federating their combination against any section of workmen
when it suits their purpose' (106)
It was in this climate that proposals were brought forward for
a General Federation of Trade Unions, a scheme which was first
mooted by socialists connected with the Clarion newspaper.
Within the building trades there were proposals for a National
Building Trades Federation. A union Of Building Trades Federa-
tions was initiated in 1899-1900, but its existence was short-
lived.
The idea of Federation was taken up by the TUC in1897 and just
over a year later the GFTU was brought into being to provide
funds for mutual financial support between trades in the event
of disputes. (107)	 The Labour Representation Committee which
was established in 1900 also grew out of this move towards
closer unity as a defensive measure and it is not surprising if,
in different areas of employment, attention was given to schemes
in which unions might consolidate their forces, drawing together
for mutual protection.
The improvements made to the employers' organisation in building
spelled out to trade unionists in that sector the need for
closer co-operation, if not for amalgamation. There were no
doubts that the employers were preparing themselves for a con-
frontation but:
'whilst the employers are getting themselves combined, the
workers are not doing the same sufficiently to successfully
withstand any serious and combined attack upon the workers in
the building industry'. (108)
It was known that the employers were determined to end the
restrictions which were operated by the building unions.
When the Lancashire, Cheshire and North Wales Building Trades
Employers proposed a uniform date for the expiration of notices
it was felt that the clash might be imminent.
'They have fairly organised their Federation now and are
prepared to deal with any emergency... they have been perfecting
their organisation for the past 10 years, they are now prepared
to deal with such matters.' (109)
The defeats in engineering, as well as their own threatened
conflict in 1899 convinced leaders of the various building
unions of the advantages of closer co-operation. Discussions
on this topic were pursued within all of the major craft
societies from the beginning of the century. Although the overt
conflict which was expected did not take place, rationalisation
was part of the tactical response to improvements in the
employers' organisation and to the wider experience of the
employers' counter-offensive.
Structural change and the bricklayers' societies, 1900-1910 
The two major organisations recruiting bricklayers were the
OBS, with a membership of 38,830 in 1900 and the Manchester
Unity Operative Bricklayers, which claimed some 3,438 members
in the same year. Although there was such a large difference in
membership of the two unions, the presence of a rival society
recruiting in the same trade was an irritant for members of the
OBS and an unproductive competition was sustained between the
two. The prevailing attitude within the OBS in respect of this
problem was reflected in a comment by the GS in 1892.
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"The action of the Manchester Order during the past two or
three years shows that they exercised very little power in the
trade for good, and it remains for the members to decide whether
two societies shall be maintained with all the concommitant
friction, to do work which could better be done by one." (110)
The "petty tyranny" of the MUOB inhibited progress in this
direction, but in 1900 proposals on amalgamation were revived.
-
The MUOB was no more receptive to moves on amalgamation in 1900
than it had been in earlier years. Proposals from the OBS that
the matter should be considered were received by the GS of the
MUOB with a refusal to put the matter to a vote of his members.
(111) It was difficult for further moves to be made in the face
of this adament refusal by the leadership of the MUOB to give
consideration to the question. (112) It was not the differences
in detail which made progress impossible, for negotiations never
reached the stage where suchdfferences could be elucidated.
Rather it was the resistance of the general secretary of the
MUOB, G.H. Clarke, to discussion of proposals which if they
reached fruition would eliminate his society, and along with it
his own position. The MUOB was too small for its general secre-
tary to be able to expect special consideration in a merger
with the OBS. A 'take—over' implied the absorption of the
membership of the MUOB into the larger society, but there was
no place which could be accorded to G.H. Clarke within that body
which compared to the one which he currently held. In the
meantime discussions were pursued more successfully with the
Glasgow Operative Bricklayers Society and the Belfast Brick-
layers and agreement on amalgamation with the former group was
reached in 1901 (113). But this did nothing to advance
negotiations with the MUOB when approaches were revived in 1908.
On this occasion it is true, the question did reach a delegate
meeting of the smaller society where amalgamation was promptly
rejected by a vote of 16 against to 8 in favour. (114) Again
it seemed that the prospects for merger had been ended before
ever being put to the membership of the smaller society. But
Batchelor, G.S. of the OBS persisted in attempts to have the
matter considered by the members of the MUOB, and by September
1909 George Clarke agreed to publish his letters in the Monthly,
Journal of the MUOB and leave it to the members to comment upon
them. In view of the disinclination of their leaders to present
a case for amalgamation with the OBS, it is not surprising if
members of the MUOB were not filled with enthusiasm at the
prospect.
It was at this point that differences in the detail of operations
of the two societies had some bearing on the question of merger.
A conference was held between the Executives of the two unions
in May 1910 when consideration was given to the value and bene-
fits of both of them. The OBS, which declared its membership at
that time to be 25,008 with a general fund of £69,884.6.3i had
a value per member of £2.15.10i, with a reserve for superannuation
of £9.055.16.4.	 The MUOB at that point claimed a membership of
1,769,with total assets of £4, 169.15.3i, or £2.6.10i per member.
It was suggested that the terms of amalgamation be the payment
of £2.15.10i per member, and that on payment of that sum, the
members of the MUOB would become entitled to all OBS benefits.
The deficiency was to be paid, it was proposed, during the 12
months from June 1910. If a member should become entitled to
any benefit during that period the contributions still out-
standing were to be deducted from any benefits which were paid.
Members of the MUOB were to be entitled to the lowest scale of
superannuation benefit, that was, for 15 years membership,
provided that they had been in membership of the MUOB for that
time. (115)	 George Clarke risked nothing in proposing such
terms to his members. By revealing the details of the OBS
project he transferred the responsibility for rejecting them
to his own members. It was, as Richard Coppock, a young member
of the OBS declared, 'an impossible basis for amalgamation.'
(116) Members of the MUOB were unlikely to welcome transfer
to the larger organisation on terms which laid on them a heavy
responsibility for additional contributions. When the question
was put to them in a ballot, the proposals were decisively
rejected, with only 25% of those voting giving their approval
to the scheme. (117)
•
The amalgamation of the two major bricklayers societies during
the decade 1900-1910 was precluded,firstly because of the
hostility of the GS of the smaller of the two unions to the
scheme. Considerations of their personal position and prestige
were likely to affect Executive Council members, as well as the
GS of that union, although Clarke, as GS, was the only full-time
official. So that there was no division in outlook between the
GS and the EC, since both were inclined to oppose the merger.
When Batchelor's persistent approaches led to a more detailed
consideration of the basis on which merger might be carried out,
it was clear that the members too might be disadvantaged in
an amalgamation where their society had a lower per capita
value than the OBS. The onus which it seemed would lay on them
to raise their value by 9/- per member was unlikely to appeal
to men who had already established their standing and their
entitlement to benefit as members of the smaller body. Amal-
gamation was not, in consequence, likely to proceed.
The woodworkers 
The relative size of the two unions recruiting carpenters and
joiners was roughly equivalent to that of the two bricklayers'
unions. The ASC&J, as the larger, had 60,264 members in 1900
compared with 7,727 in the GUC&J. But the picture was compli-
cated by the presence of craft societies for other areas, for
example the Associated Carpenters and Joiners Society of Scotland
(AC&JS) with 9,808 members. Unions recruiting amongst kindred
trades might rival the two main societies of carpenters and
joiners in particular instances - bodies such as the Mill Sawyers,
Woodcutting Machinists and Wood Turners Society (ASWM), later
the Amalgamated Society of Woodcutting Machinists, which
although still small (4,179 members , in 1900) had a firm basis
for growth amongst workers on the new woodworking machines;
and in the furniture trades the National Amalgamated Furniture
Trades Association and the Cabinet Makers Union with 6,248
members (1902) and 2,452 members (1900).
Although it has been suggested that where two unions were based
on recruitment amongst the same class of craftsman common
policies may be evolved (118), the rivalry between the ASC&J
and the GUC&J was on occasion both intense and bitter. The
two unions were in competition for members and both sides were
guilty at times,of misrepresenting the financial position and
policies of its rival (119), in order to boost its own membership.
It is true that they co-operated in United Trades Committees in
many areas, but the larger size of the Amalgamated often meant
that its members could declare a trade policy without reference
to members of the General Union in their area. Where the
smaller society refused to accept trade policies set down by the
ASC I J, existing tensions between the two were heightened by
accusations of blacklegging (120). It was sometimes argued
by members of the ASCW that the General Union recruited
amongst workers who could not truly regard themselves as crafts-
men. The motivation for this allegation lay in the existence
within the GUCW from around 1890 of a section for trade benefits
alone and it was onthiS . basis that the membership of the GUCW
was expanded during the 1890 , s. (121) For the craft member of
the Amalgamated Society the recruitment of trade-only members
suggested a break-down in the exclusivity of the craft organi-
sation and this innovation in the administrative arrangements
of the General Union conflicted with the restricted admission
which operated within the Amalgamated.
The leaders of the ASCW endeavoured for many years to take over
the smaller GUCW. When in 1901 the master builders consolidated
their organisation through the new National Federation of
-"e l Building Trades Employets,initiatives were taken again in this
direction, and it was agreed in 1902 that talks should take place
between the ASCW, the GUCW and the ACWS on the subject of
amalgamation (122). Leaders of the General Union argued from
the outset that merger could only be realised if it was based
on a reformulation of the rules of all of the societies, and
the construction of one, united association (123). Their con-
cern was based on the lack of provision within the ASCW rule-
book for trade-only members. It seems likely that there would
be a measure of resistance to 'take-over' by the ASCW in accor-
dance with the rulebook of that body, but advocates of
amalgamation within the General Union had also to confront
the problem of their trade section which could not readily be
assimilated on the basis of the ASCW rules. Negotiations were
complicated by the involvement of the ACWS, whose represen-
tatives seemed ready to accept the ASCW rulebook as the basis .
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for amalgamation and at the end of August 1902 the successful
conclusion of the discussions on this basis between these two
bodies was announced to Matkin, GS of the General Union.
Further progress in the talks between the ASC&J and the GUC&J
seemed unlikely after this (124) for Matkin could not accept a
merger which made no provision for his trade only members.
Discussions were pursued for another two months, but with little
likelihood of success. In fact the agreed amalgamation of the
AC&JS into the ASC&J was not followed through and this round of
talks was ended with no significant change in the prevailing
structure.
When the question was revived only two years later, the leaders
of the ASC&J proved more flexible in their approach. A
conference was held in Carlisle in 1904 involving the three
societies who had been present in the earlier talks, and on this
occasion it was conceded that features of the GUC&J Rulebook -
and particularly the trade section, must be included in the
consolidated organisation (125). Consequently it was possible
to put the proposals before the membership, who gave them
overwhelming support.






& Joiners 24,990 1,742 62,564 42.9%
GUC&J 2,290 1,285 6,566 54.4%
AC&JS 4,988 1,401 8,659 73.8%
In this case the factor hindering amalgamation derived not so
much from a reluctance on the part of leaders or members of the
respective unions to accept the principles involved. Rather
it related to the statutory provisions governing amalgamation
which required that amalgamation of two or more unions could
take place only if the consent were given of not less than two
thirds of the total membership of each or every union (127).
Clearly the majority of members who had voted had given their
assent to the proposals, but, as Postgate suggests, the non-
voters who represented a large 'neutral' poll invalidated any
further movement in the direction of merger.
Following this setback the ASC&J entered into talks with kin-
dred societies, including the Cabinet Makers Union, the Scottish
Saw Mill Operatives and Woodcutting Machinemen's Society, the
Amalgamated Society of Woodcutting Machinists and the NAFTA,
with a view to a consolidation of forces. (128) There was a
widespread resistance to 'absorption into the ASC&J , (129)
although there was a general agreement on the need for closer
co-operation between the various woodworking unions. The grow-
ing tendency for the better class of carpentry to be undertaken
by cabinet and house-furnishing firms, as woodworking machinery
made inroads into the operations usually undertaken by the wood-
working craftsman combined with a growth in the number of
demarcation disputes to encourage moves towards a closer union.
One Pro posal from a representative of the ASWM a scheme for a
national federation of woodworking unions was unanimously accepted
and by August 1907 all of the societies had agreed to send
delegates to the first meeting of the Central Board of the
Association of Woodworking Trade Unions (130). The existence of
this body was intended to resolve some of the difficulties regard-
ing inter-union relations and demarcation. The establishment of
an 'association', or federation circumvented the problems
associated with the implementation of a full merger, insofar as .
62
no appeal to the membership was required before a union's
general secretary, or leading officials could participate.
The involvement of any single union did not necessitate a per-
manent commitment and it does not seem that the Association had
funds independent of its constituent members. Its lack of status
was associated with a concommitant lack of power. At most it
could be hoped that the 2!_ssociation would regulate inter-union
tensions, but its functions were distinctly limited and it does
not seem to have been maintained for more than a brief period
during this decade.
It was during the same year, 1907, that proposals were again
revived for amalgamation between the Amalgamated General and
Associated Societies of Carpenters and Joiners. Again the GS
of the GUC&J raised the problem of a reformulation of rules such
that the name of the new society would be other than that of the
three existing organisations, and that there should be a trade
section open to all carpenters and joiners from 20 years of age.
The consequence of these, and other stipulations made by the
GUC&J was that they did not participate any further in the new
round of negotiations (131). Discussions were resumed only
between the AC&JS and the ASC&J.
Merger of the AC&JS into the ASC&J was accomplished in spite of
the provisions of the TU Amalg. Act, which if they had been
observed, would have again precluded progress in the direction of
unification. Negotiations were picked up in 1910, and in August
of that year a conference was held in Glasgow to draw up a
scheme of amalgamation. The matter was put to the members of
both unions during the month of October, and considerable efforts
were made by the leaders of both societies to achieve the
requisite vote in accordance with the prevailing legislation.
In spite of this, the members of the ASC&J did not vote in
sufficient numbers — in fact they were over 10,000 short of the
two thirds required by the Trade Union Act, and so the project
fell through. The repeated vote on amalgamation did nothing
to improve the stability of the Associated Society, which in
any case had lost members steadily since the beginning of the
century. A full revision of its constitution was considered,
and it was at this point that a further approach was made from
the ASC&J, pointing to the relaxed terms on which individual
members might be admitted under an amendment to their own rules.
It was on this basis that the majority of members of the Asso-
ciated Society were brought into the ASC&J, adding 4,129
members in branches in various parts of the country. (132)
The assimilation of these members was not easy, since both officers
and members had to adapt themselves to working under the rules of
the ASC&J, which were quite different to those of the Associated.
But it could at least be claimed that this move advanced the
progress towards unity within the trade throughout Great Britain.
Yet members of the General Union persisted in their independent
stance, and a further ballot on the subjectof amalgamation
during 1912 failed to produce the requisite two thirds of the
membership voting in favour.
Discussions on amalgamation recurred regularly between wood-
working unions in the first decade of this century. Most of the
small societies were reluctant to renounce their identity and
accept merger into the ASC&J. It seems likely that their leaders,
like the general secretary of the MUOB, were not enthusiastic
about an amalgamation which would remove them from office and
offer them little chance of obtaining a corresponding position
in the merged society. For many of them the situation was
complicated by differences in craft identity - between cabinet
makers, mill sawyers, wood-cutting machinists and so on. The
question was not merely one of craft sectionalism or even of
craft pride. It was apparent that a larger society which catered
predominantly for carpenters and joiners in housebuilding and
shipbuilding might give less attention to the claims of smaller
groups, and that they might have difficulty in obtaining support
within the larger organisation for actions in defence of their
own interests. And for the two societies which recruited in the
same craft area - the ASC&J and the GUC&J, the most important
question related to the specific differences which governed the
organisation of the two societies, especially the provision made
in the GUC&J rulebook for a section of 'trade-only' members.
Given these differences it was unlikely that the GS of the smal-
ler union would accept amalgamation simply on the basis of the
ASC&J rulebook. Merger could only come about if the rules
were reformulated along the lines which were agreed in 1904.
But the final difficulty which was encountered - and it was one
which may well have inhibited the initiation of discussions on
merger, let alone their satisfactory conclusion - was the exis-
tence of stringent statutory requirements concerning trade union
amalgamation. The rationalisation of trade union structure was
a difficult proposition without the rationalisation of trade
union law.
The Painters
The consolidation of the Painters' Societies at a national level
was not so advanced as in other trades prior to 1900 (133). The
largest society at that time was the Nat. Amalg. Soc. of
Operative House and Ship Painters and Decorators (Manchester)
with a membership of 10,448 in 1900. The 'London Amalgamated',
their nearest rival, had only 5,168 members in the same year.
There was little conflict between the two, since their regional
strengths were, for the most part, complementary, with the
Manchester Amalgamated being stronger in the Northern part of
the country, with branches in Lancashire, Cheshire, Northumber-
land, Yorkshire and some of the Midlands, whilst the,London
Amalgamated', as its name implied, was based in the London area
and the home counties, with very few members north of Birmingham.
(134) A separate organisation was maintained in Scotland,
claiming 3,163 members in 1900. And many localities, throughout
Britain, had local societies of painters, each with their own
provisions for contributions and benefits, their own rules and
their own officers. (135) During the decade 1900-1910 the
number of societies was to be reduced and their organisation
rationalised in a move towards one national union for the trade.
It was the largest of the societies, the NASOH&SP&D, which took
the initiative in consolidating the forces of the Painters.
It was agreed that , in order to hold our own against the forces
which are arraigned against us, that we use all our energies to
induce the London Amalgamated Society and the various local
societies.., to join us for mutual interest and support.'(136)
To this end the rules of the Manchester Amalgamated which pre-
cluded the admission of local societies were suspended from
1901, initially for a period of three months. As a result of
this move any society or branch, or any members under 35 could
be admitted provided firstly that 95% of the applicants
produced medical certificates of good health, secondly that
each should pay an entrance fee equal to the average worth per
member of the NASOH&SP&D - in no case less than 30/- per member
and that non—free members (i.e. those who had not yet been in
their society for a sufficient period of time to qualify for
benefits) must be 12 months in membership, from the time they
joined their respective organisation (137). This more open
approach to recruitment was sustained for several years and if
the response was initially a slow one, the opening up of member-
ship to local societies did, in time, produce results. At the
beginning of 1904 a circular was issued to local societies and
by September of that year it was reported that societies in
Manchester, Bury, Rochdale, London and Grays had assented to
merger (138). Negotiations were in progress with the Liverpool
Local Society and with the Scottish Amalgamated, and in towns
where previously there had been only a small presence, the union
now claimed to control the trade. (139)
It was in the same year that members of the London Amalgamated
were persuaded to merge. A flexible approach to the terms on
which amalgamation might be conducted facilitated the agreement.
At their delegate meeting early in 1904 members of the NASOH&
SP&D resolved that if merger with the 'London Amalgamated' were
to proceed, the members of the latter could be regarded as free•
members after the merger, irrespective of their age and length
of membership. Moreover if some members preferred to continue
paying at the same rate of contributions as provided for in their
existing rules, they would be allowed to do so and would be
entitled to existing benefits and privileges. Membership of
the superannuation scheme would be dated from the time of the
merger. It was however understood that new members of the
society would be admitted on the terms and conditions of the
NASOH&SP&D.
These measures were designed to overcome problems which derived
from differences in the rules and the financial arrangements
made by the two societies. It is possible that the different
geographical base of the two unions further encouraged moves
for unification. Certainly the absence of persistent conflict
between members of the two societies over recruitment or aspects
of trade policy meant that there was less mutual suspicion to
be overcome than amongst rival organisations of carpenters or
bricklayers (140). When the question of amalgamation was put to
the members of the two societies in the summer of 1904, it was
given resounding support within both of them and the formal
transfer of goods and effects was made in November 1904. The
London office was given up, but Bro. B.C. Gibbs, GS of the
London Amalgamated was designated AGS of the merged union under
the direct control of the EC, although he continued to be based
in Clapham (141).
Yet it seems that, in spite of the ease with which the merger
was conducted, statutory requirements were not fully observed.
It is true that the majority of members voting in each society
recorded votes in favour of amalgamation, but in neither case
does it seem that the proportion of members voting in favour was
formally such as to comply with the 1876 Act.
Voting on amalgamation between the two major Painters , societies,
% membership
Society •	 Size (1901) Votes for: & against voting in favour
NASOH&SP&D 10,833 4,100 436 37.85%
London Anal. 5,380 3,080 583 57.25%
Statutory requirements were that "not less than two—thirds of
the (total) members of each or every such trade union" should
consent to the merger. (142)	 It was on this basis that the
projected amalgamation between the two major societies of
carpenters and joiners was held up in the same year and it was
this obstacle which did so much to prevent amalgamation of
trade unions before 1914. It is difficult to understand why,
in the case of the painters, the requirements were not upheld.
Postgate observes simply that: 'The necessary vote was two-
thirds of the membership, by a law which greatly impeded amal-
gamation, but in this case, and this case only, it was secured
without difficulty.' (143)	 The union minutes make no reference
to a problem in achieving the necessary two-thirds vote in favour,
and indeed comment simply that the two-thirds majority has
been achieved. (144) In view of the fact that the percentage
of total members voting in favour of merger in the NASOH&SP&D
is actually lower than the percentage voting in favour in the ASC&J
in the same year (in connection with merger with the GUC&J discussec
above) where 40.1% of the members voted in favour, it is diffi-
cult to understand how the amalgamation proceeded so smoothly.
It is not that the societies avoided contact with the Registrar
or refrained from observation of obligations in this direction,
since a certificate of amalgamation of the two societies was
given by the Registrar, with effect from 25 Oct 1904. (145)
Nor is it the case that membership of the societies declined
dramatically so that the operative figure for membership in 1904
was lower than that suggested when the two societies initiated
discussions on the basis of their 1901 membership. (146) On the
contrary membership rose during the period 1901-1904, Particu-
larly in the larger society, where the affiliation of local
trade societies boosted membership, and if the 1904 membership
figure had been used, the percentage of members voting in favour
of amalgamation would have appeared to be even lower. .It is
possible that the clue lies in the 'open' approach to member-
ship adopted by the NASOH&SP&D in 1901, since the incorporation
of local societies seemed to be possible without reference to
statutory requirements or to a vote of members of the larger
society. Yet the problem with this argument is that in the
case of themerger of the NASOH&SP&D and the 'London Amalgamated'
there was a ballot of members of both unions, and officials on
both sides seemed to be conscious of the need to observe legal
requirements. It is not clear how, given the voting figures
which they reported, they managed to do so. Whatever the
explanation it is clear that fulfillment of the statutory
requirements was a serious impediment to amalgamation. That
the Painters managed to find a way around the problem in this
instance does not negate the fact that the Trade Union (Amend-
ment) Act 1876 limited the scope for merger and without adjust-
ment of statutory provisions it was only in the most exceptional
circumstances that rationalisation of union structure could
proceed.
The success of the Painters in bringing about an amalgamation
of the two major societies, as well as in negotiating the
rationalisation of structure such that the number of small trade
societies was considerably reduced meant that henceforth the
trade was dominated by one, large society, which operated
throughout the country. It gave the painters' organisation a
truly national dimension by drawing together unions from different
localities, and although the boundaries of organisation were set
by the Scottish border, (for the Scottish Painters Society was
reluctant to accept merger where their autonomy was not
guarantee0 (147) the NASOH&SP&D could now claim to be fully
national in scope.
Qjag_Big Union: Industrial u ,lionism and the building trades,
1910-14
The four years preceding the outbreak of war saw an expansion
in the organisation and activity of labour reminiscent of the
agitations associated with the development of the 'new unions'.
Trade union membership rose dramatically - from 2.1m in 1910
to 4.1m in 1914 (148). Trade unions found a base in areas, and
amongst workers where previously there had been little or no
organisation (149). And in an economic climate which was more
favourable than the previous decade for the assertion of
workers' claims, the number and the extent of strikes, when
judged by the numbers participating rose rapidly (150). There
was a wave of aggressive and sometimes violent militancy,
characterised by unofficial action in many instances. In the
mines, on the docks and the railways, amongst seamen and
engineering workers as well as amongst building workers, this
new militancy was reflected in disputes in which most of the
running was made by the members rather than by the official
leaders of the unions concerned.
Just as the 'new unions' had posed a challenge to the tenets of
craft organisation twenty years earlier, so the 'Great unrest'
encouraged a new attention to the form as well as to the social
implications of trade union structure. Concern with the question
of trade union organisation in the previous decade derived
predominantly from the need of trade unionists to draw together
in the face of an attack from the employers. The GFTU had
been formed for just this reason, and in building, where the
unions had been confronted by a new unity amongst the employers
following the formation of the NFBTE in 1901, moves to con-
solidate trade union organisation derived precisely from the
need for mutual defence. In the context of a growth in trade
union membership and militancy the attention to organisational
form shifted to an emphasis on tight organisation for the
purposes of attack. 'Industrial Unions' - that is one union
for each industry, were proposed as a means of drawing together
workers, both skilled and unskilled, to confront and challenge
the rights of employers (151).
The question of industrial unionism was part of a broader
revolutionary movement, syndicalism, which had its origins in
parts of the USA and in France. It was intended as a means of
uniting workers 'to increase the power of the fighting arm of
our class', (152) and syndicalists eschewed the use of political
means of achieving working class power. The emphasis in the
ideology, as well as the level of organisational practice
varied from country to country, and from area to area within
each country.
But in Britain, where syndicalist ideology had to confront an
established working class movement before it could challenge
the power of the employer, it was unlikely to attract the
support which might be possible in other parts of the world.
Syndicalism appealed to a class-conscious minority, disillusioned
both with the moderation of the newly formed Labour Party and
with the dogma of the SDF. Following the foundation of the
IWW in 1905, British supporters of Daniel De Leon established
the British Advocates of Industrial Unionism in 1906. But the
main impetus for syndicalism in Britain came with the return
of Tom Mann from Australasia in 1910 and the publication of
the paper the Industrial Syndicalist, followed by the establish-
72
ment of the Industrial Syndio.alist Education League in December
1910. The Provisional Committee for the Amalgamation of
existing Unions was launched in the same year and whilst
syndicalist ideas were never to receive a wide support amongst
the working class in Britain, within many industries from this
time it found adherents amongst a significant minority of
activists. (153)
In building, as in other areas, the period 1910-14 witnessed
enormous growth in organisation. The ASC&J expanded from
43,347 members to 69,036; the GUC&J from 5,653 to 8,505. The
OBS rose from 23,284 to 26,363, the Plasterers from 6,522 to
7,143, the Painters from 14,909 to 29,796 and even the OSM,
which had seen a steady erosion of its membership from a peak
level in 1900 saw a revival from 7,055 to 10,548.
This growth in membership was paralleled by an increased
militancy reflected in the incidence and extent of strikes
between 1910 and 1914. After an average of under 35 strikes a
year recorded for the period 19011910, the number rose to a
peak of 198 in 1913, falling slightly in the following year
to 177. The number of workers involved also increased, from
an average of just under 6,100 between 1901-1910 to a peak of
40,002 in 1913, dropping slightly to 38,000 in 1914, the year
of the London Building Workers lock—out (154). It was the
conciliation machinery which was blamed for many of the dis-
putes, since it was argued that it hindered progress and bene-
fitted only the employers. (155) The Conciliation Procedures
followed those established for engineering,in that a local
dispute from any workshop could be brought to a national
conference or conciliation panel, although wages and hours
continued to be negotiated district by district. A distinction
had been made between the constitutional arrangements for deal-
ing with grievances on the one hand, and questions of wages and
hours on the other. (156) In practice the two questions were
closely allied and the prevailing dissatisfaction over wages
highlighted the ineffectiveness of existing arrangements. (157)
The officials were more likely than many members to accept the
constraints of conciliation, since it gave them status and
recognition and, at least in theory, reduced the possibility
of strikes. But the prevailing industrial unrest encouraged a
review of the situation and in 1913 exploratory talks took place
with a view to the abolition of Conciliation Boards and the
establishment of a uniform code of working rules for the entire
country (158). The national dimension of existing procedures
was not called into question, but it was apparent that the form
which they should be given had yet to be resolved.
In the building industry the amalgamation movement established
an official base amongst trade unionists. The example set in
other industries provided an attractive model - on the railways
for example the Amalg. Soc. of Railway Servants (ASRS) came
together with the General Railway Workers' Union and the United
Pointsmen's and Signalmen's Society in 1913 to form the National
Union of Railwaymen. And for class conscious tradesmen indus-
trial unity was associated with a breakdown of the barriers
between craft and craft, or between craftsman and labourer in
a form of organisation which would unite building trade workers
along similar lines.
It was the OBS, which had failed by the summer of 1910 to
achieve any progress in amalgamation talks with the MUOB or in
the consolidation of the trowel trades into one trade union,
which provided the basis for the campaign for one big union
for building workers. Leaders of the OBS had long been sympa-
thetic to the notion of a broader amalgamation. As early as
1897, following the engineering lock—out, John Batchelor, the
GS of that union hadexpressed himself in favour of "only one
union in each industry" (159). Of that union's two national
organisers, one at least, George Hicks, was an ardent advocate
of industrial unionism (160). And the Annual Movable General
Council in 1906 had taken up the question of a broader scheme
for merger with consideration of a proposition for amalgamation
with unions of plasterers and masons, as well as with other
societies of bricklayers (161).
It is difficult to understand why the leadership of this society
was more progressive than that of other organisations on this
issue. But the answer may, to some extent be suggested by the
impact of the slump on trade union membership. Of the larger
craft societies it was the OBS which was most seriously affected
by the erosion of employment opportunities for its members.
The impact of new materials — concrete and steel frame buildings,
combined with the effects of a cut—back inbailding of all types
to undermine the recruitment of the OBS. Between 1900 and
1910 membership fell from 38,830 to 23,284, that is to 59.96%
of the figure for 1900. Even by 1914 it had risen only to
26,363, that is 67.89% of the 1900 membership. Membership of
the ASC&J, by contrast fell only to 71.93% of its 1900 member-
ship by 1910. And by 1914, admittedly after absorption of the
Associated Carpenters and Joiners Society, the figure for
1900 had been surpassed,and membership had reached 114.56% of
that for 1900. (See Appendix C). Trade union density for the
bricklayers & masons fell between 1901 and 1911 from 33.76%
to 21.62%. That for the carpenters and joiners also declined,
but only slightly, from 26.43% in 1901 to 25.78% in 1911.
The Painters, who consolidated their national organisation during
this period, showed even more startling gains, and only in the
case of the Masons, who had been affected by a longer-term
decline in the demand for their skills, was membership less
buoyant than within the OBS. It seems likely that even during
the climate of aggressive militancy which preceded the Great
War, leaders of the OBS had an eye to consolidating their organi-
sation on a broader basis than had hitherto been possible, and
looked to an alliance with their more successful brothers in
other crafts, as a means for doing so.
The OES contained a small, but well-organised group of syndi-
calists who made much of the running on the question of one big
union. The same names, and the same branches feature regularly
in the correspondence columns of the union's journal over the
period 1910-14 - men such as William Gormly (Parkhead branch,
Glasgow), J.H. West (East London), J.V. Wills (Deptford), Harry
Adams (in London) and George Hicks (Battersea br.) featured
prominently in the campaign and their position was boosted by
the extent to which they were encouraged by John Batchelor, the
General Secretary. A special meeting on the question of indus-
trial organisation was held early in 1911 and an ad hoc commit-
tee was set up, numbering only about a dozen sympathisers,
chaired by Hicks, to further the aims of industrial unity. The
EC agreed to provide some financial assitance for this
Provisional Committee together with a meeting hall and, with
this backing, the Committee requested branches, through the
pages of the Trade Circular, to put up resolutions for the TUC
calling upon the Parliamentary Committee to convene conferences
of unions in different industries, with a view to amalgamation
along industrial lines. (162)
The campaign for industrial unity of the building unions was
informed by syndicalist ideas from its inception. The OBS
Consolidation Cttee which was set up in Sep 1911 was influenced
by activities within the Industrial Syndicalist Education League
and men such as Hicks and Wills, if not syndicalists at the
outset were swung round to support for the movement through
their involvement with the campaign for amalgamation of the
building trades unions. (163) But it is important to recognise
that not all supporters of the move for consolidation would
appreciate or support the syndicalist ideology put forward by
its most active proponents. The prevailing climate of opinion
seemed to be in favour of alroad amalgamation, within the OBS
at least, for by Fe ry 1912 that union had recorded 185
resolutions in favour of amalgamation and only 12 against. (164)
Reports within the publications of the ISE", and sympathetic
bodies undoubtedly emphasise the extent to which syndicalist
ideas were attracting support and suggestions that they "were
increasingly making the running on the amalgamation issue,
becoming identified by many building militants with the indus-
trial union cause itself",must be treated sceptically (165).
A distinction was maintained by the activists themselves
between the Consolidation Committee which had official backing
within the OBS, and which stood for industrial unionism ,to
raise wages and shorten the hours of labour , through a fighting
policy, (166) and the Provisional Committee for the Consolidation
of the Building Industries Trades , Unions into one Industrial
organisation which was more explicit in its objectives. The
publications of the latter laid more emphasis on the possi-
bility of a complete and final overthrow of the employing class
and of the function of industrial unions to draw workers
together along class lines (167), and 'eventually dethrone
King Capital from society. , (168) The activities of the
Provisional Committee were centred in London, withsome support
from the larger industrial centres in the provinces - especially
Liverpool and Glasgow, but it is by no means certain that their
cause was identified by the bulk of the membership, either in
London or in the provinces, with the cause of industrial unionism
itself.
Within unions other than the OBS the campaign for consolidation
of the building trades' organisations into one big union
received less attention in publications and less support
from officials. The CBS was unique in providing a measure of
official sponsership and official attitudes in other unions
were not so sympathetic. Within the ASC&J the moves received
almost unanimous opposition from the General Council, whilst
within the OSM, with a sadly depleted membership, the echoes
of earlier craft supremacy were sounded with the refusal of
OSM leaders to contemplate the wider amalgamation. The resolu-
tion from the OBS which was put to the TUC in 1912 was passed
unanimously and when the meeting of building trade union repre-
sentatives was convened to consider the question of their
amalgamation a resolution was again passed in favour of indus-
trial organisation. It was agreed that a committee be set up
comprising one member of every society represented, to draw up
a scheme of amalgamation and to report back to a further
conference. (169) This was held in June 1912 when the outline
proposals for one union for the building industry were reported
for presentation to the membership. The scheme, which followed
very closely the model set out by the Consolidation Committee
of the OBS was designed to allow the fullest freedom for
different grades to discuss and promote their own particular
interests, whilst overcoming sectional divisions. It provided
only the barest framework for an organisation of a new type and
as such it did not confront in detail the particular, sectional
interests which it was aimed to overcome. (170) It was put to
the members during the autumn of 1912, but when the votes were
reported it became apparent that the majority of members eligible
to vote had not bothered to do so, although the results showed
that, of those voting, there was a considerable majority in
favour of the principle of amalgamation (171),
AMALGAMATION OF BUILDING TRADE UNIONS: Result of Ballot
Union No. of papers For Against % of mem-
supplied bers votir
for
ASC&J 55,000 18,690 10,523 33.98%
OBS 24,000 4,371 763 18.21
Plumbers 11,250 1,606 291 14.28
OSM 8,000 1,209 61 15.1
NAOP 7,700 1,738 310 22.57
Builders' Lab.	 (Nat.) 4,500 756 2 16.8
Builders' Lab. (Unit.) 3,000 2,369 40 78.97
MUOB 1,670 427 61 25.57
Street Masons & Pay. 1,150 152 104 13.22
Painters & Dec.
(London & Provincial) 900 223 1 24.78
Mosaic & Tile Fixers 100 - - -
TOTAL 117,370 31,541 12,156 26.87
It is clear that the questioh of industrial unity attracted
only a minority interest within all (but one) of the unions
which participated in the ballot. Within the OBS and the OSM
where it has been claimed (172) that syndicalist influence was
strongest less than a fifth of the membership cast their votes
in favour of the proposals. Although this does not disprove
claims for syndicalist influence in these unions being stronger
than elsewhere, it suggests that, since there would certainly
be less syndicalists than there were supporters of a scheme for
industrial unionism, their numbers were small and, more impor-
tantly that their influence, which might be judged by their
capacity to persuade fellow members to cast their votes in favour
of the scheme, was limited. It was amongst the carpenters, now
the elite of the building trades, that the highest level of
support within the craft societies was recorded for an amalga-
mation of building trade unions. The carpenters, like the
bricklayers and masons had been affected by technological
innovation, but the effects were less far-reaching and their
capacity for organisation was not similarly reduced. Their
large vote in favour of consolidation suggests organisational
confidence - for the carpenters who were the most numerous of
the trades were not likely to be swamped in an amalgamation.
And the large vote cast against points to the polarisation which
had occurred within the ASO&J on this issue. It was the only
union in which a significant number of members turned out
against the amalgamation proposals and the high level of
opposition, which was led by the General Council, may have
encouraged members who were in favour, to cast their votes in
this ballot. The difference between the level of participation
in the ASC&J and that in other unions is considerable. Whilst
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53.1% of ASC&J members voted, only 21.39% of OBS members did
so, and a mere 15.9% in the OSM. The split in the ASC&J vote,
with approximately a third of the members supporting the prin-
ciple of amalgamation and about a fifth of the members opposing
indicated a real division of opinion, which was likely to harden
with any concrete proposals for an amalgamated union. Industrial
unionism could claim a wide support amongst carpenters and
joiners, but equally it had many opponents. The level of organi-
sation and benefits which they were able to sustain meant that
their organisation also encompassed members who bitterly resisted
any scheme which might involve merger of their funds and their
benefits with other unions.
Since the results, over-all, supported the principle of amalga-
mation, the question of the government and rules of the amal-
gamated union were now tabled. At a conference held on December
3-4 1912, draft rules were submitted by Jack Wills, on behalf
of the OBS. The conference was attended by representatives of
unions which had refused to participate in the ballot, as well
as by those who had, and it is not surprising that Wills found
the going very heavy. A note had already appeared in the Daily
Herald to the effect that the amalgamation scheme had broken
down and Wills, isolated and demoralised, returned to the OBS
Executive meeting on December 4th complaining at the reception
which he was given although formal approval was accorded to
his propospls (173). It was clear that a scheme which provided
for trade but not for friendly benefits, at a subscription of 2id
a week would not be taken seriously by members of the craft
unions, who were attached to the provisions which they had built
up over the years. And when this 'twopence ha'penny trade
union' scheme was put before the members, it was resoundingly .
rejected by the majority of craft societies. (174)
A further set-back for supporters of the amalgamation movement
came with the initiation of an alternative scheme for federa-
tion, which had its origins with the General Council of the
ASC&J. At its meeting in July 1913 proposals were once again
brought forward which espoused the rhetoric of 'closer unity'
whilst stopping short of a movement for full amalgamation. It
was from the ASC&J, the union in which the question of amalga-
mation into one big union had aroused most controversy, that the
proposals for federation were initiated. Negotiations were
instigated after the scheme for full amalgamation had effec-
tively been crushed. The most remarkable feature of the new
proposals, when contrasted with earlier schemes was the provision
within the draft constitution of a guarantee fund into which all
affiliates would be obliged to contribute. An initial payment
of 4/- per member was to be followed by per capita contributions
of ld - 6d per week, payable only during a strike or a lock-
out affecting any of the federated trades (175). In return the
affiliates could expect to receive trade benefits during a dis-
pute involving their members, up to a maximum of El a week.
The financial provisions were accompanied by a constitution
which vested governing authority in a Legislative Council elected
from the General Councils of the affiliated societies, with
an Executive Council to be elected from EC's in a similar manner.
The need for some form of co-ordination between building unions
at national level, apart from the provisions of the Conciliation
Procedure was apparent to most union officials by 1912-13. At
a time when the number and extent of strikes was increasing,
their control was bounded by the degree to which they could
direct the activities of their members. The relative indepen-
dence of local federations strengthened the autonomy of branch
organisation as against the influence of national bodies and it
was this factor which encouraged the attention of the leadership
within the ASC&J, the GC as well as the EC and GS, to the problem
of co-ordinating trade policy at the national level. It was
feared that "the rank and file of which we hear so much, will
break loose and become uncontrollable which would be a serious
drawback to all progressive movements.."
	 (176)	 In the face of
this threat from below, the leadership came together with
schemes for a national federation of building trade workers.
The proposals of the ASC&J for a national federation were
endorsed, in principle, by leaders of the other unions at a
meeting in Oct. 1913. But they were opposed by the active members
who continued their campaign for full amalgamation.
The Consolidation Committee of the OBS opposed the scheme on the
grounds that past experiences of federation did not justify the
claim that it could overcome sectionalism. A federation would
have no security of support because any dissatisfied union or
group of unions could withdraw. It would not lessen the number
of unions, and indeed it would add to the number of officials as
the new institution acquired its own hierarchy. (177) Whilst
advocates of amalgamation differed in the type of scheme which
they wished to initiate, they were united in opposition to the
formation of a Federation which seemed to preclude the possibility
of one big union. It was in the urban, industrial centres, where
industrial unionism had been taken up in other industries, parti-
cularly in engineering, that support for amalgamation and
opposition to federation was strongest. Resolutions opposing
federation reached the ASC&J Head Office from branches in Clyde-
bank, Coventry, parts of London and Sheffield (178). Their
resistance to federation found support from other branches, and
when the issue was put to the vote it resulted in a defeat for
federation and for the officials. The need for unity was readily
apparent, but the means by which it should be achieved, and the
level at which it should be aimed were less obvious. Ironically
it was the industrial unionists who were in favour of full amal-
gamation at the national level, a move 'whichultimately might
further the erosion of local autonomy and their own power base.
The extent of support for their case was founded in the weakness
of local federations in building, as well as disillusionment with
federation at national level as expressed through the GFTU. The
result was an impasse. Neither amalgamation, nor federation
could proceed and discussions on structural change were, in any
case temporarily shelved as attention shifted to the London
building workers, who were locked out by the employers for six
months in 1914.
The London Lock-out highlighted the officials' need for a national
federation.
	 London had one of the most effective local federations,
whose origins went back at least to the lock-out of 1891. Nine
of the unions affiliated to the LEIF were locked out from January
1914, in consequence of their alleged violation of working rules
and a general refusal to sign a 'document' repudiating unconsti-
tuional actions. (179)	 The London employers stressed the ques-
tion of the authority of the unions nationally over their London
members. Would the unions discipline their own members for taking
industrial action in breach of agreed local working rules? A
questionnaire was sent out to the national Executive Councils of
the unions concerned and, in the absence of any machinery permit-.
ting a unified response, the employers' manouevre produced the
chaos which it was clearly inbended to create. The OBS attemp-
ted to contact other societies before responding to the employers,
only to find that the Plasterers had already replied and that
F. Chandler, GS of the ASC&J had sent a general reply in the
belief that he alone had been approached in his capacity as secre-
tary for the operatives' side of the National Conciliation Board.
(180)	 The employers refused to negotiate with the leaders of
the LEIF, but agreed to meet the Executives of the unions -
a move which exploited the lack of formal relationship between
the ad hoc meetings of EC's and the organised and established
local federation. (181)
The absence of formal links between the unions at national level
undermined the solidarity of the strike. The stoppage was
pursued with remarkable enthusiasm during the first half of
1914. The labourers, as well as the craft societies were out
and two attempts to resolve the conflict, during April and May
by concessions to the employers were overwhelmingly defeated in
ballot votes (182). The weak link in the chain was the OSM.
Their tradition of craft elitism had outlived their elite position
within the building trade unions and as demand for their skills
was reduced by the more widespread use of reinforced concrete,
so their members responded with an assertion of their own craft
superiority. The separatism of their outlook was sharply reflec-
ted during the last three months of the lock-out. They were the
only union whose members voted for an acceptance of the terms
offered in April. And by the time of the second ballot in May
it was clear that the London members of the OSM were in support
of ending the dispute - notwithstanding the views of their own,
militant Executive (183). The EC of the NFBTE resolved on 11th
May that a national lock-out should be declared if no agreement
was reached. The EC's met early in June to discuss the impend-
ing lock—out and it was apparent that they wished to avert the
threat by bringing the dispute to an end (184). A further ballot
was held, despite the objections of the London Management Com-
mittees of some of the societies (185). Against the advice of
the EC's and indeed some of the London Leadership, the vote once
again went against settlement — 4,565 in favour to 14,081 against.
Only two societies, the OSM and the Machinists voted in favour
and the OSM immediately announced that if no further steps were
taken by the LBIF they would open sectional negotiations with
the LMBA. (186) The Stonemasons, the Engine and Crane Drivers
and the Woodcutting Machinists renewed their working rule agree-
ments in July on the terms recommended in June. Facing disunity
in London and with the threat of a national lock—out due to
commence on August 15th, the Joint Executives hastened to end
the dispute. (187)
The Executives now confronted the tricky problem of persuading
or coercing their London memberships to accept an agreement
which differed little from those they had previously rejected.
Their situation was complicated by the fact that the London
employers were insisting on local representatives putting their
signatures to the agreement. They met with considerable resis-
tance and, in the case of the ASC&J, the Executive were obliged
to dismiss the London MC and appoint their own representatives
to control the affairs of the London District, whose signature
was accepted by the employers (188). Within the CBS, leaders of
the Metropolitan District Committee, Harry Adams and J. Lane,
refused to sign the agreement, unless they first had the sanction
of the Metropolitan branches (199). It was not the outbreak of
war which ended the London dispute as Postgate suggests. Rather
it was the determination of the Joint Executives, acting in
concert, to control their London members and to avert the threat
of a national lock-out.
The dispute highlighted the fundamental weakness of the frag-
mented structure of the building trade unions. Within the
London area the LEIF was able to link the various trades and
initiate action in the face of the employer& attack. But as
soon as the focus of negotiations was shifted to national level
by the threat of the Employers to instigate a national lock-out,
the need for a body to take decisions and to initiate action at
national level was apparent. The Executives of the building
trades unions faced two problems. Firstly they were required
to negotiate with the Executive of the NFBTE at national rather
than at district level. And secondly, in doing this, they were
required to exert some authority over their London memberships,
whose allegiance was to the local Federation over which they,
that is the National Executives, had no control. They responded
by meetings of representatives of the various Executives, but
their ad hoc meetings continued and were given formal status in
the months which followed through the formation of the National
Associated Building Trades Council. (190)
The problems of structural change before 1914 
Two forms of merger were projected within the building trade
unions before the outbreak of war. The first concerned
amalgamation between cognate trades, where unions recruited
within the same or similar crafts. The second was related to
the wider movement for industrial unionism and proposed to
overcome the barriers separating craft from craft by the forma-
tion of one big union for the building industry. Postgate
identified three main factois inhibiting progress towards an
industrial union — (191) the state of the law, the apathy of the
members and the opposition of the officials. These factors, it
could be argued were as much a hindrance to less ambitious pro-
posals for merger between kindred trades as they were to the
more sweeping propositions for one big union. Both types of
amalgamation were obstructed by the Trade Union (Amalgamation)
Act which posed an insuperable problem every time two or more
unions moved close to the point where merger seemed tobe a real
possibility. In the case of the carpenters and joiners in 1904
the legislation prevented an amalgamation to which the assent had
been obtained of a vast majority in each of the unions concerned.
And if, in the case of the Painters and the Associated Carpenters
and Joiners, some progress was made in the direction of unifica-
tion, this seems to have been in spite of, rather than because of
the workings of legislation governing trade union amalgamation.
One of the imponderable factors, when the question of merger is
considered at this time, is the extent to which legislation
discouraged trade union leaders from initiating talks in that
direction. If it was clear that amalgamation was made almost
impossible by the state of the law, then it is unlikely that much
effort would be made in discussing and formulating the details
of projected mergers, which would be dropped because of the
inability of one or other of the unions involved to satisfy the
stringent voting requirements which must be fulfilled. If this
was an important element inhibiting discussion of the more
limited cognate trade mergers, where the logic of recruitment
sometimes seemed to impel union leaders into talks in spite of
themselves, how much more significant would it be for the
broader industrial union which was the theme of the period
1910-1914.
The importance of the law in obstructing amalgamation does not
weaken Postate t s other points which were related to the apathy
of the members and the resistance of the officials. It is per-
haps unfair to allege that it was the members who had joined
following the passing of the National Insurance Act who were the
apathetic non-voters on the question of amalgamation, although
it is not unreasonable to assume that some at least of the new
members would have little sense of the importance of such a vote.
But given the discrepancy in voting between the ASC&J and the
OBS members on the question of one big union in 1912, the asser-
tion does not seem to be borne out since it is the ASC&J, where
membership had expanded more rapidly, which shows the higher level
of participation in the ballot. It is clear that the members
were often apathetic, or at least insufficiently concerned by the
question of restructuring the building unions, to bother to cast
their votes in elections on the question.
	 Here again it is
difficult to ascertain why this was the case. It may be that
members were confident that amalgamation would receive sufficient
support in any ballot to allow the principle to be accepted, but
it may also be the case that they were not aware - and were not
made aware by their own officials, of the need for a high vote
if the changes were to be realised. Although this factor may
have been significant in some of the early projects for merger,
it was certainly not the case after 1910, when advocates of indus-
trial unionism included information on the need for a substantial
poll within their general propaganda on the one big union. And
despite their attempts to raise interest and enthusiasm about the
issue, the % of members voting in the poll in 1912, as has
already been noted, was, with the exception of the ASC&J,
extremely low. It has been argued that the period 1910-14 was
one which was characterised by I proto-syndicalist mood' (192),
by a wave of class feeling which both corresponded to and
encouraged the spread of ideas associated with syndicalism.
But the limitations to this argument are suggested within the
building trades, where a response to industrial unionism and to
syndicalism was apparent to some extent in London and the better
organised industrial centres, but, in terms of the aggregate
membership was evident only amongst a tiny proportion of crafts-
men. The improvement in building activity and the broader
economic climate combined to encourage a movement on issues of
wages and conditions, with or without the support of union
Executives and officials, but it could not be claimed that on
the basis of participation in ballots and campaigns on the issue
of the one big union, which provide an indication of the con-
sciousness of the members, the majority of members had more than
the vaguest notion of the issues which had been taken up by the
militant minority.
The attitude of officials, as Postgate suggests did little to
further the progress of amalgamation, although here a difference
must be noted between their conduct in talks of limited or
cognate mergers, and between schemes for wider amalgamation.
It is true that they were weighed down by the 'dead hand of
tradition', at least ih the case of the craft organisations, but
where a limited merger promised to strengthen and centralise con-
trol by leaders of the largest union in each craft, it was likely
to be taken up and to receive support from officials who, in
other instances, would be reluctant to accept the philosophy
behind projects for amalgamation. The clearest example is the
attitude shown by the GS and the members of both Executive and
General Councils within the ASCW during the period 1903-1910,
when absorption of the smaller woodworking societies was actively
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pursued. Their attitude was paralleled within the OBS in relation
to the MUOB, and within the NASOH&SP&D as regards the assimilation
of smaller societies of painters. In all of these cases the lead-
ing officials of the larger unions accepted the need for the
consolidation of their societypalthough their concern was not
always reflected in an awareness of the sensibilities of leaders
of the smaller societies. Here it is clear that there was resis-
tance, especially where the General Secretary might expect to lose
his position and his salary if the merger were successfully con-
cluded. Geo. Clarke of the MUOB actively resisted attempts by
representatives of the OBS to have the question of amalgamation
between the two unions raised with members of the smaller organi-
sation. And leaders of the smaller unions of woodworkers were
reluctant to contemplate assimilation into the ASC&J. In justifi-
cation, for the attitudes shown in this respect, it must be said
that the officials of the larger unions did not suggest, by their
stance in negotiations that the particular interests and concerns
of members of the smaller craft societies would be given their
continued attention once a merger was realised. The reluctance
of the ASC&J leadership to contemplate any alteration to their
rules in accordance with the more open admissions procedure of the
General Union was a serious obstacle to any advance in rationa-
lisation of trade union structure, and it is clear from the break
through which was made in 1904, that a concession on this point
could win over both leaders and members of the General Union to
the cause of amalgamation.
As regards proposals for one big union for the building industry,
opposition from the official level was much wider, although, as
has already been noted in the case of the OBS, it was by no
means unanimous. The project for a broad amalgamation called
into question, not just the organisation and structure of the
existing movement, but its functions and purpose. Leaders of the
craft societies were, by 1912, caught up in a framework for
negotiation which tied them, in terms of their function and
interests, to the existing relations between capital and labour.
Although the framework, in the form of the Conciliation Boards,
was subject to criticism, both the employers and the officials
of the building unions saw the need for its maintenance or its
improvement rather than its abolition. Representatives of the
operatives, at this level, were in no way prepared to take on
board the arguments of the syndicalists which challenged the
rights of the employers to own and control the industry in which
their members were engaged. They understood that organisation
along industrial lines posed a threat to their social philosphy
as well as to the form of their organisation, and they moved to
contain and to discredit syndicalists who campaigned for the
one big union. At the same time leaders of the larger unions
absorbed and reproduced some of the rhetoric associated with
industrial unionism, where it could be aligned with their own
aims of rationalising, although not fundamentally restructuring,
the existing crafts societies. They took from the syndicalists
a language which was associated, essentially, with class conflict.
And they attached it to their own designs for reorganisation
through federation and for the operation and improvement of
collective bargaining machinery.
The problems of sectionalism facing the industrial unionists were of
far more immediate concern than the consideration of the detailed
operations of the one big union. It was the entrenched resistance
from within the craft unions, the opposition of their leaders and
the lack of commitment of their members which proved to be the
major obstacle.
"While nothing was easier in theory than for the building
operatives to unite in one revolutionary union, the obstacles
created by their past history were immense. The very strength
of the work of Applegarth and Coulson was a hindrance." (193)
The craft basis of the building trade unions would not easily
be swept away.
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Pt. 2. National Trade Uniols and The National Federation
This second part of the thesis comprises three chapters (ie
chapters 2-4).
Chapter 2 deals with the unions in war time covering the years
1914-20.	 The most notable organisational feature of these
years for the building trade unions was the creation of the
National Federation of Building Trades Operatives. In order to
explain this development an account is given of the impact of
war on the industry and its negotiating machinery. The emer-
gence of shop steward organisation in building production, in
aircraft woodworking and in other areas is highlighted and its
importance is counterposed to the formation of the National
Federation. Finally attention is turned to the post-war period
and to the confirmation of the new structures.
In chapter 3 attention is turned to the amalgamations which
were concluded at the end of the war. The history of merger
discussions is traced, firstly between kindred trades, and
secondly across the traditional boundaries between crafts, and
between craftsmen and labourers. The chapter concludes with
some comments on the nature of the mergers which were concluded
in this period, both as to their extent and their limitations.
In the fourth chapter the history of the building trade unions
is traced during the inter-war yenrs. Political and economic
changes were of primary importance for the industry and its
workers, and an account is given of the operation of the new
bargaining and organisational structures and their adaptation
to peace-time circumstances.
Trade union organisation and collective bargaining were national
in scope by 1920. The Natj 'nal Federation of Building Trades
Operatives, set up during the Great War, was adapted to the
demands of the post-war situation over the years which followed.
CHAPTER 2. 
THE FORMATION OF THE NFBTO 1914-20
The formation of the NFBTO, 1914-20 
Introduction
The first world war marked a watershed in the history of
British Labour.
	
Before 1914 labour leaders had played little
part in the process of government. 	 For the first time
between 1914 and 1918, trade union leaders were taken into
partnership by the state albeit in a rather junior capacity.
The urgent need for labour, both for the military and for war
industries lent a new significance to the influence of trade
_union leaders in particular amongst the working population.
This influence was harnessed by the state to ensure the success-
ful prosecution of the war. 	 Within the workplace this develop-
ment was paralleled by the growth in shopfloor organisation.
Union membership expanded dramatically - membership of unions
affiliated to the TUC almost quadrupled between 1910 and 1920.
(1)	 Trade union organisation touched many workers who pre-
viously had been outside its scope. Many women became trade
union members for the first time (2).	 Shop floor strength was
felt through the emergent shop stewards' movement, based
primarily on the engineering industry. The distance between
members and officials, between shopfloor representatives and
union leaders was widening, but this only added to the power of
stewards, since their leaders were committed to, and implicated
by policies and decisions which derived from government, rather
than from their own members.
The war generated sharper conflicts and greater industrial
unrest than had been apparent even in the turbulent years which
preceded its outbreak.	 The increases in food prices, the
inadequate housing which was accentuated by the movement of
population during the war years heightened the unrest which was
associated with government intervention in labour relations.
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The introduction of militar:: conscription and arrangements for
exemption, the controls established over the movement of labour an
the outlawing of strikes contributed to a climate of hostility
in which compliance with and enthusiasm for the war effort were
replaced by disaffection and in some cases outright hostility
to government policies. (3)
	
There was a growing belief,
encouraged by events in Russia, that social changes were imminent.
And in this context there was a move to reformulate policies
and restructure organisations to fit'the challenge of the post-
war years.	 Amongst employers as well as amongst trade unionists
there was an awareness that the post-war reconstruction demanded
a new approach to relations between employers and operatives.
This view was encouraged by the combativity of labour at the
end of the war but the changes which were implemented outlasted
the post-war industrial conflicts.
In the building trades, as elsewhere there were moves to new
structures as relations between employers and operatives were
consolidated at the national level. 	 One of the bodies to
emerge from this period was the National Federation of Building
Trades Operatives, an organisation which survived, with some
adaptations, through to the formation of UCATT. A federation
of this type demands attention in a study of trade union struc-
ture for it seems likely that its formation was of profound
importance to the continued and independent existence of those
unions which claimed a craft tradition. 	 Proposals for federa-
tion had long been counterposed to schemes of amalgamation, and
an account must be given of the reasons for which federation
was finally implemented. The functions of the new Federation
will be considered in respect of the changing relationship with
the employers. How far did the NFBTO derive from the shift, in
wartime, towards national collective bargaining? What role did
it occupy in the arrangemen f s for bargaining, And what other
functions did it assume in the context of sectional craft
organisation? What were the arrangements govelng inter-union
relations within the NFBTO? And how much autonomy remained to
the affiliated unions? These questions are central to an
understanding, not only of the Federation itself, but also of
the unions of which it was composed. The chapter which follows
focuses on the formation of the Federation.	 Attention is given,
firstly to the impact of war on building production. 	 The
development of collective bargaining is then considered, before
an account is given of the formation and structure of the
Federation itself.
The Federation was by no means the only innovation in the indus-
trial organisation of building during this period. Two other
interesting initiatives were taken, although neither of them
claimed the long-term impact which must be ascribed to the NFBTO.
The Building Trades Parliament was instigated by an idealistic
employer, Malcolm Sparkes.	 It was claimed as a new form of
industrial government, including both operatives and employers,
and it was maintained, at least nominally for four and a half
years.	 The National Building Guild was also formed as an out-
come of the widespread concern with questions of industrial
democracy and local Guilds were operated in several areas, most
notably in Manchester and London. But like the Building
Trades Parliament, the Guilds survived only for a brief period.
Both organisations, it was claimed, posed a challenge to the
ownership and control of the industry in which they operated.
Both, it could be argued, reflected the small scale of operations
which still characterised building production. In both bodies
working class control was blurred by aspirations to social
mobility as a means of extending that control. And both were
speedily by-passed as indus l rial conflict replaced projects
for industrial democracy in the post-war era. (4) If the
employers were prepared for concessions whilst demand for build-
ing work was high and labour was in short supply, this did not
remain the case for very long. The Building Trades Parliament
and the Building Guilds raised interesting questions concerning
the control of industry, but neither of them confronted the
problems of the entrenched control of private employers which
ensured that their own existence was-necessarily short-lived.
Larger units of production were encouraged during the war years
and the bigger employers had no intention of permanently relaxing
their control in favour of their workers. Since, in neither
case was there a significant impact on the form or functions of
trade union organisation, it is not intended here to give
further attention to their operations. An account of their
activities has little direct bearing on the question of trade
union structure.
Building Production and the War
The depressed state of building production in many cases during
the first decade of the century was replaced by greater activity
from 1912. In that year employment was fair on the whole, with
unemployment at its lowest level since 1902. (5) That happy
situation was broken by the outbreak of war. Private building
was rapidly cut back, to such an extent that the National
Associated Building Trades Council (NABTC) urged the necessity,
to the Board of Trade, of putting building works into operation.
(6)	 The Public Works Loans Board refused to sanction loans
for housing purposes and discouraged new starts on the grounds
that they would attract men who were eligible for military
service (7). This was followed by the use of the Defence of
the Realm Act (DORA) Regulation 8A (b) to limit the employment
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of labour on private work a:id theconsequence in the early
months of the war was a rise in unemployment in the building
industry. By December 1915 the general level of unemployment
in the building trades was around 59, although the figure for
plumbers, navvies and labourers was rather lower (8). It was
amongst the skilled workers that the impact was most marked,
especially in those areas - for example in stonemasonry, where
the work would normally be of a specialised or ornamental nature.
(9)
As the government requirements for war production were extended
so the range and volume of building production was increased.
The general principle adopted was that new work should not be
allowed unless it was necessary for the prosecution of the war.
The aim was to conserve both materials and labour, and by the
second half of 1915 government . commiLments were such that
unemployment was falling. Some trades were more readily assimi-
lated to war production than were others. Carpenters and joiners
for example could find employment in aircraft construction or
shipbuilding; bricklayers were needed for the construction of
military camps and aerodromes. And although there was less
demand for the skills of plasterers or masons, unemployment was
declining in even these sectors by the second half of 1915.
From this time onwards, building production was hampered by a
shortage of labour (10).	 A further regulation was issued under
the DORA (Regulation 8E) in July 1916 intended to restrict
private building. It forbade the undertaking or completion
of any building contract of more than E500 in value, unless for
a Government contract, a local authority, or by licence for the
Ministry of Munitions (11).	 Some 20% of applicants for a
building licence were refused and prosecutions were made in
some cases for building witl)out a licence. The labour shortage
was worsened by the loss of men to the forces - moves which
were encouraged in some instances in the early months of the
war by trade union leaders who were anxious to rid their trade
of the reserve of unemployed labour (12).	 Despite restrictions
on private building, the shortage of skilled labour persisted
during the second half of the war, although the system of
licences was continued and operated still more stringently (13).
The tasks undertaken by building craftsmen during war time were
often not their habitual ones. As industrial production was
centred in military requirements, so building skills were applied
in this area, and the relocation of building workers was accom-
panied by an adaptation of their traditional skills to new areas
of production. Aircraft manufacture for example had been very
limited before 1914. At the outbreak of war there were only
eight firms making aircraft, of which three were producing
experimental aircraft engines (14). Aircraft production developed
rapidly during the war years, as its importance for the war
effort became apparent. Extensive government factories were
established and hundreds of private firms moved into the area,
either on the manufacture of component parts or on the supply
of aeroplanes. Aircraft construction provided a major sector
of employment for woodworkers from different trades. Coach-
makers, joiners, wheelwrights, organ builders, cabinet makers,
patternmakers and machinists were all employed in the new air-
craft factories, which still relied primarily on woodworking
processes. Many of the operatives were recruited from house-
building and there is little doubt that the requirements of
their new work, whilst within their capacity as tradesmen, using
the same tools, were very different from the joiners' shop or
the building site. Similarly in munitions production, the
immense expansion of output laid a severe strain on facilities
for the manufacture of boxes, particulary for cartridges.
National factories were established and in this area of wood-
working, as in aircraft production, the trend was to the
standardisation of production as output was increased (15).
Whilst bricklayers were more often confined to their traditional
area of employment, the tendency of government departments to
favour rapid temporary constructions precluded the exercise of
the full range of their crafts skills in many instances (16). .
Skilled labour was central to government policy in industry from
1915.	 The intention of the Treasury Agreement of March 1915
was to relax trade union rules and customs and this was followed
in May-June of the same year by the War Munitions Volunteer
Scheme, intended to provide greater labour mobility.
	 From
September of the same year the emphasis was shifted to dilution
of skilled labour, with a view to using unskilled and semi-
skilled labour, wherever possible as a substitute for the
apprentice-trained craftsman (17). Dilution meant
"the entire reorganisation of the workshop with a view to obtain-
ing an output limited only by the number of skilled men available
for skilled work and supervision, and by the quality of the
newest machinery obtainable at home and abroad." (18)
Its first and most important application was intended to be
in machine tool production, but the principle was extended to
other areas in which skill shortage seemed to jeopardize output,
including the building trades. The casual nature of building
work and the shifting location of production facilitated the
introduction of dilutees, since craft resistance was less
feasible where a completely new workforce was being recruited.
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Yet craftsmen were not prerrred to abandon their claims to
exclusive rights over certain types of work. Friction resulted
in two distinct but inter-related situations. Firstly in the
rapidly expanding aircraft industry, where woodworkers were
adapting their skills to the requirements of a new production
process there was anassertion that new work processes should
be designated as craft skills and paid accordingly. Aircraft
manufacture required skills far beyond those needed in other
branches of woodworking, it was claiffied. The same tools were
-used; the same qualities of craft exercised. There was no
difference, it was argued, in the level of aptitude required in
this sphere than in others where the craftsman's worth was fully
recognised and recompensed (19). If one area of conflict
related specifically to the new woodworking processes associated
with aircraft production, the other was centred on the use of
unskilled or semi-skilled labour on particular tasks which had,
hitherto been part of the craftsman's preserve. The 'hammer
and saw' men who appeared in many areas were unwelcome enough,
but the most conspicuous dilutees were the women who were brought i
to factory based woodworking processes not only in aircraft
production, but also in other areas relating to munitions (20).
The intrusion of female labour into the craft world was an
uncomfortable feature of the war years for the woodworking
operative. 'Works previously closed to them are now, to a great
extent dependent on them.'
	 Resistance was impossible, but the
Woodworkers' Trades Unions moved to control both the wages and
the conditions of employment of women in order to protect the
interests of their own members. Claims were submitted, not
only to establish agreed levels of payment for women, but also
to ensure that skilled operatives were not displaced by women .
without other appropriate work being found for them; that
women were not employed whilst skilled male labour was avail-
able; and that dilution should be for the period of the war
only (21).
	 Standards were set by the Munitions (Employment
and remuneration of women and girls employed on woodwork for
aircraft) Order No.1, issued in Sep 1916 (22), but at the local
level the issue remained a sensitive one for the duration of the
war. In parts of London it seemed that 'Girls working with the
men are getting the same rate of wages and are looked on as
mates,Girls working by themselves are not recognised by the
_men.' (23) Women were accepted for as long as their presence
did not challenge the rights of the craftsmen to the skilled
work. The demarcation between skilled and unskilled work was
not clearly established in the fairly new sector of aircraft
production, and disputes inevitably arose as 'it appears that
the whole of the skilled workers under the present instructions
of the Ministry can be worked out by the dilution of Female and
semi-skilled labour'. (24) On this question of female labour,
as on the issue of new processes in aircraft manufacture, there
was concern, both from trade union leaders and members, to
assert the prerogatives of craft skill.
The war had an enormous impact on building production and
building tradesmen. Many craft workers were shifted to new or
unfamiliar sectors where their skills could be applied to war
production. Dilutees appeared in the workshops undertaking
tasks which previously would have been within the preserve of
the time-served craftsman. And employment in private house-
building work was cut back to make way for government projects
in furtherance of the war. The geographical location of pro-
duction was shifted from the larger towns to the more remote
parts of the countryside. Military encampments and aerodromes
were constructed in isolated regions, far removed from the
accommodation, comforts and trade union organisation of the
major cities and towns (25).
	 So building workers found them-
selves not only on different types of work to those which they
might normally tackle, but also in different places, where the
organisation and conditions established in earlier years could
not be taken for granted, but must be fought for again.
Negotiating machinery for the building trades, 1914-20
Regional and district variations in ,Tage rates were accepted by
-trade unions before 1914. Negotiations were pursued on a local
or district basis even though the unions might themselves be
organised nationally. The impact of war on existing arrange-
ments was remarkable for the impetus which it gave to the
establishment of national machinery for collective bargaining
in many areas. The dramatic rise in prices, particularly of
staple commodities created a demand for wage increases to keep
pace, a move which was national in its effects, encouraging a
shift to national arrangements for wage structures and negotia-
tions. Compulsory arbitration, which operated during the second
half of the war, facilitated the consolidation of national
machinery (26). The mobility of labour during war-time, when
industry was relocated and population directed to new centres
of employment, encouraged identity with a national organisation
and national arrangements concerning wage rates. Shop floor
militancy encouraged a new approach to questions of bargaining
arrangements and the government of industry, reflected in the
Report of the Whitley Committee during 1917-18 with its emphasis
on the joint representation of employers and operatives in
national industrial arrangements (27).
All of these trends were reflected in the building trades. The
existence of national conciliation machinery had set a precedent
for the consideration of certain issues across district boun-
daries, but not all localities were within the scheme and its
effectiveness was severely limited by the lack of co-operation
between trades at a national level.	 The 'millstone of concilia-
tion' was often unpopular with operatives, where it seemed to
slow down consideration of grievances and to remove the
initiative from them (28).	 Its limitations had been highlighted
by the lock-out of building workers in London in 1914, initiated
by the employers in response to an alleged violation of working
_rules. The employers were concerned, in a period of escalating
conflict within London building production, to force consi-
deration of grievances through the Conciliation machinery, (to
which the London Building Trades Federation was not affiliated),
to resist strikes against non-unionists and to divide trade from
trade. To this end they initiated a lock-out which endured for
over six months and which was broken only by the compliance of
the executives of most of the unions concerned with the
wishes of the employers. (29) The London lock-out reflected
the uneasy arrangements which existed for the resolution of
disputes. Whilst its conclusion following the outbreak of
war produced no immediate solution to this problem, the
demands of the war itself pointed the way for a new form of
relationship with the employers at national level.
The geographical relocation of building during the war years
necessitated a reappraisal of the system by which wage rates
were set. There was often a wide variation in the level of
wages between towns and the surrounding countryside. If
building workers were to accept employment away from their
own area, particularly in the unpleasant conditions associated
with many of the large-scale projects in more remote regions,
wage rates must be adjusted for those regions to a more
acceptable level. During ie early years of the war there
was a move from negotiating wages town by town or district by
district, into negotiating arrangements which allowed wages
to be settled for a much wider area, such areas including
sometimes three or four counties (30). The objective was a
general uplifting of the lower paid districts to the rates and
conditions of employment which applied to the higher paid
districts. Workers in the country districts stood to benefit
by comparison with operatives in the industrial areas. And if
.labour could be directed from different districts to one large
project in response to the national requirements of war, it
seemed sensible to attempt a rationalisation of wage structure
to correspond to this wider labour market.
If standardisation of wage rates between districts was one part
of the response to the war-time situation, standardisation
between different trades within one district was another.
Local building trades federations were established in many
centres, but their existence did not always imply uniform
arrangements for collective bargaining. Branches or Manage-
ment Committees of a particular union might negotiate with a
local association of employers for their particular trade and
it has been noted that the building industry, prior to the
war, had as many employers' associations as all other indus-
tries put together (31).	 One trade - for example the carpenters
and joiners, might set the pace for others, but this did not
necessarily imply joint, negotiation. In other cases trade
negotiations were pursued completely separately, and there
was no automatic link between trade movements by the different
craft unions. The desirability of joint action at the local
level was quickly appreciated by union members in war-time.
The first move was towards the standardisation of dates for
wage adjus 	 ment and notice for trade movements to be initiated,
so that joint action between trades could be taken.	 This did
not automatically involve standardisation of rates, but it
suggested a commitment to standard increases or at least to
the maintenance of existing differentials. It was agreed that
before any union initiated a movement for higher pay, there
should be consultation of all kindred trades in the locality,
with a view to concerted action (32). The move towards stan-
dardisation between trades as well as across districts was a
significant feature of the war years.
The logical conclusion of a policy which stressed the upgrading
of lower paid to higher paid districts was the establishment of
a national wage structure. The area scheme was a decisive move
in that direction for it could then be claimed that:
"instead of dealing with villages, towns, cities or counties
as we used to do, we are practically settling wages and
conditions of employment for our members in the housebuilding
industry right from John 0' Groats to Land's End." (33)
The employers were not inclined to resist the 'national idea'
during war-time. Indeed some employers were converted to the
notion, and encouraged the standardisation of wage rates as
a move in this direction (34). Throughout the various sectors
in which building trades operatives found employment there
was a tendency to national, rather than local standards for
the duration of the war.
The formation of the NEBTO 
It was the formation of a breakaway organisation, the Building
Workers Industrial Union, which provided the initial reason
for continuing the liaison of the building unions at national
level initiated during the London lock-out. The frustration
felt by militants at the failure of their earlier attempts to
amalgamate the building unions was exacerbated by the confron-
tation between lay activists and officials during the London
lock-out.	 The founding conference of the BWIU in August 2-3
1914 brought together some of the leading militants both from
the Amalgamation Committee and from the strike, men such as
Ingram of the ASC&J, Harry Adams and J. Wills of the OBS,
Beachamp of the Painters and Banfield and Ince of the Labourers.
- (35) The absence of George Hicks, newly appointed to an
organiser's position within the OBS was a disappointment to
the founder members of the BWIU, since he had been involved
in their earlier campaigns and his aspirations to offical
position were blamed. It may be the case that Hicks (who had
already renounced an official position on a previous occasion),
together with other militants who had been associated with
the Amalgamation Campaign, recognised the difficulties of
building up a breakaway union, in the face of the entrenched
position of the craft organisations. The initiative certainly
worried the leaders of the established trade unions, for they
called a joint meeting on September 16th at which the main
question was the attitude to be taken to the newly formed
union (36).	 Their first move was to oppose dual membership
and decisions to disallow membership to men who haft joined the
BWIU had already been taken in the ASC&J, the Painters, the
OSM and the United Builders' Labourers' Union. Secondly it
was agreed that a recommendation be put to all EC's that the
membership cards of the BWIU should not be recognised (37).
The new union was doomed from the outset for war-time con-
ditions ensured that its growth would be impeded. The
hostility of the leaders of the established unions meant
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that its militants could e:xnect more, not less opposition
from this quarter. And members of those unions were unlikely
to give ready support to men whose actions threatened to
undermine their own organisation. The BWIU absorbed the mem-
bership and energies of some of the best of the building trade
union militants, leaving control of the older societies more
firmly in the hands of the established leadership. Leaders
of the Amalgamation Campaign, leaders of the opposition to
federation had been removed. The way was clear for an adjust-
ment of the structure of these societies which could consolidate,
rather than undermine the control of the existing leaders of
the building trades unions. (38)
The constitution of the NABTC was drawn up at a meeting between
representatives of the various trades on October 15 1914. Its
major objectives were twofold: firstly to ensure that the
BWIU should not increase its membership or its influence, and
secondly to make joint representations to the government and
elsewhere, regarding the impact of war on the building industry.
The stagnation of the BWIU allowed the NABTC to concentrate
on the general problems facing building workers in war-time.
In 1915 it took up the question of restrictions on building
work and the refusal of loans for home building by the Public
Works Loans Board. During the following year, when the
Ministry of Munitions issued its order to restrict the availa-
bility of licences for building work it again protested. It
provided a forum for the discussion of general issues during
the first two years of the war,but it was not centrally
involved in collective bargaining which remained the prero-
gative of individual unions, or standing committees (39).
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Proposals for a Federation of Building Trades Unions were
revived in 1916 (40). Once again it seemed that federation
offered the possibility of collaboration without the attendant
difficulties of amalgamation. The exigencies of war demanded
closer co-ordination and the NABTC offered little possibility,
in its existing form for negotiations with the employers, or
even for representation with the Government, over the wide
range of issues which were of common, interest. It was the
leaders of the ASC&J who were especially concerned to con-
solidate the closer links between the building trades unions.
The difficulties of sustaining a campaign against pbr and
dilution when the trade union movement was itself divided on
these issues was apparent by 1916. The problems in aircraft
production in particular, where the Committee on Production
(a body set up in Feb 1915 which became in effect a court of
arbitration between employers and unions) refused to recognise
the building trade rate threatened to undermine the basis on
which the craft societies operated. As the largest of those
societies it was the ASC&J which led the field in oppostion
to the erosion of traditional standards and methods of payment.
The NFBTO was born out of the need to defend craft standards,
through collaboration between craft unions at the national
level (41).
Despite past opposition to the scheme of federation, the
NFBTO was formed on the basis of membership support, expressed
through a ballot held in 1917. This time the results indicated
a majority of members in favour of the principle of federation.
(42)	 The contrast with 1913 was marked. Whereas in the
pre-war era the Federation scheme was undermined by pro-
amalgamationists and had lost when put to the ballot, the
combined Executives were noi able to proceed on the basis of
a positive return. The loss of the younger and more militant
members, both to the army and to the breakaway union may have
strengthened the campaign for federation by removing the most
vocal opposition. But a number of other explanations might
be advanced. Firstly it was clear that little progress could
be made during the war for the wider schemes of amalgamation,
despite the impending changes in the law (43), for the
requisite returns on ballots would be impeded by the dispersal
of members and the disruption of normal branch activities.
Secondly the problems of wartime left little energy for the
construction and pursuit of amalgamation projects. Trade
union officers were undertaking a wider and more complex range
of tasksas their relationship with government deparLments and
with the employers was adapted to wartime needs. Thirdly it
could be argued that federation was not permanent or final,
and could easily be reversed if members opposed it on return-
ing from the war. Amalgamation, by contrast was irreversible.
Finally it was clear, to members and to officials alike, that
some adjus 	 went was necessary in the face of the intense pro-
blems facing building trade unionists. Federation provided
one expedient for maintaining a united front in the face of
the divisive tactics deployed by the employers and the govern-
ment.
The rules of the NFBTO were formulated during 1917 and its
constitution was ratified at a meeting held in Manchester on
February 5th 1918. Its objects were
to uphold the rights of Combination of labour; to consolidate
the unions for mutual protection; the adjustments of disputes
that may arise; to provide financial support in times of
strike or lock-out; to improve the general position and
status of the workers by securing unity of action amongst
the Societies forming the Federation." (44)
Its governing authority was the Executive Council of the
federation which consisted of two members from each affiliated
national union and met quarterly.
	
At the annual meet-
ing of the EC an Emergency Committee was elected to consist of
4 officers and 5 members, but no more than one member of any
trade was to be represented.	 General ,and assis-
tant general secretaries were eligible for appointment to this
body. In many respects the scheme was reminiscent of the 1913
scheme for federation.	 In particular the provision of a
guarantee fund into which all unions must contribute was
designed to strengthen the authority of the federation.
Each union, on affiliation was to pay a fee of 6d per member
on 90% of the total membership. A society became eligible
for benefits only after six months had elapsed since affilia-
tion.	 And if a society decided to disaffiliate it forfeited
all of the subscriptions and contributions which had been
paid.
	
Contributions were intially set at a rate of 8d per
member per year, but the Executive Council were empowered to
raise an additional levy of up to 4d per member per week if
this proved necessary.
	
In return each society was eligible
for trade benefits of 5/- per week and the power to pay or to
withhold payment was vested absolutely in the Executive
Council.. These financial resources distinguished the
NFBTO from the NABTC which was subsumed within it in 1918.
They provided a lever for controlling the activities of
individual unions, or members of unions, since it was provi-
ded that no society should enter into a trade dispute without
first obtaining the clearance of the Emergency Committee or
the Executive Council. Henceforth the sanction for major
trade movements and industrial action was shifted from the
Executives of the individual unions to the governing body of
the Federation (45). The formation of this new body, with
its own rules and offices and its own full time General
Secretary, appointed to his position by the Federation's
Executive Council laid the basis for subsequent amendments to
trade union structure in the building trade world. Henceforth
no changes were possible without reference to the role and
'interests of the Federation.
The NFBTO was given a local as well as a national framework
for its operations. Local branches of the NFBTO were licenced
where there were two or more branches of the national societies
forming the Federation. The local branch of the federation
comprised the trade management committees of each union in the
district, or the branch committee where no management com-
mittee had been formed. These local branches had their own
local Emergency Committee comprising two officers and five
members, with no trade having more than one representative
where there were more than five affiliated unions. Extensive
discussion had taken place within the NABTC on the need to
tighten national control over local federations and it was
agreed that they should be under the direction and control
of the National Executive of the Federation on all matters
concerning Federation action, policy and finance, with an
obligation to submit a half-yearly report on its trans-
actions (46).
Local federations were to consult and and to consider any
potential dispute with a view to united action. The
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secretary of the local federation was to provide the means
of communication with the National Federation and no branch
or lodge could withdraw from the local Federation without the
sanction of their own EC. (47)
	
Before the National Federation
could function effectively it had to assert its authority
over the local federations already in existence. Its first
moves were in this direction.
It was in Liverpool, a volatile centre of trade union activity
that the policing role of the National Federation was most in
evidence in its early days. The unions in Liverpool had
established a local Building .Trades Committee which spanned
the whole of the trades in Liverpool and the surrounding areas
including Bootle, Birkenhead and Wallasey. Despite the exis-
tence of the United Trades Committee, the employers insisted
on maintaining sep-arate negotiations for the individual trades
as late as 1916, resulting in slower procedures since the
unions were obliged to work through two local Conciliation
Boards to cover the area concerned, as well as dealing with
two Master Builders Associations. (48)
	
Delays in processing
the wage claim of 2d an hour, submitted by all the building
trades in Liverpool in 1916 led to strike threats in that
year, but industrial action was averted by the award of an
additional penny an hour. (49)
	 Difficulties could not so
easily be avoided in 1918 after the award of 125',; on time
rates in many trades outside of building production. The
Liverpool operatives acted on constitutional lines submitting
their claim for an advance, firstly through the local machinery
and then to the Northern Centre Board of Conciliation, who
awarded the increase. (50) 	 The National Board, together
with other District Boards complained that the new Liverpool
arrangements upset other district rates, although the
decision had been reached in accordance with agreed procedures.
The government was concerned that the new rate had not been
related specifically to the 12-:f! award in other areas and so
telegrams were sent out to all Liverpool jobs under govern-
ment control, forbidding payment of the increase (51).
	 A
reference to the Committee on Production was proposed, but the
prospect of the government arbitrating in its own case
aroused little enthusiasm amongst the operatives. A mass
meeting of thousands of the Liverpool-workers was held on
May 26,1918, when they decided, in accordance with the
Munitions of War Acts to give 21 days notice of the intention
to cease work (52).	 It was at this point that the National
Federation became involved. Their assistance was requested
by the Liverpool operatives, but despite the fact that the award
had been reached in accordance with established procedures the
Emergency Committee decided that: "However aggravating the
circumstances may be, we advise that the whole matter be left in
the hands of this Federation to co-operate with the National
Federation of Employers to take such steps as they may deem
necessary to arrive at the best solution of the difficulty and
that the Liverpool operatives withdraw their notice to cease
work and notify the Government that the whole matter has been
relegated to the NFBTO to settle." (53) The application of a
national award within the Liverpool District carried with it
implications for other areas. Questions of District wage awards
ceased to be purely regional in their application, and as their
significance was recognised at the national plane, so the atten-
tion of the National Federation was directed to the immediate
problem of controlling the local branches of the Federation.
The issue, in this instance was resolved with only a few minor
stoppages, but as emphasis was increasingly placed on bargain-
ing at national level, the problem was, inevitably to recur.
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The Liverpool operatives we , e not easily placated with the
assurance that the National Federation was in control. Since
Liverpool was, by tradition, a high wage area for building
workers the rationalisation and standardisation of rates over
wider geographical areas threatened to be a levelling down
exercise in their case. The conclusion of the North West
Area Agreement as part of the Area scheme, was challenged by
the strike action of Liverpool operatives in June 1919. Des-
pite the express disapproval of the Federation's Emergency
Committee, the strike was pursued until the North Western
Federation of Building Trades Employers conceded that they
would reconsider the terms of the existing agreement, provided
that there was a resumption of work (54). But try as they
might the members of the Emergency Committee could not recon-
cile the national authority of the federation with the local
militancy on wage issues. Executives of the affiliated unions
were instructed to exercise all of their authority to get their
members back to work and it finally proved necessary for rep-
resentatives of some of the EC's to go to Liverpool to meet
representatives from the local Managment Committees. The
question of the Area award was referred to the National Con-
ciliation Board for consideration and their award was made
on October 24 1919 (55). But the fundamental problem could
not so simply be resolved. If the role of the Federation was
to settle national wage rates which were relevant to the
country as a whole, then the Emergency Committee must contain
the militancy of the higher paid areas, harnessing their
energies for the national campaign and controlling local
initiatives which threatened to throw the delicate balance of
district variations. It was in Liverpool that the problems
were most acute, but the difficulties were not confined to
Liverpool.
The autonomy of local orgar i.sation was less closely guarded
in other areas, but a certain resistance to the authority of
the centralbodies of the National Federation was evidenced
during 1919 and 1920.	 Building workers in Edinburgh
expressed the view that, whilst Federation was in principle
acceptable, they should be permitted to form a separate
federation for Scotland and that the amount now being paid
to the national organisation by them should be allocated for
their own use. (56) In England too the role of the federa-
-tion was not always appreciated. In Northampton for example,
where a local federation had been set up in accordance with
the provisions of the NFBTO constitution, men were reluctant
to join it. And in London, where as in Liverpool, the Emer-
gency Committee were involved in holding back the initiative
for an increase in wages during 1918, there was a reluctance
to pass over authority to the national body (57).
If the more militant and better organised areas saw disadvan-
tages in the consolidation of the national federation, the
converse tended to be true of the weaker or unorganised
regions. A major innovation was made to organising practice
in 1918, when it was proposed that a new form of branch organi-
sation should be brought into being, uniting all of the building
trades in localities where there were too few members of any
one union to establish viable branches of the affiliated
unions (58). These composite branches as they were known,
were welcomed in the rural areas where little progress had
been made in organising building trades unions. In East
Anglia it was reported that
"They have been opened in districts unknown to trade unionism
and require a good deal of attention as the Building Trade
workers have suffered in tlse districts for years from that
terrible fear, that if they become trade unionists, their
employers will have done with their services".
In Aylesbury, Buntingford, Bishops' Stortford, Sheringham,
Royston, Sudbury, Stevenage, Halesworth, Yarmouth and
Lowestoft 'mass' meetings were held with a view to confronting
this "master ridden fever" (59).
	
Here at least it seemed
that a form of organisation could be 'developedwhich cut
-across trade barriers, strengthening organisation at a point
where craft division might preclude further expansion (60).
The Executive Council of the . NFBTO had full control over the
functions and activities of the composite section. Two
classes of membership were allowed. Firstly there were the
'A' members who were directly connected with the section.
And secondly there were the 1 B , members who still retained a
connection with their own organisation, but used the head
office of the federation as a clearing house for the payment
of contributions. (61) For the craftsman, accustomed to the
sectonal organisation which dominated the building trades
unions, the innovation must have appeared as revolutionary.
The composite branches implied organisation along industrial
lines, a notion which was certainly not replicated within the
scheme for National Federation at the general level.
As a means of improving contacts with local branches of the
federation, and with the newly foi.med composite branches, it
was agreed in 1920 that regional bodies could be set up
where necessary.
	 Regional District Councils were to be
established on the authority of the Executive, and at their
discretion there could be appointed a full—time organising
secretary for each Council. Each local branch of the
federation was free to nominate candidates for this position,
and the National Emergency Committee was to draw up a short-
list of three candidates whose names would be presented to
the Executive, who were responsible for taking the decision
on the appoin 	 ment. This full-time official was to be the
sole means of correspondence with the national executive coun-
cil, the link between the national federation and its local
operations. The establishment of a cadre of officers at this
level lent the federation an identity within the regions which
' otherwise would have been absent. It was especially important
in view of the evolution of bargaining machinery for the
regions. If the rationale of the NFBTO lay in its importance
in bargaining with the employers, it was the more effective
for fulfilling this function at the regional as well as at
the national plane.
Crucial to the operations of the National Federation was its
capacity to exert control over the actions of its affiliates
at local level. But it was not directly answerable to its
own local branches at this stage, for there was no annual
conference separate from that of the Emergency Committee. It
was the national executives of the affiliated societies who
directed the policies of the Federation, through their rep-
resentation on its governing bodies and members at rank and
file level, could influence federation policy only indirectly
through their own Executive Council. An attempt to instigate
an annual conference representative of the local branches
was rejected in 1919 but it was allowed that some reference
must be made, on occasion, to the bulk of the membership.
It was agreed therefore that all questions of policy of a
national character, affecting large numbers of members should
be submitted to ballot - a move designed to allow a limited
expression of membership opinion on the policies of the
federation (62). Clearly decisions as to what constituted
questions 'of a national character' and what affected 'large
numbers of members' remained in the hands of the Federation's
governing bodies. The formulation of the questions to be put
also rested with the Executive or the Emergency Committee so
that the procedure was designed to curtail, rather than to
encourage the formulation of policy In line with the expres-
-sed views of the members. At its inception at least, the
federation was designed for liaison at the level of existing
union leadership although on . local issues it formalised
arrangements for contacts between trades.
It was intended that the federation should provide, from its
inception some control over the structural changes affecting
unions in building production. Recognised by the employers
and the government at national level, it restricted affilia-
tions to national unions and in principle (although not always
in practice) allowed membership only to the major organisa-
tion for each trade or occupation. The membership of two
societies of carpenters and two societies of bricklayers was
tolerated since it was expected that they would merge. But
the federation's authority was used in the case of a local
bricklayers' union, based in Sheffield, which was refused
affiliation and advised that members should join one of the
national unions organising in their trade (63). Similarly
applications were refused from the Operative Glaziers and
Assistants, but it was in relation to the organisations of
labourers and semi-skilled workers that the most difficult
questions were raised.	 The intention of the leaders of the
craft societies was that, by restricting the affiliations
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from the labourers' societis, those bodes which recruited
solely amongst builders' labourers and navvies would be
forced to amalgamate (64). This would provide a unified
organisation of builders' labourers, which would be in a
stronger position to recruit than the general unions which
also were established within the industry. Two organisations
of builders' labourers were allowed membership on second appli-
cation - the Navvies, Builders, Labourers and General
Labourers and the United Order of General Labourers (65).
010‘,
But their affiliation was allowed conktional in the conclusion
of successful discussions between the builders labourers unions
regarding amalgamation (66). 	 It was the initiative of the
Navvies Union respecting the establishment of separate bargain-
ing machinery for the civil engineering industry which under-
mined the projects of the craft leaders for amalgamation of
the labourers' unions. Their influence over the labourers
derived from their control of the bargaining machinery and
from the position of the NFBTO as the recognised negotiating body
on the union side.	 Once this was shaken by the creation of
alternative bargaining machinery the possibilities for influenc-
ing the labourers' unions to merge were seriously reduced.
Discussions between the labourers' societies were continued
for the moment but the prospects for a successful outcome
were not propitious (67).
Building for war production
War production disrupted completely the pattern of employment
and the trade union organisation which prevailed in building
operations in 1914. Firstly the impact was effected through
the departure of many of the younger operatives to the forces,
leaving those over the age of 31 to man the industry for the
duration of the war (68).
	
It seems likely that in the early
months of the war, when unrnployment was high in this sector
and when popular enthusiasm for the war was still widespread,
the younger operatives may have experienced an economic as
well as an ideological pressure to join up (69). Secondly it
is apparent that the direct involvement of government in
commissioning building works, in the context of military
requirements meant that the production which was undertaken
was completely different in type to that which was pursued
during peace time. The construction'of military huLments for
_troops or the erection of factories for munitions manufacture
placed a premium on speed, and a lesser value was attached to
the range and quality of craft skills which might be deployed
in other periods. The work which was undertaken was more
routine and repetitive and temporary dwellings were erected
in areas where the shortage of accommodation was most acute
(70). Thirdly, the relocation of building work, outside of
the main towns, sometimes in the more remote regions of the
countryside posed enormous difficulties, both for the govern-
ment and for the trade unions. The problem confronting the
government was the recruitment and retention of labour in these
isolated spots. Before any huLments were begun — as early
as August 1914, the London organiser of the ASC&J offered the
services of the union as a means of supplying labour to any
part of the country for work of this type. The intention was
that, by retaining control of the supply of labour the union
would be able to ensure that these new sites were organised
and controlled by their members (71). It was apparent even
at this stage that if building work were centred in regions
where the unions had little or no presence, they could be
organised effectively only through a control of the labour
supply at the central level.
The question of maintaining trade union organisation on these
new sites was central, both for the rank and file activist,
and for the trade union leader to the struggles of the war
years. Existing branches were depleted of their activists
and officers by the dual disruption of military service and
military building.	 And in the new centres of military pro-
duction it was essential to reconstruct the framework for
trade union organisation if the principles and policies on
which those trade unions operated were to be sustained for the
duration of the war. It was for this reason that there was
an extensive commitment from the national headquarters of the
unions concerned to the supply of labour for military work
(72). And the same problem was used to justify the increased
number of organisers and delegates whose job it was to recruit
over a district or within a particular township where the lack
of uniformity in conditions and the obstructive attitude of
many. contractors or their subsidiaries precluded the develop-
ment of organisation by the men actually employed there.
The problems inhibiting trade union organisation and the obser-
vation of trade union conditions were illustrated by the
experiences of the ASC&J camp delegate at the Salisbury Plain
camps. Many of the men in the camps on the Bristol side of
Salisbury were lodged in Salisbury or Warminster and were
taken each day by workmen's trains to the nearest station to
the camp on which they were engaged, walking the remainder of
the distance, through the mud to their work. Others were
lodged in huts at the camps themselves. The difficulties of
establishing a branch organisation, in the face of the dread-
ful travelling arrangements and the scattered locations of the
workforce encouraged the ASO&J camp delegate to establish an
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'emergency branch' of the Society at Salisbury, collecting
union contributions personally, contrary to the normal ASC'JJ
practice, and encouraging the men to set up Camp Committees
to deal with the problems of their particular Camps. The
appalling absence of welfare facilities, particula or the
men who were lodged at the camps themselves was compounded by
the wet weather which was abnormally bad during the first
winter of the war (73).
	 Union members were often misled
about the conditions which they could expect on camp jobs and
not surprisingly there was exasperation at the shortage of
accommodation, the poor quality of the food, the verminous
beds, the wet blankets and the absence of medical attention.
Attempts to build trade union organisation, both in the camps
and in the locality, met with resistance, and then with out-
right hostility from the authorities in this situation.
	
The
camp delegate was confronted, during a meeting with a foreman,
by a posse of military police who escOUted him off the camp
as far as the nearest railway station and refused him subsequent
entry (74).
	
Whilst another delegate was subsequently allowed
on the camps, it is clear that the employers were resistant to
trade union organisation at site level.
	
However respectable
the image of the unions nationally, their presence on camp jobs
could be sustained only by the efforts of national delegates
committed to organising on a full-time basis. Apart from the
work on Salisbury camps ' the ASC&J appointed organisers to
work on camps in Southampton and, Winchester; in Birmingham
and Oldham; in Edinburgh, Hartlepool, Liverpool and London (75).
The OBS was also committed to the appoinLment of full-time
delegates to organise at site level. Work on the construction
of a large cordite factory was begun in Gretna in August 1915.
By October there were some ! ; ,000 workers on the site, where
building work was initiated, not only on the factory itself,
but also on accommodation and public buildings appropriate to
a centre which it was expected would employ from 10,000 -
15,000 workers (76).	 The primary problem was one of site
organisation and in October 1915 a full-time organiser was
appointed to the job by the OBS (77). 	 The major difficulties
derived from the employment of non-union labour and the lack
of liaison between contractors which 'made negotiations for
standard trade union wages and conditions almost impossible.
More generally at district level the OBS established a number
of organisers by the beginning of 1917 who were responsible
for recruiting and developing organisation in the changed cir-
cumstances of the war. Organisers were able to pursue the
question of wages negotiations, encouraging the observation of
agreed wage rates and assisting with claims for improvements.
Government involvement in building production was crucial to
the move towards the standardisation of wage rates over the
whole country.
	
In 1915 an interdeparLmental committee was
set up to link the various contracting deparLments in review-
ing wage issues. (78) 	 Its powers were limited and the problems
at Gretna and at other sites/ illustrated the difficulties of
enforcing district rates where contractors moved into an area
where trade union organisation had previously made little
impact, recruiting their own labour on their own terms. An
appeal was made by the building trade unions to the Government
to ensure that contractors observed the agreed rates and a
scheme was established in 1916 allowing the Inderdeparbmental
Committee to intervene in the agreement of district rates, with
provision for reference to arbitration if no agreement was
reached. (79)	 District rates and conditions, once formalised
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along these lines provided the basis for a more systematic
and standardised approach to the settlement of wages at the
national level, since the justification for adjusLments, in
terms of the impact of price increases as well as the method
of settlement through arbitration, invited comparison which
was national in scope.
Comparison with the experience of engineering craftsmen is less
relevant to an account of the probleffis confronting building
trades operatives in the war years than it is say to the air-
craft woodworkers.
	 The obstacles to trade union organisation
posed by the casual employment and the shifting location of
production was nothing new for the building trade worker. But
the significance of war-time production lay in the heightened
impact of these problems as government intervention forced the
reorganisation of building production according to military
requirements.
	 The identification of stewards on sites related
to the question of trade union organisation and the need for
card checks to be conducted.
	 The responsibilities of the
steward were defined by the problem of sustaining organisation
and ensuring the observance of agreed rates and conditions
for the district. Stewards were not obliged to negotiate on
questions of piecework payments, since the traditional adherence
to the plain-time rate was maintained and their commilments
lay in quite another area. Organisers and stewards worked
in tandem to boost recruitment and organisation and there
was less reason for conflict between the full-time official
and the lay activist than within engineering, where workshop
organisation did not accord with the fo/mal provisions on
trade union structure. (80)
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Building Trades Woodworkers in Aircraft Production
For woodworkers involved in aircraft manufacture, the novelty
of the industry, and its vital part in the war effort raised
tricky bargaining issues.
	
The employers who were, for the
most part, members of the Engineering Employers Association,
rather than members of the NFBTE contended that 'aircraft'
was a section of the engineering industry and should not in
consequence be paid at the rates or in accordance with the
conditions set down for the building 'trades (81). This
ambiguous status combined with the absence of established con-
ditions to stimulate widespread unrest. The major problem
concerned the system of payment which was to be adopted.
Piecework had been accepted within the engineering industry
following the lock-out of 1897, but it had never been regarded
as an acceptable form of payment for the building trades who
adhered to the plain-time system. If pbr were accepted in
aircraft manufacture, its introduction in shipbuilding and
housebuilding for building trades operatives would certainly be
eased. The problem was complicated by the fact that some of
the craftsmen accepting employment on aircraft manufacture
were members of unions which allowed piecework, although the
majority were from organisations which, like the ASC&J, were
opposed to the system (82). The absence of established bargain-
ing arrangements combined with the introduction of pbr in
many aircraft establishments to stimulate discontent.
	 The
agitation escalated during the war in centres such as London,
Bristol and Manchester as woodworkers, realising the demand
for their skills, asserted their right to an appropriate
level of remuneration.
In the early stages of the war, wage claims were pursued at
district level. In the London District, where there were 23
aircraft factories establisl ! ed before the end of 1914, 11
different district rates were being paid to the men they
employed.	 A London District Aircraft Workers Committee was
quickly set up to investigate the rates of pay and conditions
which were operating at all of the London factories. In Nay
1915 a claim was submitted to cover all aircraft workers in
London. The claim was ignored until a strike was threatened,
at which point the government intervened, through the medium of
the Chief Industrial Commissioner. (a3) The issue was twice
submitted to the Committee on Production for a decision and on
both occasions the claims of the operatives were rejected.
(84)	 In 1916 a third claim was drawn up, for a standard time
rate of 1-0d per hour, backed this time by a threat to with-
draw labour if the claim were not met. (85) A ballot of wood-
workers in the London aircraft industry gave overwhelming
support to the proposal for industrial action if their claim
were not met. Of 2,700 operatives, 2,400 requested their
leaving certificates (86). But the government again stepped
in and negotiations were arranged between the Ministry of
Munitions, the Admiralty and the War Office, and the National
(Executives) Aircraft Committee, a body linking woodworking
trade unionth with members in aircraft production. But before
negotiations could be resumed, it was insisted that the ap pli-
cations for leaving certificates be withdrawn. After some
hesitation, the national officials responsible for negotiations
made a recommendation to this effect, pending consideration of
the claim.
	 The result was an award allowing pay increases to
all operatives, but making no concessions on the question of
a working rule agreement or a standard rate. The principle
that the highest prevailing district rate for a woodworking
trade should be applied in aircraft manufacture had not been
established.
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In Glasgow similar claims wc, re pursued, again with the aim
that the highest district rate for a woodworking trade should
be applied. In thesecases too the claims were taken to the
Committee on Production and once again they were rejected (87).
The decision given at the time of the second London claim
(Jan 1916) was cited, and it was argued that the industry was
too new to be classified, but that it was undesirable to apply
building industry rates to aeroplane manufacture. (88)
The difficulties confronting trade union leaders, committed to
the principle of a plain-time system were severe. It was
estimated that the system of pbr covered some 40-5T: of workers
engaged in aircraft production and in some areas the percentage
was much higher. In Coventry where piecework was an accepted
feature of ngineering production, there was little resistance
to its application amongst woodworking craftsmen (89).
	 And
the variation within as well as between districts made resis-
tance more difficult.
	 The position whit/h was reiterated by
the Committee on Production in its awards both to the London
and the Glasgow Districts allowed the employers to evade res-
ponsibilities under existing agreements and to exploit the
differences in background and trade identity of the wood-
working crafts recruited onto aircraft work. Even between
Government deparLments there were differences in approach for
the Admiralty employed men only on time work, whilst the
War Office paid only on a piece work basis (90). Reliance on
the awards of the Committee on Production eliminated the
possibility of effective resistance to a form of payment
which threatened to uncle/mine trade union organisation in wood-
working. Little alternative remained to the leaders of the
ASC&J, the largest of the woodworking unions, than to build
resistance to pbr by consolidating their control over the
supply of labour and over tide union rolicies in tbis now
and troublesome area.
Negotiations concerning the appropriate rates and conditions
for aircraft woodworkers were consequently shifted to the
national plane. In February 1916 a conference of the execu-
tives of the Woodworking Unions was held in order to review
the situation in aircraft. It was agreed that joint action be
taken and submissions were made during 1916 to the Minister of
Munitions who declared simply that the aircraft industry was
controlled by the awards of the Committee on Troduction.
Further protests were issued at the refusal of the Committee to
agree a national code of rules and its willingness to accept
the erosion of established working arrangements.
	 A National
Woodworkers Aircraft Committee was set up in 1916, both to
assist with the formation of local Aircraft Committees along
the lines of those already in existence in London and Glasgow,
and to pursue the claims already submitted for agreed working
rules. It was the National Aircraft Committee which was res-
ponsible for negotiations on the London claim during 1916 with
the employers and the government.
	 Further pressure for an
increase for woodworkers in the early months of 1917, in line
with awards made for other areas were met by pressing demands
from the .Government that piecework be formally accepted in air-
craft production for the duration of the war. The urgency of
production requirements was emphasised by representatives of
the Government in support of their piecework proposals. They
were countered by the claims of the National Aircraft Committee
for the establishment of plain-time rates and the formation of
a National Advisory Committee to deal with labour questions,
together with permission for shop committees to be organised
in all aircraft factories. (91)
	 In August 1917 the Robinson
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Committee was appointed to Jook into anomalies in the payment
of aircraft workers.
	 As the question of aerial bombardment
became more serious, so the government was forced to take a
closer account of the productive capacity of the aircraft
industry. The Robinson Committee conceded for the first time
the principle of a standard time rate, to be at the minimum,
the highest rate for woodworkers in the district, and in no
case less than 1/- an hour with provision for overtime payments.
A maximum working week of 53 hours wi.s recommended as part of
a code of working rules.
	 But the catch as far as members of
the unions opposed to pbr were concerned was that for the period
of the war the system of pbr should be ac d, or at least
if any member or non-member wanted to work on pbr the unions
should not oppose him doing so. These proposals precipitated
a crisis within the Committee, for not all of the unions were
opposed to payment by results. Some unions favoured settle-
ment at district rather than at national level, but it was the
ASC&J, committed in its opposition to pbr which insisted upon,
and ensured that a decision was reached at national level after
a ballot of all union members (92). The ballot showed a size-
able majority against pbr, but leaders of the 1SC&J were torn
between the commiLment of their own members to oppose the
system and the need to preserve a united front between the
joint Executives of unions with members in aircraft woodworking.
A national agreement was concluded on Oct 30 1917, signed by
the National Aircraft Committee in conformity with the recom-
mendations of the Robinson Committee. Whilst it allowed the
principle of time payments, it included a clause to the effect
that pbr could be adopted if employers and workers were agreed
on the issue. This was tantamount to an acceptance of pbr
where it had already been ef uablished or where it could be
implemented with majority support. There was in consequence
widespread dissatisfaction with the agreement amongst the
operatives. And because of its concessions to the principle
of time payments, the employers and some government depart-
ments objected to its implementation. From the Admiralty it
was argued that an agreement which conceded standard time rates
could not be applied without affecting wages in shipbuilding
yards, so Admiralty establishments were exempted from the agree-
ment. Engineering Employers refused to be party to the agreement,
since they argued it would introduce working standards and
wages of the building industry into the engineering trades.
(93)
	 National agreement had been reached, but both employers
and operatives were reluctant to accept its implications. If
the negotiators for the ASC&J had as their objective the main-
tenance of a uniform resistance to the introduction of pbr,
they were limited by the need to balance the militancy of their
own members against the resistance of other trade unionists to
a serious campaign against pbr.
The counterpoint to national negotiations in these circumstances
was the increased activity at shopfloor level. Since the
national agreement permitted pbr where this could be agreed
at plant level, there was an added incentive for shopfloor
organisation and militancy to ensure that this did not happen.
There was widespread unrest amongst woodworkers in aircraft
factories during 1918. Defence of the national agreement
(despite its defects) provided the initial cause of escalating
conflict. The Admiralty and the Engineering Employers had
already exempted themselves from the provisions of the Agree-
ment, but when the government refused to undertake the
implementation for the remaining areas, it seemed as though
confrontation was inevitable, During January 1918 aggregate
meetings were organised for aircraft woodworkers in the largest
districts and in early February a representative conference was
called in Manchester, when a resolution was unanimously passed
calling for strike action on February 9th. The Minister of
Munitions, Winston Churchill, called for a meeting with the
National Aircraft committee and after negotiations which lasted
until February 8th, the government conceded the observance and
implementation of the Agreement reached four months earlier.
A second issue, national in its dimensions, which generated
widespread unrest in aircraft manufacture was the application
of the 125.: award made by the government to skilled time
workers in engineering and foundry trades. The award, which
was announced on 13 October 1917 was intended to compensate the
time worker for the erosion of the differential between his
earnings and those of the less skilled pieceworkers. (95) It
was apparent when the award was made that there would be diffi-
culties in deciding who was and who was not eligible to receive
it (96). Discontent was rife amongst those workers who were
excluded from receipt of the payment, in particular where those
occupations were connected with the engineering industry, for
example amongst aircraft woodworkers as well as amongst the
building trades.	 The inequitable distribution of the award
was only too evident. Woodworkers employed on aircraft work
for shipbuilding establishments received the 12' from October
1917, whilst many woodworkers engaged in other sections of
munitions production had received nothing. In some districts
the award had been implemented everywhere, but in other districts
some firms had paid and some had not. (97) Given the existing
tensions concerning the application of pbr it is not surprising
that the question generated a good deal of unrest and the issue
was resolved after the intervention of the YFBTO, only by the
extension of the award to all building trades workers including
aircraft woodworkers engaged on munitions or government work.
(98)
The turbulence manAfested amongst woodworkers in aircraft produc-
tion during 1918 derived from the accumulation of grievances
during the war years.
	 Their services were claimed to be essen-
tial to the prosecution of the war, yet they were treated less
advantageously than engineering operatives in respect of exemp-
tion from military conscription (99). Dilution and piecework
payments threatened the basis of trade union organisation and
hardly a week passed without a stoppage within one or other of
the aircraft factories. Strikes were often short-lived - in
ITanchester there was a succession of amall strikes lasting only
a day or half a day during the Spring and Summer of 1918.
Demarcation questions played a part in some areas. The Chief
Investigation Officer in Bristol stated that:
"There has been and is continual agitation and unrest among the
woodworkers and the claims and counter-claims of the carpenters
and joiners, the shipwrights and boat builders to various classes
of aircraft work keep the whole of these trades in a perpetual
turmoil..." (100)
But it was in London that the conflict was most extensive.
Shop steward organisation in engineering production -developed
a pace during the years of the war. It provided a model for
woodworkers in aircraft manufacture, where the unaccustomed
scale and continuity of operations allowed a level of shop floor
organisation which wa6 almost impossible to achieve in the
casual operations of building production. The power of steward
organisation derived from the struggle against the allied pro-
blems of dilution and pbr. If the shop stewards movement
within engineering rested on the growing importance of wage
determination at shop floor level, within aircraft it derived
more from opposition to pbr than from its implementation.
This struggle was articulated in terms of the quality of output
and related in essence to the prerogative of craft control,
called into question by the craftsman's location within the air-
craft workshop, and by the threat of dilution. The protracted
struggle for minimum district rates and working conditions neces-
sitated organisation within as well as between the aircraft
factories and in London this led to conflicts over the recog-
nitions of stewards' committees during 1918. (101) The
dismissal of a woman steward from the Alliance Aeroplane Co.
(Waring and Gillow) in June 1918 provoked a struggle which
extended to nearly all of the aircraft establishments in
London. The stewards' committee called for her reinstatement,
but management refused to recognise the committee and stopped
their pay for the time spent in taking up her case. The
committee alleged victimisation, and on 26 June some 700
operatives ceased work. The strike was controlled, not by the
official London District Aircraft Committee but by an unofficial
organisation which refused to comply with recommendations for
arbitration and called for an all-out stoppage in support of
the victimised steward. By 6th July 26 firms were out on
strike. Four days later it was claimed that between 15,000 -
20,000 workers were out, from aircraft firms throughout London.
The struggle was governed by two key factors. Firstly it
concerned the recognition of the stewards' committee within
the plant itself. It seems likely that the initial sacking
was related directly to this question and recognition was
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certainly a major issue within the settlement of the dispute,
when it was agreed that an elected body of shop stewards should
be the authorised channel of negotiations with management (102).
Secondly the strike provided one of the few occasions when the
building trades unions were affected by the rifts between
officials and rank and file which characterised engineering
production in some areas during the war years. The consolidation
of a local movement of shop stewards through the unofficial
Woodworkers Council suggested a level and a type of organisation
reminiscent of the London Building Workers lock-out during
1914 and•:
it seemed as though a struggle was developing between the
shop stewards and the constitutional union authorities." (103)
The struggle for minimum district rates had contributed to
the development of locally based unofficial activity akin to
the movement within engineering. But there is little evidence
in aircraft production of the broader movement for revolutionary
change which was apparent insome engineering centres. If the
building trades unions were not, on the whole, characterised
by a 'syndicalist ,
 frame of reference before the war, neither
were they generally affected by the revolutionary mood of craft
workers in engineering in the second half of the war. The
exceptions to this generalisation are within aircraft production,
where conditions were related as much to engineering as to
building work. The unusual continuity and scale of production,
when compared with building, together with the novel nature of
aircraft work generally facilitated the establishment of shop
steward committees. But the focus tended to be the observation
of accepted working' rules, and on the whole struggles were con-
fined to this framework. In some cases - and the Waring and
Gillow strike is one example, the economic issues demanded wider
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organisation at the unofficia7_ level, calling into question the
relationship between stewards and officials. find in this
instance the conflict threatened to escalate. 13ut for the
most Part the shared objectives of officials and stewards -
namely the abolition of pbr and the recognition of union organi-
sation within the new industry, meant that the rift within union
organisation apparent in engineering was not automatically
extended to building workers in related areas.
The experience of war provided a new dimension to the struggle
against pbr for the woodworking trades unions, especially for
the ASC&J. Craft operatives were committed to participation in
the infant aircraft industry, but they were committed additionally
to its organisation and control. Like engineering workers they
were confronted by the threat of dilution. But unlike engineer-
ing workers they were engaged in a novel production process,
where they had yet to assert their rights to control and define
particular tasks as within their craft prerogative. Since air-
craft production was related in many respects to engineering
work, it is not surprising if the independent spirit and organi-
sation apparent in many engineering centres spilled over into
aircraft manufacture.
	
But the fundamental difference between
the engineers and the woodworking craftsmen was that whilst the
latter were threatened by a. redefinition of craft boundaries
and were influenced to some degree by the , deskilling t associa-
ted with the introduction of semi-skilled labour into the work-
shops, they were not facing the irreperable breach of craft
controls in their traditional sphere of operations (104).
Moreover the syndicalist ideology in the pre-war period had
found a stronger base in the engineering worksho ps than it
had in the branch rooms of the building trade unions. 	 The
revolutionary momentum of the engineering shop stewards move-
ment during the war derived from the interaction of the doctrines
of syndicalism and industrial unionism with the erosion of
craft controls inengineering production (105). Amongst wood-
working craftsmen the ideological commitments, as well as the
erosion of craft autonomy had less impact. The war provided a
catalyst for new struggles and new forms of organisation amongst
aircraft woodworkers but their experience was not simply an
echo of the shop stewards movement within engineering. It was
more explicitly related to the conditions and traditions within
which the woodworkers were themselves located.
In building work, as in aircraft production, it has been shown
that the trend, during the war years, was towards the settlement
of wages on theTasis of national negotiation and this was con-
solidated, during the period of post-war boom, by the establish-
ment of national machinery for collective bargaining within the
building industry. The formation of the KFBTO provided the
means, on the operatives' side of joint representation to the
employers and its leaders actively pursued the standardisation
of wage rates and conditions at the national level. In February
1917, one year before its formal inauguration, application was
made to the employers on behalf of the NFBTO for formal recog-
nition as the appropriate negotiating body on behalf of the
operatives. (106)	 It was acknowledged on both sides that
there would be problems in the post-war era which required
urgent consideration and the report of the Whitley Committee,
together with the proposals to establish an Industrial Parlia-
ment for the Building Industry reinforced the conviction that
arrangements for negotiation at national level should be
formally confirmed.
l uilding operatives in other industries 
Little need be said about the situation of building operatives
employed outside of building and aircraft woodworking. This is
so firstly because in engineering and shipbuilding, on the rail-
ways or in steel production, building trades operatives repre-
sented only a minority of the workforce and as such their unions
did not direct events. Secondly it is apparent that, at least
for the war years, the employment of building workers on main-
tenance and production in other industries was not directly of
concern in the formulation of new trade union structures and
new bargaining machinery with the employers for building itself.
The trend towards the settlement of wages and conditions along
national lines was evident in many sectors of employment during
the years of the first world war. The factors identified within
the building industry which pointed in this direction - namely
inflation, and government intervention in industrial affairs -
were evident in other industries. The war-time situation
encouraged co-operation between trades and across districts and
negotiations were generally shifted towards settlement on
national, or semi-national lines (107). This trend emphasised
the difficulties, already apparent before 1914, of identifying
and delineating industrial boundaries, for the purposes of trade
union organisation and collective bargaining. A joiner might
be employed in a railway workshop, or in a cotton factory, in
aeroplane manufacture or in a brewery. How far could his rate
of payment and his trade union organisation be expected to vary
in accordance with these shifts in his place of employment,
To whet extent could the 'building industry' claim to include
all of those operatives employed, via their knowledge of
building skills, in sectors of employment which claimed their
own industrial identity. 	 T3'e problem has already been iden-
tified in the case of aircraft production, where the novelty
of the production process and the number of woodworking crafts-
men involved lent intensity to the conflict. And it was in
evidence to a lesser extent in other sectors where building
craftsmen had established their presence.
Yet if the wartime shifts in employment seemed to exacerbate
these difficulties, leaders of the craft societies were con-
cerned primarily to assert the principles on which their nego-
tiations were normally founded. Opposition to payment by
results was crucial to their negotiating stance. In shipbuild-
ing there WI 'S concern at initiatives by the employers to
introduce a system of premium bonus payments - one case where
its introduction was effectively prevented was at •essrs.
Vickers Ltd. Barrow (108). But negotiations in shipbuilding
were conducted via the Confederation of Shipbuilding and ;ngineer-
ing Unions where some unions were prepared to accept payments on
a piece work basis. The ASC&J, as one of the largest societies
opposed to pbr, was obliged to keep up its opposition, in the
face of government initiatives to circumvent the shortage of
skilled workmen by this means. (109)
On the railways, the craft unions hPd P common concern to
oppose the industry-wide recruitment which had been initiated
by the newly formed National Union of Railwaymen. They were
Particularly concerned that the NUR had no intention of obser-
ving the rates agreed for craftsmen. In consequence the two
societies of carpenters and joiners, together with NAFTA and
the UK Soc. of Coachmakers and the Scottish Painters partici-
pated along with the Boilermakers, the Ironfounders and
others, in the campaign to raise the wages of raill .ey shopmen.
Negotiations were conducted - -Irough the Railway Shopc. Organim,-
tion Committee of Craft Unions. Agreements were normally reached
on a company basis, but the intervention of the Committee on
Production ensured the extension of awards from one company to
another, so that the effect was to generate settlements along
national lines. (110)
In general it was the case that building craftsmen outside of
building production were confronted with particular problems
concerning their opposition to pbr because of its acceptance in
other industries and by other unions. But in many areas there
was nonetheless a tendency towards the centralisation of nego-
tiations, often involving collaboration between cognate trades
or between the different trades in one industry. Bodies such
as the National Aircraft Committee, the Standing Joint Committee
on Shipbuilding Trades and the Railway Shops Organisation
Committee of Craft Unions drew together unions involved in res-
ponse to pressure over such issues as payment systems, dilution
and labour supply.	 Within the building industry it was the
National ASsociated Building Trades Council - subsequently the
National Federation of Building Trades Operatives which developed
and encouraged trade union co-ordination - and it was in this
area that the most significant adjusLments were made to trade
union structure for the building unions during the war.
rost War Changes 
The accumulation of housing problems which resulted from the cut
back in house building between 1914 and 1918 ensured a chaotic
situation at the end of the war. The need for housing was acute
in some areas. In Lanarkshire, especially around Glasgow,
Dundee and the Rosyth Dockyards, it was suggested that some
100,000 houses were urgently required (111). In those regions
where housing was in short supply before the war tho demPnd
was inevitably very:
 high. Agitation over rents during the war
forced the Government in 1915 to pass a Bill limiting rents to
the level of July 1914 (112) and it was apparent that govern-
ment intervention in this area was required at the war t s end
to alleviate tensions which resultaLfrom housing shortage.
(113) The social conflicts before and after the Armistice,
together with the heightened strength of the labour movement
over the war years - in particular the growth of the shop
stewards movement, aacouraged Government intervention in an
area which provoked such evident dissatisfaction in the working
class. Rent controls were continued during 1919 and 1920;
subsidies were provided for some smaller private sector dwellings
by the Housing (Additional Powers) Act in 1919; and subsidies
were to be provided for the expansion of municipal housing
through the Housing and Town Planning Act (Addison) in 1919.
(114)
During the elections of December 1918 Iloyd George had promised
half a million working class homes in the next three years -
an enormous target. The achievement of such an objective
required the concentration of resources and efforts to this
end. But in the same month that the Coalition Government was
returned to power, the building controls established in war
to limit private building, were lifted. The consequence was
a boom in construction activity during 1919-20, with an
increased demand for industrial and commercial building, as
well as for housing. The release of the demand accumulated
over war-time led inevitably to shortages of materials and
labour. Schemes for dilution met with little enthusiasm
amongst the building trades iv)ions. The industry was depleted
of women as production was re-oriented to peace time needs and
having rid themselves of this war-time problem, building crafts-
men were unlikely to favour dilution in another (and possibly
more lasting) form. Yet for a brief period building activity
flourished, with low levels of unemployment and a high commit-
ment to new starts, both in the public and the private sector.
In the nine months after the Iddison ;let was passed, local
authorities undertook commitments to build 162,000 houses,
sanctioned by the Ministry of Health. (115)
The post-war boom was short-lived. The slump which followed had
a serious impact on building activity. Trice rises and shor-
tages of materials and labour discouraged new building, whilst
the slump in the economy more generally proved a disincentive
for new building in the industrial and commercial field. It was
in this context that the Government cut expenditure on housing,
cutting along with it any possibility of satisfying the urgent
need for housing within the working class. And it was against this
background that national negotiations within the building industry
were consolidated.
The breakthrough to settlement on national lines was finally
made in 1919 with an agreement on the establishment of a forty
four hour week for the building industry. The claim was first
submitted via the NFBTO in January 1919, with a request that a
shortened working week come into effect from Kay of that year.
(116)	 It coincided with a release of the floodgates of demand
for building work of all types as the war ended, and with it
the controls on building output. The unions feared that
employers would turn to high overtime and increased hours to
boost output. The regular unemployment which hit building
workers because of casual employment and seasonal fluctuations,
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as well as in consequence of the lonn:er cycle of boom and
slump, encouraged the forward move on the question of hours at
a time when the bargaining position of the union side was
relatively favourable. The claim for a forty four hour week
was first discussed in March 1919, when the NFBTE conceded that
an average 44 hour week could be worked during the winter months,
but insisted on a 46 J- hour week in summertime. But the opera-
tives were encouraged by the concession of the Scottish building
employers who agreed the claim (117). A ballot of union mem-
bers was held on the issue, resulting in a large majority in
favour of pursuing the claim and in July it was referred to the
National Conciliation Board for consideration. The equal
balance of representation between employers and operatives
inhibited progress on this issue, as on so many others. The
employers agreed to consult their members and return to the
Board in September. Their tactic was to postpone consideration
of the question until the bargaining strength of the operatives
had been undermined by a slow down in the rate of new work
and to this end they suggested that the local autonomy which
had previously been upheld ought not to ho breached by agree-
ment at the national level. Local agreements were still in
operation and could not be by-passed without the consent of all
of the parties concerned, the employers argued (118). But
it was clear that, since the em ployers had already entered into
negotiations on the question of a national agreement for
forty four hour week, they had implicitly condoned an adjuat-
ment in bargaining arrangements, accepting, at least informally
the need for a national agreement for building production.
Their disagreement was with the content rather than with the
method of considering the proposal, and in presenting their
case to the NCB they argued at both levels. With the backlog
of demand accumulated during the war years, and a high level of
combativity amongst building nperatives ar nmongst other ruc-
tions of the working population during 1919 concessions from
the employers were in order. At the next meeting of the Con-
ciliation Board it seemed that little progress could be made,
but a resolution to the effect that a forty four hour week
should be introduced as of May 1st 1920 was finally accepted..
(119)
The agreement on the forty four hour week was significant for
the building trades unions for two reasons. Firstly it was in
itself a considerable improvement even on the best prevailing
standards in respect of working hours in the building trades
and for the less well organised and lower paid rural areas
represented a substantial reduction of the working week(120).
It was in advance of concessions made in other industries
during the same period - in engineering for exam ple the working
week was set at 47 hours and it could justifiably be claimed
that:
the securing of the 44 hours week by the National Federtion
of Building Trades Operatives was easily the most significant
success that has resulted from federated action." (121)
If its introduction was postponed and its operation jeopardized
by employer resistance, it represented nonetheless an important
improvement to conditions, wrung from the employers durin r,
 the
months of the post-war housing boom.
	 econdly the agreement
on the 44 hour week paved the way for the consolidation of
negotiations at national rather than at local level. The war-
time strategy adopted by the leaders of the buildin n- trades
unions to raise the level of wages and conditions of outlying
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districts up to those of the m a jor industrial centres pointed
almost inevitably to the standardisation of wages and condi-
tions at national level. 7dhilst the employers' representatives
hedged around this question during negotiations on the working
week in 1919, it does not seem that they were opposed to the
reorganisation of collective bargaining along national lines.
Indeed it could be argued that the major concession made in
respect of the 44 hour week was on indication of their positive
commitment to reformulating the bargaining machinery in this
Way. Such a significant improvement in conditions for all of
the operatives represented in negotiations highlighted the
advantages to be gained by national negotiations and gave
credence to the newly established UPBTO which could claim to
have achieved the concession.	 In view of the reluctance to
agree the 44 hours on the employers' side it seems unlikely that
the agreement was engineered with this objective so clearly
formulated. A reduced working week in line with the employers'
earlier proposals (that is for a 44 hour week in winter and a
461 hour week in summer) could still have been presented to the
operatives as a major concession suggesting the advantages of
national negotiations. The forty four hour week was not in
itself necessary for this purpose. And the widespread resis-
tance to its implementation combined with the employers'
determination to revoke the concession at the earliest possible
moment to suggest that the 44 hour week was achieved by the
operatives as a consequence of their own bnrgaining strength
during 1919. It was indeed the lmost significant success' which
had resulted from federated action.
National negotiating machinery for the building industry was
confirmed by the agreement of June 1920 which led to the
formation of the rational Waes and Conditions Council. In
1919 the Federation endorsed the principle of area schemes
and in the same year it was agreed that all area schemes be
submitted to and endorsed by the BC of the rFBTO prior to their
submission to the membership for acceptance - a move which was
designed to ensure progress towards national uniformity of
wages and conditions, with control over negotiations vested
primarily in the UFBTO. (122) In June of the following year
the EC's of the trades unions and =TO, together with the
KFBTE agreed the establishment of the F„ Te,CC, a move which set
the basic framework for national collective bargaining. The
Council would comprise 19 (subsequently 20) representatives on
each side and would hold 2 statutory meetings each year to set
wage standards and conditions (123). The rules were ratified
in	 of the following year (1921) arid although the name of
the organisation, and the detailed regulations concerning its
o peration were to change in later yers, the vital ingredient,
the joint relationship at national level between representatives
of the operatives and the employers WES now established. It
was an important feature of the representation on the oper,,,hivest
side that it allowed individual unions, as well as the ITFBTO,
a voice within the Council. The Federation provided the
medium for liaison and joint representation to the employers.
But it did not do so to the exclusion of the rights of the
individual society which had its own representative within
negotiations. Joint representation was combined with an indivi-
dual presence to allow the maximum freedom for craft autonomy.
(124)
Pn essential feature of the revision of negotiating machinPry
was the formulation of a new national working rule agreement
which was finalised in 1920. The diversity of existing
district agreements could not easily be reconciled within the
scope of national arrangements despite the trend of the
preceding years towards standaridsation. A complex national
grading structure was evolved to deal with differences in wages
and seventeen district variations were established, with provi-
sion for districts below the highest grade to make application
for regrading (125). Negotiations could take place around the
grade of a particular area, with the objective of upgrading
lower to higher paid and rural to urban areas. It was recog-
nised that this approach would not always benefit directly the
higher paid towns, although it was argued that the improvement
to lower paid areas would reduce the flow of labour from those
areas into the towns, with its detrimental effects on their
bargaining position. But since there were still many towns and
villages which had few or no local rules, it was held that the
district grading structure which was set up on a national basis
would result in a levelling up operation for thousands of mem-
bers at present outside of any agreed arrangements with the
employers.
The significance of the national working rule agreement was not
confined to the relationship which it set up between districts.
Its novelty lay also in the uniform payment which was set for
the wages of different trades. Before 1914 negotiations were
generally conducted on a trade basis within each locality and
there was no automatic regulation of wage rates in accordance
with established links between trades. Differentials varied
between districts and were adjusted over time as the bargaining
position of craftsmen was affected by industrial and technolo-
gical changes. In general it was the case that painters were
paid at a lower rate than other craftsmen - sometimes as much
as 1d an hour less, but there was no fixed ratio of wage rates
between the bricklayer, carpenter, stonemason, plasterer and
other trades. This situation was changed by the national war
which established the principle of a craft rate which should be
payable to all skilled operatives, whatever their trade. The
craft rate for June 1920 was established on the basis of an
estimated increase in the cost of living of 170% since AuLust
1st 1914. Wage rates were subsequently adjusted in accordance
with changes in the Cost of Living Indexpso that for every rise
of 6i points above or below 170% an adjustment was made to the
craft rate of id an hour, across all of the trades represented
within the NW&CC. (126) The sliding scale was an integral part
of the national framework, since it provided a mechanism to
adjust wages in accordance with national fluctuations in prices
across all regions and all trades.
The establishment of the NW&CC was not the only change which
was affected in the post-war era. The Federation of Civil
Engineering Contractors, a body representing some of the larger
employers engaged in construction work, proposed to establish
negotiating machinery separate from the provisions of the
National Conciliation Board. They contended that conditions in
civil engineering were substantially different from those in
building work and required negotiating procedures distinct from
those which were already operating for building. Their proposals
were rejected by the craft societies, but it proved impossible
to control the labourers , organisations who perceived advantages
in breaking free of the fraternal supervision exercised by their
craft brothers. The labourers , societies grew up in a different
era and with distinctive objectives to the craft unions in
construction. Unable to control the supply of labour or to
assert unilaterally the wage rates which should apply to their
occupations, they were organising in an area which, seemingly,
was unorganisable. The geographical and industrial mobility of
their potential members made recruitment and retention very
difficult tasks. The prospect of recognition at national level
must for them have been an attractive proposition. Following
the rejection by the craft societies of the proposals made by
the Civil Engineering Contractors, leaders of the Navvies Union
went direct to the Civil Engineering Employers with the offer
of a separate agreement (127). This move undermined the stra-
tegy of the Federation's leaders which was to reassert their
control over the activities of the unions of builders' labourers.
If the latter had their own medium for discussions with the
employers, separate and distinct from that which operated in
the building industry, such control would no longer be possible.
A separate agreement for a branch of industry so closely related
to building might undermine the controls and conditions estab-
lished over past decades on behalf of the craft worker. It had
the potential at least to legitimise the dilution of craft skills
and the working of extensive hours of overtime.
The Civil Engineering Construction Conciliation Board was set
up in consequence of the initiative from the Navvies in 1919.
Since it was an established fact, the leaders of the craft
societies were obliged to suspend their previous decision not
to accept a separate agreement for civil engineering and to
open up negotiations for their admission to the new body (128).
The formation of the CECCB confirmed the division, already
apparent, between skilled and unskilled. Its first effects
151
were on the control by the unions of skilled workers, over
the organisation and activities of the unskilled. But in the
long-term it laid the basis for the erosion of craft autonomy
as organisations of unskilled and semi-skilled workers were able
to extend their control, aided by the impact of technological
change and the altered requirements of the product market.
This first assertion of independence was the prelude to a more
significant threat in later decades - that the unions of
unskilled or semi-skilled workers Might ultimately assimilate
the unions of craft workers.
Conclusion
The National Federation of Building Trades Operatives was for-
med out of the conditions of war. The shift in occupational
location of building trades operatives encouraged the breakdown
of the lines of demarcation between crafts in kindred trades.
And as skills were adjusted to military requirements so the
determining features of each trade were blurred by the adapta-
tion and simplification of production processes. The Federation
was formed as the body which united the craft societies and
which represented their interests, both with the employers and
with government. It was a response to the difficulties posed
by dilution and deskilling, by labour shortage and by the
application of payment by results to crafts which had identified
the plain-time system of payment as fundamental to their union
organisation.
The objects of the NFBTO were related integrally to its function
within collective bargaining procedures. Organisation between
trades at the national level presupposed a national control of
the united trades at local and district level. This in tarn
assumed a formal link between the Federation's national and
local arms. The question of local autonomy was a sensitive
one in the better organised areas, but in the rural backwaters,
where trade unionism had made little impact, Federation influence
was welcomed and composite branches were heralded as a break-
through. There was less evidence in the building trades of
the militancy which characterised the shop stewards movement in
engineering during this period. But the rift between executives
and the rank and file members, which was highlighted during the
1914 lock—out was a sufficient problem to justify for the
executives a form of organisation which strengthened their hand
at the expense of the local activists, rendering the local
federation subordinate to the national.
If the N_EBTO represented craft interests as against those of the
unskilled worker, it was the ASC&J which provided the initiative
for their defence. It was the ASC&J which had pushed for the
establishment of the Federation in 1913 and which was responsible
for reviving the Federation scheme just three years later. It
was the ASC&J which proposed the establishment of the composite
branches. And it was the ASC&J which was most centrally con-
cerned with opposing the introduction of payment by results.
Their resolution, submitted to the 1919 annual meeting of the
Federation stating that only unions 'working on the plain time
rates shall be eligible for affiliation' was withdrawn yet it is
clear nonetheless that ASC&J officials regarded the Federation
as a means of strengthening collective opposition to pbr (129).
The cost to the ASC&J was high.
paid to the NFBTO in this early
union, although it had only the
unions on its governing bodies.
to the membership concerning an
One third of the contributions
period came from the largest
same representation as other
When in 1919 proposals were put
increase in contributions to the
Federation, they were rejected by members of the ASC&J. The
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issue was settled by an adjustment of representation, allowing
the influence of the largest affiliate to be more directly felt
within the governing bodies of the Federation. Henceforth the
governing authority comprised two EC members of each national
union affiliated up to 20,000 paying members and one extra for
each additional 20,000 or part thereof. local branches were
similarly reorganised and the change ensured a continuation and
extension of ASC&J influence within the Federation, both at
national and at local levels. (130)
In the six years which had passed since the outbreak of war, the
informal and intermittent liaison between building trade union
Executives had been transformed into one of the largest and
most effective Federations in the country. Its primary role
within collective bargaining was confirmed by the creation of
the National Wages and Conditions Council and it claimed a
significant success through the concession by the employers of
the 44 hour week. It was consolidating its own structure at
regional, as well as at local and national level, and appointed
its own officers and General Secretary. Whilst its influence
and income depended in essence on the goodwill of its affiliates,
the new body seemed likely to survive provided that it retained
the support of the largest of them, the ASC&J.
CHAPTER 3.
BUILDIYG TR,.kDE UNIONS AND .A.1;. ALGANA TI 01,1 1 9 1 4-24
Building trade unions and am_agamation, 1914-24
Pt.1.	 An epoch of mergers 
The years between 1919 and 1924 saw the creation of some of
the largest and most powerful of the trade unions which form
the basis of organisations still in existence today. In the
space of just a few years, the shape of the trade union move-
ment was changed. Craft was brought together with craft to
form the Amalgamated Engineering Union in 1920 with a member-
ship of around 400,000 (1).
	
Unions which were organised along
occupational lines joined together with unions organising the
unskilled, at the initiative of dockers , leaders, in particular
Ernest Bevin, to form the mammoth Transport and General Workers
Union in 1922 (2). 	 And just two years later, a similar range
of organisations, this time including a union catering specifi-
cally for women workers, was merged to establish the National
Union of General and Municipal Workers (3). 	 It was a period
of initiative and innovation in the field of trade union organi-
sation and two factors had combined to faciliate the process
of structural change.
Firstly there was the idealism of the pre-war period, when the
impact of syndicalist ideas had encouraged the belief that
amalgamation of trade unions would strengthen working class
organisation. For the active trade unionist - in the building
trades men such as J. Wills and Jim Hamilton - syndicalism
involved campaigning for the establishment of 'One Big Union'
for the industry. Unity along class lines was the aim, and
craft sectionalism the enemy, in this movement which, theoreti-
cally was to tackle the question of ruling class power by the
establishment of industrial and class based trade unionism.
The 'One Big Union' was to provide the hammer on the anvil of
industrial and social change, the instrument of working class
unity and action.	 The extent and depth of syndicalist influence
have been debated elsewhere (4) and it is not intended here to
reiterate the arguments concerning support for syndicalist cam-
paigns, or the significance of the strike movement pre-1914.
What must be stressed in the context of this discussion of
attitudes towards structural change in the trade union movement,
is the spin-off from syndicalism in respect of proposed mergers.
For the syndicalist, the 'One Big Union' was a key element in
the struggle for working class power. But when campaigning for
amalgamation within the trade union branch, or the workplace,
many other arguments might be produced in favour of amalgama-
tion. Merger along less ambitious lines would still lead to
greater efficiency, with elimination of the wasteful duplication
of resources which characterised existing, sectional organisations
It might lead to a reduction in the number of organisers, or
more effective use of the time and energies of the existing
organisers. (5)
	
It would mean larger, and stronger unions,
with greater financial resources, more capable of resisting the
attacks of employers, who were themselves combining, aiming
more effectively to deal with their workers (6). It was not
necessary to accept syndicalist ideas in order to support their
campaigns on amalgamation, and when the issues were raised -
as they regularly were, before 1914, and even during the war-
years, voting and active support for amalgamation could be
won for limited mergers, even if there was less sympathy or
understanding for the syndicalist concept of the 'One Big
Union'. (7)
Not only the lay activists were touched by the earlier cam-
paigns on amalgamation.
	
The advantages of merger were apparent.
to trade union leaders too where it seemed that it would
strengthen their hand in neLotiations. (8)
	 Ideologically the
climate of the post-war years favoured consolidation and the
far-reaching mergers of that period were carried through against
a background of propaganda amongst the membership and wide-
spread general support amongst the rank and file for amalga-
mation. The question then was not whether mergers might receive
popular acclaim, but how far and how fast new structures might
be created. A sympathy for the ideology of amalgamation did
not resolve the ever-present pragmatic considerations, which
were to play an important part in shaping the new trade unions.
The second factor which encouraged the structural changes of
the post-war years was the impact of war. Common problems
faced trade union leaders and in the building industry as else-
where they struggled to respond to the conflicting demands of
government officials and their own membership. The extension
of the Munitions of War Act to construction work, and the
increased importance of government contracts encouraged co-
operation between union leaders at a national level (9). The
same influences which in the short term gave rise to the
establishment of the National Federation of Building Trades
Operatives also encouraged renewed attention to the possibili-
ties of amalgamation. The consolidation of collective bargaining
at national level in other sectors hastened measures designed
to deal with disunity in the operatives' ranks. Discussions
between transport union leaders were underway from the summer
of 1920 with a view to constructing a new framework for
organisation in this area to by-pass the limitations inherent
in the existing National Transport Workers Federation (10).
Leaders of the construction unions had often stressed that the
two methods of adapting structure - by federation and by amal-
gamation - were not mutually incompatible. Federation was now
a reality, but the possibilities of amalgamation had still to
be tested.
A commitment to the principle of amalgamation by some trade
union leaders was apparent by their participation in the cam-
paign for changes in the statutory requirements governing
trade union mergers. The Trade Union (Amendment) Act of 1876
stated that amalgmation of two or more unions could proceed
only if not less than two thirds of the total membership of
each and every such trade union were shown to be in favour (11).
This requirement had hampered past attempts at merger and in
1911 a Bill was introduced into Parliament designed to ease the
restrictions on trade union amalgamation, but it was not passed.
F. Chandler, G.S. of the ASC&J was one of the leaders most
actively concerned with the question, both within the Labour
Party and the TUC (12).	 In 1917 another Bill was brought
forward to permit trade union amalgamation where a majority of
members of the respective unions gave it their approval in a
ballot. Far from wishing to discourage a rationalisation of
union structure, the majority of employers and politicienr were
aware of the advantages which would accrue if the Bill were
passed. The situation where several unions represented the
same group of workmen created a problem for them since one
union might refuse to be bound by decisionspor to participate
in joint negotiations or arbitration with other unions concerned.
It was Chandler who put the case, on behalf of the TUC to the
Ministry of Labour in connection with the Bill. Opposition was
limited, but it was impossible finally to avoid amendment, such
that when it was eventually passed it allowed amalgamation to
158
to proceed where
"the votes of at least 50% of the members entitled to vote, ..
are recorded and on the votes recorded those in favour of the
proposal exceed by twenty per cent or more the votes against
the proposal."
The pressure of trade union leaders, combined with 'the new spirii
that is abroad between capital and labour' to enable the passage
of this legisation which governed the amalgamations of the
post—war years. (13)
Amalgamation discussions proceeded between two very different
groups in the building industry during the years under consi-
deration. Firstly talks took place amongst kindred organisations,
representatives of woodworkers' unions discussing merger with
other woodworkers, bricklayers with bricklayers and so on.
Secondly, talks took place across traditional craft boundaries,
along the lines suggested by advocates of the 'One Big Union'.
Hence there were merger discussions between leaders of unions
of labourers and craftsmen, or between different categories of
craftsmen. It is essential, in considering the patterns of
structural change during these years to consider both types of
negotiation on amalgamation — between kindred trades, and across
traditional demarcations, in order to establish the scope and
the dynamic of the mergers which were finally brought about.
Three types of merger proposals between kindred trades will be
considered — between woodworkers, between trowel trades, and
between labourers. Attention will then be given to proposals
for merger on a grander scale — to further discussions of 'One
Big Union', and to the possibility of an amalgamation which
crossed craft boundaries. Finally some attention will be given
to the nature of mergers which were realised in this period, and
to the problems which were confronted before they could be
established.
Pt. 2. Woodworkers and amalgamation
Joint concern with mutual problems by the woodworking trade
unions during the war years laid the basis for subsequent dis-
cussions on amalgamation. Particularly important to the
craftsman was the relationship between skilled and semi-skilled
and it was in defence of this, most basic of demarcations, that
boundaries between different categories of skilled woodworkers,
between carpenter and cabinet maker, joiners and pattern-makers
were lowered. It was in the aircraft industry, a central area
of employment for woodworkers, and a newly developing industry
in which standard terms and conditions of work had still to be
established that changes were most profound. In some instances,
cabinet makers, coachmakers, joiners and pattern-makers worked
together on different kinds of woodwork without any question
being raised as to which section should 'claim' the work as
their own (14). Efforts were made to establish uniform condi-
tions of employment in this type of situation, since, it was
argued, demarcation may have appeared to benefit some craftsmen,
but in the final analysis, it was the employer who was the main
beneficiary (15). An increased tolerance was appearing for
the movement of craftsmen from one area of skilled work to
another, and this, in its turn, seemed to encourage consideration
of, and receptivity towards amalgamation across traditional
demarcations within kindred trades. This did not mean that
craftsmen were more likely to accept an erosion of the traditional
demarcation between the skilled and the semi-skilled. It was
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feared that, if semi-skilled workers were allowed to take on
areas of work traditionally undertaken by the craftsmen, and
admitted into the craftsmen's unions, the lines of demarcation
would become irremediably blurred - with disastrous consequences
for the skilled man. (16) 	 As craft unions drew together in
defence of their skilled status and against the risk of dilution,
and particularly where they had a common aim in abolishing
systems of payment by results, so they established common
interests, paving the way for - sometimes leading directly to
consideration of the question of amalgamation (17).
It was the ASC&J which was central to the discussions on merger
conducted after the amendment to legislation governing trade
union amalgamation. Fundamental to the interest of their
leaders in merger was their dual opposition to dilution and to
payment by results. The NFBTO had been formed as a means to
extend their influence, through all of the building trade unions
in respect of these fundamental principles. And once the legis-
lative path was cleared they pursued their objective through
the strategy of amalgamation with other woodworking societies
as well as through federation. Frank Chandler retired in 1918,
but his place was taken by A.G. Cameron, formerly a shipping
delegate in the London area, who upheld the prevailing policies
on the payment system, and the craft orientation of the society.
As the largest of the unions recruiting amongst woodworkers,
the ASC&J became, almost inevitably, a dominant influence as
negotiation on merger proceeded. But Cameron, like Chandler,
was concerned with the amalgamation question as a means of
strengthening his own hand with the employers. This necessi-
tated reinforcing his position within the trade union movement
and within his own union. Control at the national level over
the form and the method of the payment to be adopted required
an extension of organisation wherever woodworking processes
were undertaken. In pursuit of these objectives, negotiations
were conducted with four other major woodworking societies.
The first of these was the Amalgamated Union of Cabinetmakers,
a national union since 1833 (18).	 This was a small, artisan
based organisation, numbering in 1915 some 3,500 members (19).
Recruitment was amongst handicraft and skilled workers engaged
in cabinet manufacture, and it is not surprising that, during
the war years, with the orientation towards war production,
and the emphasis on output of woodwork for aircraft, shipbuilding,
for military hutments, or for munitions boxes, the specialised
constituency of the AUCM was undermined. No longer could the
distinction be so readily maintained between the cabinet maker
and other sections of woodworking. Talks were initiated
between F. Smith, General Secretary of the Cabinet Makers,
leading members of that union, and representatives of the much
larger ASC&J. By June 1917 proposals for amalgamation had been
drafted, and these were submitted to the members just three
months later. The merger, which represented a take—over by
the ASC&J of the smaller union, was to allow flexible arrange-
ments for the existing members of the AUCM. The new union was
to be known as the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters, Cabinet-
makers and Joiners. Members of the AUCM could decide between
their present contributions and benefits and those of the
ASC&J, but since the benefits of the latter were, on the
whole, better than those operating within the AUCM, it seemed
likely that a degree of standardisation would speedily be
achieved. (20)	 Provision was made for special representation
of the AUCM on the General Council of the ASC&J for a period
of three years following the merger, and on Management or
District Committees for one year and arrangements were made
to retain the services of the General Secretary and the Assis-
tant Secretary within the new union. (21) Voting on the scheme
took place under the provisions of the amended legislation
governing trade union amalgamation and both unions achieved an
overwhelming majority in favour of the proposals (22). On April
1st 1918 the formal inauguration of the ASCO&J took place - one
of the only mergers of building trade unions to be finalised
during the war. (23) A smaller union, the Scottish Cabinet
Makers Association, was assimilated at the same time, but since
it numbered only thirty members, no major problems of adjust-
ment were anvisagedI (24)
The merger of the AUCM was followed by the amalgamation of the
GUC&J and the ASC&J,to form the Amalgamated Society of Wood-
workers, a body which formally was brought into existence from
Jan 1921 (25). The courtship between these two had been pro-
longed, and occasionally acrimonious, but, by the early war
years it was apparent that the smaller union could not retain
its independent status indefinitely. Whether in negotiations
with the government concerning the introduction of piece work,
on dilution, or on future housing policy, it was evident that
the size and impact of the ASC&J, in joint negotiation along-
side its smaller rival, offered little scope to the GUC&J
for the maintenance of its autonomy. There was a strong,
syndicalist based movement in favour of amalgamation amongst
members of the ASC&J by 1916. It was argued, perhaps optimi-
stically, that the desirability of merging the two unions
was supported by the most enlightened members of each of them
(26).	 In London a conference was held to consider ways and
means to promote the fusion of the two unions and an action
committee was formed to encourage the movement in favour of
merger (27). On Clydeside to a conference was initiated by
local District Committees, attracting a range of woodworking
trade unions, and if branch resolutions are any indication, it
seems that, at least within the ASC&J, merger of the two unions
was strongly favoured (28).
Within the GUC&J, the matter was a cause for some contention.
William Matkin, GS of the General Union held the view that
amalgamation was not appropriate during war—time, but would be
essential once peace was restored, when the various trades
would need to draw together against the possibility of an attack
by employers (29). An invitation to discuss amalgamation,
issued by the General Council of the Amalgamated Society during
the summer of 1916 was rejected by officials of the smaller
union, for three reasons (30). Firstly they argued, members
of the GUC&J serving in the forces would be disenfranchised if
a vote were taken during war—time. Secondly, it was noted that
previous voting had not produced the requisite numbers in
favour of merger, and finally it was stated that there was no
wish to take a vote during the period of the war,but that this
might be done once peace was restored (31). Further discussions
it seemed, would be fruitless. But following the passage of the
Trade Union Amalgamation Act, and the successful merger of the
AUCM into the ASC&J, the invitation to the General Union's
representatives to discuss amalgamation was renewed (32). Atti-
tudes in some quarters were still ambiguous. The relative sizes
of the two organisations meant that merger, at the grass—roots
level would almost inevitably appear as a take—over bid, a
'heel—in—the—neck kind of business', where 50 or 60 members
of the General Union in one locality tried to hold their own
against some 12 lodges of -Up. kindred society, representing
perhaps some 3,000 members. (33) By January 1918, the EC
of the GUC&J had indicated that they were willing to discuss
the matter with the Amalgamated, but they found themselves in
conflict with their own General Council, who clung to the positior
adopted in 1916, that merger should not be discussed until the
war had ended (34). The conflict was in part a geographical
one, pitting London members of the General Union, from whom the
EC was elected, against members, and their representatives from
the provinces (35), on the General Council.
London members of the General Union had, in the past given
support to amalgamation campaigns (36), and it seemed that the
London District Cttee was influencing members in favour of
merger (37). The matter was sufficiently serious for some
members of the General Council to suggest the removal of the
general office from London, a manouevre which was designed to
produce a new EC, less sympathetic towards the proposed merger
(38). Bros. Baker and Sharpe, members of the EC, both agreed
to renounce their position on the unofficial amalgamation com-
mittee which had been brought into being in London, rather than
give up their positions as EC members (39). But Bros. Lack and
Lewis, GC members who were campaigning for merger, were less
compliant. (40) Matters reached a head when an unofficial
amalgamation circular was issued, and attempts were made to
fine the signatories, including Bro. Lack, of Walthamstow Lodge
(41). The branch, situated in an area of strong syndicalist
traditions (42) gave full backing to their GC representative,
and refused to collect the fine. As a consequence the entire
lodge was suspended. (43) 	 But by this stage the war was over,
and attempts to move the general office, in order to inhibit
further discussion on the question of amalgamation wore post-
poned, and finally abandoned (44). The conflict was diffused,
as members of the General Council announced in December 1918
that they were now willing to abide by the resolution of July
1916, and take a vote of the members on the question of amalga-
mation (45). The union's Monthly Report was now to be opened
up for items on amalgamation. The thorny question of Bro. Lack's
fine remained outstanding, but (46)/ it was clear that a ballot
would be taken on the principle of merger, with provision for
a postal vote in order to ensure that the vote was as broad,
and as representative as possible (47).
	
When the votes were
reported in the autumn of 1919, it was apparent that half the
battle had been won. Of a total membership of 14,584, 4,389 vote
were recorded in favour of continuing discussions on amalgama-
tion, with only 1,477 against. (48)
The amalgamation of the GUC&J with the ASCC&J represented the
merger of two separate and self-contained trade unions, competing
for membership amongst the same class of craftsman (49). Unlike
the merger of the AUCM into the ASC&J it involved the establish-
ment of a completely new union, although it was based, in
essence on the working of the larger organisation. (50) Their
members could be expected to endorse the new society, since it
confirmed that they were joint partners with the ASC&J in a
new venture, rather than junior partners in a take-over bid
by the Amalgamated Society.
In order further to alleviate fears, amongst members of the
General Union, that the new union would not adequately represent
their interests, it was agreed that special provision be made
for General Union delegates to sit on the major governing bodies
one on the Executive, until 1924, and one on the General
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Council, until it was due fo2: re-election (51). As regards
organisation at District level, in districts in which both
societies had a presence, it was established that a new commit-
tee should be elected, in accordance with the new constitution,
and that the committee should make its own arrangements for the
election of local officials. The M, in conjunction with di -s-
trict officials, would, in time, amalgamate the branches and
lodges throughout the country, with a view to rationalising
their number (52).
Financial questions were always of paramount importance in
amalgamation discussions, and the merger of the ASCC&J and the
GUC&J proved to be no exception. Firstly it was necessary to
provide that the financial position of the existing General
Secretary of the General Union, William Matkin, be assured,
and that the position of the AGS be secured for the unexpired
term of his office, after which it was to be reviewed by the
General Council (53). Other full-time officials appointed to
their position prior to the amalgamation were to continue to
operate for the period of their appoinLment (54). A more
tricky question was the basis of payment to be made to branch
and lodge secretaries. In the ASCCEJ they were paid on a scale
ranging from 10 up to 250 branch members, whereas those in
the GUC&J were paid an equal sum, on a quarterly basis, regard-
less of membership (55). If payment was made on the latter
basis, it would mean a very heavy increase in expenditure,
owing to the large number of branches. It was therefore agreed
that the amounts currently being paid in each society should
be averaged, and paid on a sliding scale basis similar to that
which had formerly been applied in the Amalgamated Society,
but the arrangement still necessitated a substantial increase
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in expenditure (56).
As sensitive as the financial questions affecting the officials,
at various levels, within the new organisation, was the issue
of contributions and benefits, and the effects which changes
could bring to the membership. Entrance fees, contributions
and benefits were revised, and the number of sections reduced
with the intention of rationalising the basis of organisation
without adversely affecting benefits (57). The number of
sections was reduced to three, the number 1 section providing
full benefits, including sickness and superannuation, for a
subscription of 1/6d a week; the number 2 section providing a
lesser range of benefits - unemployment, trade, tool, accident
and funeral, for a contribution of 9d per week. The third
section was intended for apprentices, who could join between
the ages of 16 and 20 for a subscription of 3d per week. (58)
One of the greatest problems was the establishment of a sound
superannuation scheme, for the amounts paid out by both societies
on superannuation represented an ever-increasing proportion of
their expenditure, and involved members of the relevant sections
in payment of levies to sup port superannuated members. The
benefit was to be increased, but, in order to ensure that this
was financially viable, it was established that contributions
too would be increased, for members of the no. 1 section, but
that a special fund for supperanuation was not necessary (59).
In an attempt to ensure a smooth transfer to the new organi-
sation, it was established that members of the lower sections
of the old societies could transfer into the higher section of
the new union if notice of their intention in this respect were
given within three months of the formation of the ASW (60).
Altogether the provisions were designed to encourage a flexi-
bility which could incorporate previous arrangements, whilst
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ensuring that the results wcre not detrimental to any largo
section of the membership who might have the capacity to block
implementation of the merger. Vested interests, whether of
full-time officials, branch officers or members, had to be
satisfied before merger appeared as a real possibility.
	 The
creation of a new set of rules, deriving from features of both
of the major constituents of the new union was designed to
circumvent such problems, whilst endeavouring to establish a
viable financial basis for the operations of the new society.
Political attitudes played a significant part in shaping some
trade union mergers, but they were perhaps less important in
the formation of the ASW, than in other negotiations on
amalgamation.
Both unions were characterised by traditions of craft conser-
vatism, and in neither case did the leaders or officials
feature conspicuously amongst the more progressive elements
within the trade union and labour movement (61). Both unions,
of course, contained a proportion of members who were more
actively committed, but it was the traditionalists who dominated
amalgamation negotiations, and although some members feared
that this might have an adverse effect on the outcome of talks,
the composition of the negotiation committees, on both sides,
does not seem to have inhibited and in practice may have
helped the merger. (62) 	 Both unions were affiliated to the
Labour Party, and the ASCC&J already had one Parliamentary
representative, W.T. Wilson. 	 It was agreed at the time of the
merger that the elected Parliamentary candidates for both
organisations should retain their positions until after the
next general election (63). The maintenance of the contingent.
fund, which was operated by the ASCC&J to provide assistance
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for members in distress (as distinct from trade benefit paid
to members of the ASCC&J) or for other additional activities,
was the cause for some controversy, and it was eventually
agreed that the fund be abolished, and that the EC have the
right to use up to 1% of the contributions to provide for
assistance to members of their own or other trades in dispute, or
to take legal proceedings (64), in certain, prescribed circum-
stances. This provided the EC with a means of meeting calls
for assistance without resort to a levy which would require a
vote of the membership, a power which conferred upon them an
independence of membership decisions in circumstances in which
membership pressure might otherwise provide an impetus for, or
constraint upon their activities.(65)
	 The power of the EC to
act on behalf of the society was further encouraged by a
decision relating to representation within the Building Trades
Industrial Parliament.
	 The EC and GC were to sitf in this
body in equal numbers, and it was apparent that a decision was
necessary as to who, in these circumstances, was to decide
policy, in the event of a conflict arising. (66)
	 It was agreed
that preliminary meetings between the two Councils should be
held, in an attempt to circumvent this problem, but that in the
event of no agreement, the EC representatives should determine
policy (67).	 The politics of merger provided a continuity
with the past practices of both unions. Amalgamation may have
been the ideal of the left—wing and syndicalist elements in
both societies, but when it was effected, it was carried through
by leaders embodying the craft conservatism of what is des-
cribed by Postgate as the 'old order'. Affiliation to the
Labour Party, and concern with Labour representation were a
continuing feature of the ASW. The merger contributed to a
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strengthening of the initial-dye of the EC, as representative
of the society in political, as in other affairs. If few
political problems were experienced in merger discussions
between these two unions, it is because the inauguration of the
ASW reaffirmed and strengthened the political Labourism of its
predecessors, with a centralisation of control, politically;
as in other matters, being consolidated for the new Executive
Council.
Within the ASCC&J it was expected that the 'enthusiastic amal-
gamators' would endorse and campaign for the projected merger
with the General Union. (68) This merger had been advocated
by the union's activists for many years and no difficulties were
expected by the EC, other than the problem of persuading the
more apathetic members to record their votes. But when they
put the issue to the members, the EC combined it with the ques-
tion of a partial alteration of rules in readiness for the
formation of the ASW. Sensitive questions concerning members'
benefits were involved. For example on the question of super-
annuation, existing rules provided that a member, at the age
of 55, if a member for 30 years, was entitled to 7/— per week
for life. The alteration to rules extended the age limit to
60 years. Moreover it was proposed that if a member had an
income from any source exceeding two thirds of the wages of
the district he should be barred from receiving superannuation
benefit. It was clear that the EC wished to avoid discussion of
some of the less palatable innovations which they intended to
make in any case, by combining them with the question of amal-
gamation and allowing only one vote to cover all of the matters
which were raised. (69) A member was asked to vote, not on the
principle of amalgamation alone, but on the specific proposals.
brought forward as a result of negotiations. In rejecting the
proposed terms a member was therefore assumed to be rejecting
altogether the project for amalgamation. Complaints were
received from several branches for the manner in which voting
on the amalgamation scheme was carried out. But it was the
smaller branches, in the less industrialised areas, for the
most part not associated with the amalgamation movement who
were prominent in this respect (70). In the districts more
closely associated with earlier campaigns for merger, it was
understood that the advantages of the scheme outweighed any
losses which might be incurred through minor adjusLments of
benefits.
When the ballot on amalgamation was taken during the summer of
1920, both societies recorded an overwhelming vote in support.
Within the General Union the total vote in favour was 7,467
with 2,749 votes against amalgamation. The total recorded vote
of 10,216 represented some 7056 of the membership of the union
which was declared to stand at 15,000 at that time (71). For
amalgamation purposes the overseas membership of the ASCC&J
was not counted, so that their declared membership at the time
of the merger stood at 129,278.	 Of this number there was a
total poll of 71,374 with 67,141 votes in favour and only
4,233 cast against merger, more than adequate to satisfy pre-
vailing statutory requirements. (72)
Amalgamation was now decided, and the Amalgamated Society of
Woodworkers was established as of 1 Jan 1921 with a total
(including overseas) membership of 160,678 and assets worth
some Z298,287 (73).	 The structure, despite the reconstitution
of the rulebook, derived, for the most part from the rules of
the Amalgamated Society of Carpenters, Cabinetmakers and
Joiners. The rules were to be administered by the Executive
Council, a body of seven members drawn exclusively from the
craft section, one each for Scotland and Ireland and 5 for
England and Wales. Nominations for the EC were made within 7
electoral districts, but members were voted into office on the
basis of elections involving the whole of the membership. EC
members held office for a three year period, but elections
were held twice in every three years, replacing three and then
four of the EC as a means of retaining continuity. Nembers
were eligible to stand for re—election. An additional position
on the EC was allocated to the GUC&J who were allowed a rep-
resentative until 1924 (74). The EC, which was to meet monthly
had the full power to administer the whole of the rules and
could fine, suspend or expel any member, branch or committee.
They were to transact the ordinary business of the society and
could determine anything on which the rules were silent.
Elected by the membership as a whole, they could claim to be
more representative than the EC under the previous rules of
the ASCC&J. But the breadth of their geographical base created
problems in respect of the day to day control of the society's
affairs. The intention of the rule change was to combine
national representation of the membership with a position of
central authority, reflecting and controlling members through
the country as a whole. The problem was essentially one of
the distance between EC members, and this was, temporarily to
be dealt with through the appointment of a sub—committee of
the EC, comprising the three EC members living nearest to the
General Office to meet 'as required'. It was they who were
responsible for reviewing claims for benefits, for issuing
voting papers and counting votes. They could appoint deputa-
tions where necessary and execute any other minor under-
takings which were essential for the operation of the Society's
affairs. (76)
The new Executive retained the powers formerly vested in the
EC of the ASCC&J in respect of trade movements. It was stated
that 'under no circumstances will any branch or district be -
allowed to strike without first obtaining the sanction of the
EC or EB, whether for a new privilege or against encroachment
on existing ones.' 	 They had the power to close a strike,
whenever they deemed necessary. 	 And they had, additionally the
power to appoint a number of organisers, especially in the
lower paid districts, to be paid from general funds and under
their own control. (77)
The formation of the ASW was used by the existing leaders of
the ASCC&J to widen and strengthen the formal controls vested
in them through the union rulebook. There were abundant advan-
tages for the General Secretary in having about him a group of
men associated with the creation and administration of central
policies. This role was assigned to the new Executive, whose
power was enhanced by their status as the nationally elected
representatives of the whole membership. Although they did not
initially assume full—time responsibilities, their regular
contact with headquarters ensured a different level and type
of involvement from that which could be expected of the General
Council, who met only once every three years. The status of
the GC was little changed. It comprised 13 members, including
9 representatives of the UK and one each for the overseas
districts. An extra place was made on the General Council until
the next election for a representative of the GUC&J. (79) The
GC had ultimate power over the EC and if they decided that it .
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was essential for the efficient running of the society, they
could take possession of all books and documents and appoint 4
of their number to perform the duties of the EC pending an
expression of membership opinion on the matter. (78) But the
increased authority of the new EC undermined the established
position of the General Council within the new organisation.
No longer could the GC claim to be the only body elected by the
whole of the membership. They were now rivalled by an Executive
which regularly assumed administrative responsibilities and could
establish a familiarity with each other and with the affairs of
the society impossible for a body which met only once every
three years. (79)
Like the General Council, the Management Committees were
retained in accordance with the established practice of the
ASCC&J. NC's might be elected for the purpose of negotiating
and carrying out local working rules where there were two or
more branches in a district. NC's were to have a minimum of
four and a maximum of seven members, with no more than seven
sub-districts in London from which the London NC should be
elected. Any district with more than 4,000 members could elect
a full-time secretary. Districts with less than 4,000 members
could, with a majority of 2/3 of members voting elect a full-
time secretary, with the sanction of the EC, and 25;., of the
salary in this case would come from general funds. It was the
MC (or branch where there was no MC) which was responsible for
the election or appointment of delegates to the local Building
Trades Federation, to Conciliation Boards and to the Engineer-
ing and Shipbuilding Trades Federation. The Management Com-
mittee also retained a primary role within the new Society (80),
in relation to shop stewards.
	
The development of a sizeable
shop steward movement within the aircraft industry during the
war years had forced the official recognition of stewards within
the ASCC&J prior to the merger. Shop, job and yard stewards'
rules were issued in 1918, specifying that stewards were to be
elected in the workplace but accredited by the District Manage-
merit Committee. Stewards were responsible to and under the
jurisdiction of the MC which retained the over—all responsibility
for negotiations. (81)
Despite the continuity in rules governing the structure of the
NC's, their role was changed over this period as a result of
the shift towards national collective bargaining. Previously
the initiative concerning trade movements had rested with the
MC, and even if they required the sanction of the EC before
proceeding with industrial action, they claimed a considerable
measure of autonomy in district affairs. Now the responsibility
for initiating trade movements was shifted to the Executive
Council, and whilst the MC retained its authority in respect
of the local working rule agreement, its scope for adjusting
local rates was considerably limited. Whilst a formal simila-
rity with the Amalgamated Engineering Union might be suggested
in view of the common origins of the two rulebooks, the fact
that payment by results had been accepted in the engineering
industry meant that there was greater scope for local negotiation.
Stewards in engineering were responsible to their District Com-
mittees and at a general level the District retained considerable
authority for controlling its own affairs. In the ASW by
contrast, local initiative was possible only via an application
for regrading under the national scheme. The possibilities
for movement in this direction were to be fully exploited over
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the coming period as MO's souht to improve the position of
their District within the national scheme. It was in the better
organised areas, those already graded Al that the scope for local
initiative was most reduced. London and Liverpool, which were
already at the top of the wages league were more restrained by
the new bargaining structure than the less well-organised country
districts.
	
Without formally adjusting the rulebook provisions
for Management Committees with the foundation of the AST in 1921,
it is clear that the MO's were in a very different position than
they had been prior to the consolidation of national collective
bargaining. And it was the better-organised centres, those dis-
tricts where wages were highest which were most seriously affected
by the erosion of their authority.
It was not intended when the ASW was formed that it would com-
prise only the ASCC&J and the GUC&J. 	 The name of the new
organisation had originally been proposed in the context of
amalgamation discussions between the ASC&J, the AUCH and the
National Amalgamated Furnishing Trades Association (rAFTA) (82).
The NAFTA was a union of some 14,000 members recruiting amongst
carvers, polishers and upholsterers employed in the shop-fitting,
shipbuilding and other industries, together with carpenters,
cabinetmakers and joiners (83). Other trades which were
organised included woodcutting machinists, furniture packers,
and plate-glass workers, and the union was distinguished from
the craftsmen's organisations by the fact that it had a section
for women. Otherwise there was no demarcation line between its
various sections (84). Yet in 1917 talks on amalgamation were
initiated, and progress was rapidly made. By November of that
year, officials of the ASC&J and the NAFTA had agreed on the
desirability of amalgamation, had exchanged copies of their
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respective rulebooks, and had established a sub-committee from
the Executives of each society, in order to draft a full scheme
of amalgamation (85). Two major differences should have divided
these organisations; the first, already mentioned, is the
Women's Section, which was organised by the NAFTA. The ASC&J,
as a craft organisation, had never given serious consideration
to the recruitment of women, for their membership was derived,
predominantly from the craft worker who had completed an accepted
period of training at the trade, in order to acquire his skills.
Yet the response, from ASC&J negotiators, to the Women's Section
of the NAFTA was remarkably acquiescent. The necessity, in the
furnishing trades for recruiting amongst this, otherwise
undesirable class of labour was conceded:
"In the best interests of the furnishing trades for the purpose
of controlling their industry, it has been found necessary to
take in various other classes of workers, viz., polishers,
carvers, upholsterers, glassworkers and women". (86) The general
rules of the NAFTA governing the Women's Section, as well as the
rules for f Ttiergency females , admitted as a result of war-time
conditions, were to be incorporated into the new structure. (87)
This was no small concession for a union with the traditions and
recruiting pattern of the ASC&J. What then was the motivation?
It seems likely that it derived from the other major difference
between the two societies. ilembers of the NAFTA could legiti-
mately, within the terms of their oun society, accept piecework.
This was the issue which really concerned members of the General
and Executive Councils of the ASC&J (88). Two of the three
resolutions passed at the joint meeting of these two Councils
to consider the question of merger with the NAFTA were concerned
with this issue (89). Much of the rationale behind moves to
amalgamate or federate with other unions during this period,
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within the leadership of the ASC&J, derived from the need to
control picework which was accepted both by non—unionists and
(sometimes) by members of other unions. It was agreed, as con-
cerned the NAFTA, that on the date on which amalgamation came
into operation, piecework should cease in the furnishing trades
and that members of the NAFTA employed in the furniture industry
on the piecework system at the time of amalgamation, should,
within three months, decide to adopt time rates, or they would
forfeit their membership in the new union. (90)
	 This was not
merely a concern to abolish piecework within another industry or
for other trades. There was a considerable amount of overlapping
on trade questions,. between the two unions especially during
the war (91), and if a control over piecework was to be established
then liaison with leaders of the NAFTA was essential, whilst
amalgamation would ensure full control.
Other issues regarding the projected merger were agreed with
comparative ease, and there seems to have been a considerable
measure of good—will on the part of negotiators from both unions.
The name of the new society was to be the Amalgamated Society
of Woodworkers, but the general rules governing this body would
be those of the ASCC&J. Any member of the NAFTA should have
the option of continuing his present rate of contributions and
benefits, or of accepting those of the ASCC&J. The consecutive
years of membership of the amalgamating unions should be
recognised as membership of the new society, and existing
branches of the NAFTA were to become branches of the consolidated
organisation. (92)
The question was put to the members of both societies during
the summer of 1918. By July it was apparent that the NAFTA had
achieved a substantial majoriLy in favour of amalgamation (93).
But members of the ASCC&J failed to comply with the requirements
of the amended Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act, in that an
insufficient number of members bothered to vote. In order to
conform to the requirement that 5056 of the UK membership cast
their votes a return of 53,235 ballot papers was required, but
only 47,741 members actually voted. A large majority of ASC&J
members supported the merger but it seemed to be blocked by
statutory requirements (94). It is not clear how much effort
was made by the leaders of the ASCC&J to circumvent the difficul-
ties which faced them. Whilst the NAFTA reported the ballot
results in July 1918, voting in the ASCC&J was not announced
until December during the same year. The delay may have resulted
from attempts by the officials of the larger union to ensure
that an adequate return was received. But other considerations
may have entered into the situation during the intervening period,
not least the possibility of consolidating a merger with the
General Union, a project which was actively pursued since August
1918 when a sub—committee of the GC was elected to negotiate with
the General Union (or any other kindred union) (95).
Leaders of the ASCC&J were committed to the principles of craft
trade unionism, involving opposition to payment by results and
to dilution. The amalgamation with NAFTA presented them with a
difficult choice. Either they could accept into membership many
operatives who would generally be regarded as outside the ranks
of the skilled workers, aiming, in doing so, to end the applica-
tion of piecework payments to these operatives. Or they could
avoid amalgamation with the NAFTA, but risk the continuation of
the payment system to which they were opposed. In view of the
popular feeling in favour of merger of the woodworking trades,
discussions with the NAFTA were continued during 1919, but it
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seems likely that the imperative to close ranks with the semi-
skilled workers in that union were reduced by the ending of the
war. With the revival of housebuilding activity during 1919 and
the declining importance of the aircraft industry as a centre of
employment for woodworkers, the logic of the amalgamation with
NAFTA was, at least partially, undermined. Consolidation of the
• two societies of carpenters and joiners was a higher priority in
peace time, and it is not impossible that the leaders of the
GUC&J, sensitive to the pending changes, may have resisted moves
which would widen the base of membership of the merged organisa-
tion beyond the recognised boundaries of the woodworking crafts-
man. As discussions with the GUC&J became more amicable so the
attitude of the leaders of the ASCO&J towards the NAFTA became
more frosty. An approach from Alex Gossip, GS of the NAFTA to
F. Chandler in June 1919 concerning NAFTA representation at
meetings of the GUC&J in connection with impending rule changes
which were to provide the basis of the merged society was met
by the response that no such representation was necessary at
this stage. And when the question of voting on the Furnishing
Trades amalgamation was considered by the General Council of the
Amalgamated Society at its meeting in 1919 there was a minority
of GC members who wished, in issuing instructions to members
regarding amalgamation for members to be told that if amalgama-
tion were agreed to l it includes stone carvers, glass bevellers,
upholsterers, polishers, japanners and women,all to carry the
same card' — a move clearly designed to discourage a positive
vote on the question. And although this was not carried, it was
agreed 'to place all the aspects of such action clearly before
the members.' (96) Not only was the membership base of the
NAFTA wider and less skilled than that of the larger union, but
its political orientation was very different to that of the
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conservative craft societies which represented the main body
of carpenters and joiners. It counted amongst its members
Jewish refugees from Eastern Europe, who established communities
of furniture makers — most notably in the East End of London,
and who formed trade union organisations subsequently branches
of the NAFTA which were politically to the left (97). And
although many of its members may not have shared their point of
view, the leadership of the NAFTA was identified by its opposition
to the war effort and to conscription. Alex Gossip, the General
Secretary, and Fred Bramley, the trade organiser had campaigned
actively against the government for the duration of the war.
The NAFTA's leadership was active in support for the revolutionary
government in Russia and promised to be a political embarass-
ment to the more restrained leaders of the ASCC&J (98). Politics
reinforced craft conservatism in this case, and discussions
between the NAFTA and the ASCC&J were taken no further. Not
for many years would the Woodworkers and the Furniture Trades
come so close to merging their respective organisations.
Negotiations with other woodworking unions during this period
would not have been complete without the pursuit of discussions
with the Amalgamated Society of Woodcutting Machinists (99).
This body, with 22,132 members in 1920 was expanding rapidly as
woodworking processes were mechanised. Workers came into the
industry and developed their abilities as woodworking mechani-
cians very often, as the result of years of experience, rather
than as a consequence of apprenticeship, which was more common
in handcraft woodworking (100), and their presence within the
industry posed a threat to members of the ASW, whose position
at the bench might be undermined by members in the machine shop
(101), doing the same, or similar work. Not surprisingly there-
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fore there were demarcation Oifficulties (102) and leaders of
the AST, as it was by the time that amalgamation discussions
were underway, were concerned to establish the right of labour
to transfer from one process of the industry to another (103),
although it was conceded that the woodworking machinist, with
no training as a handcraftsman should have some protection in
his area of employment when trade was slack. (104)
In view of such innovations in the industry, the woodcutting
machinist was not to be easily bought off by the woodworking
craftsman. The formation of the ASW had already established a
structure and form of organisation into which leaders of the
AS'/ hoped that the members of the ASIET could be slotted (105).
But W.J. Wentworth, GS of the ASWN, together with members of
his Executive, had their own views on amalgamation (106). A
considerable degree of autonomy was required for the activities
of the woodcutting machinists within the proposed amalgamation.
A National Committee composed exclusively of woodcutting
machinists was proposed, together with the continuation of dis-
trict committees of woodcutting machinists where these were
already in existence (107). Far from accepting the dictates
of the ASW regarding work on systems of payment by results,
officials of the ASWM insisted that, in districts where their
members had been employed for many years on this basis — in the
carriage building railway shops, in the motor and engineering
industries, they should continue to have that option after the
formation of the new, merged, society (108). The usual provisions
regarding the position of existing officers were required, but
in addition Wentworth demanded that there should be elected
nationally four members of the Woodcutting Machinists to repre-
sent those interests on the Woodworkers' EC, as well as on
outside bodies such as the NFBTO and the Engineering and
Shipbuilding Federation (109).
Surprisingly, given the diversity of the proposals emanating
from the two organisations, a draft basis of amalgamation was
prepared for submission to the membership. The ASW was, to
some extent able to carry its position, by maintaining that the
new organisation should have one central Executive Council, with
authority to deal with all of the members of the combined union.
Similarly it*was proposed that composite branches be brought into
existence, drawing in both the woodworking craftsman and the
woodcutting machinist, with the rights of either to transfer
their labour from one process to another, although with priority
of employment for the woodcutting machinists on machine processes
in times when work was short (110). The Woodcutting Machinists
were to be represented by two members on the Executive, and two
members on the General Council until 1926, when the number would
be reduced to one on each body. Provision was made for a National
Advisory Council, along the lines proposed by the Woodcutting
Machinists, and special provision was to be allowed for
representation on some of the larger Management Committees, for
example on Clydeside, in the West of Scotland, Liverpool, London,
Manchester and Birmingham (111). On the question of piece work
a compromise proposal was adopted, whereby all members of the
new Society should revert to the system of plain—time working
'at the earliest practicable opportunity' following amalgamation,
but no action was to be taken, until 'circumstances and the
state of trade are favourable'. (112) The compromises made by
leaders of the ASW suggest their concern to incorporate this
new class of tradesman, who exuded the confidence, which derived
from a knowledge that the machine sector of the trade was
destined to expand. Perhaps the compromises were encouraged by .
the recognition that it was unlikely that the members of either
body would swallow the propoculs, and if that was the case
then expectations were proved correct. ',Then put to the member-
ship of the AMIN, the proposals were actually defeated, the
final vote being:
ASWM In favour of amalgamation 	 4,540
Against	 5,040	 1 1 3)
A section of the ASWM's EC and GC's had deleted a recommendation
to the membership to approve the terms of amalgamation, which,
they had been promised would be included. Against the background
of changing processes which favoured the machinists, the leader-
ship of the AS'.11 .1 were unlikely to accept a subordinate role
within the larger society. The draft proposals were accepted
as the basis for a ballot precisely because they could not, in
their existing formulation, provide a framework for merger.
Since the leaders of the ASWM were not anxious to conclude an
amalgamation, reference to the membership provided an effective
means of ending negotiations with the ASW.
Political attitudes were less significant, in these discussions
than the question of trade identity. Wentworth and the other
leaders of the ASWM were scarcely more radical than their
counterparts within the ASW. Because the Woodworking Machinists
had, for some years been struggling to establish a distinctive
identity for their trade, and because they aspired to the
conti.ols and status previously associated with the craft organi-
sations, they assimilated the political views and values of the
craft societies. Essentially they were supporters of the Labour
Party and their moderate outlook accorded well with the pre-
vailing views amongst leaders of the ASW (114). Differences
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derived from their assertion of a distinctive trade identity,
rather than from any conflict in political views. And at this
level compromise was improbable. The two societies continued
in their separate ways, untroubled by merger discussions for
over forty years.
It is apparent, from the above account, that leaders of the
ASO&J, subsequently the ASW, actively pursued amalgamation with
kindred trade unions from 1916 through to the early 1920's.
Two significant problems had emerged for the craft unions, by
the middle of the war, and they are central to an understanding
of the discussions which took place on amalgamation. Firstly
the changing processes of manufacture during the war years,
placed new requirements on the organisation of woodworking
production. Demand for labour was intensified in the lesser
skilled sectors — in the production of wooden munitions boxes,
in the manufacture of pre—fabricated wooden components for
army hu
	 ments, undertaken on a mass basis, and most important,
in the aircraft industry. The reduced skill content of many of
these processes allowed the use of dilutees on work which might,
according to custom and practice, have been part of the range
of activities of the woodworking craftsman. The introduction
of female labour was symptomatic of the extent of the changes
which were taking place — and of the threat which was posed to
the traditional delineation of craft within the woodworking
sector. And it is in response to changes of this nature, as
well as in the context of the new collective bargaining problems
posed by the wartime intervention of government in industrial
affairs, and particularly in the manufacture of munitions, that
woodworking skills — and along with them the framework of
trade unions organising woodworkers — were adjusted. •
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The second and related problcm concerned attempts to introduce
payment by results into an industry in which the plain time rate
formed an integral feature of the craft identity. The payment
system was closely bound up with the form of engagement of the
building trades operative. This is to say that payment by the
day, by the hour or by the piece define the form of wage contract
in which the worker was involved. At the general level it has
been established that payment on a time or piecework basis are
necessarily related. Payment made on a time basis assumes a
certain volume of output and conversely payment on a piece
basis assumes an approximate period of time for which the
operative is employed (115). Although this assertion has a
general relevance for the building trades, it was apparent, as
early as the 1860's that the payment system had important impli-
cations since it defined the basis on which the operative was
engaged — and this was of crucial significance in an industry
where employment was essentially short—term. Until 1860 it
seems that the building trade worker was usually employed on a
day basis — so that he would be taken on or laid off by the day,
with the shortest recognised period being the quarter day. But
in that year the employers launched an attack which culminated
in a move to payment, and to hiring and firing, by the hour.
Previously the employer paid for bad weather — but the hourly
payment system meant that it was the operative who paid. And
whereas the daily payment included the short day on Saturday,
with provision for overtime payment where extra hours were
worked, the hourly payment elimated these benefits, to the dis-
advantage of the operative (116). The introduction of payment
by results threatened to worsen this situation by defining the
period of engagement in relation to the period necessary for
the completion of a certain task or range of tasks. Since the
work would vary from job to job, it seemed likely that
negotiations would, as a result of pbr be conducted by an indivi-
dual worker or group of workers, rather than by a body represen-
tative of the trade as a whole. The same problems were apparent
in engineering where the result had been
"a chaos of inconsistent customs and practices varying from shop
to shop; and withal a tendency to a continuous decline in piece-
work rates." (117)
The ASE, as the largest of the societies of skilled engineers,
had encountered considerable difficulties in evolving a uniform
position on trade matters with the smaller unions in the same
field.
The problems provided a momentum for consolidation, effected in
1920 through the establishment of an agreement between 6 of the
competing unions in engineering to form the All% Similarly in
the woodworking trades, the problems of the war years — especially
the moves to generalise payment by results provided a powerful
lever to bring about a rationalisation of trade union structure.
It was in defence of the plain—time system of payments that
leaders of the ASC&J impelled the structural changes which could
reinforce resistance to payment by results. Whilst they were
able to assert the importance of opposition to Dbr within their
own organisation, their capacity to do so across the whole of
woodworking production was limited, despite their size, unless
a medium for control of members of other unions could be found.
Both amalgamation and federation were useful towards this end.
And the rationale behind moves towards amalgamation was based,
not on the wider theories of 'One Big Union', but on a !theory'
of cognate trade unionism, an assertion of the need for merger
to be effected between kindred trades, with common interests.
It was at this level that the need for changes in the organi-
sational framework was identified. ASW strategy was not to
alter for some 50 years.
Ft.3. The trowel trades and amalgamation
Whereas officials of the ASO&J favoured limited cognate trade
amalgamation, in conjunction with the development of a federal
structure to unite building trade unions, leaders of the major
bricklayers society, the OBS, had in the past shown themselves
more sympathetic towards aims of full industrial unity (see
Ch.1). Before the outbreak of war, they had loaned offices and
support to the campaign for 'One Big Union', and although their
response was deemed inadequate by some, at least of the syndi-
calists, in contrast with officials of other unions, John
Batchelor, the GS until 1919, and George Hicks, one of the
national organisers for much of this period, and Eatchelor's
successor, were positively in favour of amalgamation. The
possibility of an effective campaign for industrial unionism
during the war years was limited, but initiatives were kept up
for amalgamation within unions catering for bricklayers.
The other major union recruiting bricklayers was the Hanchester
Unity Operative Bricklayers Society, led by its GS, John Gregory
(118). By contrast with the OBS, this was a small organisa-
tion (119), and numbers were stagnating during the war years.
(120)	 Financially the union was in dire straits, with some
of the benefits showing a constant loss (121), but the level of
animosity between the two societies was such that merger did
not seem to be an immediate prospect (122). An approach made
by Batchelor to Gregory urging discussions on amalgamation met
with an ambiguous response bolth from the Executive and the
membership of the MUOB, but it was eventually agreed, by 677
votes to 597 that negotiations on merger should proceed (123).
By January 1916 certain preliminary conditions had been laid down.
It was established that, from the date of amalgamation, all full
benefit members of the MUOBS should become full benefit members
of the OBS except that they would not be entitled to superannua-
tion benefit, since this had not been operated within the MUOBS
in recent years, until they qualified by the appropriate period
of membership within the OBS (124). After the merger they would,
in all other respects, operate on the same basis as members of
the OBS, paying the same contributions, for the same range of
benefits, and working under the rules of the larger union (125).
Particular problems arose in discussion of the matter of superan-
nuation. It was argued by Bros. Williams (EC of OBS) and
Batchelor (GS) that superannuation benefit represented a heavy
drain on the funds of their union, and consequently, since a
comparable scheme was not operated within the MUOB, they felt
unable to take members of that organisation directly into benefit,
unless an initial per capita contribution was made equivalent to
that put up by the OBS (126). Yet negotiators for the smaller
union were reluctant to accept this argument, and after some
wrangling it seemed that the preliminary conditions for merger
would be submitted to the membership as they stood. However a
further hitch was raised by the IIIJOB delegates. What would be
the position of their General Secretary after amalgamation?
And would they be entitled toTecial representation on the
AMGC of the merged union (127). On these issues too the OBS
proved uncompromising. The decision taken by the Annual Movable
General Council in August 1916 was to the effect that Gregory,
and any other properly qualified member of the MUOB would be
eligible for nomination to anj position in the OBS, but no
preference could be given to them (128). Perhaps not surprisingly
there was little enthusiasm within the NUOB for merger on such
terms, and negotiations were, for the time being abandoned. (129)
Discussions with the Bricklayers' Trade, Protection, Sick and
Burial Society, a Sheffield based organisation, promoted by ft
former members of the NUOB, were no more successful. Under the
auspices of the National Associated Building Trades Council
attempts were made to amalgamate this body with one or other of
the national unions of Bricklayers (130), and in Dec 1915 it was
reported that the Sheffield union had agreed to ballot its
members on the question of fusion (131). The results crushed
hopes of amalgamation in this direction, for of 300 ballot papers
issued, only 8 votes were recorded in favour of a merger (132).
Ironically, the initiatives which precipitated discussions
leading to the formation of the AUBTW came, not from the OBS,
but from talks on merger between the TTUOB and the OSE.
	
The
Stonemasons' Organisation had suffered considerable setbacks in
recent years. At one time the stonemason had been amongst the
best paid and most respected of workmen, part of an elite whose
position derived from its capacity to control entry into its
trade and to restrict labour sup ply (133). The OSN had been in
continuous existence, since 1834, if not longer (134), and its
members had a standing and dignity which separated them, some-
times to the detriment of working class unity, from other
members of the building trades (135). The introduction of
reinforced concrete, especially on the larger scale public
buildings, from the turn of the century had undermined the demand
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for stonework, and the mason was soon faced with a reduced
demand for his skills (136). The geographical concentration of
building work which had been available - and especially acces-
sible to the working mason during the early and middle years of
the Victorian era was diminished, as city centres were 'completed'
and development shifted to smaller-scale and more wide-raniing
developments on the outskirts of the major conglomerations (137).
The profound impact of such changes on the life and livelihood
of the operative mason were compounded by the effects of the
war.
	
It was precisely those areas of building in which the
mason was employed - large public buildings, often of a
luxury nature, which were curtailed during the war years, leav-
ing the stonemason no alternative but to seek employment else-
where - very often in munitions production (138). Membership
of the OSH, which had declined steadily since 1900 plummeted
after 1914 (139). The financial and organisational consequen-
ces for the union were disastrous.	 Amalgamation with other
building trade unions - which hitherto would have been unthink-
able, was now a real possibility, if not a necessity.
Negotiations with the MUOB were attractive for two reasons.
Firstly, because the MUOB was smaller than the OSM, it was
likely that leaders of the Stonemason's Society would be able
to maintain - and indeed even enhance their position at the
head of a merged organisation. A merger along these lines did
not represent a 'take-over t by an outside body and it could
even be argued that the OSM was 'taking over' the smaller
society of bricklayers. Secondly it was apparent that the
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leaders of the OBS would lik(' to consolidate their organisation
by a 'take-over' of both of the smaller societies. Hence the
MUOB and the OSM had certain interests in common and by joining
forces against the OBS they could enhance their position in any
future discussions of amalgamation of all three societies.
Officials of the Manchester Unity, perhaps not reluctant to
associate themselves with the superior Stonemason Society,
proceeded with negotiations. Conditions for merger were drawn
up and it was agreed that a vote be taken in both societies (140).
John Batchelor reported this matter, within the OBS, and it was
suggested that approaches be made, via Wm Bradshaw and the
NFBTO, in order to participate in the discussions .
 (141). As a
result, a conference was held in Manchester in July 1919,
attended by representatives of the OSM, the I1U0B, the OBS and
the Amalgamated Masons and Paviors (AMAP) (142).
Attitudes, at the outset of negotiations, seemed to augur well
for a full amalgamation (145), and it was agreed that a committee
be set up, comprising two members from each society, in order to
draw up terms (144). At its first meeting the committee under-
took to define the mainline principles on which amalgamation
might be conducted. A new name and a new rulebook were regarded
as essential prerequisites for the establishment of the merger.
The union was, optimistically, to be known as the Amalgamated
Union of Allied Building Trade Workers (145). Its structure was
to be based on geographical areas, known as districts (subse-
quently divisions), along lines already established within the
OBS (146). The Executive Council, to be elected on the basis of
one representative from each of the nine districts was to elect
the President and trustees of the union. The financial position •
of the full—time officials of all of the unions involved in the
merger was to be guaranteed, and a common fund was to be set up
based on a contribution of 10/— per member as an indication of
the good faith of the unions represented in discussions (147).
The matter of entrance fees and contributions was to be referred
to a Compilation of Rules Committee, set up to consider the
detail of the new rulebook, although it was agreed that superan-
nuation, sick, accident, death and other benefits should be
continued on the basis of the average experience of the societies
which were party to the amalgamation (148). At the end of the
meeting, enthusiasm for the merger was high. The 'utmost good
feeling and confidence' prevailed, and 'everyone present wended
their way homewards to spread the good news'. (149)
But optimism and good feeling were not, on their own, a passport
to a successful conclusion of the discussions. Towards the end
of 1919, voting papers on the general principles of amalgamation
were issued to the members of the unions concerned by the NFBTO,
and members were instructed to hold special meetings in order
that the returns be submitted by Dec 6th (150).
	 Both the
Stonemasons' Society and the Manchester Unity Bricklayers secured
an overwhelming majority in favour of the amalgamation proposals,
but within the OBS, despite a majority voting in favour of
merger, the total vote recorded amounted to only some 35,. of
the membership, and therefore failed to comply with the provisions
of the Act of 1917 (151). The Plasterers' Society was caught
in a similar predicament, and withdrew from negotiations, but
the GS of the DES, together with Wm Bradshaw of the NFBTO,
approached the Registrar of Friendly Societies, and it was agreed
that a further vote be taking within the OBS (152). Branches
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were again instructed to sumpon special meetings on the question,
and in an attempt to ensure that results complied with statutory
requirements, it was agreed that returns be kept open until the
March quarterly meeting in 1920, when the votes would be
scrutinised.
It is difficult to compare the turn-out for the meetings on
amalgamation with branch attendance at other times, since 1919
was scarcel3i a 'normal' period of trade union activity. The
disruption of branch activity which resulted from the war was
compounded by the relocation of building operatives as house
building was resumed. The return of men from the forces swelled
membership figures but the consolidation of the expanded member-
ship in branch meetings and activities was a difficult proposi-
tion (153).
	
Yet there is no reason why the OBS should have
been more affected by these factors than any other union, and it
seems likely that voting on amalgamation was broadly similar in
volume to voting on any other major issue during the same
period (154).
The leaders of the OBS doggedly pursued the goal of amalgamation.
Hicks, now GS, issued a circular calling for merger on the
grounds of economy, efficiency and solidarity, and the persis-
tance of the leaders of the OBS in this matter was rewarded
when the votes in favour came in in sufficient numbers to meet
legal requirements, (155) the result being reported in May.
It is ironical that, of the three main unions participating in
the discussions on merger, it was in the OBS, for so long the
union in which activity had suggested favourable attitudes
towards merger, that the voting returns were deficient. The
explanation might in part derive from the size of that union,
for the larger the union 195
the more difficult it is to chieve a high voting return on
such issues. It may be that, because of the history of amal-
gamation campaigns within the OBS, a favourable return was
assumed by members who were not unsympathetic to merger, but who
simply did not bother to vote on the first occasion. In any
event it does not seem that the majority of members could be
counted as 'enthusiastic amalgamators', even where they might
generally be favourable to, or acquiescent in the process of
amalgamation. But a majority of members were in favour of the
merger on the second ballot, and whilst the issue may not have
been a matter of pressing concern for many members, it is clear
that support for the principle had been won. Meetings of the
Cognate Trades Amalgamation Committee were curtailed between
January and April of 1920 and resumed only at the beginning of
May, when the Compilation of Rules Committee was established
to give consideration to the details of merger (156).
Arguably, the chief problem for this amalgamation was one of
craft identity, for it was proposed to bring together two
crafts, bricklayers and masons, which had hitherto maintained
their independence, one from another (157). It is true that in
some parts of the country there was already a degree of overlap
between the trades, particularly in rural areas. In Scotland
and parts of the North of England trained bricklayers were less
numberous than masons, who often reserved to themselves the
right to undertake bricklayers' work (158). But at least as
far as Scotland was concerned, the representative organisation
The Scottish Masons Society was not a party to amalgamation
discussions, and in England and Wales the question of distinctive
craft identities had still to be overcome. During the period
of post-war boom it was agreed that members of the bricklayers'
19 6
and masons' societies should work together without regard to
questions of demarcation, and recognise the card of the related
societies, provided that currently prevailing rates were paid
to bricklayers engaged on masons' work or vice versa, such that
neither craft should suffer a reduced rate as a result of this
flexibility (159). This decision called forth protests from
some areas (160) although in others members of the different
trades worked together amicably (161). But it laid the basis
for the operation of one card for both trades after the amalga-
mation, a solution which was designed to end the wrangles over
demarcation (162).
The situation was complicated by the fact that the OSH had,
in recent years opened up membership of the society to quarry-
men and some labourers in related work (163). Since the other
societies did not recruit labourers, it was necessary to decide
whether these members should be admitted into the new union,
or should be handed over to another organisation recruiting in
that field (164).
	
A number of the quarrymen were semi-skilled,
and an agreement had been reached with the employers that these
men should receive a rate only 1d below that of the craftsmen.
It was feared that by transferring them to a society such as
the 'Altogether' Builders Labourers, which might seem more
appropriate, they could lose this benefit (165). This question
pointed to the wider issue of organisation on industrial lines.
How far was it intended that the new organisation should recruit
outside of the sphere of craft work in bricklaying and masonry?
To what extent was the new union to form the basis of a larger
movement of amalgamation towards one union for the whole of the
building industry? (166) Moves to extend the scope of recruit-
ment to labourers had little support during the discussions,
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and it was agreed that arrar,ements might be made for the trans-
fer of all labourers already organised (167) into a labourers'
union. A sharp line was drawn between the semi—skilled workers,
engaged on monumental work or in the quarries, and members who
were labourers. (168)
	
George Hicks paid a personal visit to
Portland, where the majority of members in quarries were based,
and it was subsequently agreed that it was necessary to retain thE
specialised semi—skilled men in the union and to continue organi-
sing in the quarry districts (169). The distinction which was
made, between the skilled or specialised worker on the one hand,
and the labourer on the other, was one which was to define the
new union, whatever its title and other provisions, in terms of
the traditions of craft organisation of its major constituents.
A common obstacle to amalgamation was the resistance of full—
time officials, many of whom might fear theloss or threat to
their positions in a new, and larger structure. In the context
of the expanding membership and relatively stable financial
climate of the trade unions in the immediate post—war years
(170), this difficulty was not insuperable. It was agreed early
on in discussions that the financial position of the full—time
officials of all of the unions was to be guaranteed when the
merger was completed.
	 George Hicks, who had replaced John
Batchelor as GS of the OBS in 1919 was elected as GS of the new
union at a salary of £600 p.a. free of income tax, and with
provision of accommodation (171). The existing general secre-
taries of the other two unions, Williams of the OSM, and
Gregory of the MITOB, were to be taken on to the staff of the
Amalgamated Society as chief officers of their respective trade
deparUments, under the control of the EC and the GS, and were
each to be paid a salary of £450 p.a. with free housing or
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payment in lieu thereof (172). Other existing full—time
officials were to be taken over and placed in positions in
accordance with the direction of the Executivepand organisers
would, ordinarily be subject to re—election every three years
from July 1st 1922, on a geographical basis (173). In view of
the successes achieved in some areas by the local appointment of
a walking delegate, it was agreed that, where proof could be
shown of the need for such an appoinLment in a locality, the
Society should pay 25% of the salary of the delegate in order
to assist local organisation (174). The question of the payment
of the salaries of branch officials was more sensitive. In some
branches members joined mostly an a trade only basis, whilst
in others the majority paid for friendly benefits in addition to
trade. Secretaries in the latter branches undertook a greater
volume of work than those in the former type, and it was intended
that the payment which they received should differentiate between
the two (173). Every effort was made on the part of the nego-
tiating team to ensure that the interests of full—time and
branch officials did not stand in the way of amalgamation. Nany
full—time .
 officials were, in fact, enthusiastic proponents of
amalgamation. George Hicks, in particular, adopted the slogan
'More unity and fewer unions', and was responsible for pushing
the campaign forward when the outcome seemed to be in doubt (176)
both within his own union (177) and in the face of difficulties
raised by representatives of the other two unions (178). As
GS of the largest of the amalgamating unions, Hicks could proceed
with some confidence in the likelihood of filling a similar
position in the amalgamated society, and it might, therefore be
argued that he had a vested interest in seeing the merger
effected. But other officials, with perhaps less prospect of
improving their position, spoke enthusiastically in favour of
amalgamation and seemed concerned to eliminate, rather than to
create obstacles to the 'for , ard movement'. (179)
Nonetheless the last minute difficulties which arose must be
attributed in part to dissatisfaction by leaders of the OS• and
the NUOB with their position within the projected structure.
Whilst the GS's of all three unions had been represented within
the Compilation of Rules Committee, it was agreed at a meeting
of EC's and organising staffs of the unions, held in Nov 1920
that pending the election of members for the EC of the new
society the members of the Executives of the amalgamating organi-
sations should act in that capacity. An Emergency Committee
was also set up to deal with any Emergency Business which might
arise, comprising one representative from each of the unions,
together with the Secretary, George Hicks (180). No place was
made for Williams and Gregory, and this exclusion led, not
surprisingly to protests from the two. Williams in particular,
proceeded to raise a range of last minute objections to the
proposals for transition to the new, merged, society. The timing,
as well as the content of these objections suggest that they
arose from personal interests, as much as from principled con-
cern with the transition to a unified structure (181). The
access of the former GS's of the OSM and the I .ILTOB to decision
taking bodies within the amalgamated society was a key issue.
Queries relating to the drafting of contributions cards, to
financial arrangements during the transition period and to OBS
financial abligations were added to the central problem of the
role of Williams and Gregory in the forthcoming period, and for
a brief moment, the unity, so long discussed, seemed to be
jeopardized. Williams might, it seemed, encourage the OSM to
renege on the commitments already made. (182) He had been given
a free hand by his Executive in the conduct of affairs, and,
in his insistence that the ON 'required a little more time
working on their own lines before indulging in anything con-
nected with the amalgamation scheme' (183) it seemed that he
was intent on using it to postpone, if not to curtail the pro-
gress towards full amalgamation. Not surprisingly, it was felt
by representatives of the OBS that someone was l out to stop the
amalgamation'. But concessions were made on the matter of the
composition of the Emergency Committee, and it was agreed that
the GS/s of the three unions (Hicks of course was already there)
be included (184). Arrangements were then concluded regarding
the centralisation of finance and the control of organisers,
pending the merger of the three societies. The resolution of the
personal issues had prefaced a satisfactory conclusion of other
questions.
The AUBTW, like the AS[, was brought into existence from the
1 Jan 1921. As in the case of the woodworkers' merger, it was
founded on the principle of a new rule-book and a new structure.
But, as with the woodworkers, it was the largest of the unions
participating, in this case the OBS, which provided the basis
from which the rules were developed. The Society was carved
into 11 Divisions, rather than the nine which were originally
proposed, Divisions 10 and 11 covering Scotland and Ireland
respectively, where only the OBS, of the three unions, had
recruited in the past (185). From each of the Divisions a mem-
ber was elected to the lay Executive Council, which was aug-
mented by two members from each of the societies amalgamating,
in order that the interests of each craft section be safeguarded
(186).	 In this way it was hoped to reconcile geographical
divisions with the craft interests brought together for the
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first time under the umbrell, of the one organisation. This
arrangement was intended to survive, at least for the first
twelve months of the amalgamation, after which it could be main-
tained if there seemed to be a continuing need for such provisions
(187). As in the former OBS, each division comprised a number
of Districts with District Committees representing branches in
the area covered. The District Committees and Divisional Coun-
cils of the OBS were maintained with co—option of members from
other societies, pending elections of new committees during
1921 (188). Wherever practicable, branches were to amalgamate,
bringing together masons and bricklayers, and economising
thereby in the working expenses of branch life (189).
A new system of benefits was drawn up, which became operative
from 26 June 1921. The minimum payment — for trade benefit
alone, was 9d per week, with the benefit of E1.10.0 per week
for strike, lock—out or victimisation payment. On the friendly
side, members could make optional payments for sickness, at 6d
a week, superannuation, 3d a week and funeral at 2d a week so
that a member who paid for all benefits would have a weekly
outlay of 1/8 per week with friendly benefits paid out in accor-
dance with contributions made (190).
	
Provision was also made
for juvenile membership at a reduced rate of entrance and
contribution fees. Members contributing for trade benefit only
in the old societies, but wishing to qualify for one or more of
the friendly benefits in the new organisation could do so
but were obliged to contribute for the full qualifying period
of 12 months before receiving benefits. Members already contri-
buting for friendly benefits became entitled to receive benefits
immediately the new society began to function, provided they
had opted to contribute at the new rate of payment (191).
In an attempt to encourage ihterest amongst the membership, an
Annual Delegate Conference was initiated from 1922, along the
lines of the Annual Moveable General Council which had been held
in the OES (192). The conference consisted of five members
from each Division, one from each of the five District Commit-
tees. The Conference gave consideration to the general policy
of the union, but it had no Executive authority, the governing
body of the union being the EC (193). Members of the EC,
together with the full—time organisers also attended the con-
ference, and it was argued that it provided the occasion for
closer contact between the Executive and the members (194).
Despite the freedom which this conference gave for the expression
of rank and file opinion, compared for example with the ASW
which held no comparable gathering, political commiLments
within the trowel trades union were not such as to allow for
the creation of a political fund within the union to further
activities in support of the Labour Party (195). The syndicalist
ideas of many activists discouraged Labour Party affiliation and
although leaders of the AUBTJ appeared on the left of the
political spectrum, by comparison with other trade union
officials, no politcal fund was set up within the new union.
George Hicks, the new General Secretary, had been associated
with the movement for industrial unionism, at least until 1914,
when the establishment of the BWIU caused him to break with
some of his former comrades (196), but by the early 20's he
was more actively associated with the political left in the
LP. Similarly Dick Coppock, formerly a member of the Social
Democratic Federation and an anti—war campaigner, as well as
an organiser with the OBS prior to his appointment with the
NFBTO, was known as a left—wing militant (197) at this time.
Members of the Executive Council were sufficiently committed to .
the principle of political activities on behalf of the union
to encourage persistant appeals to the membership regarding
the creation of a political fund, and yet they were repeatedly
defeated on the issue (198). A left wing presence within the
leadership and an attempt to stimulate an identity with, and an
active support for the Labour Party were ineffective. It seems
unlikely that moves for Labour Party affiliation would have met
with significant opposition from the left within the membership,
since members of the newly formed Communist Party were commited,
from its inception, to working within the Labour Party (199).
Rather, the substantial majorities against participation
recorded when voting was taken on the question suggest that the
membership perceived few advantages to be gained from the
increased contributions which would be necessitated by the
political fund, and that there was little enthusiasm amongst
the rank and file for such activity (200). Paradoxically then,
the AUBTW, with its 'progressive' image, particularly vis a vis
the more conservative ASW, was not affiliated to the Labour
Party. It was a position which was to prove a considerable
embarrassment in .subsequent merger discussions with the Wood-
workers.
The foundation of the AUBTW followed a long—standing policy
within the OBS in favour of the reduction of the number of
trade unions. Yet ironically, the merger was initiated, not
so much as a result of this commitment, on the part of some of
the leaders and members of that union to the principle of
amalgamation, but as a result of discussions between the two
smallest unions involved, in what appears as an attempt to
consolidate their forces against the CBS. 	 Neither the IIIJOB,
nor the OSM had been able to benefit from the climate in the
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trade union world during thc first world war, when membership
was expanding and trade unions were receiving a new form of
recognition through their relationship with Government. Both
had suffered in the context of restrictions on the volume and
type of building activity which might be undertaken and their
negotiations regarding merger can be seen as a defensive manouevr(
for the leaders of both unions were reluctant to accept incor-
poration into the larger and stronger OBS. The MUOB was too
small to retain its autonomy for much longer, whilst the long-
term decline in the membership and status of the OSM impelled
consideration of structural change. Both bricklaying and
masonry had been affected by technological changes in the run-up
to the war, as ferro-concreting was introduced on the larger
constructions, whilst the steel frame building eliminated some
areas of work formerly available to bricklayers. But it was
the stonemason who was most acutely affected by such changes
and the participation of the OSM in talks on merger were a
direct consequence.
The new structure was interesting in that craft boundaries
seemed to be breached by the participation of the masons. It
is true that bricklaying and stonework were akin to each other
as trades, but they had in the past held distinct and autono-
mous positions within the building trade world. The time-
served mason of the nineteenth century would not have considered
bricklaying as an alternative form of employment if work in his
own field was not available, and would have relied instead on
travelling, or 'tramping' to obtain employment, supported in
the meantime by his society, the OSM (201). Yet the AUBTW was
founded on the principle of one card for all of its members
(with the exception of semi-skilled workers in quarries),
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assuming thereby the intercl-_,ngeability of crafts, provided that
the rates for each trade were not affected. The nature of the
new organisation, appears to be ambiguous, for although the
society was defined by the craft traditions of its three major
constituents, by its admission of certain semi—skilled workers,
it seemed to allow the possibility of future development on the
basis of a more 'open', pattern of recruitment. The name itself
suggested that the intention might be to expand along industrial,
rather than along craft lines, yet the decision to transfer the
labourers already recruited by the Stonemasons' Society into
a Labourers' organisation suggested a reluctance to trespass
outside of the areas of craft organisation. If the nature of
the new organisation was ambiguous, the intentions of some
at least, of its founders were less so. Discussions regarding
merger were pursued by George Hicks with a number of other
unions, not all of them amongst kindred trades, in the following
years.
In an attempt to broaden the scope of the amalgamated society
negotiations were initiated with other cognate trade societies
during 1921/22, notably the Tile, Faience and Mosaic Fixers
and the Building and Monumental 1:orkers Association of Scotland.
On the first of these two societies, it was Hicks, as GS who
raised the question of amalgamation with Sharp the GS of the
Tile and Mosaic Fixers. A meeting between representatives of
the two organisations followed in which a number of questions
were raised. Firstly it was argued by Sharp that the smaller
organisation risked losing its identity within the AUBTW.
He was assured that his union would be allowed to retain its
identity, both through the establishment of a special branch
of the AUBTW and by identifying its members, by their trade,
	 .
upon the contribution card. This seemed to satisfy the formal
objection, but it was clear'chat Sharp, and other representa-
tives of the TF&MF Society would lose their positions as a
result of a 'take-over t . The smaller union would not be allowed
any direct representation on the EC, although it was stated that
its members could stand for any post in the same way as any
other members of the union. There were already several dis-
placed officials within the Amalgamated Union, and it is unlikely
that Hicks would make any further concession on this point, in
view of the limited size of the TF&MES. The propositions, as
they stood were unlikely to appeal to the leaders of that union,
but there were disincentives for the members too, in the way
that the merger was proposed. There was to be nothing to pre-
vent any member of the amalgamated society from working at any
trade for which the society catered in which he was competent,
although it was allowed that the special rates paid to the
tile, faience and mosaic workers must be upheld. The question
of benefits, always a sensitive area in merger discussions
added to the obstacles to amalgamation and the discussions did
not reach fruition (202).
Negotiations with the B&MWAS at Executive level were no more
successful. The AUBTW provided benefits which were better
than those paid by the Scottish organisation for the same
contribution, so it was proposed that the B&1 1 VA.S could be
'taken over t by the AUBTW on the basis of the provisions of
the AUBTW rulebook (203). On the important question of craft
representation on the governing bodies, it was clear that the
rules of the AUBTW would have to be changed, if this principle
were to be admitted. It was suggested that the issue could
be referred to National Delegate Conference with a recommenda-
tion that the size of the EC be increased to 12 comprising one
bricklayer and one mason representative from Scotland, with
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two masons, one quarryman and seven bricklayers from England
and Wales. In the event of conference not accepting the prin-
ciple of craft representation, then this could be allowed
through the co-option of a craft representative from any craft
not adequately reflected in the composition of the EC. The
future position of the three full-time officials, including
Hugh Dic2herson the General Secretary of the MEWAS was to be
assured, in the capacity of organisers for the no.10 Division
and this large and scattered Division was to be regrouped into
10 separate Districts with a new General Office in the Glasgow
District. (204)
	 These proposals were not sufficient to tempt
the members of the ME•AS to renounce their autonomy in favour
of merger with the Amalgamated Union. The position of the
B&EWAS was in no way comparable to that of the OSH prior to mer-
ger, since the number of stonemasons in Scotland was less
affected by technological innovation than in England, and in
any case masons claimed the right to do brickwork. A measure
of Scottish resistance to take-over was certainly a part of the
response to the merger proposals, but it was grounded in the
difference in building practices between England and Scotland
and reinforced by the limited representation to be allowed to
the B8111JAS at national level within the AUBTW. Although the
balance of representation which was proposed was favourable in
view of the relative size of the two organisations, it was
clear that decisions would be taken by an Executive which was
dominated by representatives from the South (205). An earlier
merger involving a Scottish bricklayers ?
 society had given
the AUBTW a base North of the border, but the EC of the BETAS
resisted pressures to concede their autonomy to the larger
English based society. Other initiatives regarding amalgamation
which were taken by representatives of the AUBTW involved
unions which could not, in ally sense be regarded as recruiting
cognate trades,and discussions around these, broader proposals,
will be given further attention in the section relating to
proposals for One Big Union.
Pt.4. The Labourers and amalgamation
The movement for unification amongst kindred trades was more
effective amongst the craft unions, during this period, than
amongst unions of builders' labourers. The attempts which
were made to rationalise trade union structure, encouraged by
the NFBTO, were less successfully applied to the unskilled,
despite attempts by leaders of the craft organisations to
spread the gospel of fusion.
Four major unions of builders' labourers were in existence at
the time when the NFBTO was brought into being; the United
Builders' Labourers Union (UBLU) (1918 figs) with 20,484 mem-
bers; the United order of General Labourers of London with
12,000 members; the National Association of Builders Labourers
(NABI) with a membership of 14,955 and the Navvies Builders
Labourers and General Labourers with 7,000.
	 In addition there
were two general unions recruiting amongst builders labourers;
the National Union of General Workers and the Workers Union.
It was the intention of leaders of the craft unions to bring
together the unions representing builders' labourers into one
organisation which would be the recognised home for this cate-
gory of workers, thereby undermining the potential scope of the
general unions.
This craft strategy depended on their ability to control entry
to the NFBTO, and via that body to the negotiating machinery	 •
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within the industry (206). They would then be in a strong
position to restrict the progress of the general unions. Only
two of the unions of Builders' Labourers were represented at
the first annual meeting of the Federation in 1918, the UBLU,
and the National Ass. of Builders' Labourers. Applications
for affiliation were received from a number of other unions,
including the United Order of Gen. Labourers and the Navvies
Union, and although these applications were initially rejected,
appeals from the two bodies of Builders Labourers ensured that
they were accepted into affiliation, although the Executive
strongly urged the fusion of the four labourers' societies
(207). A conference of their Executives was called, in May
1919, when the general principle of merger was agreed and a
committee set up, of two representatives from each of the
unions, together with a sub-committee of the Federation, to
draw up a scheme of amalgamation (208). By November amalga-
mation seemed to have been secured (209), but progress was
hampered by the rivalclaims for the position of General Secre-
tary.
	 The debate grew up around the election of S. Taylor of
the Navvies Union as General Secretary, elected against Dan
Haggerty of the UBLU, and it led to a split within the new
society which theoretically encompassed all of the labourers'
unions, the National Builders Labourers and Constructional
Workers Society (210). From the ensuing fracas two organisa-
tions emerged. The first, known as the NBL&CWS, was a con-
tinuation of the old UBIU, with Dan Haggerty as General Secre-
tary.	 The second, which was registered as the 'Altogether'
Builders' Labourers and Constructional Workers' Society
comprised the other amalgamating unions, led by S. Taylor (211).
Attempts by Coppock, now GS of the Federation, following the
death of Wm Bradshaw, together with other leaders of the
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NFETO, to bring about a reconciliation were unsuccessful, and
he was forced to accept the continued existence of the two
bodies (212).
The establishment of the Civil Engineering Construction Concilia-
tion Board in 1919 undermined the influence which the cra:t
societies could command within the unions of builders' labourers.
Craft authority relied on control of the negotiating machinery -
a control which had beenabsolute when arrangements at the
national level were confined to the machinery of the National
Conciliation Board. It was intended by the leading figures
within the Federation that this authority should be continued
with the creation of machinery for national collective bargain-
ing but the initiative of some of the labourers' leaders
undermined their strategy. (213)
	 Henceforth the labourers
were less dependent on craft influence and leaders of the craft
societies were less able to secure their own position by resist-
ing an extension of the membership of the general unions in
building production.
Pt.5.
	 One Big Union: Discussions in the early 20's 
If attempts to amalgamate the Labourers' Unions were not an
unqualified success,the mergers of cognate craft trade unions
in the post-war era, nonetheless represented a significant step
forward in the movement for unity. It was not yet clear how
far that movement might be taken; organisational boundaries
were not finally drawn and prospects for fusion across, as well
as within trade areas had still to be confronted. Amalgamation
between kindred trades had often been described as a necessary
preface to full industrial unity, and the Federation, which
was yet in its formative stages, was not seen cs a final
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answer to organisational problems. How far could the hints
at wider unity, which were contained, for example in the struc-
ture of the AUBTW, be carried through into a fully fledged
industrial unionism? Discussions proceeded around this question,
both between individual unions, and under the auspices of the
YFBTO, until crises in inter—union relations during the mid
20's severed the existing tenuous unity within the Federation.
Leaders of the AUBTW consistently favoured one union for the
building industry as the appropriate form of organisation
(214), and consequently encouraged amalgamation across craft
boundaries. Not long after the foundation of that union,
negotiations were initiated with the NBL&CWS in an attempt to
prepare a suitable scheme of amalgamation for the two. Amal-
gamation along the lines of a fusion, with new rules was not
envisaged. Rather, it was pro posed that the labourers' union
be absorbed into the larger body, although there was no inten-
tion of insisting on an adjusLment in the rates of contribution
and benefit in the labourers' society, since it was recognised
that the lower wages of the labourer would prohibit the success-
ful conclusion of an amalgamation on such . a basis (215). It
was intended that a section for labourers be maintained, with
separate branches, which could be grouped into geographical
districts and Divisions, along the lines already operating
within the AUBTW. The Labourers' Section was to be allowed
special representation on the Executive Council, the Divisional
Councils and the District Committees of the AUBTW, able to
nominate and elect their own representatives. The scheme,
outlined by a sub—committee of representatives of both unions
received only a luke—wailli reception from the EC of the
Labourers Union, and a less than enthusiastic response from
the members of the AUBTW. The EC of the NBI&CWS were wary of
relinquishing control over their organisation or their assets,
after their recent difficulties with the other unions of
builders' labourers. Consequently they demanded the right of
control over the funds, assets and organisation of the Labourers'
section for a period of at least twelve months after the merger.
Hembers of the AUBTW, by contrast, were not enthusiastic for
a scheme which suggested a lowering of their own status, by
association with an organisation of unskilled workers. When
the proposed amalgamation was mentioned in the union's journal,
resolutions were sent in on the subject from a number of branches,
and of 38 resolutions received, 31 were against the proposals.
Craft prejudices survived within the AUBLI, despite the enthus-
iasm of its leaders for the movement towards amalgamation.
And in this case craft prejudice won the day, for Hicks had
to concede that, in view of the 'mixed reception' which had
been accorded to the proposals, a further period of propaganda
was essential, and that in the meantime 'the matter stands
adjourned' (216).
The onus of preparing a satisfactory scheme of industrial
unity was then shifted to the NFBTO. In November 1922, follow-
ing the acceptance of a resolution endorsing the principle of
industrial unionism for building trade workers, a committee,
representing each union, was set up to explore the possibility
of re-organising along industrial lines. Craft unionism, it
was agreed, was deep-rooted, and any scheme for industrial
organisation was obliged to take account of the various craft
interests (217). That obligation led, very rapidly to a
renunciation of proposals for full amalgamation and a concen-
tration on a scheme for the co-ordination (or 'semi-amalgamation!)
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of the trades and labourers' unions in the building industry
(218). The projected 'confederation' amounted, in effect, to
an amalgamation for trade purposes, as an attempt to circum-
vent the difficulties associated with the adjusLment and stan-
dardisation of the benefits of the various organisations. (219)
It was hoped that, in this way, the transition could be made
from Federation to full amalgamation at some future time. A
minority report, signed only by S. Sigsworth of the Plumbers,
and W. ColeS of the Plasterers, suggested that full amalgamation
was impossible, for the same reason, but recommended that unions
amend their rules along standardised lines, such that, at some
future date, the movement towards amalgamation might be facili-
tated. (220)
	 The Amalgamation Cttee reported to a meeting of
the Joint Executives, held at York in January 1923, and in view
of the prevailing division of opinion, and the lack of any
cleaa' method of progressing on the issue, the Joint Executives
passed a resolution asking the amalgamation committee, in
conjunction with the Federation, to continue its efforts in
relation to amalgamation of cognate trades — a rather different
proposition from that which had originally been put forward
(221).
Discussions of full amalgamation under the umbrella of the
Federation were abandoned, and the initiative was again returned
to the individual unions.
Correspondence had already been exchanged between the AUBTW
and the 1S7 on the matter of amalgamation, but the question
had not been pursued whilst meetings were being held via the
Federation. The Executive Councils of the two societies were
brought together in conference on the 19th June 1923 when
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the issues were broached in a general way. George licks was
anxious to bring together the two largest organisations in
the building industry as a means of furthering the cause of the
One Big Union, but difficulties were envisaged by Tom Barron
of the ASW regarding the structure and activities of the two
(222).
	 Firstly, he argued, there was a greater degree of
Divisional autonomy within the AUBTW than within the ASW, where
policy was morearectly under the control of the Executive.
Secondly there was the matter of political activities and
affiliation to the Labour Party, a principle upheld within
the ASW, but not supported by the members of the AUBTW. Thirdly
there was the problem of the Annual Delegate Conference, held
by the AUBTW, but not favoured by officials of the ASW, who
preferred their own structure which gave authority in policy
matters to the Society's General Council (223). Other issues,
such as the differences in benefits, or the different patterns
of recruiting outside of the building industry proper — for
example in shipbuilding or the iron and steel industry, were
not seen as insurmountable difficulties. Generally the
attitudes seemed to favour unity and some fine speeches were
made on bothsides regarding the need to hasten amalgamation,
to bring together the two largest unions in the industry, and
thereby impel the smaller unions to accept merger, and the
necessity of overcoming the 'evil of the official element'
hindering the progress of amalgamation, a problem which, it
was stressed, was particularly acute within the smaller unions.
'Every little union has its official'. Yet despite this
promising beginning, no further progress was made. The diffi-
culties encountered when the question of industrial unity was
discussed within the Federation could not, magically be over-
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come when the framework for discussions was adjusted to elimi-
nate the smaller unions. If the matter of differing contribu-
tions and benefits had been significant in January, it was no
less significant in June, and neither party to the discussion
brought forward proposals which tackled these obstacles.
Opposition to amalgamation was almost certainly present amongst
some, at least of the officials i volved in discussions (224),
but perhaps more seriously, the economic and political climate
impelled officials to give attention to more pressing matters,
in particular to the crises in relations with the employers in
1923 and 1924; the question of fusion along industrial lines
was pursued no further.
Pt.6.	 Building trade union merFers 1914 -24 
Despite the wide-ranging discussions on industrial unity, the
amalgamations which were effected within the building trade
unions during this period relied fundamentally on the principle
of alliances between unions organising kindred trades. Unity
between carpenter and cabinet maker, or between bricklayer and
mason, did not transgress the lines of demarcation between
crafts, although it suggested that those lines were shifting in
response to changes in the process on which each craftsman was
engaged.
The progress was made in accordance with the moves to national
identification of problems and national negotiation which had
emerged during the First World War. Whilst the focus for organi-
sation and collective bargaining had been widened during the
years before 1914, the experience of war-time inflation and the
problems of negotiating with government representatives encoura-
ged the move from local and regional to national collective
bargaining, and it was in res ponse to such pressures that the
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IIFETO had emerged. The rule . ; of the iTBTO required that its
affiliates should organise on lines which paralleled its own,
and the national trade union, organising one class of workers
throughout England and Wales, andpreferably throughout Scotland
as well,was a pre—requisite for the effective workings of the
Federation. Affiliation was restricted to national organisations
so as to undermine splinter groups, or local organisations which
hoped to retain their separate identity (225), and the logical
extension of this policy necessitated the establishment of
one union for each class of affiliated workers. This is not to
suggest that discussions on structure were always pursued within
the orbit of the NITTO, but rather that the evolution of the
Federation was itself a part of a movement towards national
organisation which also incorporated the changing structure of
the individual trade union.
	
The OBS and the NUOB, like the
ASC&J and the GUC&J, organised the same class of craftsmen,
across the country on a national basis. Rivalries of this type
were less susceptible to exploitation by the employers when
negotiation proceeded along regional lines, allowing each society
to operate in the areas within which it was best represented.
In the context of national policies and national negotiation,
such divisions could less readily be reconciled, and the
rationalisation of structure appeared as a matter for immediate
concern.
The relationship with unions organising in Scotland remained a
problem, for although attempts were made to draw the Scottish
societies into the orbit of the wider movement, questions of
Scottish autonomy remained important. It is true that the ASW
had successfully incorporated the Associated Carpenters and
Joiners of Scotland, as a result of the merger in 1911/12, but
the AUBTW had failed to draw in the societies of Scottish
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masons, which had united in 1920 to form the Building and
Nonumental Workers ?
 Association of Scotland (226). Similarly
the National Society of Painters, which had consolidated the
two main Painters' Societies in 1904, made no progress in unity
with the Scottish society, whilst organisations of plasterers
and slaters in Scotland maintained their trade unions distinct
from their English and Welsh counterparts until the 1960's.
The only major success in this period was achieved through the
reunification of the English and Scottish plumbers in a merger
which became effective on January 1st 1921 (227). Differences
in building practice, which varied regionally, became more
marked when comparisons were made between one country and another,
affected by differences in materials and style of building.
Trade union practice and political outlook north of the border
were also rather different from customs in England and Wales,
and it is not surprising that in the tougher climate of Scotland
union members were reluctant to sink their identity in with
their brothers in the South. Claims for a separate negotiating
structure for Scotland had still to be met, but pending that
decision, members of the building trade unions in Scotland
declined to abandon their own distinctive organisations. The
matter was complicated by the fact that the OBS, like the
ASC&J, was already organising in Scotland, but whatever the
impact of their recruitment, they were unable to overcome the
desire amongst Scottish trade unionists in the building crafts,
for autonomy in organisation and bargaining.
Despite this important limitation, the scope of the ASW and the
AUBTW was wider, as a result of the rationalisation, than it
had been hitherto. It is true that the ASC&J had been amongst
the foremost of the nationa] amalgamated societies of the 19th
century, yet for all of its apparent strength, it had never
managed to eliminate its much smaller rival, the GUC&J, nor
the related organisations of cabinet makers and furniture trades
operatives. The unity now achieved, although not complete in
respect of some of the related trades, was a break with past
rivalries. One organisation now predominated in each of the
trades - woodworkers, bricklayers and painters, and could speak
for each of thosetrades within the National Federation.
Unity may have been the principle governing these mergers, but
it was a principle which was confined to organisations recruit-
ing predominantly amongst craft workers, and operating within
the confines of each craft. It is true that the processes of
industrial change which characterised the pre-war era, as well
as the period 1914-18, served to undermine the traditional
notions of craft, and to encourage a more generalised approxi-
mation in definitions of skilled work - the aircraft woodworker,
the woodworker in ship building, the carpenter employed on
house construction were all woodworkers, and the specialist
terminology which distinguished between their various ty pes and
levels of skill, applicable in the nineteenth century, were no
longer so appropriate in the years after the first world war.
The operative stonemason, the craft aristocrat of the nine-
teenth century, was forced to accept amalgamation with the
bricklayer, whose position in the building trade hierarchy
was formerly rather less elevated. And all of them were
threatened, as craft workers, by the process of technological
innovation and speed up. The impact of innovations in tech-
nology or raw materials was much less marked amongst the building
crafts than they were in engineering where techniques. of
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scientific management narrol'A the range of skills which the
craftsman was called upon to exercise (228).
	 Many of the
tasks which the craftsmen in building work might perform were
undertaken on site, and required the ability to organise and
to execute each particular piece of work, with only a limited
degree of supervision from a craft or generalforeman. Yet the
experience of war-time, when a range of activities had been
shifted to the workshop, had redefined the Possibilities for
managerial innovation, in which the off-site pre-fabrication
of components was to play an important part. Manufacturers who
had participated in the production of woodworking for aircraft
or engineering during the war, now interested themselves in
the possibility of workshop production of joinery and other
components for on-site assembly of standardised forms of housing -
the 'homes fit for heroes' which were so much discussed in
the period (229). Experiments had long since been undertaken
regarding the possibility of speed-up in bricklaying (230) and
it seemed likely than an intensified demand for building work
might result, not so much in an increased demand for building
labour, as in a widening application of new technology - use of
the woodworking machinist being one example - and in new forms
of organisation which would affect the demand for, and status
of the building craftsman. It is in this context that the
structural changes affecting the building crafts must be
viewed. The principle of inter-changeability of crafts amongst
cognate trades embodied in the new societies was a recognition
of the extent to which traditional forms of employment might
be eroded by these trends. Conservatism amongst the members
ensured that changes in structure did not overstep the require-
ments of innovation in building practice, and so the general
delineation of craft was broadened to encompass the new
industrial trends.
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The balance in size and reD d ye influence of societies within
each trade facilitated administrative arrangements for merger,
once the general principle was agreed. The predominance of
one large society within each trade area had, at times seemed
to threaten the smaller organisations with a e take-over t in
which the particular interests of their members, or arrange-
ments which were valued parts of their organisation, would be
ignored (231).
	
In order to bring about the unity which had
been discussed for so long, leaders of the largest unions -
the ASC&J and the OBS were obliged to recognise this problem
and to accommodate the individual officials and the organisa-
tional practices of their smaller associates.
	
In both socie-
ties rule changes were contemplated in the post-war years.
In both cases it was possible to present these rule changes as
the basis for a new pattern of trade union government, distinct
from that of all of the constituents of the unified society.
In the case of the ASC&J, the membership was asked to vote,
both on the question of amalgamation, and on the new rules,
within one ballot - forcing members who favoured amalgamation
to vote in favour of the rule changes, or alternatively, by
rejecting the rule changes to reject amalgamation too (232).
In Practice the rules and structure of the new organisations,
the ASW and the AUBTW showed a high degree of continuity with
the operations of the largest of their constituents. The
pattern of government of the OBS, which had already been modi-
fied by the rule changes of 1918 laid the basis of operations
for the AUB7.7, with its District and Divisional structure,
and the Executive Council elected from the Divisions (233).
The AST was founded on the basis of the structure of the
ASC&J, with its Executive & General Councils, and its Manage-
ment Committees. So that the largest society, in each case,
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provided the nucleus - not just in terms of membership or
finance, but also in relation to administrative arrangements,
for the operations of the new union.
In each case amalgamation tended to centralise the power to
take policy decisions. Within the ASC&J the impetus to amal-
gamation derived specifically from the threat which was posed
by the employers' attack on the plain-time system of payment
for woodworkers - an attack which was associated with war-time
changes in woodworking processes. Leaders of the ASCUJ
identified the -problem in terms of resistance at the national
level. Unwilling to leave the initiative to members in parti-
cular workplaces, to shop stewards or to their Management
Committees, their response to the attack was to strengthen the
influence of the ASC&J over other unions in related trades,
and to strengthen the authority of the EC of the ASC&J over
the members. Moves towards unity between the various union
organisations were associated with a centralisation in control
of policy and organisation which defined the structure of the
ASW.
As the key official within each union, it was the general
secretary who initiated and controlled negotiations in respect
of trade union merger, as in many other matters. One of only
a few full-time officials the GS was concerned to consolidate
the organisation and in doing so to reinforce his own position
at the centre of affairs. During the war years he was ham-
pered in some measure by the new responsibilities accruing to
the union's national headquarters and his response was to foster
the formation of a body of officials who could assist with the
conduct of business at the national level and give support to
the policies which he was pursuing. In the case of the 1k3Ce,J
it was the Executive Council which was strengthened in conse-
quence of the emphasis on central control. The General Council,
which met only occasionally, could not command the influence
necessary to such a task. With the creation of the ASW, rules
were adjusted to allow the EC equal authority with the GC, as
nationally elected representatives from all over the country,
with provision for a sub-committee to take responsibility for
the regular control of affairs. This was followed by a decision
in June 1924 that the existing part-time EC of 7 members be
replaced by a full-time EC of five members - proposals which
were put into effect during the course of the following year
(234). Amalgamation involved not merely the elimination of
rivalry between one union and another. A key part of the amal-
gamatprocess was the pursuit of a policy, at central level,
to raise the authority of the unions Executive, In order to
defend their policy on payment systems, the Executive removed
the major questions concerning wages and hours from the juris-
diction of the LTC's, shifting power from the districts to the
central Executive level within the merged Society. They could
do so without o pposition precisely because those most likely to
oppose them - the activists within each district, were also
the 'enthusiastic amalgamators' who had campaigned so long for
unity through amalgamation.
Within the AUBTW, the progress of centralisation was less marked
than within the Woodworkers union. It is true that the rationali-
sation within the OBS in 1918 had broadened the representative
basis on which the Executive was elected. Whereas in the past,
Executive members had been chosen from a limited geographical
area, according to the location of the seat of government, the
new Executive Council was rerresentative of the whole union,
one member being elected in each Division (235). In the ASW,
by contrast, although nominations were made on a regional
basis, elections took place across the membership as a whole,
so that Executive members did not regard themselves as answer-
able to any particular region. The AUBTW then, had an Execu-tive
which was less centralised, and more directly responsive to
regional variations. Since it was not a full-time Executive,
its power was naturally more limited than that of the ASW, and
it had less capacity to create policy at a national level. It
might be argued that the independence of the EC within the ASW
was checked by the presence of the GC, but it has already been
suggested that the GC's legislative capacity was limited by the
infrequency of their meetings. And within the AUBTW, the
Annual Delegate Conference, although not yet a policy making
body, posed similar limits to the autonomy of decision making
by the Executive Council. Moreover there was established, within
the AUBTW, an important body of full-time organisers, elected
at Divisional level, whose influence, within their own locality,
might be at least as significant as that of the lay members of
the EC. So the AUBTW, despite the emergence of a central
executive deriving from the union as a whole, did not manifest,
to the same extent as the A,T:, the tendency towards centrali-
sation of policy making.
If amalgamation was defined by craft tradition during this
period, how serious was the prospect of unity along industrial
lines, which was proposed and discussed after 1921? 'Our industry
is one which lends itself peculiarly to one union', it was
argued 'There is no other industry more compact than the building
industry' (236). It is strange that this point of view should
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have been expressed by Tom T =on, of the 11 5:, for his union
was one which recruited widely, not just in building sites and
in joinery sho ps, but amongst woodworkers in shipbuilding and
engineering, in the aircraft industry and on the railways, in
short wherever woodworkers were employed, either in manufacture
on woodworking processes, or in maintenance work in other,
unrelated industries. Contrary to the statement which he made
in negotiation with the AUBT 71, the notion of a single 'building
industry' in which one union could o perate along industrial
lines was not unproblematic. The AUBTW, by the scope of its
organisation, reflected the difficulties which might be encoun-
tered. Its members might be employed in the iron and steel
industry, in foundries,
	 in the mines, or in railway work-
shops, as well as in building houses, factories, or public
buildings. Similarities might exist in the type of work under-
taken - that is, a bricklayer would be laying bricks wherever
he was employed, but there was a lack of homogeneity in the
areas of employment in which he would be carrying out that
work. The painter too might find work in diverse industrial
situations, and faced the additional problem that, with the
greater risk.
 of unemployment in his trade, he might be defined
as a 'building worker' only for part of the year, working in
other areas altogether, or facing unemployment for the months
when no painting work was available. Lines of demarcation
between one 'industry' and another often seem to be arbitrary,
and contrary to the views expressed by Barron, this is parti-
cularly the case in any discussion of the building industry.
Organisation had, until this time, proceeded along craft lines,
and there was no necessary correlation, although one was often
assumed in negotiations on structure, between craft and industry.
Both forms of definition were incorporated in the structural
changes of the period 1914-24. The mergers leading to the
formation of the AUBTW and the ASW continued, although in a
modified fashion, the craft definitions of the previous century,
whilst the establishment of the Federation provided a framework
for the representation of interests along industrial lines.
The establishment and consolidation of the Federation itself
required the perpetuation of craft organisation and it was the
disintegration of craftism which was eventually to undermine
the Federal structure. The NFBTO, like other Federations, was
set 111) on the basis that unions could a-rfiliate all, or a part
of their membership, and it was possible, in this way to recon-
cile the apparently conflicting interests of craft and industry.
The prior existence of the Federation, brought into being from
1917, may have undermined any serious movement towards indus-
trial unity, since it provided a limited, but adequate frame-
work for the expression of industrial interests. William
Bradshaw, the first GS of the Federation was concerned to show
that federation and industrial unity were not mutually incom-
patible, but rather that the federal structure could, itself
pave the way for a wider form of amalgamation.
'Federation is not the last word in organisation. Some day we
shall realise the futility of having so many unions. Such
multiplicity means waste and weakness, and it should be the duty
of our Federation to promote, and the triumph of its purpose to
accomplish the healing of differences which ought never to
exist. There are those who think that Federation may postpone
the coming of amalgamation. From such an opinion I would most
respectfully differ. There is nothing in the National Federa-
tion to retard or im pede the work of amalgamation proceeding.'
(237)
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Insofar as Bradshaw was referring to amalgamation between kin-
dred trades he was correct,for the _AU= was brought into being
partly as a result of the assistance of the leaders of the
YFBTO - including both Bradshaw and, after his death, Richard
Coppock (238). But the statement was less accurate in relation
to the matter of industrial unity, where the Federation struc-
ture would itself be threatened if negotiations were successful.
Discussions of unity were themselves stimulated by dissatisfac-
tion with the early machinery of the Federation, and the level
of friction which subsisted between the affiliated unions (239).
But ultimately it was recognised that amalgamation had, in the
past, proceeded between similar, or identical trades, and that
the industrial unity which was proposed represented a signifi-
cant and perhaps not altogether happy move into a new industrial
arena. A new principle was involved (240), and it was one
which would not be wholly welcomed, either by the members, or
by the leaders of the craft trade unions.
Even amongst cognate trades, amalgamation proceeded only with
difficulty..J.s Coppock pointed out, in 1924, (in the article
cited in footnote 237) 	 'although amalgamation may sound
very obvious and simple, the difficulties are very real'
'amalgamation must in the long run rest on an actuarial basis,
and it is here that unpleasant realities occur'.
He was of course quite right, for the actuarial assessments
even between cognate trades had been a major cause of difficulty
in the pre-war discussions, and a sensitive area for negotia-
tion in the mergers of 1920/21. If contribution payments and
benefits could feature so largely in talks between unions of
kindred trades, which shared some traditions, as orgrmisations
of the craft aristocracy, it was certain to be a high priority
for craft negotiators in discussions which drew together, not
only one craft with another, but unions of craftsmen with unions
of builders' labourers. Since the latter made little provision
for payment of friendly benefits /
 unity had necessarily to be
effected on a trade only basis, if it was to be effected at all.
But for a craft organisation based on 'amalgamated' principles,
such as the AS T , the unity of funds for trade and friendly
purposes was one of the fundamental tenets, and not lightly to
be abandoned in favour of an abstract principle of amalgamation
with whatever impecunious organisation of builders' labourers.
The overseas membership of the ASW may have seemed to present
practical problems inhibiting amalgamation (241), but it was far
less significant than the prevailing actuarial differences
between unions involved in these discussions.
Nonetheless it might be argued that reference to differences in
contributions and benefits by union leaders was a rationalisation
of more entrenched opposition to mergers.
	 True the principles
of craft trade unionism would not lightly be abandoned, but
they would be adjusted where it proved advantageous to the
leadership of an amalgamated union to consolidate, by opening
recruitment outside of the traditional craft sphere — as in the
case of the AEU where a trade only section was established for
labourers. For the building trades, no apparent advantage was
to be gleaned by permitting unskilled and semi—skilled workers
to join unions whose membership had previously been confined to
the ranks of the craftsman.
	
The intention was to reinforce
the distinction between skilled and unskilled and admission of
the labourers to a craft society, or merger between a, *craft and .
labourers' union would have tiLe opposite effect.
	
Financial
differences were a fundamental problem, but with a positive
commitment by union leaders to the issue of amalgamation, its
actuarial basis did not prove to be an insurmountable problem.
Financial questions did not derive solely from the interests of
the members in the status quo. Officials of all of the unions
had an interest in ensuring the preservation of their current
situation and prospects and would not lightly enter into arrange-
ments which, in the long-term, would be to the detriment of their
own employment. Could the one big union accommodate all of
the officials of all of the unions currently affiliated to the
Federation? And if so, what would happen to the claims of the
pro-amalgamationists that the one big union would be an econo-
mical measure? Militants suggested that amalgamation could
never come about through the pe/Inanent officials, and allegations
were made that the federation represented a 'fusion of official-
dom' which doomed efforts at amalgamation to failure (242).
George Hicks echoed the idea, expressing resolute opposition to
Federation at its inception in 1917:
'Federation ... has always been found wanting. The association
it permits of is always too loose
	 It unites offibials, but
not the rank and file; it is clumsy in its activities; it is
weak in its expression; it is autocratic in administration; it
is obsolete as a fighting force' (243).
	
Just three years later
Hicks was Fresident of this "obsolete fighting force", and the
tenacity with which the Federation was maintained by full-time
officials in subsequent years, suggest that his earlier analysis
may have been correct.
	 The problem was most acute in relation
to the officials and General Secretaries of the smaller unions.
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In the words of Tom Barron 'every little union has its official',
and they may have feared that one big union could not provide
a niche for all of them (244).
	
Dick Coppock, once he had con-
solidated himself as GS of the Federation, had a vested interest
in its expansion, rather than its contraction p and he could expect
to be backed by the Federation's Regional Secretaries, who had
a similar axe to grind. To qualify this, it must be stated that
vested interests were not introduced into the building trade
unions by the formation of the NFBTO. Rather, it was the strength
of the Federation that it was able to accommodate the many and
varied interests which existed within its individual affiliates.
In accommodating them, it ensured their perpetuation, and the
perpetuation of the individual unions which made up the NFBTO.
It provided moreover, a new structure with its own entrenched
interests, which was to prove equally difficult to dislodge.
Amalgamation along industrial lines was unlikely to sweep along
at a rapid pace when separatism could be reinforced so satis-
factorily.
Finally consideration must be given to the ideological factors
affecting amalgamation, in particular to the significance of
the pre-war syndicalist movement in encouraging trade union mem-
bers to favour the movement for fusion. It has already been
suggested that there was a s pin-off from the campaigns for
industrial unionism to the extent that arguments in favour of
merger were put, and were put frequently, within union publica-
tions, in trade union branches and, presumably, on the shop floor.
That members of the various building unions favoured the simple,
uncomplicated mergers within cognate trades can be established
indisputably from the returns made in elections on the issue,
for even within the OBS in 1920 a large majority voted in favour .
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of amalgamation, although the total vote was insufficient to
satisfy legal requirements, and in all other major votes over-
whelming support was recorded for projected cognate mergers
(245). But how far can the support indicated for these rela-
tively straight forward mergers, be taken as an indication of a
wider commitment to the principle of amalgamation, or indeed
to proposals for One Big Union? It is always difficult to ascer-
tain the views prevailing amongst the membership on such issues.
So often questions of structural change appeared as the prero-
gative of union leaders, discussed in conferences attended by
a select few, reported briefly, if at all in union journals,
reflecting perhaps a limited interest amongst the rank and file
and generating still less.
	
A resolution at the annual meeting
of the Federation might stimulate a new round of predictably
abortive activity in this direction, but in itself it need not
imply strong feeling at the grass roots on the need for unity.
On this issue, more than on many others, the membership seems
to have been wheeled out for voting purposes, and it is conse-
quently hazardous to draw far reaching conclusions from voting
returns. They can be taken when positive only as an indication
of tacit approval, and not as an indicator of active commitment.
It is true that resolutions from branches, and letters on the
subject were, periodically, numerous, but the deduction which
can be made from this fact need go no further than to suggest
that the 'enthusiastic amalgamators' were able to swing support
on this issue amongst an otherwise apathetic membership. That
there were such enthusiasts for the amalgamation movement is
indisputably true - but that their numbers were large, or their
following very active is more questionable. Hany members might
be unaffected by the problems of multi-unionism, particularly
if their allegiance was to one of the larger unions, operating
231
in an area where its trade irfluence was almost unrivalled and
they might not then perceive the problem as one of pressing
significance for their own organisation. A lack of clarity
persisted between campaigns for merger amongst kindred trades
on the one hand, and full amalgamation into one industrial union
on the other. Supporters of the movement for One Big Union
would almost certainly lend their efforts to the campaign for
amalgamation amongst kindred trades, as being a move in the
right direction. Supporters of the kindred trade amalgamation
were by no means so certain to support the endeavours to bring
about an industrial union for the building industry. The need
to stimulate membership interest even for the more limited form
of amalgamation, was reflected in concern that the ballots
should not be rushed and that the rank and file should be given
adequate information and plenty of time in which to record their
votes (246) whilst proposals amongst the leadershi p
 of the
kUBTW for amalgamation with a labourers' union could not
achieve support, even for the principle of amalgamation, let
alone for a detailed scheme for merger (247). So it seems that,
although there was membership support for the principle of
amalgamation, it was amalgamation along cognate trade lines
which was favoured. There is little evidence of enthusiasm
for the wider industrial fusion, and the large votes in favour
of the mergers which were concluded cannot be adduced as a
general indication of support for industrial unity. Quite
simply, the ideological battle for one big union never really
got underway. The issues were not clearly presented, and
although a campaign for industrial unionism was waged it failed
to find the widespread response which was needed if progress
was to be made in the face of leadership resistance.
The movement towards cognate trade amalgamation, encouraged by
the leadership of the ASW, reflected, not so much a rival
ideology as a policy decision, taken in the face of encroach-
ments on craft control and payment on a plain time basis. It
was presented very often as the precursor of wider forms of
amalgamation along industrial lines, and no attempt was made,
by its proponents to distinguish between the more limited, and
the more extensive models of amalgamation. ;ihilst the leader-
ship of the AUBTW were concerned to promote industrial unity,
officials of the ASW at no time seemed anxious to move beyond
the parameters of merger between cognate trades. The extent to
which structure changed in accordance with the wishes of the
ASC&J and subsequently the AS leaders is striking. It was as
a result of their initiatives that the NFBTO had been established,
drawing together unions recruiting in or around the building
industry.	 The commitment within the AST to the principle of
Federation was based primarily on the possibility of ensuring
support for their own policies, where necessary, amongst other
building trade unions. The joint negotiations established via
the Federation ensured a common purpose in collective bargaining,
reducing discrepancies in policy which might have undermined
their position. Given that the AS T was the largest, and most
powerful of the building trade unions, it is not surprising
that it was seen as a natural ally by leaders of many of the
other craft unions — even when they were separated by political
differences.	 In this context, the enthusiasm of some of the
leaders of the AUBTW for amalgamation with the Woodworkers is under,
standable	 — especially where the larger organisation seemed
to promise enhanced job prospects for officials and a greater
political influence within the trade union movement. Tactically,
amalgamation with the Woodworkers would have guarantccd the
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success of the wider industri'd amalgamation, for, rs AT:
negotiators were aware, a merger between the two largest trade
unions in the field would have ensured that the smaller ones
were rapidly assimilated (248). But the loodworkers needed to
go no further than the liaison established via the looser frame-
work of the Federation. This ensured them, both an autonomy
on issues of policy, which were decided within their own union,
and the supremacy of that policy when it was carried to other
building uniOns within the federation. George Hicks pursued
the matter of amalgamation across craft barriers persistently
throughout this p eriod, but his endeavours were doomed to failurc
so long as he confronted the resistance of the 21T.1 negotiators
to any wider fusion.
The two unions which were established in the period of post-war
rnalgamations reflected limited but significant changes in indus-
trial practice, especially during the first world war. They
were founded on the basis of alliances between unions recruit-
ing cognate trades. The structure and recruitment of the AUBTW
hinted at a wider form of industrial unity, but both unions
were inaugurated as the result of mergers between kindred
trades, and were defined by the craft traditions of their pre-
decessors. Attempts to encourage the unification of the
labourers , organisations backfired, and subsequent merger
discussions between the AUDTW and the NBL&CWS found little sup-
port in either of these bodies.	 Indeed all of the discussions
around the question of industrial unity were destined to fail,
for leaders of the ASW were unwilling to abandon fully their
independent organisation and benefit structure, or their
autonomy on policy issues. The Federation provided the means
of stabilising relations with the other building trade union
leaders, without renouncing this inde pendence and as such,
it provided the industrial c(anterpart to the craft trade unions
within the building industry.
	 The movement for a broader based
amalgamation was inhibited, by the vested interests of both
members and officials, expressed within the prevailing Federation
structure which ensured their perpetuation.	 Nonetheless the
mergers which were effected were carried through on the basis of
some degree of popular support, deriving in part from the cam-
paigns in favour of 'amalgamation', conducted for the most part
by industrial unionists over the previous years. The inter-
action between the changing base of trade union organisation in
the building industry, and the ideology which favoured struc-
tural change )wast by no means clear—cut.	 Supporters of full
industrial unity were involved and implicated in the campaigns
for merger between unions of kindred trades.
	
There seems to
have been a vague and widespread support for 'amalgamation',
deriving from the campaigns for industrial unity, without any
necessary implication of support for industrial unity itself.
The shape which was taken by unions of woodworkers, brick-
layers and their associates over this period, was to last for
almost fifty years.
CHAPTER 4. 
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE NFBTO : 1920-1939 
The Consolidation of the NF3e0: 1920-1939 
Introduction
Commentators on the inter-war years in Britain have stressed
the problems of adaptation, within the British economy, from
the decline of the staple export trades - notably textiles and
the heavy industries such as coal, steel and shipbuilding to
the creation of the 'new' industries, especially motor vehicle
production and electrical engineering, (1) The shift in the
nature of economic activity was accompanied by set-backs for
sections of the working population which were, traditionally
amongst the best organised - particularly the miners and the
engineers. The domestic recession was later compounded by an
international financial crisis whose effects, measured in human
terms, were disastrous. A National Unemployed Workers Movement
was founded in 1921 to organise and fight for the rights of
unemployed workers, and following the industrial defeats sus-
tained by the working class during the early twenties, symbolised
during the General Strike in 1926 with the capitulation of the
General Council of the TUC, the question of unemployment became
a critical one for the trade union movement. The number of
workers unemployed remained at over one million during the
1920's, rising to 2 million in July 1930, following the Wall
Street crash, and peaking at 2i million during 1932. (2) After
this low point in the slump, the growth of the new industries
led to an expansion in the economy, reaching a high point in
1937, although unemployment was still over 1 million. (3) The
'problem of the distressed areas' - those regions most seriously
affected by the decline in the staple industries of Britain's
industrial revolution was countered by the emergence of a new
prosperity in parts of the Midlands and the South of England.
Regional diversity was a key feature of these years.
Politically, lines were red/awn by the emergence of the Labour
Party as a party of government. A new constitution for the LP
was accepted in 1918, permitting membership at an individual
level and campaigns were wages by activists in many areas to
consolidate local units of the Party, which could back affiliated
unions in providing an electoral machine. With the decline of
the Liberal Party, Labour now represented the political alter-
native to the Tories, a focus for working class aspirations,
despite the formation of the Communist Party in 1920.
Labour achieved office twice during this period - in 1924 and
1929, although in neither case did the Labour Government com-
mand an over-all majority of seats. (4)
Trade union organisation was affected, both by the defeats and
disillusionment of the twenties and by the unemployment of the
thirties. Union membership had risen after the war, with the
return of troops and the buoyancy of the post-war economy which
seemed to promise full employment. Encouraged by expectations
of social change, fostered during the war years, and by the
novel sensation of power which had accompanied the development
of union strength on the shop floor, membership had risen to
8,548,000 in 1920, approximately double the number of union
members in 1914. It then fell steadily until 1933, its fall
broken only by small increases in two years - 1924 and 1929 -
the years when Labour was elected to office. From 1934 it
rose as employment opportunities widened with the consolidation
of the new industries, but even by 1939 it reached only 6,298,000,
well below the record level set in 1920. Not until the end
of the second world war was this record to be surpassed (5).
How were the building trades affected by the economic and
political changes of the inter-war years? What impact did
the election of 2 Labour Governments have on building produc-
tion? How did the relocation of industry and population affect
the type and quantity of building output during these years?
And to what extent were the bargaining structures formulated
after the first world war, retained in the ensuing period? The
stabilisation of collective bargaining at the national level
is a central feature of developments. Attention will be
directed to the procedural changes which led to the formation
& consolidation of the National Joint Council for the Building
Industry and to subsequent adaptations to the national negotia-
ting machinery. The final objective of this chapter is to
evaluate the adjustments made to trade union structure. How
far were the building trade unions affected by the unemploy-
ment and defeats of the inter-war years? And what impact did
this have on their internal government and organisation? What
role was assigned to the NFBTO in its early years? The question
of structural change was closely related to the stabilisation
of the Federation. The consolidation of the NFBTO was of
singular importance to its affiliated unions and an account
will be given of its history between 1920 and 1939.
Building production between the wars 
The Addison Act was abandoned in 1920/21 as the result of a
catastrophic slump. The abolition of building controls in
1918, combined with the impact of post-war inflation to raise
building costs to the local authorities. Pressures at the
political as well as the economic level encouraged the termi-
nation of government projects to expand the stock of working
class housing, although it was recognised that something must
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be done to compensate for the lack of interest by private
enterprise in this area (8). Preparation was made for another
Housing Act, which was introduced in 1923, but before it could
be made operative, an election was called which resulted in the
return of a Labour Government. The election of December 1923
resulted in Labour gaining 191 seats supported by the Liberals
who had 159, to the Tories 259. Clearly the Labour Govern-
ment's authority was limited in this context as the Liberal
Party would certainly oppose any sweeping measures of reform.
Despite Labour's lack of an over-all majority it has been
claimed that: ',The Government's record of reform was not
altogether barren. Its most notable achievement was John
Wheatley , s Housing Act, which paved the way for a substantial
increase over the following years in municipal house-buildingll
(9). John Wheatley, an ILPer was appointed to the Minister
of Health and together with Tom Shaw as the Minister of Labour,
pushed through the Housing (Financial Provisions) Act, 1924,
more commonly known as the Wheatley Act. The new legislation
provided an increased subsidy of E9 per house per year in
urban parishes and E12.10 in rural parishes for a 40 year period
and returned to local authorities the power to provide working
class housing without having first to show that this could not
be done by private enterprise, as required by the Chamberlain
Act in the previous year. The legislation envisaged a growth
in local authority building, but it did not tamper with the
property relations which governed the structure of the industry
and the scope for output. Land was not nationalised. Finance
for building activities was still to be raised within the capital
market. It was essentially through its commitment to a large
scale output that the Labour government could be distinguished
from its Tory precessors.
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The move from low levels of activity to projects for high out-
put inevitably promised to strain supplies both of materials
and of labour. It was apparent at the outset that the provi-
sion of skilled labour would be essential to the success of
the project. The recession in shipbuilding and other industries
employing large numbers of joiners and plumbers had tempo-
rarily eased the supply of workmen in these trades,but a shor-
tage of bricklayers and plasterers was expected. The govern-
ment pursued its objective of securing the co-operation of
building employers and operatives through the uncharacteristic
initiation of tripartite meetings where these issues could be
discussed. A Sub-Committee on Labour Supply was set up com-
prising four employers and four trade union representatives
to consider the problem. They concentrated on the possibilities
of expanding the supply of skilled labour and concessions were
made by trade union representatives to allow an increased
number of apprentices to be trained, and to permit dilution
through the establishment of adult training schemes which
would increase the number of new entrants to the industry (10).
No serious attention was paid to the possibility of making
more efficient usage of the existing supply of skilled labour
through a scheme for decasualisation, despite the pressure
from the leaders of the AUBTW, in particular George Hicks,
during the national dispute in that year.
The Government scheme was intended to provide for a long-term
programme of housebuilding, financed from the public sector
and it was on this basis that the co-operation of the trade
union movement had been secured. Some 2i million houses were
scheduled for construction over a fifteen year period - an
average of 170,000 p.a. (11) 	 But Labour was in office for
less than one year and there was no guarantee that subsequent
governments would maintain the project in its original form.
In September 1927 the Minister of Health reduced the subsidy
on housing as of September 30 1927. The effect was that housing
already under construction was rushed through in order to qualify
for the full subsidy - to such an extent that 52,000 houses
were completed in that month alone. From October 1927 there
was a dramatic drop in monthly completions - in March 1928 for
example only 7,170 houses were completed. (12)
The election of a second Labour government in 1929 was heralded
as likely to bring a renewed spurt of activity to building
production. Arthur Greenwood was appointed as Minister of
Health, and it was announced that the subsidy on houses built
under the 1924 Act would be restored. There was no new initia-
tive in the field of housebuilding comparable to that which
had been taken by the 1924 government. The Housing (No.2) Act
had less impact than Wheatley's legislation, for it was con-
cerned almost entirely with slum clearance. Moreover the
initiative under this legislation remained with the local
authorities, many of whom were not anxious to become involved
in the provision of public housing. (13) Beatrice Webb com-
mented early in the Government's life that the absence of any
provision for housing, other than for slum clearance or relief
of distress suggested that Labour's policies were not being
fulfilled (14).	 In the context of the acute financial pro-
blems which followed the Wall Street crash, and in the absence
of any policy within the Labour movement to explain or legislate
for improvements in the situation, political decisions were
centred on the possibilities of cutting rather than increasing
public expenditure. Financial expediency was placed above
political commitment and ho , Lsing, in this situation was
accorded a low priority (15).
The turning point came in 1933 after the collapse of the Labour
Government when the sharp fall in interest rates led to an
intense boom in private housebuilding which continued at a -
high level, for most of the decade. If the public sector was
the focus of attention between 1924-51, it was the speculative
builder whO took first place for the rest of the thirties,
employing a majority of building workers and turning out the
larger proportion of the houses (16). Many building firms
turned to the construction of owner-occupier properties,
especially around the outskirts of London. The firm of John
Laings for example, which had not been involved in private
housing development since the beginning of the century incor-
porated a new company to operate in this field - Laings
Properties Ltd. John Laing viewed such activities as part of
a commitment to the national well-being:
"Once a man owns his house, he has a stake in his country. Else
he is rootless ... The man who is tenant of a house and garden
can: be very happy but never altogether satisfied." (17) The
provision of state housing was not the only answer to the social
turbulence of the post-war years. Owner-occupation was designed
to foster identification with a property owning democracy and to
this end and with substantial profits to be made Laing construc-
ted about 1 in 50 of the houses put up by private enterprise in
the London area. Estates were built at Colindale, at Sudbury,
at Golders Green, Woodford and in Uorth East London. Like
John Laing, Frank Taylor became involved in housebuilding activity
around London during the 30's. Unlike Laing Taylor's background
was in housebuilding and until 1930 he was based in the rorth
East of England. The move to London was followed by housebuilding
activities in the suburban areas and in 1935 Taylor Woodrow
became a limited company incorporating Taylor Woodrow Ltd.,
F. Taylor Jnr. & Co. Ltd., Wonder Homes Ltd., and the Sudbury
Estate Co. Ltd. (18)
In the Greater London area, private enterprise housing output
increased from just over 34,000 in 1929 to almost 45,000 in
1931, climbing sharply to reach a total of nearly 73,000 houses
in 1934. Private output in London fell slightly in the follow-
ing years to around 68,000, and as the rearmament programme
was put into effect it dropped still further. By the end of
March 1938 private firms had completed over 600,000 homes in
the Greater London area since the end of the war - a total which
was possible only because of the impact of the depression,
which lowered interest rates to levels which encouraged invest-
ment in housebuilding (19). For a time it seemed that the
private sector had seized the initiative which had been taken
from them by successive governments during the twenties.
There was a wide range in the size of firms operating, from the
one man business to the large scale contractor. In terms of
numbers the large and medium sized firms were swamped by the
small jobbing builders, and the number of small firms actually
rose during the inter-war period - especially during the 1930's.
The numbers of workers engaged in firms with less than 10
employees increased:
Firms employing not more than ten workers (on average) (21)
1924
	 1930	 1935
No. of returns rec'd	 27,625	 40,078	 64,028
Av. no. of persons
employed	 419,053	 453,566	 502,278
Av. no. employed in firms






The expansion of building output created new opportunities,
both in the field of new building, and in the areas of repair
and maintenance vacated by the larger firms. Capital require-
ments were low and initiatives may have been encouraged by the
level of unemployment, since a craftsman, owning his own tools,
might be likely to work on his own behalf, especially on small-
scale repair work, if no other employment was available. (20)
Only four firms employed more than 2,500 operatives in 1935,
and only 31 firms employed more than 1,000 operatives & although
it should be recognised that the casual nature of building work
makes these estimates liable to inaccuracy (for the number of
employees could vary significantly in a very short period) it
is clear that the size of building concerns, when assessed on
this basis, remained limited. However it is apparent that the
number of large firms had increased since 1930, when only 16
firms employed more than 1,000 workers. Whereas in 1930 only
32,978 operatives were employed in firms of 1,000 or more,
by 1935 the figure had risen to 55,550. (22)
It was the larger firms which were most likely to be responsible
for the bigger projects connected with building other than
housing. The firm of Higgs and Hill, founded in 1874 and
established as a limited liability com pany in 1898 was involved
with a number of large jobs in central London during the 1920's,
concerned with the construction of large stores - Peter Robinsons
in 1923, Liberty's in Regent Street in 1924, and Swan and
Edgar's at Piccadilly Circus in 1928, when one of the first
tower cranes was used in Britain. During the thirties the firm
moved to the industrial developments in outer London - the
Hoover factory on Western Avenue, the Gillette, Coty and
de Havilland factory buildint,s, and in Coventry, Alvis Motors
(23). In Civil Engineering there was a concentration of the
larger companies, since the capital requirement was much higher
than for the smaller scale housing programmes. John Laing ts for
example apart from their involvement in housebuilding during
the thirties, built the new pumping station at the Littleton-
Reservoir, for the Metropolitan Water Board and was engaged in
work for the Air Ministry, and on other major public contracts.
(24). The defence works which were underway from 1936-37 pro-
vided further contracts for the big companies who could move
from house-building to civil engineering according to the level
of profits to be made in each area. A factory building epi-
demic was reported in parts of South Wales during 1938, with
the development of ordnance factories at Bridgend, Glascold
(Monmouthshire) and Pembrey (Caermarthonshire) (25). In the
Southern Region during the same period, it was reported that
towns nearest to Government contracts were busy, although sea-
side and holiday resorts on the South coast were slack (26).
Despite the activity generated by building and civil engineer-
ing work of all types unemployment amongst building trade
operatives remained at a fairly high level throughout the inter-
war years. The percentage of the building workforce which
was unemployed was higher as always than the average figure
for the economy as a whole. Unemployment amongst building
workers rose steadily daring the late twenties and reached its
peak daring the winter of 1932/3. The unemployment figures
given in Appendix B relate to the building trades, rather than
to those workers who were under the building and civil engineer-
ing agreements, so clearly they reflect the impact of cut-backs
in areas outside of the building industry itself. Unemployment
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was lower among craftsmen than among unskilled workers, with
the notable exception of the painters (27). The official
unemployment statistics for the building industry may have
been boosted by an influx of workers from other industries who
had found, or hoped to find temporary employment in building
production (28). The impact of unemployment was harshest in
the traditional centres of heavy industry, in the North of
England, South Wales and Northern Ireland. The Midlands and
the South-East of England, where the 'new' industries were
expanding were less seriously affected (29).
Unemployment was almost certainly exacerbated by the process
of rationalisation within building production. The introduc-
tion of labour saving machinery reduced the demand, both for
craftsmen and labourers (30). Mechanical navvies, mortar
mixers, tubular and ratchet scaffolding, pneumatic hammers and
drills, new saw frames and carborandum wheels for stone cutting,
electrical hoists and cranes - all of these innovations had
an impact on the work of bricklayers, masons, or their labourers
(31). Carpenters and joiners were affected by the mechanisa-
tion of the manufacture of door and window frames, which had
proceeded to such an extent that it had an appreciable impact
on the volume of work available. The introduction of other
mechanical processes and modern methods of concrete construction
meant speedier production and shorter periods of employment
when work was found. (32) Paint-spraying machinery took its
toll of the work available for painters, whilst the complex
process attached to the mixing and matching of colours was
simplified by changes in the chemical constituents of the paint
(33). No single innovation can be pin-pointed which affected
all of the trades uniformly, but a tendency to standardise
processes wherever possible, to encourage specialisation in a
particular task, rather than working over a range of tasks,to
use new and synthetic materials and to intensify and speed up
the process of production seemed to gather momentum (34).
Whilst modern methods were introduced, most often in the larger
towns, and on the larger building sites where innovation was
an economic proposition, their impact was sufficiently wide-
spread to be a cause for concern, insofar as they intensified
the high level of unemployment, and undermined the basis for
craft organisation in the industry.
Under the triple impact of economic crisis, cutbacks in govern-
ment expenditure and innovations in the machinery and raw
materials in use in the industry, membership of all of the
building trade unions declined, to reach a low point around
1932-3 when unemployment was at its peak.
Trade union membership in building in the inter-war years
Union 1921 1925 1930 1933 1935
ASW 124,831 107,056 108,861 93,871 102,839
AUBTW 76,000 59,620 55,220 50,067 54,335
Painters 61,984 39,423 35,304 28,063 33,27
Plasterers
(English) 11,530 11,319 12,396 11,240 12,98
Plumbers 24,844 20,676 23,244 21,298 23,105
Slaters &
Tilers
(Engl.) 2,066 1,340 998 910 991
(35'
The building trade unions, weakened financially by the struggles
of the early 20 , s, and in particular by the building workers lock-
out of 1924, suffered a reduced income through declining
membership and increased devands for unemployment benefit, in
this period.
	 The ASW, the largest, and financially amongst
the most stable of the craft unions in the industry showed an
increase in the amount paid out for unemployment benefit from
£31,036 in 1925 to £131,524 in 1930 rising to £200,454 just
two years later. (36) As the payment of unemployment benef±t
rose so the value of the union's assets declined. At the time
of the amalgamation these had totalled £298,287,and although
the amount had fluctuated during the early 20 , s, a peak had
been reached in 1930, of some £363,737. In just two years
this was eroded to £149,601 (37). Payment of unemployment
benefit from the funds of the AUBTW rose from £13,958.5.11d
in 1930 to £56,730.8.5d in 1932 (38). Whilst the Plasterers,
who experienced the fastest rate of increase of unemployment of
any of the crafts, saw unemployment benefit payments rise from
a mere £197.14.9d in 1925 to £13,834.10.9d in 1932 (39).
The Painters who had consistently the highest level of
unemployment amongst the craftsmen, saw an increase in unemploy-
ment benefit payments from £53,102.6.4i in 1925 to £69,067.10.4
in 1932.
	 Assets, which were low in Dec 1925, following the
impact of the lock-out (standing at £49,871.10.5) fell from
£68,919.13.0* in 1930 to £43,616.16.2i in 1932 (40).
It was the Painters too who were slowest to recover from the
impact of the depression. Whereas by 1935 the Woodworkers had
restored their membership to 82% of the 1921 level, and the
Bricklayers had reached 71.5%, in the case of the Painters,
membership still stood at only 54% of the level claimed in
1921.
The nature of the building activities was inevitably affected
by the geographical relocation of industry generally during the
inter-war years. The industrial buildings and the infrastruc-
ture required by the expanding sectors made demands on the
capacity of the building industry providing employment in the
South and East of England in particular. The interest of gOvern-
ment in housebuilding provided employment opportunities in this
area during the twenties - opportunities which were shifted to
the private sector in the thirties, as low interest rates facili-
tated speculative building. But unemployment in building
remained slightly higher than the average for the economy as
a whole, and the building trade unions were subject to a crisis
in membership and in their financial stability, especially
between 1929-32. It was not a propitious period for the con-
solidation of the collective bargaining machinery established
in the wake of the first world war. What difficulties were
experienced in the operation of the new machinery after 1920?
And how far were adjustments necessary during the depression
if the National Wages and Conditions Council was to fulfil the
role assigned to it at its inception.
Collective bargaining in building, 1920-39
The National Wages and Conditions Council was founded in 1920
on the crest of an economic boom. Fundamental to its operation
was negotiation at national level concerning the pay and con-
ditions of building operatives.	 The central principle embodied
in the national working rule agreement was the notion of the
craft rate, that is uniformity of pay for all craftsmen. This
involved levelling up the wages of the lower paid crafts, in
particular the painters, to the standards of the carpenters
and the bricklayers. District variations in payments were
accommodated by a national grading structure which linked wage
rates throughout the country. And wages were to fluctuate in
accordance with a 'sliding scale' which was based on moves in
the cost-of-living index. These key features of the agreement
were established at a time when the balance of industrial power
favoured the operatives. 	 In the political climate of the -
post-war months, with an increase in the number and extent of
strikes in building, as other areas, concessions from the
employers were in order (41). Economic conditions were suffi-
ciently bright, until the latter months of 1920, for employers
to permit improvements in wages and the introduction of the
44 hour week at small cost to themselves. But towards the end
of 1920 a fall in prices began, accompanied by a contraction of
the volume of trade. Unemployment mounted rapidly from 5.8%
(of total insured workforce) in 1920 to 11.3% in March 1921
and 17.8% by June of the same year (42). An account of the
following years highlights the return of the initiative, in
industrial matters to the employerspas the disintegration of
the Triple Alliance and the demoralisation of Black Friday, the
defeat of the Engineers in 1922 and the General Strike four
years later undermined the organisation and vitality of the
trade union movement.
In the building industry struggles were centred around the
defence of •the principles embodied in the national working rule
agreement. The employers applied the strength which they
gained as a result of the shift in economic climate to attack
the unions over a number of central issues. What was the
building industry, and to what extent should the rate agreed
for building be applied in other areas? Could building trades
operatives employed in other industrial sectors be regarded
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as within the building industry? Should the craft rate be
applied to all crafts regardless of the level of skill asso-
ciated with their work? Should not the rate paid to painters
be below that paid to other crafts? The attack on the agree-
ment was extended to the principle embodied in the adjustment
of wage rates on an index-linked basis. The agreement had
established a specific relationship between wages and prices.
How far, if at all, could this be varied to take account of
wage adjustments in other industries, or of the general level
of industrial activity? And on the question of working hours,
or any other conditions of work, how far could regional varia-
tion be allowed to terms which were agreed at national level.
If local autonomy was permitted in negotiations of this kind,
was there not a risk that the national unity, effected for the
first time through the National Wages and Conditions Council,
would be undermined? These questions were fundamental to the
operation of collective bargaining in building during the
twenties.
Their resolution was an essential prerequisite for the more
effective formulation of bargaining machinery at national level
during the following decade.
The traditional organisation of building trades operatives
along craft lines could not readily be reconciled with the
industrial demarcations established during the post-war years.
Building craft workers in engineering and shipbuilding, on the
railways or in the iron and steel industry were beyond the
scope of the building industry as such. The organisation of
these craftsmen, in unions which recruited according to trade,
conflicted with their industrial identity. In engineering
and shipbuilding this untidy situation had, at least partially
been resolved by the formation of the PEST, to which several
of the building unions were affiliated. It was the PEST which
was responsible for pursuing negotiations in engineering and
shipbuilding and it was generally accepted that the rates for
building craftsman would be different from those which
applied in building production itself. Although two major -
disputes involving building craftsmen took place during 1921—
22, they were concerned with the level of payment, rather than
with the principle on which payment was to operate. Whatever
the contradictions resulting from the fact that craft organi-
sation spanned industrial boundaries, this was not the direct
cause of conflicts within engineering and shipbuilding during
this period (43).
On the railways the situation was more contentious. There had
been endemic conflict between the NUR and the building craft
societies since the formation of the former organisation before
the war.
	
The claims of the NUR to recruit and to negotiate
along industrial lines conflicted with the established presence
in railway workshops of the building trade unions. They had
participated/ during the war in a Committee representing craft
workers in railway workshops. In the post—war years it became
evident that there was a lack of uniformity in the rates and
conditions which were applied. In some areas building crafts-
men were paid on the basis of various engineering awards. In
others the building trade rate was applied. As the war bonus
was reduced, and the engineering awards terminated, it became
clear that payment according to the building trade rate was
preferable from the point of view of the operative. When
attempts were made to initiate negotiations to resolve the
problem, the Negotiating Committee of General Railway Managers
refused to discuss the matter unless representatives of the
NUR were present. The outcome was a reference to the Industrial
Court in February 1922 (44) with terms of reference 'to deter-
mine the rate of pay and conditions of employment applicable to
the various classes of men employed in the several departments
of the railway shops or in connection therewith.' In its award
(No.728) the Industrial Court defined the railway service as
one complete industry. Rates of pay and conditions for rail-
way shopmen were standardised at base rate, to take effect from
Oct 1 1922. The decision was a blow to the craft unions on the
railways.
	
The Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding
Trades issued a circular criticising the terms of the award and
within the NFBTO there was considerable disquiet since the
decision effectively undermined any claims to parity with the
building trade rate. 	 The craft societies did not have the
strength to control the railway workshops without the assis-
tance of the NUR, and it was the NUR viewpoint which predomi-
nated within the Industrial Court. The pay and conditions of
building trades craftsmen could henceforth be settled without
reference to the building trade rate, although it was agreed
that representation be allowed to the building unions on a
grading committee which was set up as a result of the award (45).
By declaring industrial entities such as the 'railway industry',
the 'engineering industry' and the 'mining industry', Arbitra-
tion and Industrial Courts undermined the claims of the building
trades to incorporate their members who were employed in these
areas into the 'building industry' with its own terms and con-
ditions. There were at least 150,000 building workers who were
members of the NFBTO via their own unions, whose situation was
not governed by the NW&CC. The scope of the bargaining machinery
for building, and with it the authority of the NFBTO, was
constrained by the new definition of industrial boundaries.
The problems on the railways were paralleled by a major dispute
in the iron and steel industry which employed large numbers
of bricklayers and bricklayers' labourers relining brick fur-
naces.	 In June 1919 an agreement was reached between the OtS,
the Nat. Association of Builders' Labourers and the Iron and
Steel Makers Association setting rates and conditions for the
Teeside and Tyneside area. The rates were set at a level which
included war bonuses, but it was agreed that they should be
reduced when any portion of the war bonus was wiped out by a
national award, a trade award, or by mutual arrangement between
the parties concerned (46). Subsequent adjustments were made
in accordance with fluctuations in the sliding scale for the
steel industry, but once again it was clear that payment in
accordance with the building trade rate held more advantages
than payments on the basis of the iron and steel trade rates.
Following a ballot vote on the question, the trade unions gave
notice to the Iron and Steel Masters in October 1921, of their
intention to terminate the existing arrangements. Meetings were
pursued until February 1922, when negotiationshroke down. (47)
Bricklayers and masons engaged in the steel industry were
receiving less pay when the strike broke out than were labourers
engaged in the building industry. This situation could con-
tinue - could even deteriorate, if the relevance of the building
trade rate were not clearly established. (48)
It was the operatives in the North East of England who were in
the forefront of the struggle for the building trade rate, but
they were by no means isolated in their support for the prin-
ciple, although not every area took strike action. In Scotland
building operatives employed in the steel works were already
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paid in accordance with building trade rates, although the
steel masters were anxious to reverse this position. (49)
In South Wales, where employers refused to observe the building
trade rates, the bricklayers responded with an overtime ban
(50). But in Manchester strike action was taken, although the
steel masters there were not affiliated to the employers,
national body and seemed more willing to discuss settlement in
line with terms negotiated for the building industry. Union
strategy was to establish wage negotiations at a national level,
but even after six months of industrial action, the employers
refused to meet representatives of the unions. The turning
point came in July of 1922 when the claim for the building trade
rate within the South Wales Steel Industry was taken to the
Board of Arbitrators under the Industrial Courts Act. In line
with the principles embodied in award no. 728 the Industrial
Court ruled against the union and in favour of distinctive
terms for the iron and steel industry. This decision confirmed
that the building trade rate should not extend to other areas
in which building trades operatives were employed. From this
point the resolve of the AUBTW leaders weakened. The strike
had been pursued for over six months, with little outcome, other
than the establishment of a breakaway union for bricklayers in
the steel industry (51). Conflicting assertions were made
concerning the commitment of the strikers to pursuing their
objective, but the situation, after six months of strike action
in the North East, was extremely serious. Unavailing appeals
were made to the Minister of Labour, for intervention, but by
October the situation was declared to be hopeless. The union
had incurred heavy financial losses and membership was falling.
At the end of October a sub—committee was appointed to visit
the steel works district and after consultation with the
Divisional Secretaries, they recommended that the dispute-ft-
be officially closed. (52)
This defeat confirmed the limited application of the building
trade rate. The authority of the NW&CC was, in future, confined
to operatives engaged on building, public or private, housing
or other construction works. It also included repair and -
maintenance where this was undertaken by building employers
or by public authority. But where craftsmen were employed on
repair and Maintenance tasks in other industries, it was clear
that their terms and conditions of work should be set by the
appropriate negotiating body for those industries, rather than
by the NW&CC. The bricklayer whO moved from the steel industry
to housebuilding was, for the purposes of collective bargaining,
moving from one industry to another. Unions recruiting within
the building trades found that the scope of their organisations
conflicted with new industrial boundaries. Employers in the
steel industry, as on the railways, challenged an interpreta-
tion of bargaining arrangements which involved them in agree-
ments reached by the building operatives with the NEBTE.
The next challenge to the building industry agreement came from
the ranks of the building employers themselves. The notion of
the 'craft rate' united the building trades unions within the
Federation and gave them a common purpose in negotiations.
This principle, was attacked as employers endeavoured to break
the precarious unity established within the ranks of the
The trade which was singled out for special attention, with
a concerted attack on the craftsman's rate, was painting.
Painters had not, in the past been credited with the full
256
dignity of the craftsman's status (53).	 Their position was
at the bottom of the craft hierarchy, both in terms of the
level of their pay, and the regularity of their earnings.
Painting was distinguished from other trades, by the severity
of seasonal fluctuations in employment, a situation which was
exacerbated by the extent of luxury work in that trade, which
meant that painters could be more readily dispensed with than
other workers (54). In recent years the number of painters
had declined dramatically; there were over-all some 40,000
paintersL
	
in 1924 than there were in 1914 (55). Innova-
tions such as the use of electricity, instead of dirt-producing
gas and the use of water paint instead of size distemper,
combined with the continuing trend towards more superficial
work to reduce the demand for labour. Unemployment amongst
painters was much more widespread than amongst other building
trades (56) and it is not therefore surprising that it was the
painters who were singled out for the employers' attack.
Their campaign was opened by the suggestion that painters'
wages should be reduced to a level 12% below other crafts.
(57) The proposal was pursued within the NW&CC, with the
suggestion that many men employed in painting should be paid
at a rate mid-way between the labourers and the journeyman
painter. 'Brush-hands' argued the employers, were common
within the trade, and were not as skilful as fully trained
craftsmen (58), therefore a special rate should be established.
This suggestion, if accepted would have established a new
grade of operative, and a new level of payment within the
WRA - that of the semi-skilled. The Painters, naturally
enough, were happy to latch on to the coat-tails of the more
elevated crafts, in particular the woodworkers, being defined,
with them, as skilled worker-, and paid at the same rate.
But for the other trades too there were obvious disadvantages
in the employers' proposals.	 The introduction of a semi-
skilled grade would make the undercutting of the craftsmen's
rate very easy for the employers. The suggestion was the
thin end of the wedge as it would establish a precedent capable
of extension to other trades. (59)
	
Clearly this was a test
of the principles on which the Federation was based (60) and it
was a test which was to be made outside of the confines of the
NW&CC.
In January 1923 the employers in the Eastern counties informed
the operatives' secretary that they intended henceforth to pay
painters 1d an hour less than other craftsmen (61). The attack
was launched in a region where organisation was far from strong,
but the Federation sanctioned a complete withdrawal of all
trades in support of the painters. The ensuing strike lasted
for three months and was hailed as a victory for the operatives
insofar as the return to work was made at rates applying prior
to the dispute (62).
	
Yet the strikers were not successful in
ousting the notion of a semi-skilled worker within the final
agreement.	 The settlement allowed that the fully skilled
craftsman should continue to receive the standard rate for
craftsmen within the district and that joint action should be
taken to secure an adequate supply of apprentices and to
ensure that they were properly trained. But it also provided
that 'lesser skilled painters' could be employed at a rate
between that of the craftsman and the labourer. Operatives
were to be registered in accordance with their skill, and the
register was to be prepared by local joint committees of
employers and trade unionists (63). The locus of the struggle
was then shifted to the individual districts, where the merits
and status of painters was argued out.	 In the stronger areas,
where joint painters' committees had been formed, for example
in Felixstowe and Newmarket, it was possible to ensure that all
of the painters were classified as skilled. Whilst in the
weaker districts, such as Leiston, Saxmundham and Aldeburgh,
considerable local initiative was put into tabulating details
which would strengthen the case for skilled classification (64).
However the scheme was never embodied in the national agreement,
and it seemed that for the time at least, the differential
rate for craftsmen as a feature of the NWRA had been effectively
resisted.
The struggle was to be re-opened just four years later, this
time in the South and South-Western regions, where the employers
called for the establishment of a differential rate for painters
(65).	 There were a few towns in these areas where painters
had never received the same rate as other craftsmen, and
despite, or perhaps because of, the observance of procedural
niceties by the union officials, the employers prevaricated
when attempts were made to deal with the issue. The fight
centred around the larger towns - Plymouth, Exeter and
Gloucester (66), and reflected a regional weakness in organi-
sation. After 10 weeks of strike action in Plymouth during
1928 the matter was referred to the National Grading Commission
where the employers blocked a decision. Local differentials
remained although formally precluded by the national working
rule agreement.
Whatever the local variations - and some areas did maintain a
differential rate for painters throughout the period, the WRA
established a uniform rate for craftsmen which was maintained
and defended in the face of the employers ,
 divisive tactics.
This position was central to the operation of the NPBTO (67),
since it was only by the existence of the uniform rate that the
different unions could be held together.
	 The fact that the
uniform rate could be held, for all crafts, during the 1920'-s,
facilitated the maintenance of the Federal structure and
strengthened alliances between and across craft unions.
The national building trade rate and the employer's counter-
attack
In the building industry wages were steadily reduced, by 2d
an hour in May 1921, with a further 1d an hour from August
and an additional ha'penny from September. Building activity
had slumped and as wages were steadily falling in other indus-
tries, the employers demanded a further reduction of 6d an
hour in March 1922. By 1 June in that year, six reductions in
wages had been made, amounting in all to 8d an hour, and only
two of them derived from variations in the cost of living
arrangements (68).
At the meeting of the NW&CC on 11 Jan 1923 the employers deman-
ded an increase in working hours — to 47 hours per week for 8
months of the year, 44 hours for two months and 41 hours for two
months, requiring in addition a reduction of 20% in wages (69).
They admitted that they had no case, under the index figures
of the sliding scale, for further reductions of wages, but it
was argued that, as the building industry depended on the
prosperity of other industries for its success, the conditions
operating in those industries must be taken into account, when
legislating for the building industry (70). There was no case,
said the employers, for the maintenance of higher rates of pay
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in the building industry than elsewhere. The difference
between the pay, and working hours of the joiner in the
housebuilding and shipbuilding sectors could not be justified.
Here then was a new set of criteria by which wages might be
set. The WRA provided for wages to be index-linked to move-
ments in prices but the employers were now basing their demands
on the general level of industrial activity, and on the
relationship between building trade wages and wages in other
sectors.	 The operatives had accepted previous departures
from the terms of the agreement in order to improve the state
of trade, but regarded any further moves in that direction as
unreasonable, in view of the greater stability of prices which
now applied. (71)
Organisers of the NFBTO led a campaign against the reductions,
the crisis serving to bring the trades together. A conference
of organisers of the NFBTO affiliates was held on Jan 26th 1923
when it was agreed organisers be allocated to areas, and that
area district councils be set up in response to the crisis (72).
Mass meetings were held throughout the country, and when the
employers terms were put to the members in a ballot they were
decisively rejected (73). At a meeting with Sir David Shackleton,
arbitration was proposed on the question of wages (74). A
national lock-out was threatened, but a last minute intervention
by Ramsay MacDonald, leader of the Opposition, led to an agree-
ment that arbitration should be accepted on the question of
wages, and that the question of hours be discussed regionally,
after which, failing settlement, the matter would be referred
to the NW&CC for consideration (75).
	
Sir Hugh Fraser, the
arbitrator was then appointed, and the award was given on May
15th on the wages question, the dispute regarding hours being
referred somewhat later to '.he same arbitral body (76).
The Fraser award re-established the premier position of London,
which was given a rate of payment of id over and above that
applying to other grade A towns, in accordance with the situa-
tion which had applied before 1915.
	
It allowed a reduction in
wages of 1d an hour, but perhaps most important amongst the
decisions was the clarification given to the WRA. In future
the sliding. scale of wages was to determine the fluctuations in
wages and it was established that there should be no departure
from this method of wage adjustment (77). The clause was
abolished whereby employers could urge exceptional circumstances,
or use the lower rates of pay in other trades as a reason for
lowering pay in the building industry. The criteria for wage
adjustments was henceforth to be circumscribed in accordance
with the arbitrators decisions and the operation of the WRA
for the building industry was consequently clarified.
On the question of working hours, it was now apparent that the
44 hour week no longer applied. Men were regularly required
to work for longer than the stipulated working week in many
areas and the employers were obdurate in their resistance to
serious discussion on the hours question (78). The matter was
referred back to the Regional Councils who were unable to come
to a decision, so the question was forwarded to the NW&CC who,
not surprisingly also reached a deadlock. Indeed the opera-
tives argued that the conditions laid down procedurally were
not being observed, since there had been no serious attempt to
get a settlement on this question (79).	 However Fraser did
not agree and, in accordance with the procedure of the NW&CC,
the issue was referred to arbitration.
	 In August 1923 the
award was given. Summer-ti me working hours were to be
lengthened to 46-with a 44 hour week for the remainder of
the year (80).
At one level the awards, under arbitration represented a defeat
for the building trade operatives.	 They had lost yet agaiii
through the reduction of wages, and whilst the increase in
hours had perhaps only served to confirm de facto extensions,
it was nonetheless a formal and final departure from the 44
hour week, the notable victory of the Federation's early days.
In most other industries shorter hours were maintained. Yet
at another level, the building trade unions had not completely
lost out by the Fraser award. They shared in the general round
of defeats which hit the labour movement, but they had maintained
the principle of the national agreement, a principle which, it
was argued with some justification, was essential if the lowest
paid and least organised areas of the country were to be affec-
ted in any way by building trade unionism. And in maintaining
the national agreement, they had also limited the criteria
which the employers might utilise in order to claim adjustments
in the rate of pay. The national agreement, concluded in the
more prosperous post-war years, had survived - and along
with it continued the rationale for the existence of the
NFBTO.
The Fraser award prefaced rather than precluded overt conflict
within the building industry. In 1923 the employers consolida-
ted their organisation by taking into membership the Institute
of Plumbers, the Nat. Fed. of Master Painters and Decorators,
the Nat. Association of Master Plasterers, the Nat. Federation
of Slate Merchants, Slaters and Tilers and the Scottish
Employers. Together these bodies made up the new National Allied
Building Trades Employers (iABTE). (81) Building operatives
had accepted wage cuts for a period of almost three years,
but by the end of 1923 trade was beginning to improve and the
return of a Labour Government in December of that year seemed
to augur well for the unions. A claim for an increase of 2d
an hour was submitted to the NW&CC early in 1924 (82). The
arguments produced to support the claim were reminiscent of
those brought forward by the employers in defence of wage cuts,
referring to gains made in other industries, and to the state
of trade generally.	 The reductions of 1922 and 1923 were too
recent to have been forgotten and since the employers had
effectively used factors other than the movement of prices in
support of their moves for wage reductions the same tactic
was adopted by the operatives' negotiators in the more promising
political climate of 1924 (83).
But the employers came nowhere near to meeting union demands.
Their offer of id an hour was made with the proviso that, if
the average cost of living figure had risen by the meeting in
July, then the id could be absorbed in any larger increase
which might apply under the sliding scale (84). It was agreed
by the unions' joint Executives that this offer was unaccep-
table and further meetings with the employers were convened to
pursue the claim. In April the matter was put to the members.
Three questions were asked. Firstly, were members in favour of
accepting the employers offer of id? Secondly were they in
favour of further negotiations with a view to obtaining an
improved offer? And finally, if no improved offer was made,
were they in favour of strike action? The results left no doubts
concerning membership feeling on the matter. (85) There was
no question of accepting the offer, and whilst continued nego-
tiations were acceptable, there was a large majority in favour
of strike action if the offc ,r were not improved. Subsequent
talks produced little that was new.	 The basic increase was
still id an hour, with some variation in dates of implementation,
there was to be provision for regrading towns which were
grade 'A' from Jan 1925, and an enquiry might be held into
the incidence of time lost through inclement weather. But -
new conditions were to be attached. 	 These recommendations
were made conditional on what were described as deliberate
breaches, by NFBTO affiliates, of the terms agreed by the NW&
CC, especially on Summer working hours, overtime, and the
refusal of the Scottish operatives to put the constitutional
awards into effect. (86)
The employers stressed the importance of national control, by
the N/BTO over its own members. Particular emphasis was
placed on the Federation's ability to bring the Liverpool Dis-
trict into line, for the Liverpool operatives had never accepted
the principle of national negotiations and still operated in
accordance with their own local working rule agreement. When
in 1919 the Liverpool Building and Allied Trades Employers
affiliated to the North Western Federation of the NFBTE, the
operatives in Liverpool refused to accept the terms agreed for
the North Western area and struck in defence of the local
working rule agreement and for higher rates of pay. The
dispute concluded with an award which gave Liverpool operatives
wages substantially higher than those in Grade A towns (2/—
per hour, compared with 1/8d) (86). The employers in Liverpool
then withdrew from the North Western Employers Federation,
claiming that they had received insufficient support. In 1923
the Liverpool and District Employers reaffiliated to the North
Western Employers Federation, and through them to the NABTE,
on the understanding that the existing working rule agreement
would continue in operation until April 1924. It was intended
that the Liverpool workers would then come into the national
grading scheme on the grade 'A' rate (87). The problems in
doing so reflected the fundamental difficulties associated
with national negotiations. In essence the implementation of
a national wage structure was advantageous for the poorly
organised rural areas. In order to incorporate the Liverpool
operatives, the highest paid and the best organised of all of
the provincial towns, it was necessary to shackle their organi-
sation, and to make pay cuts of approximately 4/- to 6/- a week
(the differential had by this stage been reduced to around 2d
an hour).
Predictably the conflict led to strike action by the Liverpool
workers.	 In June the strike was begun, against the advice
of most of the Executives of unions affiliated to the NEBTO.
The EC of the ASW led the way in condemning the strike, for the
assertion of local autonomy by the strikers conflicted with the
principle of national settlements, endorsed and supported by
the leaders of the ASW (88).	 'It was a situationthat had to•
be remedied since it cast doubts on the validity of national
negotiations and hence could have opened the door for further
successful revolts in other areas.' (89) The commitment to
national negotiations was central to ASW policy and there was
no question of the EC allowing this to be neglected in order to
support the Liverpool strikers. Trade privileges were not
granted and the Liverpool MC were informed that they should
accept the employers , offer (90). Support of the Painters' EC
for the line adopted by the leaders of the ASW was axiomatic.
Local autonomy could easily be associated with the adoption of
varying rates of payment for the different crafts - a principle
which the painters EC — conscious of their position at the
bottom of the craft hierarchy, were anxious to avoid. The
Liverpool operatives had not adopted the principle of one craft
rate, and the painters were the lowest paid of the crafts in
Liverpool (91). Support for the Woodworkers EC was based on
the Painters' commitment to one craft rate. 	 The Painters' EC
actively pursued this line with their Liverpool members. But
to the latter it was clear that it was preferable to be at the
bottom of the craft ladder in Liverpool than to be equal with
other trades in a national structure which was lower than the
one which currently applied in their locality. At a meeting
addressed by their Executive in April, the Liverpool painters
agreed to accept national policy on this issue, but popular feel-
ing soon reverted to support for local negotiations, and at
another mass meeting in May the previous expression of opinion
was over—turned. The EC of the Painters recognised only the
local expression of opinion which accorded with their own. Like
all of the other craft societies at executive level (with the
sole exception of the Plasterers) they gave consistent support
for the national policies adopted by the Federation. National
negotiation required the subordination of local interests and
initiative to the operation of the national agreement. Adherence
to this policy necessitated opposition to the position adopted
by the Liverpool men.
The resistance in Liverpool to the provisions of the national
agreement was in many ways exceptional. 'Militant Merseyside'
was dominated by activities around the ports. The resilience
and solidarity of its working class was displayed in the great
strike of transport workers during 1911. And it has been
claimed that the casual based nature of much of the port work
encouraged the self—reliance of many Liverpool workers who
often regarded their own union officials and national execu-
tives as being on the side of the employers (92). These
factors certainly fostered independent attitudes evident amongst
the Liverpool building operatives.	 The prosperity of the
building trades during the previous years had established a
high demand for labour, and it was against this background that
trade unionists in Liverpool had won wage rates which were so
much better than the standards set by the national agreement.
London posed comparable problems, although the case for special
treatment was more widely recognised because of the concentra-
tion of building activities in the capital city. In Scotland
too there were claims for autonomy in negotiations. But
employers and unions were reluctant to concede a breach in the
national agreement. 	 If Liverpool once set a precedent, this
could be emulated by any other district, and national negotia-
tions would be correspondingly undermined.
Confusions arose concerning the terms on which the employers
revised offer was made. The NABTE claimed that the increase of
id an hour was conditional on the unions asserting control over
their members. Union leaders did not apparently take account of
the conditions and put the terms to their members without any
reference to their conditional nature.
The Joint EC's recommended acceptance and when the question was
put to the ballot, their position was endorsed (93). A meeting
with the employers was held on June 16th 1924 when a settlement
was agreed and signed by both sides (94).
It stated that:
"Should there unfortunately be any section of the Liverpool
operatives which fails to fall into line with the rest the
Executives of the bodies al/Jady referred to pledge themselves
to co—operate energetically until a complete settlement of the
Liverpool dispute is effected."
It was not yet clear that the very basis of the settlement would
be jeopardized if the Liverpool question was not resolved. On
17 June it was announced that a settlement had been reached.
As a consequence the situation in Liverpool deteriorated, for
the agreement certainly implied wage cuts in Liverpool. The
operatives there rejected the terms of the settlement (95).
The employersoacting in support of their Liverpool affiliates,
withdrew all offers, broke off negotiations and declared a
lock—out as of July 5th. 	 It has been suggested that this
arbitrary behaviour by the employers derived from their deter-
mination to embarrass the Labour Government, which was then
putting Wheatley's Housing Bill through Parliament (96). But
this does not provide an adequate explanation of the employers'
intransigence, in view of the fact that they, like the opera-
tives stood to gain by increased orders for building work.
Their concern related far more to the scope and credibility of
the negotiating machinery for the industry, than to political
issues at this juncture.
The national strike which followed lasted for a total of 7 weeks.
The tactic on the union side was for local agreements to be
reached wherever employers were prepared to abide by the rates
agreed at national level. The question of guaranteed time,
raised in earlier discussions with the NABTE vas also pursued.
The conduct of the strike itself was based upon controlling the
supply of labour to employers who were prepared to accept
terms (97). And, ironically, support was to be given to the
Liverpool operatives in their.. dispute (98). By the beginning
of August it was claimed that thousands of agreements had been
signed throughout the country and that by the beginning of
August over million building trades operatives were working
under the new terms (99).
The dispute was concluded towards the end of August. Terms
of settlement reached on August 22 1924 provided for a wage
increase of id an hour, but there should be no further altera-
tion before Feb 1 1926. Hours of work were to be in accordance
with the Fraser award, except in those localities which had
agreed to vary the hours by mutual consent. A committee was
appointed to consider the problem of time lost through inclement
weather, to report within six months, and other provisions were
made, concerned with the question of local independence. In
particular London was to be made the subject of a local inquiry,
with a view to adjusting its position within the framework
laid down by the NW&CC. Liverpool was to be brought within
the scope of the national agreement, with national rules and
conditions to be operative in Liverpool and District from
December 1st 1925. Wages in Liverpool were to be brought in
line with other grade 'A' towns as and from February 1st
1926 and in the meantime the local agreement was to be effec-
tive (100).
The National Building Workers lock-out of 1924 represented a
crisis in the relations of unions and employers. The national
structure for the joint regulation of pay and conditions,
erected in the post-war years required a central authoritative
negotiating body on both sides of the industry. The employers
had strengthened and consolidated their organisation during
the previous year. They required that the unions collectively
do likewise, in respect of tie more militant sections of their
membership. At Executive level the unions were committed to
the principle of national negotiations, but high wage levels
in Liverpool and London could not readily be assimilated into
a national wage grading structure at a super 'A' level without
encouraging parity claims from other large towns at grade 11:"
level.	 The total number of strike days during the 1924 strike
was greater than the aggregate of all strike days between 1921
and 1938 (1O1). Despite the determination on the employers
side, the local autonomy which had been identified as the
source of disagreement at the outset was not eliminated by the
strike. The Liverpool operatives had effectively defeated both
the employers and their own union leaders by upholding the
local arrangements for wage negotiation. The Liverpool employers
were prised out of the National Employers' organisation and
local bargaining re-established. Liverpool was not assimilated
into the national arrangements until 1942.
The formation of the National Joint Council for the
Building Industry
The problems of operating a national agreement for the building
industry were by no means resolved by the 1924 strike. It was
not easy to reconcile identity by trade or by district with the
operation of a uniform wage structure. On a question such as
the payment for time lost through inclement weather, the
interest of trades working out of doors were likely to be
stronger than those working inside. Different emphasis and
different priorities governed the individual unions. For
bricklayers and masons, employed almost entirely on outside
work, the question was more important than for carpenters.
Various schemes were produced on wet-time payments, and the
problem was raised during the 1924 strike (102).
When terms of settlement were reached in August there was no
provision for wet-time payment. A special committee was plan-
ned to give further consideration to the question, but the
Executive of the AUBTW was reluctant to settle for so little.
It decided as a gesture of protest, to disaffiliate from the
NFBTO and their decision was ratified by a ballot of the mem-
bers (103). On March 27 1925 they left the Federation. Unable
to induce that body to make the issue a priority in the settle-
ment of the 1924 dispute the AUBTW wanted to establish their
freedom of action on the issue (104). Their break with the
Federation, and the NW&CC shook the precarious unity which had
been established, and indeed called into question the very
existence of the National bargaining machinery (105).
There was unanimous agreement on the need for a revision of
procedure, but the split between the unions was a central pro-
blem in moves to restructure the industry's negotiating machinery.
Proposals were devised during 1925 for a new National Joint
Council for the Building Industry, to operate in accordance with
the basic premises of the NW&CC, subject to some revisions.
The main change concerned the method of adjusting wages.
Under the NJCBI it was suggested wages should be adjusted by
two methods. Firstly they should fluctuate in accordance with
changes in the cost of living. And secondly they should be
subject to revision where either party moved for a constitu-
tional amendment to vary the index figure on which the sliding
scale was based (106). When members were asked to vote on the
new agreement, there was a high level of support coming fairly
evenly from all of the unions which were still affiliated to
the Federation (107). The NFBTE supported the proposed changes,
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but made ratification of the proposed NJCBI conditional on
all of the building unions adhering to the agreement (108).
The AUBTW and the NAOP which had also disaffiliated from the
NW&CC, were reluctant to accept the new procedure. Negotiators
for the AUBTW were currently pursuing a claim for wet-time
payment, or for a lieu payment of 2/- to 2/6 a week and they'
were not immediately prepared to commit themselves again to the
uniform craft rate (109).
The new procedure was intended to allow greater flexibility
and more local autonomy in the operation of the national grading
structure.	 Districts and towns already on grade 'A' were to
be permitted to put a case for an 'exceptional grade' rate.
Existing rates would be stabilised until August 1st 1927
and the question of a differential between trades held in
abeyance. Negotiators for the NFBTO considered the package
acceptable. They were prepared to agree the 'exceptional rate'
which it was felt would increase local autonomy, without under-
mining the principle of national negotiations. Coppock at
least was confident that the 'exceptional rate' would not be
interpreted as a rate below the national level (110).
Regional (or national) autonomy was to be furthered by atten-
tion to the situation in Scotland. The NCJBI seemed to answer
some of the problems which had been raised in the operation of
national negotiations over the previous years.
The new national agreement confirmed many of the procedures
embodied under the old NW&CC. The craft rate was central to
its operations, adjusted according to the sliding scale and
with a new provision for constitutional amendment to permit
alterations to wages and conditions. A national grading
structure was still in being, but with greater flexibility
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allowed for regional autonomy. It is not unlikely, given the
employers' concern that the agreement should cover all of the
building unions, that there was an informal recognition that
no additional agreement should be reached on the question of
wet-time payments. Although the NAOP and the ASWM remained
outside of the new agreement, the AUBTW reaffiliated to the -
NFBTO shortly after the formation of the NJCBI. Hicks at least
seemed to recognise that little progress could be made outside
of the ranks of the Federation.
Further adjustment to the operation of the National Working
rules was necessary to consolidate the joint relations between
employers and operatives via the NJCBI.
	 The wage reductions
which resulted from the operation of the sliding scale between
1927 and 1930 caused considerable dissatisfaction amongst
building trade workers (111) and there was some concern that
wages slid in only one direction - downwards and that the
basis of their adjustment bore little relationship to real fluc-
tuations in the cost of living (112). Yet again the EC of the
ASW reiterated the advantages of the national working rules,
and the benefits which had accrued to the lower paid and country
districts. Economic crisis and cuts in building, were not an
auspicious context for a battle over the national agreement
(113). But in 1930 claims were submitted for a minimum rate of
1/7 an hour, with the sliding scale so readjusted as to allow
increases, but no further decreases in wages (114). Additional
points included a claim for the 40 hour week in 5 working days,
payment for time lost on account of inclement weather, and
greater regional autonomy in negotiations (115). The employers
responded with the demand that the painters' differential should
be extended, that labourers should be classified in grades,
with an increase in the differential between their pay and
that of craftsmen, that working hours should be shortened in
winter-time and lengthened in summer and that employers should
have freedom as to who should be used on the operation of
mechanical tools. 	 Following the employers' reply the Joint
Executives of the NFBTO agreed to end their affiliation to the
NJCBI in 1930 (116).
Leaders of the building unions were committed to the operation
of national negotiating machinery for the industry. Why then
did they disaffiliate from the NCJBI, which provided the
medium for national collective bargaining? The explanation seems
to rest in the employers' resistance to any concession in res-
pect of the operatives' claim.
"Their attitude had hardened to such an extent that it was
evident that nothing could be extracted from them... They held
the very definite opinion and expressed it without ambiguity,
that they were not convinced of the soundness of the operatives'
claims." (117) At a time when unemployment and falling member-
ship undermined the capacity of the unions to back their claim
with action, disaffiliation from the NJC was a manouevre
designed to emphasise their attachment to their objectives.
The employers responded with proposals for a new national agree-
ment which was to allow bonus payments - a nropos -il hardly likely i
win acceptance by the leadership of the NFBTO. The proposals
were to be submitted by the EC's to their members, with no
recommendation, but before this could be done they were with-
drawn, and a new scheme brought in which related both to
procedural and to the substantive issues.
The new scheme drew together the arrangements governing concilim-
tion as well as wage negotiations. In 1927 an agreement was
reached for the prevention of disputes in the building trades.
Arrangements already existed through the National Conciliation
Board and through the Demarcation Committee for dealing with
disputes, and the new procedures were not intended to super-
cede these. The specific object of the 1927 agreement was to
prevent disputes, by establishing joint machinery for processing
grievances & preventing strike action (118).
	 The agreement
provided for consideration of a grievance through regional and
national panels, with the proviso that reference could be made
to an appropriate Conciliation Board, to the NJC or to the
Demarcation Committee where necessary (119).
	 In the procedural
revision of 1932 it was decided to incorporate the new concilia-
tion procedures within the arrangements for national negotiation.
The disputes machinery (with the exception of the National
Conciliation Boards which were separately maintained) was
accoMmodated within the national working rules, and provided
in the future, the procedure for processing a dispute within
the framework of the existing agreement (120).
Adjustment was made to current standard rates applied under the
agreement wit h a grade 'A' rate ranging from 1/6i to 1/8,
the lowest craftsman's rate - Cl being 1/3id. The operation
of the sliding scale was to be retained, but provision was made
for a special rate for London, lid above the 'A' grade rate
and exceptional and differential rates were to be allowed,
questions of exceptional or differential margins being dealt
with by their Council on their individual merits (121). The
Council would establish standing committees, including a
Procedure Committee, a General Purposes Committee, a Grading
Commission and a Conciliation Panel, and would agree their
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composition and powers (122).
The new constitution stabilised relations between employers
and operatives. In essence it was a revamped version of the
NW&CC, preserving the central principles of national negotia-
tion and the craft rate, but incorporating for the first time
procedures for settling disputes. The novel and significant
feature of the 1932 constitution was this, the fact that it
brought together procedures for negotiation and conciliation.
The extension of responsibilities increased the authority of
the central machinery and confirmed the commitment to it both
of Employers and unions.
The question of autonomy for Scotland was resolved by the for-
mation in 1930 of a National Joint Council for Scotland.
Previously a variety of agreements existed, some of them outside
of the arrangements of the NCJBI. The employers were divided,
but there was sufficiently strong feeling on proposals for a
Scottish NJC for the issue to be pursued (123). The existence
of differential rates encouraged the better paid craftsmen to
oppose proposals which it seemed would lower their rates, if
the principle of one craft rate were adopted. Where employers
had attempted to follow the decisions of the NJCBI concerning
wage reductions - for example in Glasgow - they met with resis-
tance and it seemed thst in Scotland it would be hard to
standardise wage rates and agreements (124). Following the
withdrawal of the Scottish employer bodies from the NJCBI a
Scottish National Joint Council was formed in Dec 1930. Pro-
longed negotiations for a new procedural agreement took place
and a settlement was finally concluded in April 1931, its
main feature being the establishment of a 1/7d 'A' grade rate
to be maintained until January 1932. Wages were to be regulated
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in accordance with the cost of living index, in the same way
as they were in England and the rate for labourers was set at
75% of the craft rate. A significant difference between the
terms of the	 for England and Wales and that for Scotland
was the preservation in Scotland of the 44 hour week, to be
worked for 10 months a year, with the 41i hour week for Decem-
ber and January (125).
In Ireland there was little prospect either of incorporating
the Irish towns into the arrangements governing England and
Wales, or of establishing an autonomous negotiating body, at
the national level for that country. Organisation centred on
the largest towns in the North, and on Dublin and Cork in the
South (126). There were separate negotiations for each town and
the responsibility for initiating and carrying a movement for
improvements in wages and conditions rested on the local bran-
ches.	 The situation was complicated by the presence of Irish
based unions - the Workers' Union of Ireland, the Irish Transport
and General Workers Union, the Seamen and Port Workers and the
Amalgamated T&GWU (the Irish section of the English T&GWU)
recruiting mostly amongst labourers. This meant that even at
the local level the English societies could not hope to dominate
affairs, although the NFETO attempted to extend its influence
in Ireland. The co-ordinated movement more than doubled in
size between the mid-20's and the mid-30 1 s, from around 3-5,000
to over 10,000, although this did not necessarily reflect an
increase in aggregate trade union membership. Rather it
reflected a growth in the number of unions affiliated to the
Federation (127). Although some successes were claimed by
the mid-30 1 s, there was little optimism concerning the possi-
bilities for further expansion in the Irish Free State. It
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was feared that the Free State Government might wish to limit
the activities of bodies not having their headquarters in the
26 counties. The prospects of consolidating the Federation's
limited presence there seemed slight (128).
Many of the early problems of the Building Industry Agreemerit
had been resolved by the time that the 1932 constitution was
brought into operation. But there was one difficulty which
could not be settled by a constitutional provision. Since 1919
there was another agreement relating to building workers, the
Civ 1 Engineering Award, the terms of which were set by the
FCIO and thegeneral unions which recruited amongst builders'
labourers. The craft unions and the federation had no voice
in this agreement and there was considerable bitterness at an
agreement which it was claimed was 'prostituting' the name of
trade unionism (129). Thepractice of applying civil engineer-
ing rates, rather than those for the building industry was
growing, to the detriment of the craft operative. The Civil
Eningeering award did not permit the controls - over recruit-
ment of labour or overtime, which were an integral part of the
building industry agreement and its application led to disputes
(130).	 The general unions were already affiliated to the
NFBTO and their presence threatened the influence in the long-
term of the craft rivals. Ch. Beard, representing the T&GWU
(following the amalgamation of the Workers Union into the
larger organisation) pointed out that the Federation and its
affiliates could not unilaterally dispense with the Civil
Engineering Conciliation Board, which was as regularly con-
stituted as the NJCBI (131). Within the Federation the issue
was one of increasing concern, since the new projects of the
thirties - the power stations, railways, swimming baths,
football stands and so on, viere as often subject to the civil
engineering awards as they were to the building industry agree-
ment (132). The Emergency Committee sought a meeting with the
FCEC, with a view to establishing a line of demarcation between
building and civil engineering work (133). By 1934 a demar-
cation agreement was reached.
	 The agreement gave tacit -
recognition to the rights of the general and labourers , unions
to negotiate separately for a distinct area, known as civil
engineering work. In itself this was worrying for members of
the Federation, but in practice the agreement merely confirmed
earlier developments. The general unions could not be
ousted from civil engineering work. Their presence within the
industry could not be wholly rejected. And so agreement was
reached on the principle of demarcation which should govern
the operation and the distinction between the two spheres.
No further revisions were made to the procedural arrangements
for building industry negotiations during the 30 , s. On the
wages front there was a tendency for earnings in building to
lag behind the average, throughout the decade (134). Within
the Federation it was noted that there had been more progress
in other industries and in an attempt to compensate for this
situation, the Joint Executives submitted a claim for 1d an
hour in 1934 (135). In the context of a promising building
boom the employers moved for a settlement which would fix
wage levels for several years in advance. Agreement was
reached on a new base figure of 65 which was to be substituted
for the previous figure of 78. The resulting increase of
Id an hour was awarded in two stages, id from 1 July 1935
and id from 1 Jan 1936, with proportionate increases for
labourers. But this was done only on condition that no further
notice of a constitutional amendment should be submitted
before Feb 1940 (136).
The hands of the trade union negotiators were now tied. What-
ever the prevailing circumstances, they were committed to the
existing rates for another five years. W.J. Nichol of the
Woodworkers Executive expressed a view currently prevailing in
official circles justifying this move when he stated that pre-
vious booms had lasted for no more than two or three years at
the most - even under the conditions, largely manufactured, of
the boom in house building following the Wheatley Housing Act
(137). No attempt was made to pursue other outstanding issues,
such as the shorter working week and holidays with pay. (138)
And it was accepted that no regradings by area should take
place prior to May 1938,unless both operatives and employers
were satisfied with the proposals. (139)	 By that time it was
apparent, at least to some of the union delegates at the annual
conference of the NFBTO that the five years tie-up had been a
serious mistake (140). There was strong dissatisfaction at
the grass roots about an agreement which ended, for such a
long period, the right to make a further wages application and
determined but unsuccessful efforts were made to change the
situation (141).
National negotiating machinery for the building industry was
firmly established with the concurrence of the employers by
1939. The shift in the locus of negotiations which had been
encouraged by the events of the Great War was confirmed against
the very different background of economic depression and
defeats for working class organisation, in the inter-war
period.	 Early arrangements had been adapted to permit greater
flexibility in the operation of the working rule agreement.
Autonomy had been granted to Scotland and maintained in Liver-
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pool, despite intensive opporlition in the latter case.
Exceptional rates had been allowed, although so far only London
had achieved the 'exceptional' status. But the principle of
one craft rate was maintained as the central feature of the
agreement, within a framework of district grading and subject
to variation either by the sliding scale, or through constitu-
tional amendment submitted by either party to the agreement.
Most important on the trade union side, the inter-war years
confirmed the co-operation which had been pursued since the
inception of the national bargaining machinery. The consolida-
tion of collective bargaining at the national level was
accompanied by the confirmation of the union structures which
were established in the wake of the war.
Trade union structure in the inter-war years 
The processes of building production remained essentially craft
based during the inter-war years. It is true that new areas of
work were emerging which blurred the traditional distinctions
between skilled and unskilled - steel erectors, woodworkers
engaged on formwork shuttering and operators of mechanical
diggers could not be classified within the traditional trades,
yet their work was by no means unskilled. But the craftsmen,
the wodworkers,bricklayers, plasterers and the rest, remained
central to building production. And itles their trade unions,
the ASW, the AUBTW, the Painters and the smaller craft socie-
ties which consolidated their hold on the industry during the
period 1920-39. The internal arrangements governing the indivi-
dual unions changed little during this period. It is in the
area of inter-union relations that the most significant adjust-
ments were made.
The unofficial organisations of the pre-war years were
revitalised in a series of rank and file movements which were
closely associated with the Communist Party and the Red Inter-
national of Labour Unions. The Building Workers' Minority
Movement, founded in the 1920's was superceded by the Builders'
Forward Movement in 1932. In 1935 a new rank and file paper,
the New Builders' Leader was launched with funds left over from
a strike in London (142).	 The paper was created 'out of the
movement towards unity and fighting strength' and stood for
unification of the building trade unions and for an extension
of trade union democracy (143). The circumstances surrounding
the wage settlement of 1934 encouraged support for the
unofficial organisation. The Joint Executives abandoned the
demand for 2-?,--d an hour and a forty hour week, settling instead
for the reduction .of the datum figure from.78 to 65 - repre-
senting an increase of only 1d an hour at a time when the
industry was moving to a new prosperity. Opposition to the
sliding scale, the introduction of a guaranteed week, payment
for statutory holidays and the abolition of overtime consti-
tuted the core of the NBL programme (144). But it was on the
wages question that it made its strongest case, for the terms
of the 1934 agreement were binding over the following five
years, lending weight to the criticisms of the officials put
forward by the NBL. Although the motivation for the paper
stemmed from Communist Party members within the building trades
a wide circulation was claimed. Many of the men associated
with the paper were CP l ers - such as Jo Roots, Harry Weaver,
Frank Jackson and Jimmy Manderston, but other contributors,
such as Harry Adams, London Organiser of the AUBTW were
members of the Labour Party (145).
Amalgamation of the building trade unions was a fundamental
tenet of the NBL which stoofi both for 'One Big Union' and for
trade union democracy. The rhetoric on amalgamation had been
absorbed from the campaigns before 1914.
The emphasis was on unity of action, on fighting to protect
card stewards and to defend the working rule agreement on site
after site. It was argued that
'the Union for the Building Industry is not an experiment but
a fundamental necessity, not an idealistic product of the
imagination but the only form of organisation suited to modern
conditions of industrial struggle'. (146)
But the experience of unity on site, unity in action, could not
be paralleled at national level where the situation was compli-
cated by the real experience of merger since the syndicalists
had fought their battles over twenty years earlier. When
references were made to the 'unity of all building workers'
they were not coupled to an account of the ways in which past
amalgamations had restricted the control of the Management
Committees and encouraged the centralisation of authority
within the merged organisation. There was no reference when
amalgamation was discussed to the effects of the creation of
the ASW or the T&GWU. Although the movement for union
democracy was fundamental to the NBL, no attempt was made to
assess the impact of amalgamation on the democratic process.
The NBL criticised the officials for their dealings with the
employers but did not point out that if their own objectives
were realised - namely the formation of one big union, this
was likely to strengthen rather than to undermine the authority
of those officials (147).
	
The question of unity was important
within the NBL where it affected the militants on site - at
Earls Court, on the Exeter House Job and elsewhere. But con-
trary to Harry Weaver's stat e ment above, it was not an integral
part of the real work of rank and file activists in the inter-
war years. The meaning of the l one big union' had changed,
both because of the creation of the large, amalgamated unions
of the post-war era and because of the creation of the Com-
munist Party as a focus for the political aspirations of
militants. Amalgamation was not the key issue which it was
represented to be, for activists during this period, Its
inclusion within the objectives of the movement around NBL
reflected the traditions of and the organisation within build-
ing production, rather than the demands of the thirties.
Amalgamation was not, in this era, a real priority for the rank
and file.
The  Woodworkers 
Under the terms of the formation of the ASW, it was established
that rules be revised at a meeting of the GC in 1924, three
years after amalgamation. The key change which was made at
this stage was the creation of a full-time EC, comprising five
members, Tom Barron, W. Nichol, D. Merson, A.G. Gossling and
E.F. McDermott. (148) The increase in central control of activi-
ties and expenditure was crucial if the newly merged unions
were to maintain their authority over their membership. Local
identities, stretching to the Management Committee, may often
have seemed more relevant to the member on site or in the joinery
shop. But if the national dimension of operations, focussed
on the new collective bargaining machinery was to be fully
developed, then it was agreed by the GC, priority should be
given to strengthening the conduct of national affairs, at the
expense of district organisation. In 1924 there were 10
District Organisers, one for each of ten districts. When the
decision was taken to elect a fUll-time EC of 5 members, the
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number of District Organiser,, was halved (149).
The second measure effected by GC meetings in October 1922
and 1924 was the ending of the relationship with the colonies
and former colonies. Members of the ASW hadpreviously been
permitted to maintain their union card if they migrated to
Australasia, to South Africa, to Canada and to the USA.
Branches of the ASC&J had been established in these places (150).
and although each centre had its own Executive Board, the
central authority of the parent organisation had never been
relinquished. By 1924 it was apparent that this situation could
not continue for much longer. In the USA and Canada the ASW
was outclassed by the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and
Joiners and the British organisation was not in the long-term
able to survive. In Australia, New Zealand and South Africa
the development of trade union legislation made the perpetuation
of a union based in Britain very difficult. The General Council
was in principle, unwilling to relinquish its overseas members,
but the original connections proved impossible to sustain.
Arrangements were drawn up to allow reciprocity so far as the
exchange of members was concerned. By 1924 all of the over-
seas members had been given up. No further claim was made to
recruit outside of the British Isles (151).
Apart from these two significant changes, the rules of the
ASW were amended only in respect of the detail of operations
during these years. Perhaps the most significant omission,
if the ASW is compared with other trade unions established
during the same period is the absence of a National Delegate
Conference to make policy.	 The principle was accepted by
the AUBTW, by the T&GWU and by many other unions. A national
conference permitted, in theory at least, a clear expression
of membership opinion, to c/eate, or to shape the creation of
union policy. It was not a principle which attracted the
leaders of the ASW. Frank Wolstencroft, GS of the union since
the retirement of Cameron in 1925 was anything bUt enthusiastic.
A national delegate conference threatened to permit the expres-
sion of political views which he preferred should remain
unarticulated - or at least not given an official forum (152).
When in 1935 the rank and file paper, the New Builders Leader
•n••n••••n
was founded', it seemed that the campaign for union democracy
was gathering strength. The question of a union conference
was perceived by activists within the ASW and the NBL as of
fundamental importance. A union conference might allow them
the opportunities which were denied by the right wing nature
of their union leadership. The rank and file movement endorsed
the campaign to replace the General Council by a delegate con-
ference (153).
	
And in doing so they confirmed the worst fears
of Wolstencroft that they would bring to bear within such a con-
ference a political machine which was opposed to the leader-
ship and policies currently governing the union. A delegate
conference threatened the centralised control of union policy
and administrative arrangements. Not surprisingly it was
opposed by the GS and by the EC of the union.
The_LEIshlaxaT.
The AUBTW, like the ASW was consolidated during the inter-war
years. The original constitution provided the basis for its
operation, subject to some adaptation. Following the amalga-
mation, a special committee was set up to consider the question
of organisation.
	
The number of full time officials had
increased with the rise in membership and the expansion of
income during and immediately after the war. Organisers were
often appointed at local level and supported from district
funds, so that the Executive prior to the merger, had little
control over them. 	 In 1923 the Committee recommended a reduc-
tion in the number of organisers and the standardisation of
conditions of appointment (154).
	
The payment of 25% of the
wages of District Organisers out of general funds had been
authorised during 1921. This move gave the EC an interest in,
and a degree of control over the District Organisers. Hence-
forth EC approval was necessary before a man could be appointed
(155).	 The right of a District to appoint its own organiser
was just one facet of its independence. It assured that the
person who was appointed owed his loyalty to the District
Organisation and, whilst his wages were paid locally there was
an incentive for him to maintain the organisation and income
of the locality in which he worked. But with the intervention
of the Executive, local independence was considerably under-
mined.	 Whilst the District could still nominate an organiser,
they could not do so without reference to the union's central
Executive Council. By making a contribution to the wages of
organisers, the EC broke with the tradition of local autonomy
and subjected District Committees to their own authority.
Perhaps the major change effected in the constitution of the
AUBTW at this time was the inclusion of political objects within
its aims.	 The question was one which was close to the heart
of George Hicks the General Secretary, who had sufficiently
renounced his syndicalist views to cherish political ambitions
concerning a seat in Parliament. He doggedly pursued the
issue against a resistant membership during the early 20's,
and eventually in 1928 they accepted that the AUBTW would
include in its rulebook political objectives (156). Finally-
the union had accepted a place in the Labour world enabling Hicks
to go forward more easily as a prospective Parliamentary
candidate. He was elected IS for East Woolwich at a by-
election during the life of the second Labour Government and
held the seatodespite the setbacks for Labour, at the Gene-
ral . Election of 1931 and thereafter until his retirement in
1950 (157)..
The Painters
The NSF faced more serious difficulties than the larger craft
societies. • The very high levels of unemployment amongst the
painters, combined with the particularly vulnerable position of
that trade in the face of the employers' attack during the
1920's to drain finances and membership. The union decided
in 1921 to increase unemployment benefit but the membership
rejected proposals to increasecontributions, causing extreme
financial stringency. In consequence the appointment of two
national organisers was held up, and the one organiser cur-
rently employed by the union tendered his resignation because
of the low pay which he received (158). But the appointment
of national organisers was not postponed indefinitely. By
1924 two men were in post - W. Bonner and Victor Beacham; the
number increased to three by 1927.
	 Their role was primarily
concerned with servicing the members in rural and less well
organised areas, since in the larger towns members paid a levy
to support a District Organiser.
	 The financial problems
which resulted from unemployment precluded a more centralised
administrative control. By 1928 Gibson, the GS was hampered
by the lack of funds available to pay the national, let alone
the District Organisers. In February of that year members
voted to dispense with the services of the national organisers
(159). The society seemed to be on the point of disintegration
and the appointment of national organisers had failed to prevent
membership falling.
	 In the face of a concerted attack by the
employers, the interest of 'luny members was with the mainten-
ance of organisation in their own locality, rather than through
the country as a whole. But the viewpoint of the membership
was by-passed by a decision of the General Council, in a meeting
with the EC during February. On a proposal of Bro. Pickles
from the EC it was agreed that the present organisers should:
be retained under a temporary scheme until other arrangements
could be made (160). Formal arrangements governing the creation
of policy within the NSP, were by-passed where those arrange-
ments did not accord with the view's of the union's leaders.
The preservation of a scheme for national organisers, in the
NSF as in the other unions, was a vital ingredient in the
union's national authority supporting and upholding the arrange-
ments for national collective bargaining. Without national
organisers the employers might break the unity across districts
and across trades it was argued. And whilst for many members
it was the District which was the focal point for organisation,
the GS of the NSP was required, by the logic of national nego-
tiations, to assert the authority of the national organisation
against the autonomy of the districts.
Like the ASW, the NSP had no arrangement for a national delegate
conference to allow the expression of membership opinion. Like
the ASW, the Painters Society had in membership communists and
sympathisers who were organised around the paper the NBL,
based especially in the London area. But the key problem for
the Painters was the question of organisation. Only 24% of
London painters were in the union and activities were centred
on the need to boost membership and to prevent the use of semi-
skilled and unskilled labour on painters' work (161). Schemes
for reorganisation in the London District were proposed in 1935
with the intention of strengthening the base in the capital.
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The LDC proposed the appointuent of an additional organiser
and an additional place on the existing District Committee,
bringing it from 7 to 8. Their scheme was supported by the
EC, but again it was the members who were reluctant to accept
additional financial commitments, since the scheme involved
paying an extra levy to support the new organiser. When put'
to the vote of the London members, the Reorganisation scheme
failed to win sufficient support (162). The EC were concerned
at the result of the ballot, and set up a sub-committee with
three members of the LBO to draw up a further plan for organi-
sation (163). The question of improving organisation and
sustaining membership was crucial both to the Executive and
to the District Committees of the NSF, as well as to the activists
within the rank and file. Although NBL commentators suggested
amendments to the projected arrangements - for example
through area committees within the London District to look
at the question of organisation, they did not oppose the
scheme brought forward by their own leaders at District or
at national level, since they recognised and shared the pro-
blem of combating non-unionism within their trade. For the
I cinderella t of the building trade the question of organisation
was fundamental. And on this issue there was less scope for
disagreement between officials and lay activists than on the
more contentious questions of union democracy.
Inter-union relations between 1920 and 1939 
The NFBTO providedthp medium for liaison between unions in the
inter war years. In 1920 it was newly established. Its future
was uncertain and its general secretary, Richard Coppock was
hardly known outside of the North-Western area where he had
previously been employed as a Regional Official. 	 By 1939 the.
Federation was established within the building industry by
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virtue of the central role Nthich it played within the bar-
gaining process. The uncertainty and the setbacks of the 20's
were forgotten as the NFBTO was consolidated as one of the
most influential trade union federations in existence (164).
Dick Coppock had established a unique position within the
building trade world as a skilful negotiator and a shrewd
diplomat, able to achieve by persuasion the objectives which
could not be won through the authority of his position alone.
In 1921 there were 16 unions affiliated to the NFBTO with a
total membership of 411,803 (165). They ranged in size from
the newly formed ASW, the largest society, to the tiny Scottish
Plasterers and the smallest of the English affiliates, the
Slaters and Tilers.	 The general unions as well as the craft
societies were accepted as members from 1921 when the Perth
Agreement was concluded, allowing membership to the general
unions providing that they respected the craft boundaries then
in operation (166).
	
Unions affiliated on theIasis of the
number of their members covered by the building industry agree-
ment. But in addition to the affiliates there was the com-
posite section some of whose members were directly associated
with the Federation, without connection with the individual
societies (167).	 In 1920-21 there were some 16,000 members
in the composite section, but by 1924 numbers had declined,
ostensibly because of a lull in organising efforts (168). Not
all of the leaders of the craft organisations were enthusiastic
about the development of the composite section. 	 Some of them
viewed it as a cheap evasion of their own higher contributions
and directed their efforts towards restricting, rather than
encouraging its growth (169).
Ironically, the status of t il e Federation, often viewed as the
precursor of the t one big union' was enhanced by the failure
of amalgamation talks between the ASW and the AUBTW in 1922/23.
The existence of the Federation derived from the preservation
of separate and autonomous societies for each trade or group of
trades. If the two largest unions could have merged it would
have ensured their subsequent take-over of the membership and
assets of the smaller unions in building production. And in
that event the need and justification for a body such as the
NFBTO would have been considerably reduced. But if the failure
of amalgamation talks across trade lines promised a future
for Federation, it was not clear at this stage how far the
unity of the Federation should be taken. Could the Federation
ensure a more rational allocation of existing resources and
a more effective use of fall-time organisers employed by the
individual unions? Would it take over the control and direction
of those organisers for the benefit of all of its affiliates?
Would it create a Federation ticket which would be recognised
by all affiliated unions? The logic of national negotiations
seemed to suggest that it might. In 1922 the Emergency Com-
mittee discussed proposals for the co-ordination of organisers
(170). Some societies, with only a small membership, had
difficulty in sustaining a sufficient income to pay their
organiser - as in the case of the Painters, and they might
benefit, it was suggested, by arrangements to 'pool , the
resources available within the Federation. Not surprisingly
the scheme had little appeal to the leaders of the ASW, who
viewed the project unfavourably. Tom Barron, a member of the
EC of the ASW and later to become chairman both of the ASW
and the NFBTO put the case against the proposals. 	 The
'co-ordination' of organisers meant that the ASW paid, whilst
other societies benefitted. It shifted the control of organisers
away from the individual society. It would strengthen the
Federation at the expense of the affiliated unions and this
was precisely what the ASW leaders were concerned to avoid.
(171)	 Their intention in creating and contributing to the
Federation was exactly the opposite. They did so because it
had the potential to strengthen their own position, both with
their own members and within the building trades more generally.
Schemes such as the co-ordination of organisers or the establish-
ment of a Federation ticket,tEnding to counter their influence
were unlikely to attract their support.
Whilst the Federation had a key role to play within the national
negotiating machinery, it was never intended that it should
supercede the rights of the individual unions whose views it
represented. Both the NW&CC and the NJCBI allowed representa-
tion to the individual unions as well as to the Federation on
the negotiating bodies, although it was the Federation's
officials - the General Secretary and the President, who led
the unions' negotiating team. The balance between the indepen-
dence of the individual union and the collective representation
of Federation affiliates was a sensitive one, but procedures
were carefully calculated to avoid submerging the former.
Although the constitution of the NFBTO provided a Committee
structure with central machinery for the Federation's admini-
strative control, it is clear that the most important decisions,
especially those which related to the question of bargaining
with the employers were pursued through meetings which were
aligned to although formally outside the structure of the Fede-
ration. It was the meetings of the Joint Executives which
took the key decisions concerning bargaining objectives, what-
ever the provisions of the Federation's constitution (172).
If decisions reached in national negotiations were to be binding,
then they must be settled with the full concurrence of the
societies concerned. The merg. Committee of the Federation
was too small to allow one representative from every union and
it was felt that the Executive Council did not carry sufficient
authority.	 So regular meetings of the unions' joint execu-
tives were the best means to ensure the maximum unity on the
operatives' side.	 The meetings were organised under the aus-
pices of the Federation and they were chaired by Coppock. But
their importance reflected the limitations of Federation
authority in the face of the continued autonomy of the indivi-
dual craft society.
It was often difficult to reconcile the views from a particular
union with the priorities of the Federation as a whole. The







when the question of structural adjustment by the
not been fully resolved.	 The Federation had not yet
value and for members of the AUBTW, concerned
with the question of payment for wet-time, the
the 1924 strike were unfortunate. Leaders of the
committed to the principle of full amalgamation
and may not have been disappointed at the apparent failure of
the Federation. George Hicks, GS of the AUBTW and a member
of the General Council of the TUC since 1922 was an ambitious
and determined man. Like Ernest Bevin he saw himself as the
architect of a grand amalgamation and he made a consistent and
concerted effort to weld together the disparate craft societies.
Cameron, GS of the ASW was a sick man and prior to his retire-
ment in 1925 on grounds of ill-health, Hicks could justifiably
have felt that he would be likely to emerge from amalgamation
as GS of a larger and more powerful union, with greater recog-
nition, both from the employers and in the trade union world
generally. The dissociation of the AUBTW from the NFBTO in
1924 almost certainly resulted as much from Hick's preoccupa-
tion with the issues as it did from his concern with the
matter of wet-time payments. It can be seen as a calculated
move to break the unity of the Federation at a time when its
popularity was lowered with a view to permitting the amalgama-
tion for which Hicks had long campaigned. In 1925, with the
AUBTW outside of the Federation, he again approached the leaders
of the ASW, this time with a scheme for Confederation on a
model which was reminiscent of the ISTC (173). But he under-
estimated the commitment of the ASW to autonomous organisation.
He was countered by two moves which effectively undermined his
strategy for full amalgamation. The first was the retirement
of Cameron on grounds of ill-health. Frank Wolstencroft,
Cameron's replacement was still a young man, who could expect
to continue in office for many years (174). His election meant
that Hicks could not automatically assume that he would be
elected as GS of a merged organisation. Secondly discussions
were pursued with the employers with a view to consolidating
existing bargaining arrangements to ensure that the AUBTW
was eventually brought back within the Federation. The advan-
tages of separatism were effectively undermined.
The AUBTW was followed out of the Federationly the Amalg.
Soc. of Woodcutting Machinists who were suspended in December
1925 for failing to observe Federation policy, and subsequently
expelled.
The dispute between the ASWM and the NFBTO derived from the
situation at Weirs, where it was felt, the ASWM had undermined
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attempts by the Federation Lo establish trade union rates and
conditions of work (175). Government interest in housing
schemes, had led to experiments in house—building by alterna-
tive methods, and a special committee on new methods of House
Construction had been appointed by the Labour government (the
Moir Committee) to look into the matter. 	 Progress was made
with substitutes for the conventional house building materials
of brick and stone, and Lord Weir, of Messrs G & J Weir had
raised a scheme for the mass production of wood framed and
steel encased bungalows (176). The operatives objected not to
the innovations suggested by the structures themselves — for
as they indicated, standardisation had previously been used
on army huts, and in other wooden building structures — but to
the practices of G & J Weir in attempting to over—ride the
terms and conditions agreed for the building industry (177).
The building trades representatives on the Scottish Regional
Council of the NFBTO (for the houses were scheduled for Scotland)
attempted to open up negotiations with Messrs Weir, but were
met with a point blank refusal to discuss the position (178).
And in the meantime, members of the ASWM were engaged by Messrs
Weir in the preparation of structural woodwork, thereby defeat-
ing the objects of other trades who were attempting to compel
Lord Weir to observe building trade rules and practices (179).
The EC of the ASWM claimed that the work which their members
were doing was sawmill work, and that it was not therefore
within the jurisdiction of the NFETO or its affiliates (180).
Their members were connected with Federations in every industry,
argued the leaders of the ASWM, and it was a vital principle
that the union should have the right to control its own
members where they were outside building industry rates and
conditions and employed according to their agreement with the
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employers (181). The situation was insoluble. The NFBTO
could not abandon their claim to the work, for it would have
established a serious precedent regarding the rights of their
affiliates to work on pre-fabricated components for mass
production, whilst the ASWM would not relinquish their claim
to control their own members on other than building trade work.
The Emergency Committee of the NFBTO decided that the ASWM
were not carrying out Federation policy and recommended their
exclusion from the NHBTO. This position was endorsed by the
Federation's Executive and the ASWNwere subsequently expelled (182
The Federation was now seriously in disarray. The NAOP had
seceded for the second time and with three of its major
affiliates gone numbers and income were reduced. (183) The
influence and credibility of the Federation were seriously
undermined. Leaders of the member unions were bound, in the
circumstances, to review their continued support for the
Federation.	 The ASW, whose leaders had provided the momentum
for the operation of the Federation debated the question at
a special meeting. Withdrawal would certainly mean the dis-
solution of the Federation, with disadvantages for the wood-
workers themselves. 	 'The ASW has been the mainstay of the
Federation' said the chairman, Tom Barron, in his statement to
the General Council, 'We have every reason to believe that
the employers would take full advantage of a further cleavage
in the ranks of the operatives.' (184) Two principles remained
fundamental to the continued support of the ASW for the Federa-
tion. Firstly the question of the one national craft rate
reinforced the opposition to pbr. And secondly the Federation
provided a medium for controlling the activities of the rank
and file, especially where, at the local level, united trades'
federations could be sustained. 'One certain result which
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would follow from the demise of the NFBTO would be the springing
up in every enterprising district of local federations, probably
started by our own people. It would be well nigh impossible
to prevent our branches becoming affiliated to such movements,
nor would it perhaps be wise to prevent them if such were pos-
sible. Having regard to the operation of national settlements
on wages and hours, the activities of such federations, freed
from national control (his italics) would give rise to sporadic
local strikes all over the country, creating general chaos in
the industry, probably resulting in a national lock—out.' (185)
Support for the Federation was closely allied with support for
the national wage structure and with the national and co-
ordinated control of trade movements by the Executive. It
was on this basis that ASW commitment to the Federailtion,
though shaken during 1925-26, was maintained.
Inter—union relations in the building industry were further
ruffled by events during the General Strike. The NFBTO was
given co—ordination of building trades activities in connection
with the strike by the TUC — in particular by Bevin (186).
This formal recognition from the Central Strike Organisation
Committee of the role of the Federation was particularly galling
to Hicks, himself one of the 'lefts' on the General Council.
Whilst officials from the Plasterers' union agreed to meet the
other building trade union representatives under the auspices
of the N±J3T0, no representative of the AUBTW was present. They
were, they said, 'exceedingly busy' (187). A message was later
received from them, stating that the AUBTW could not co—operate
with the NieETO over strike action, since their policies differed
regarding the withdrawal of labour (188). The NFBTO's position
was that there should be no withdrawal of labour on working
class housing built under subsidy, either through the local
authorities or by builders cperating under the Chamberlain Act,
1923. All repairs to working class property, and repairs to
all sanitary arrangements were to be allowed to proceed.
Similarly there was to be no withdrawal of labour from work on
schools, or on repairs and upkeep of existing hospitals, clinics
or sanatoria (189). In a letter to Walter Citrine, on 11th
George Waddell, President of the AUBTW, commenting on the
TUC's decision to instruct the NFBTO to act in an advisory
capacity on building trade matters suggested that the Federa-
tion had already, by its interpretation of TUC policy on
housing and hospitals, created the fear that it was concerned
only with keeping men at work. The AUBTW, by contrast, was
concerned to bring more men into the fight (190). The sub-
committee of the AUBTW's EC, appointed in connection with the
General Strike argued that the fight must be short and sharp,
and that in order to win it was essential to involve as many
men as possible in the struggle (191). Their policies were
designed to this end. On housing, 'working class housing'
was defined as homes
	
built for let but not for sale; on
hospitals, maintenance work on existing hospitals only was
to be allowed, with work on nursing homes and clinics stopped
as these were regarded as outside the category of hospitals.
The building of new schools was similarly stopped, and work
on sanitary arrangements was allowed only for working class
homes, or in the interests of public health. A request for
a permit for maintenance work on the Savoy Hotel was refUsed
(192). The policy of the AUBTW was then, characteristically
more militant than that of the other trades. And there was
some bitterness regarding unions which kept members at work
in order to protect their funds.
The animosity generated betueen the ASW and the AUBTW during
the strike was, ironically, worsened by the decision to end it.
The conservative leadership of the ASW expressed its outrage
with the 'inglorious and humilitating capitulation of the
TUC , . The desertion of the miners and the failure to secure
pledges against victimisation from the employers before the
resumption of work was ordered represented, in their view,
t one of the most deplorable and discreditable episodes in the
history of trade unionism.' (193) 	 George Hicks, as a member
of the General Council, was of course party to the decision,
and he was subjected to personal criticism for the part he
played. He railed at such attacks — especially when they were
made within the annual conference of the NFBTO, where, since
the AUBTW was not affiliated, he was unable to reply. Such
calumnies he claimed had 'widened rather than narrowed the
breach between officials of the Federation and the organisations
concerned. ,
 (194)	 The ending of the strike had provided an
unusual twist to relations between the AUBTW with its militant
identity and the more conservative society of woodworkers.
But it presaged a restoration of relations between the two
organisations, for the AUBTW reaffiliated to the Federation in
the following year.
Despite the apparent success of the Federation in consolidating
its hold, the 'one big union' had not been entirely abandoned.
Its cause was revived by a resolution at the annual conference
of the NFBTO in Norwich in 1928. The matter was removed from
the hands of the delegates by Wolstencroft who successfully
moved that a committee of three members should be set up to
draft a scheme for amalgamation to include rules, contributions
and benefits. (195)
	
By so defining its terms, Wolstencroft
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ensured that the divisive p ,-oblems, concerning the financial
interests of the members of the craft societies would be
emphasised when the committee reported.
	
It was an astute
move, for Wolstencroft himself had no desire for amalgamation.
A skeleton scheme for amalgamation was presented a year later.
It encompassed a membership of million, 600 localttrades
committees and 18,000 trade management committee men, nearly
500 area committee men and 11 Divisional Officers, 20 Executive
members, 150 organisers and a Head Office Staff of 100 (196).
No one of course was opposed to the principle of amalgamation.
In the abstract it could generally receive unanimous endorse-
ment, but concrete proposals were received with less enthusiasm.
Wolstencroft ensured that the concrete proposals were carefully
elaborated. How many full—time officials would there be in
the new union? Had account been taken of District Officials
who were paid from thetInds of their own Committee, rather than
from General funds? The ASW had 64 local officials he pointed
out.	 The estimate of 150 officials altogether was very low.
Was it certain that the new society could afford all of the
fulltime organisers currently in post? (197)
At the Special Conference on Amalgamation, held in Chester
between October 15 and 17 1930 Wolstencroft pursued his objec-
tive of defeating the amalgamation proposals. The scheme for
he t one big union' received more attention than it might have
done because of the disastrous economic climate in which the
unions were operating. As membership fell and finances
dwindled there was an economic imperative for the smaller
societies to rationalise their resources (198). But the ASW
had no need to absorb the liabilities and the difficulties
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of the smaller organisations. Again Wolstencroft emphasised
the problems of amalgamating the existing full-time officials
into one efficient unit. Efficiency, he argued, militated
against it.
	
The promise of continued employment within the
new union was designed to nullify the opposition of existing
full-time officers. In stressing the need for efficiency the
GS of the ASW highlighted the difficulties in this sensitive
area, appealing to the conservatism of full-time officials as
a means of overthrowing the scheme for amalgamation. Ironically,
in view of his continued opposition to a delegate conference
within his own union, he spoke vigorously in favour of democra-
tic rights in the new organisation, stressing the importance of
elections for an EC of limited size, even though this might
produce an Executive emanating from only one of the constituent
unions. Existing leaders of Federation affiliates would be
unlikely to abandon their senior positions with so little chance
of a comparable office within the merged society. 	 Sixteen
societies were represented within discussions, each with its own
full-time General Secretary. The Federation could accommodate
this number of leaders, but it was unlikely that they could be
so easily assimilated into one big union. Having pointed to the
interests of leaders and officials alike in preserving the
status quo, Wolstencroft turned to the particular interests of
his own members.	 Craft traditions involved not simply an
abstract pride in a knowledge of the trade and a particular
expertise with the tools. It also involved allegiance to a par-
ticular craft society with its own contributions, benefits and
values.	 It was a financial commitment which corresponded not
simply to a difference in administrative practices, but to the
expectation of particular benefits.
	 The payment of superan-
nuation benefit was fundamental to the operations of the ASW.
Members paying for superannuation were currently in the majority
and Wolstencroft made it clear that if no provision were made
for superannuation, then the scheme stood not the remotest
chance of receiving the support of members of the ASW (199).
In the face of this determined opposition by the leader of the
largest of the building trade unions, a man who in some ways
stood to enhance his personal position. through such an amal-
gamation, the scheme for amalgamation was unlikely to succeed.
George Hicks, for so long a supporter of amalgamation was less
vocal on this occasion, expressing hesitations at the 'big
bureaucratic machine' which was likely to be the immediate
outcome of the merger. He may have felt some hesitations
about amalgamation into a machine headed by Wolstencroft who
was now also a member of the GC of the TUC. Craft differences
apart, the two men had a profoundly different approach to
political and trade union matters and the preservation of the
AUBTW on a separate and autonomous basis may not have been
unattractive to Hicks by this stage. There had after all been
difficulties in maintaining the unified structure of Federation
during the previous decade, and in the words of one commentator:
'The Federation was purely a courtship and if we could not
agree when we were courting, only a madman would enter into
marriage.' (200)
The discussions at Chester suggest that there was still a lobby
for amalgamation, a lobby which came largely from the left and
in particular from the Communist Party. But although the dis-
cussions were pursued for three years and led to a vote of all
of the members of the affiliated unions, they never presented
a serious challenge to the prevailing structure. There were
hesitations amongst the leaders of all of the unions concerning
the prospects for such sweeping change (201). And these hesi-
tations were encouraged and endorsed by the leaders of the largest
of the building trade unions, who.preferred the influence allowed
to them by participation within the Federation to the responsi-
bilities which would be incurred by the amalgamation of all of
the unions which were currently affiliated. The failure of
discussions on amalgamation confirmed the position of the
Federation as the medium for bringing about the unity of the
building trade unions. It showed too the extent to which the
position of the Federation had already been consolidated.
Further progress on full amalgamation was not possible, despite
numerous resolutions and campaigns inspired by the left, until
the Federation's value to the leaders of the ASW had been
diminished.
The position of the Federation had been reinforced by the
repeated decisions against amalgamation. The GS of the
Federation had assumed a new authority by virtue of an altera-
tion to the rules of the Federation which required that he
should be elected by a ballot vote of the membership, and
subject to re—election every six years. Arrangements govern-
ing the Regional Councils had been adjusted at the same time
so that the NEC could, at their OW11 discretion, appoint full—time
officers to the Council to act as secretary (202). 	 These
changes ensured that the Federation was developing its own
body of officials, with their own particular vested interests
in the preservation of the existing structure. As officials
of the affiliated unions upheld the status quo because of their
personal position, so too officials of the Federation were
unlikely to favour changes which gave them a less advantageous
position than the one which they currently held.
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The last half of the thirtie p saw the consolidation of the
Federation, with minor adjustments to its constitution to allow
increased representation to the larger unions, especially the
ASW. Its affiliates now included the T&GWU, following the mer-
ger of the Workers Union and the 'Altogether' Builders Labourers
into that organisation. Also represented on the labourers side
were the NUG&MW and the NBI&CWS. Leaders of the ASW were
concerned to limit the control exercised by the other organisa-
tions, both over policy and administrative matters. The ASW
was the largest contributor to the funds of the Federation and
they wanted more effective control within it.. Amendments were
proposed to the effect that the Executive Council (to be
renamed the General Council) should comprise one member from
each union up to 10,000 affiliated members, 2 representatives
for 20,000 members and one additional representative for each
additional 10,000 members or part thereof (204). This change
would weight the balance in favour of the larger unions, who
could currently claim to be under—represented within the Councils
of the Federation. The Annual Conference of the NFBTO in
1936 rejected the proposals (205). 	 The ASW indicated that it
might disaffiliate from the Federation, if given no satisfaction
on these matters, but the threat was not made too seriously.
The GC of the ASW recognised that:
'It is undesirable, in the best interests of solidarity that
the ASW should cease to be affiliated with the Federation,
whilst recognising there is a limit to the forbearance which
must be shown to some phases of activity. Therefore we
sincerely hope that the efforts of the EC to limit the activi-
ties of the Federation within which it should operate will be
successfUl.' (206) It was proposed that six months notice
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should be given of the ASW I s intention to withdraw, if the
principle amendments outlined by the ASW were not accepted at
the 1936 conference. A ballot of the membership produced a
slim majority in favour of continued affiliation (207). But
the objective was, nonetheless achieved. It was agreed in 1937
that an ad hoc committee of 7 representatives be appointed to
examine the constitution and make recommendations (208).
Wolstencroft was to chair the committe, which was to report
at the next conference.
Many of the resulting changes served merely to confirm and
stabilise the existing practises within the Federation. The
title of the main committee for example, hitherto known as the
Emergency Committee, was now to be changed to the Executive
Committee, whilst the former Executive Council now became the
General Council (209). Some of the intentions behind the
original proposals put forward by the ASW were incorporated
in the new constitution.
	
The structure of the General Council,
for example was to be altered such that there should be two
representatives for the first 10,000 members, and one additional
representative for each further 15,000 members, instead of the
previous arrangement which allowed one representative for the
first 20,000 and one for each further 20,000 or part thereof.
The effect was to give each of the seven largest unions an
additional representative, making a total on the new General
Council of 47 (210). Full—time administrative officers of the
affiliated unions were now to be eligible for seats on the
General Council — a decision which was of particular impor-
tance to the ASW which had a full—time EC from 1924. The size
of the new Executive Cttee was to be increased from 6 to 7
to avoid a stalemate in the event of their being a division of
opinion, and the EC was to be elected by and from the GC,
with submission of nominations prior to the annual conference,
and election by means of ballot papers taking place at the
conference itself (211).
The problems of reconciling the interests of all of the socie-
ties, both large and small, was common both to the N.bETO and to
the PEST which was reconstituted in 1936 to form the OSEU.
In the building trades it was clear that the ASW could not
dominate the Federation by virtue of its size alone. It claimed
in 1938 an affiliated membership of some 86,469 out of the
NFBTO's membership of 266,003, that is approximately one third
of the members. 	 As a craft society, with interests defined in
relation to woodworking rather than to building production as a
whole, its leaders had no aspirations to organise along indus-
trial lines. It was instrumental in establishing and main-
taining the Federation as a vehicle to liaise with the smaller
unions, and to ensure its own influence in defence of the
standards - in particular on time payments, which were asso-
ciated with craft organisation. For this reason its represen-
tatives were prepared to accept a Federal structure which gave
less representation to their members within the leading coun-
cils of that organisation, than their numbers in fact justified.
Even after the revisions of 1938, the ASW claimed only one
sixth of the votes for the Executive Committee for example,
although they had one third of the Federation's members (212).
Wolstencroft was concerned to ensure that his society always
had adequate representation to sustain its case against the
smaller unions and the T&GWU and the G&I,IWU. The last two
unions together claimed some 18% of the affiliated membership,
more than the AUBTW which was the second largest affiliated
union (213). But he could count on the support of the other
large craft unions on many of the issues which concerned him,
though on political matters the AUBTW was not always reli-
able. ,A compromise which permitted his union a lesser
influence than its numbers strictly warranted was acceptable
within the Federation framework.
Within the engineering industry, by contrast, the AEU was
still not affiliated to the CSEU in 1939, although all of.the
other main engineering unions were in membership, with the
exception of the Foundry workers who joined only in 1942. Like
the NFBTO the CSEU included both the T&GWU and the G&MWU,
but it could still be dominated by the AEU in membership terms.
Skilled craftsmen in engineering production were more vulner-
able than building tradesmen to innovations in the production
process. Semi-skilled workers were used in many areas which
had in earlier years been the preserve of the fully qualified
craftsman.	 The AEU was obliged during this period to broaden
the scope of its recruitment in response to the encroachments
of the two general unions. There was a greater similarity in
engineering than within building production in the range of
tasks which was undertaken. The distinctive occupational
demarcations in building - between carpenters, bricklayers,
painters, plasterers and so on wns not paralleled in engineer-
ing. Leaders of the AEU were, unlike the representatives of
the ASW, inclined to favour organisation along industrial lines
as a means of controlling the activities of semi-skilled wor-
kers.	 Their objectives conflicted with those of other societies
within the Confederation which preferred an arrangement which
upheld their own autonomy. If the AEU had affiliated to the
CSEU it had the potential to dominate proceedings solely because
of its size, unless its representation was scaled down within
the leading bodies. 	 The AEU had 333,619 members at the end
of the inter-war years, so that the principle condition of AEU
affiliation was that it should be denied the voting strength
which it could claim because of its size. Such a condition
was unacceptable to the AEU which remained outside the CSEU
until after the 2nd World War (214). Whereas in building the
Federation was strengthened by the participation and support
of the largest of the building unions, in engineering at least
the opposite was the case.
	
The Confederation was established
against the objectives and without the support of the AEU.
In the Printing and Kindred Trades Federation which linked
unions of craftsmen and other workers in printing, the largest
society, The Typographical Association was several times larger
than most of the other affiliates.
	
The situation was in many
ways comparable to that in engineering, yet the TA remained
in membership of the PKTF, accepting a structure which was
weighted in favour of the smaller societies as regarded repre-
sentation on the Federation's leading bodies. 	 The TA Executive
countered the inequitable arrangements for representation
by restricting the scope and functions of their federation.
Despite proposals by the employers for an industry-wide agree-
ment in printing negotiated through the PKTF, the TA leaders
refused to relinquish their autonomy in bargaining. They went
so far as to allow the PKTF to negotiate on the subject of
working hours but they adamantly refused to relinquish their
rights to negotiate independently on wages. Indeed on major
industrial issues the TA went its own way with scant regard for
the views of other trade unions represented on the PKTF.
Both in engineering and building, but not in printing the
primary purpose of the Federal organisation was its role within
collective bargaining.	 Since the consolidation of national
negotiations for both industries just after the first world war,
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there was a need for joint wnrking arrangements between unions
in order to present a common case to the employers in negotia-
tions. The Federal structure reconciled industrial representa-
tion with craft organisation in both areas, although the balance
between union autonomy and federation authority was a sensitive
one. Below the national level the differences between the -
NFBTO and the CSEU were more marked. In the building industry
the NFBTO was strongest at the national level, but at Regional
and local levels it was confirmed, both through the procedures
for dealing with disputes and through the initiatives allowed
within the national structure for appeals on regrading.
	
The
appointment of Regional officials gave the Federation a presence
in the provinces as well as in the capital and although it was
the individual unions which were responsible for recruitment,
? unity in action ? gave the position of Federation steward some
meaning on the larger and more militant sites.
Nonetheless stewards held their credentials through their own
trade union and at the general level it seems unlikely that the
Federation was an effective force on sites in an industry where
problems of recruitment and organisation were so intense, The
Confederation was even less effective below national level than
the NFBTO. District Committees of the CSEU were sustained in
many areas, but only in a few instances - in Coventry, Birming-
ham and Bristol for example, were they engaged in local negotia-
tions. And at workshop level there was considerable resistance
to suggestions that an officer of the JSSC, holding a position
as officer of the Confederation, should have any authority over
members of another union. The CSEU provided a formal solution
to the problem of multi-unionism at the local level, but its
Dowers were severely restricted (215). Both organisations were
most effective at national level.
	
And in both cases it was
the leadership, rather than he members who were brought
together as a result of the federal structure.	 In the words
of a contributor to the NBI,
'The Federation is a Federation of officials (Executive Coun-
cils) based on clearly defined craft interests, the membership
not being united on the basis of the workers in the industry.'
(216)
Conclusion
The craft societies in the building industry never recovered
the membership and vitality which they had claimed at their
formation.	 The impact of the post-war slump, the national
building workers lock-out and the general strike was sharpened
by the depression in building activity between 1928 and 1932.
All of these events served to diminish the employment prospects
for building workers and to lower trade union membership. And
although recovery was heralded with the boom in housebuilding
during the latter thirties, its effects were concentrated in
the South and East of England and in other parts of the country
the improvement was delayed until the initiation of government
rearmament contracts.
The machinery for national negotiations, set up in the wake of
the war was confirmed and refined, despite the weakened bargain-
ing position of the operatives' side in the economic context of
the inter-war years.
	
The National Wages and Conditions Council
provided the model which, with some reformulation set the frame-
work for the National Joint Council for the Building Industry.
And the National Working rule agreement embodied principles
which remained fundamental to the settlement of wages and con-
ditions in later years.
	
	
The craft rate, the sliding scaleand
the district grading were central features of wage settlements
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in building for at least the next forty years. Whilst the
forty four hour week could not be sustained against the
employers' attack in the early 20 t s, leaders of the Federation
successfully consolidated the procedures for the settlement
of key issues at the national level, with only minor adaptations
to allow for the regional autonomy required in some instance.
In only one case - that is in Liverpool, was there a failure to
subsume local arrangements within the national negotiating pro-
cedures.	 but otherwise the national negotiations set up as
an outcome of the first world war had effectively incorporated
the various craft and district arrangements into a unified
national structure.
The two major craft societies established in '920-21 as an
outcome of mergers between kindred trade unions confirmed their
leading position within the NFBTO and within the NJCBI. The
basic divisions between skilled and unskilled were reaffirmed
by the separate bargaining arrangements for unions recruiting
amongst unskilled and semi-skilled workers, through the Civil
Engineering _Agreement. And the application of new methods and
materials, especially during the thirties threatened to under-
mine the craft workers. Yet for all this the craft societies
retained their authority in an area of production which relied
intensively on handicraft processes. Craft identities continued
to be profoundly important and the separate existence of the
craft unions in building - the Woodworkers, the Bricklayers,
the Painters, the Plumbers and so on, was never seriously
challenged.
The consolidation of the NFBTO was the most important single
development in trade union structure during the course of this
period.	 In 1921 the NFBTO wasun-tried. Its capacity to
survive was unknown. Its stability was tested by the short-
terms disaffiliation of the AUBTW and the loss of other less
important affiliates for a longer period. 	 Its resilience
was undermined by the financial strains imposed by the depres-
sion. But its authority was boosted by its continued involve-
ment in co-operation with the employers in stable arrangements
for national collective bargaining, with the aim of achieving
the upgrading of the lower paid and less well organised areas
to the levels prevailing in the larger, urban centres. Dick
Coppock, the GS of the Federation was a recognised force within
the building trade world by 1938. There was a delicate balance,
within the bargaining machinery and within the NFBTO itself, betweer
the autonomy of the craft societies and the arrangements govern-
ing the industrial organisation of the Federation. The balance
was adjusted to accord with the priorities and interests of the
ASW, the dominant union within the Federation. But essentially
the Federation permitted the preservation of the separate craft
societies and interests of which it was comprised. Its existence
corroborated the individual existence of its particular affilia-
tes. And it upheld the authority and status of the leading
officials in each of its member unions. 	 The strength of the
Federation lay in the fact that its existence seemed to justify
the autonomous organisation of the individual craft societies.
The Federation was by 1939 an extremely powerful organisation.
And, as G.D.H. Cole noted in 1913, Federation can be seen as
an alternative, rather than as a prelude to amalgamation.
Yt. 3  The breakdown of the I  Ltional  Structure 
There are two chapters within this part of the thesis. The
first of them (chapter 5) covers the years 1940-60. Once again
building activity was affected by the shift to a war economy
followed by the disequilibrium of post—war reconstruction. The
national bargaining structure, which had survived throughout the
inter—war years, was undermined by the formal recognition of
piece—work as an acceptable system of payment within the industry.
This shift proved decisive for the credibility of the national
machinery for collective bargaining. 	 Trade union organisation
was undermined by the more extensive use of labour—only sub-
contracting and the building trade unions were threatened by
declining membership and unstable finances.
In chapter 6 detailed attention is given to the process of merger.
The level and nature of activity in construction in the 1960's
is described and attention is directed particularly to the crisis
resulting from the break—down of the national wage structure in
bargaining. Consideration is given firstly to negotiations
between kindred trade unions and secondly to initiatives for
'One Big Union'. The account concludes with the mergers which
presaged the formation of UCATT in 1971.
CHAPTER 5..
THE ITFBTO  AND UNION  S TRUC TURE 1940-60.
The NFBTO and union structure, 1940-60 
Introduction
The outbreak of the second world war promised a repeat of many
of the experiences of the Great War for organised labour.
Trade union membership, which had been increasing during the
previous years, was initially disrupted by the movement of y6ung
men and women into the forces, but increased steadily for the
latter years of the war, reaching a peak density by 1947/8 (1).
The importanbe of labour for the war effort ensured that trade
union and labour leaders would at some point be co—opted into
the realms of government, the most notable example being Bevin's
appointment at the Ministry of Labour (2). 	 But on this occa-
sion the supply of labour for military and for war production
requirements was not left to chance. Military conscription was
introduced in April 1939 — before the outbreak of war, and a
schedule of reserved occupations was established, designed to
channel skilled workers into the appropriate service, and to
ensure that others were retained for essential war production at
home (3). A category of 'protected establishments' was intro-
duced, together with the Essential Work Order, which was
designed to secure and retain workers for any establishment
where production was declared to be 'essential'. Government
ministers, and Bevin in particular, were concerned to control
labour supply, and the directive powers which they assumed
towards this end went further than anything adopted by their
predecessors between 1914 and 1918 (4). The effects of this
demand for labour were felt most strongly at shop floor level,
and the shop steward movement, dispersed by the defeats of the
inter—war period, was revived.
Post—war reconstruction renewed the intensive demand for labour




a majority labour government committed to social reconstruction
along the lines of the Beveridge report, seemed to promise full
employment and a better standard of life for the majority. The
hopes and expectations which had followed the war to end all
wars were revived. If the experiment fell short of the expecta-
tions, this did not end the demand for labour and the promise of
full employment which remained a novel characteristic — by
contrast with the inter—war period, for the workers in the fifties.
The buoyancy and confidence of labour in this period must be
understood in this context. Political defeat for Labour in
1951 had not ended working class aspirations which were pursued
at least in part, against the predictions and warnings of the
prophets of slump (5).
Building activity was particularly affected by the changes of
this era. The demands of the war—time economy, for munitions
and shadow factories, for aerodromes, for mulberry harbours and
for camps were rapidly followed by the exigencies of reconstruc-
tion. Bomb repair work and house building were carried out
against a background of political promises which were to prove
unrealisable. Construction work was less amenable to manipula-
tion than were the statistics regarding building output. War-
time disruption had affected the su pply of labour, especially
skilled labour, to the industry and 'productivity , was, hence-
forth to be a central feature for consideration, not just of
building employers and the government, but also for architects,
planners and trade unionists. The shape of trade union organi-
sation was modified in the context of sweeping industrial and
social changes, and attention must be directed firstly to this
area if the implications of structural change are to become
apparent.
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Collective bargaining in the industry was dominated, through-
out this period, by the activities of the Federation and its
leaders. It was through the Federation that building trade
union leaders maintained their contact with the employers and
with the Government. Despite strains in inter-union relations
which recurred at intervals there was never again the suggestion -
as there had been in the 20 1 s, of an individual union severing
its connection with the NFBTO. It continued to provide a
medium for contact between building trade union leaders, and
the conflicts of the 40's were not reflected in its composition.
The role of the NFBTO will be considered, firstly for the war-
time period and secondly for the years of peace. Attention will
be given in each section to changes in the requirements of the
construction industry, to relations with the government and to
the impact of alterations in the payment system which was
officially operated. Finally the effect of these changes on
union structure will be discussed.
Pt.1	 The  Federation in War-time 
Building activity during the latter part of the 1930's had
intensified in response to stimuli from two directions. Firstly
the private house building, undertaken very often on a specula-
tive basis had provided employment for many operatives.
Secondly, the renewed interest of government in the sphere of
military production had ensured work on government contracts
for this purpose, set up via consultation with the employers
and the unions (6). The outbreak of war in August 1939 ended
activity in the first of these areas. Housing construction was
suspended, and, just as it had at the beginning of the Great
War, unemployment in construction rose rapidly. In August 1939
109,000 building workers and 98,000 workers in contracting and
civil engineering were witho.it work. By the end of 1939 the
figures had reached 165,000 and 89,000 respectively, rising
to the high point of 275,000 and 106,000 by February 1940 (7).
It was the smaller building firms which were most seriously
affected by the cut—back in building output. Government con-
tracting departments tended to entrust a considerable proportion
of their work to just a few of the larger firms, with a
paralysing effect on the many smaller contractors (8). A com-
pany such as Mowlem Ltd. received orders in 'bewildering succes-
sion' (9). John Iaings, another of the largest companies had
been involved at least since 1938 with defence projects ranging
from sites for protective barlage balloons to the new head-
quarters for RAF Bomber Command (10). Government contracting
departments accepted, in principle that building contracts
should be distributed as widely as possible, but the NFBTE,
with a large number of small firms in membership, was making
bitter representation to the government, before the end of 1939
concerning the fact that in practice the larger firms received
priority in the allocation of government work (11).
The concentration of activity in the hands of the larger firms
was intensified, as building activity was increased from the
Spring of 1940, in response to war—time requirements. Large
construction contracts were placed in the hands of a limited
number of contractors. Firms such as Wimpeys, Laings and
Mowlems benefitted (12). As regards work commissioned by the
Air Ministry for example, it was reported in 1942 that of the
contracts for over E20,000, nearly a quarter of the value of
all the work was allocated to just 1.7% of the total number of
contractors. Thirty three out of the 121 contractors concerned
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in contracts of this size, ct 26% of the contractors had five
or more contracts and between them this group had two thirds
of the total number and over 70% of the total value of the
contracts (13). Government Ministers argued that although they
were concerned with the problems confronting the small contrac-
tor, it was necessary to allocate work according to the capacity
and organisation of the individual firm. 	 The scale and the
problems of war—time projects suggested that large firms
would be most appropriate for as long as building production
was centred on larger construction projects. 	 Between July 1941
and October 1943 the employing capacity of the very large firms
was increased (14). 	 Control of the construction industry was
passed to the Ministry of Works, Lord Portal, from 1942. He
worked in consultation with both John Laing and Godfrey Mitchell,
Chairman of Geo. Wimpey and Co. (15). Allegations concerning
the inequitable allocation of government contracts over this
period were cleared in a White Paper issued in 1942 (16). But
it was apparent that the larger firms had benefitted from war
production through the centralisation of capital permitted by
their work on government contracts. In the case of Geo. Wimpey
and Co., the issued capital at the outbreak of the war was
E475,000. During the war years the company accumulated a
large quantity of plant, including diggers and mechanical earth
removers and a very large fleet of lorries. 	 Trading profits
for the war years were consistently high, and like other large
firms, Geo. Wimpey Ltd. ended the war in a favourable position
to benefit from the opportunities of peace—time reconstruction
(17).
From the Spring of 1940 employment prospects revived and
unemployment amongst construction workers was reduced: In the
last figures which were pub l ished concerning unemployment by
trade during the war, the numbers of unemployed in building
and civil engineering were reduced to 56,000 and 38,000 respec-
tively (18).	 Henceforth it was labour shortage which
bedevilled contractors — particularly shortages of skilled
craftsmen.	 Government Ministers were obliged to overcome
this obstacle if they were to boost production as they intended.
In June 1940 the Undertakings (Restriction on Engagement) Order
(SR&) 1940 n.o.877) covering engineering,building, civil engineer-
ing, mining and agriculture was introduced. It required all
jobs to be filled through a labour exchange, a move which was
intended to prevent firms poaching from each other and to
facilitate official control over the movement of labour (19).
Most important, from the perspective of trade union organisa-
tion in the industry during the war years, were the govern-
ment's two key measures, the Uniformity Agreement and the
Essential Work Order for Building and Civil Engineering, issued
under the Emergency Powers (Defence Act). The requirements
from war—time building labour, as seen from the Ministry of
Labour, were mobility, flexibility and increased output. Not
surprisingly, given the risks of aerial bombardment, much of
the building work which was undertaken inihe early part of the
war was removed from the major towns and cities. Labour
must be brought into the remoter parts of the country and
employed on work which did not match up with the traditional
definitions, by custom or by written agreement, of building or
civil engineering work. And most important, the productivity
of labour so employed must be raised in order that the engineer-
ing factories and the camps, indeed all of the war bases,
could be used as soon as possible to maximum effect.- The
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success of operations in thi, area was a pre-requisite for
the success of the war effort.
The Uniformity Agreement was introduced in June 1940 in an
attempt to overcome the problems deriving from the fact that
two distinct agreements were operating for construction work -
one for the building industry, negotiated within the National
Joint Counoi1 for the Building Industry, and another for civil
engineering, agreed by the Civil Engineering Construction
Conciliation Board (20). The Uniformity Agreement was reached
by the parties to both of the existing agreements and operated
on building or civil engineering jobs which were being carried
out by, or on behalf of the Government, and specified by the
1,1inistry of Labour to be essential parts of the Government's
war programme. A Joint Board, comprising representatives of
the employers and the unions was set up to administer the agree-
ment and to deal with any difficulties which might arise from
it.	 It was felt that the existence of two national agreements
was bound to lead to problems of organisation and production
and the standardisation of terms and conditions of employment
on specified jobs could provide a solution (21). The major
features of the agreement were that overtime should be paid
after 47 hours, with an additional payment for night gangs; that
fares to and from the job should be paid to men coming between
4 and 25 miles, and that after 25 miles the fares should be paid
once only, with an additional allowance for lodging for married
men, or others who, for special reasons had to maintain a home
elsewhere.
	
A Guarantee payment against broken time was allowed,
where a worker remained available for employment for a period
of one week.
The provisions of the Unifor ,
 ity figreement were different and
in some respects it was argued, worse than the terms of the
building industry agreement. In providing for a 47 hour week
before overtime should be paid, its effects were to undermine
conditions in those areas where a 44 hour working week currently
applied. In many areas the working week was actually 46i -
hours, but despite the minimal difference concern was expressed
that the effect of the Agreement would be to encourage a general
lengthening of the working week (22). Other aspects of the
agreement would operate, it was feared, to the detriment of
prevailing conditions.
	 The Scheduling Agreement already drawn
up to deal with wages, travelling and subsistence arrangements
on war—time jobs had been applied only in rare instances and
was superceded by the new arrangements. The Demarcation Agree-
ment too ceased to exist on jobs covered by the Uniformity
Agreement, and it was suggested in some quarters that it was
the civil engineering employers, the most powerful financial
group in the industry who were behind the new agreement (23).
Matters were complicated by the fact that the Civil Pmgineering
Construction Conciliation Board negotiated for the whole of
the British Isles, whilst the Scottish National Joint Council
for the Building Industry negotiated separately from, although
along similar lines to the National Joint Council for England
and Wales: Representatives of the building industry in Scotland
feared that they would have little autonomy in a situation where
the Agreement applied to Scotland for civil engineering purposes
but not for building (24).
The most significant opposition to the Uniformity Agreement
came from leaders of the ASW. It was they who made the running
within the Federation over the content of the Agreement and the
way in which it was introduced.
	 The building trade agreement
was negotiated by and for cr ftsmen, and they had no intention
of abandoning it for an arrangement which conceded, not just
their kinship and joint interests with the unskilled operative,
but the terms and conditions negotiated on behalf of the latter,
and defined in the Civil Engineering Agreement.
'They were not going to allow anyone to say that a building trade
contract was not a building trade contract even to get better
conditions'. (25)
The detail of the agreement was criticised, but opposition from
the ASW derived essentially from the fear that, in the move
towards a unification of working rules for building and civil








mistrust which persisted between woodworker and
was brought to the fore in the conflict over the
Agreement. Bevin, together with Coppock, who was
Labour Supply Board of the Ministry of Labour, as
of the Agreement, exploited the rift which had done
sour inter—union relations during the twenties. It
would normally be expected that the ASW, as the largest of the
Federation t s affiliates, would set the pace in responding to
an initiative of this type. If essential war production was to
become effective, government must liaise with the larger civil
engineering contractors to ensure a steady supply of labour,
with the minimum of disruption concerning the definition of
work on which it was engaged. And it was to this end that the
provisions of the Uniformity Agreement were directed. The
government was committed to observing prevailing arrangements
for collective bargaining in industry, and the approval of the
NFBTO was formally necessary before the new agreement could be
introduced.	 Conflict within the Federation had, in the past,
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centred on the question of -Lie guaranteed week, a provision
which was of much greater importance to the trades employed
mostly out of doors — in particular to bricklayers — than it
was to other groups. Discussions had been protracted, and
the question of a contributory scheme had been mooted in the
immediate pre—war period. 	 To Luke Fawcett, and other repre-
sentatives of the AUBTW within the Federation the promise of
payment for broken time on a non—contributory basis outweighed
any considerations regarding the implications of uniformity for
the craftsman. 	 Insofar as the guaranteed week was of a lesser
importance for woodworkers, it had not been a priority for the
Federation, and its inclusion within the new Agreement ensured
the positive support of the AUBTW alongside the general unions,
for the principle of uniformity (26). Dick Coppock gave his
active support to the principle influenced perhaps by his old
allegiance to the bricklayers' union.
	
But the agreement
embodied a notion which he had encouraged throughout his careeer
with the Federation, that is the standardisation of wages Pnd con-
ditions across crafts and across regions, in order to elevate
the worst organised and paid to the highest levels prevailing in
the industry.
	 Carried to its logical conclusion this neces-
sitated the reunification of the building and civil engineering
agreements in the move towards uniformity;
'they were two bodies now, but if he (ie Conpock) knew the
feeling of the Operatives' side of the civil engineering industry,
they would be willing to subordinate themselves into the greater
machine.
	
There should be one body and one only' (27) • Coppock
certainly envisaged the continuation of the principle once
established after the war, and it is not impossible that he
expected to head the 'greater machine'. His voice was added to
those from the AUBTW in favour of the new agreement, and
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together they won the case. Voting within the Federation
conference on this question saw the ASW defeated by 179,313 to
102,208 (28). It was one of the few instances, within the
history of the Federation, in which the views of the ASW did
not prevail.	 A special appeal had been made to the interests
of the bricklayers and in this way it was possible to divide the
Federation and defeat the largest of its affiliated unions,
which stood, throughout these negotiations, for the interests
of the craftsman, and for a separate agreement in which the
craftsman's views could predominate.
The Essential Works Order for Building & Civil Engineering,
like the Uniformity Agreement, was introduced in order to break
down the traditional arrangements which governed employment in
the industry.	 The EWO was issued by the Government laying
down conditions of employment over and above the joint agree-
ments which were established.	 It had as its main object the
speedy completion of contracts, and to this end it provided for
direction of labour by the Government, (29) and for incentives
to encourage output. Previously payment by results had been
most common in civil engineering, although unofficially it had
played a part in the speculative house building boom of the
30's (30). Its introduction as a regular practice, endorsed by
employers', government and unions was a turning point for the
industry, and a major element of controversy within the Federa-
tion.
The Essential Work Order, passed in 1941 gave to the Minister
of Labour the power to designate as 'essential' the work carried
on in any factory or other undertaking.	 When this was done,
workers could not leave or be dismissed without the prior approval
of the Ministry's local National Service Officer, a move which
was intended to deal with tI,J problem of labour turnover. The
Order, which could be applied to any contract, not merely to
government work, was applied only where conditions of work
were deemed satisfactory, with provision of minimum standards
for welfare and training, and payment of a guaranteed weekly
wage. It was also proposed to register 'building volunteers)
who would go wherever they were sent by the Minister of Works
and Buildings with special inducements in regard to holidays
with pay, payment of a guaranteed week, and protection under
the Schedule of Reserved Occupations (31). When Bevin raised
the matter with the Federation's leaders in May 1941, objections
were immediately made to the proposals concerLing pbr. Nonethe-
less Coppock was informed that the Order was to come into effect
almost immediately and attempts were hurriedly instigated to bring
the Executive Committee of the Federation together with the Ministe
on 6th June 1941 this failed to obtain modification in the Order,
which was signed three days -later. Irresolution was replaced
by capitulation.	 The Order was accepted and pbr was officially
introduced (32).
Opposition to the EWO, like opposition to the Uniformity Agree-
ment was most forcefully expressed by the leaders of the ASW,
and in particular by Wolstencroft. Central to his objections
was the belief that there was no justification for departing
from the plain-time method of payment. It was 'the very prin-
ciple upon which the organisation had been built l and it had
'been sold, and had been given away within twelve days'. (33)
The plain-time system meant control over the pace and output of
each job, over the quantity and the quality of production.
Payment by results, on the other hand, was associated with the
use of diluted labour, with the erosion of the craftsman's
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status and with an end to rE,trictions on entry to each trade.
The introduction of pbr should not be allowed merely because
Bevin was at the Ministry of Labour, argued Wolstencroft, since
it would not have been permitted from any of his predecessors.
And in any case the government was guilty of violating its own
undertakings in regard to the trade union movement, by failing
to observe the existing machinery of negotiation within the
industry (34). Wolstencroft spoke for the older generation of
craftsmen, and although none of the leaders of craft unions
was enthusiastic in support for pbr, no—one else was prepared
to go so far in maintenance of craft principles, when the EWO
offered sufficient carrots to encourage acquiescence (35).
Within the Painters' Executive, as well as within the leader-
ship of the ASW, there was a division of opinion on the matter
(36). Payment by results was prohibited by the rulebooks of
both organisations, yet by accepting negotiations with the civil
engineering employers, who were already committed to bonus,
its introduction in the context of building work was made the
more likely. Perhaps the most important factor for the
Federation's negotiators during their brief skirmish with the
Government was the recognition that payment by results was
already being operated in many areas and that the chances of
eliminating it, in the context of war production, were slight
(37). In any event outright opposition would have involved
severing connections with the government & mobilising the
membership for a fight at a time when the war effort seemed
to demand maximum co—operation in the attempt to increase pro-
duction. Such an option was never seriously contemplated.
Rather, it was hoped to influence the government through the
TUC General Council — a move which Luke Fawcett accurately
predicted, was unlikely to lead to any dramatic changes in
government policy. Payment I . results could be controlled, it
was suggested, even if its introduction could not be prevented.
Attempts by Executive Members of the ASW to move the Federation
in the direction of resistance to the government's imposition
of pbr failed to carry a majority. The NFBTO was split, and
again the ASW, the natural 'leader' within the organisation,"
was defeated on a key policy question (39). Other unions, in
particular the AUBTW, which had a greater affinity with the
labourers' Unions, through their involvement in the civil engin-
eering industry, were prepared to attempt to limit, rather than
to eliminate pbr.	 Less exclusive than the Woodworkers, they
were less vulnerable to technological innovations. They were
perhaps less troubled by the need to prevent the dilution which
had posed a serious problem for woodworking craftsmen during
the first world war. It was recognised that pbr was of most
relevance to the bricklayers, whose work was more readily quan-
tifiable than that of the woodworkers on site. Yet in joinery
shops and munitions factories, where machinery was already
eroding the need for craft skills in woodworking, the implica-
tions of pbr were more threatening. As the production pro-
cesses were standardised into tasks which could be performed
by untrained labour, so they could be quantified, with payment
made on a basis which related to output. 	 And so too could
dilutee labour be introduced, undermining the craft basis of
an organisation such as the ASW.
The Essential Work (Building and Civil Engineering) Order,
1941 marked a watershed for trade union organisation in those
areas to which it was applied. Firstly it was associated with
the recognised application of a payments system which was, by
tradition, an athema to the craft trade unionists. Bevin had
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effectively browbeaten the Deaders of the Federation into sub-
mission, achieving his success by splitting the craft unions
from one another. Secondly it signified the defeat of the
ASW within the Federation, a body which it had brought into
being and sustained through the strains in inter—union relations
in the 1920's. The Federation embodied the separation of -
craftsman from labourer, the separation of the building from
the civil engineering industry in accordance with the two
distriPt agreements which operated until 1940. Although it
included the two general unions, as well as the NBIaCWS,
their affiliation was allowed only on the basis of recognition
of the rights and prerogatives of the craft organisations (59),
dominated by the ASW. The impact of war—time changes called
into question the distinctions and definitions which had pre-
viously applied. No longer were separate agreements to apply
for different aspects of the construction process. And no
longer was there such a clear distinction in the types of
work which might be undertaken by craftsman or labourer. The
traditional categorisation was more effectively broken down
in consequence of the introduction of pbr and although much
was made of promises of the restoration of pre—war practices,
war—time innovations were to have a lasting impact on collec-
tive bargaining and trade union organisation in construction.
Government intervention in the industry and the extension of
pbr were encouraged over the following year by the general
shortage of labour.
	 In a directive issued on 27 Nov 1941
the Prime Minister required the labour force in the industry
to be cut from 920,000 to 792,500 during the first three months
of 1942,and to be reduced to 600,000 by the end of 1942 (40).
The Government broadened the scope for payment by results and
this was reluctantly accepted by the unions concerned. Initially
the scheme had limited applil;ation but it was periodically
extended so that eventually it covered the major operations
such as housing and hutting. The ASW's General Council accor-
dingly voted to amend their rules for the period of hostilities
and in other unions, it was tacitly accepted that no more than
verbal opposition would be made.	 Unions such as the T&GW, the
MEV and the Woodcutting Machinists were, in any case not
opposed to the system, but the Painters accepted the fait accompli,
and although the Plasterers who had reaffiliated to the Federa-
tion in 1933, suggested that their area representatives would
not support any contract which bound their members to pbr, their
views found little support. (41) Attempts to cut government
building programmes, and to direct labour away from the industry
whilst stimulating productivity, were thrown out of balance by
the need to provide accommodation for the American forces in
Britain under the 'Bolero' scheme. In a move to circumvent
the chaotic problems of labour supply, building operatives were
brought into a single labour pool for government work in order
to encourage mobility from one job to another. Departments
were no longer entitled to an allocation, but could draw on the
available labour for completion of priority, contracts. Build-
ing operatives were de—reserved, but their call—up was sus-
pended on the condition that they transferred to priority work
on government contracts (42).
This renewed intensity of demand for labour combined with
the adaptation of production processes to encourage dilution.
Just as the first world war had concentrated labour and pro-
duction in war industries, removing building craftsmen from
the processes on which they were traditionally engaged, so the
events of the second world war served to break down the
barriers between craft and Eon-craft workers. This break down
took two forms. Firstly craft workers accepted work which pre-
viously would have been allocated to labourers.
	 And secondly
labourers or semi-skilled workers encroached on tasks which
hitherto had been the prerogative of the craftsman.
The skilled worker was accustomed to work with a labourer - one
per pair for carpenters, one or two per gang for bricklayers.
The reservation of craftsman without a corresponding allocation
of labourers created an imbalance which was rectified at the
cost for the craftsman, of the line of demarcation between the
two. 'Designated craftsmen' paid at craftsmens'rates could be
employed if necessary on labouring work for projects of national
importance. Dissatisfaction was expressed by employers, as
well as by trade unionists at such plans, but in a meeting with
both sides of the industry Bevin pointed to the urgency of the
task, and appealed to the patriotism of his audience.
'If the men on the job will turn their hands to anything just
to get the job done, they can go back to the dignity of their
craft and have all the demarcation troubles they like after
the war ... q appeal to every man to forget his traditions' (43).
Subsequent changes in government policy did not reverse the
trend to the erosion of the demarcation between craftsman and
labourer.
	 A new flexibility had been introduced in the types
of work which each might be expected to undertake. As the
diminishing reserves of manpower were used for a wider range
of tasks so were the recruitment policies of the craft trade
unions - closed for the most part to those who were not for-
mally trained as craftsmen, called into question.
Organisations were forced to take into account the 'general
craftsman', receiving building craft rates and conditions, but
without the formal training normally required of members of
the building craft unions. 	 Bricklayers, carpenters, plumbers,
painters and plasterers were all involved in this problem, for
men could work at various trades in the course of their employ-
ment and in wartime, with simplified conditions and often on
temporary work the tendency to employ this type of craftsman
increased (44). At an annual conference of the NFBTO a review
of organisation was proposed in order to take account of such
changes, since the number of craftsmen, as a proportion of the
total personnel in the industry was declining, and the scope
for recruitment to craft trade unions was, therefore decreas-
ing (45). The 'undeniable decadence of the apprenticeship
system' posed a problem for organisations where it was
expected that the members would have served their time. Even
if the rules did not stipulate that an apprenticeship was essen-
tial before a new member could be admitted, craft conscious
members sometimes refused applications at the branches from
'general craftsmen' without apprenticeship training (46).
At aljme when thousands of craftsmen were doing the work of
general labourers, and where the distinction which had formerly
been maintained between different types of work no longer held
good, it was more difficult to resist the encroachment of the
general unions (47). The problem could not be tackled within
the context of the Federation, since it touched on the rules
of each of the individual affiliates. But for many members,
it raised the question 'was our structure satisfactory?' (48)
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Aircraft woodworking during  f ie 2nd world Yar
The introduction of women onto many operations normally reserved
for the fully trained craftsmen, further complicated the pattern
of recruitment of the craft organisations. The effect within
woodworking was especially marked, as it had been during the
1914-18 war, particularly in aircraft construction and ship-
building (49). Women proved remarkably adept at acquiring the
skills which craftsmen could assimilate only over an apprentice-
ship lasting* several years.
	 When drafted into aircraft produc-
tion for example, women with no knowledge of woodworking tools
moved rapidly, after a short period of training, from work on
small sections to production of many of the large sub-assemblies
from start to finish. Such work had been done by men in the
past, but it was found that women on these jobs needed no more
supervision than the men, and that the skilled nature of the
work did not prevent them from equalling the men in terms of
output (50). Clearly the situation was worrying for the craft
trade unions, which relied, for their recruiLment, on skilled
male workers. The EC of the ASW was frustrated by the recruitment
policies of the other woodworking trade unions, in particular the
NUFTO, which like the general unions admitted women into member-
ship. As they reported to their General Council in Feb 1942
'The EC viewed the incursion of female labour into our craft
without complacency, but for obvious reasons could not completely
resist it. Our view was, and is, that so far as is possible,
it should be limited.'
A number of agreements were made with individual firms allowing
female dilutees temporary membership of a section of the union,
under the auspices of the Management Committee, but this type
of membership raised problems, since it might involve branches
in providing cards for small groups of women, and there was no
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established rate of contributLon. Koreover the value of
membership on such a basis was dubious, since it seemed to
preclude the possibility of women taking up trade union member-
ship on a more permanent basis. Nonetheless this exceptional
and temporary provision for women was continued although the
General Council deemed that it was not advisable to admit women
to a special section of the union. There was relatively little
controversy on a question which, if answered in the affirmative,
might seem to confirm the rights of dilutees within the trade.
As in the first world war, ASW leaders were concerned to nego-
tiate on behalf of the women to ensure that the rates of their
own members were not under-cut. In 1942 an agreement was reached
through the NJCBI governing the employment and wages of women
dilutees (51). But at a time when the AEU was opening up
membership to women workers, and when the question was the sub-
ject of considerable debate in other unions, there was little
dissension on the issue within the ASW's leading bodies. In
general the EC and the GC resisted changes in structure and
recruitment policy, which encompassed the general craftsman and
the women dilutees. The ASW leaders clung to craft traditions,
making the minimum adjustaents necessitated by changes in
war-time production.
The craft trade unions were founded on controls on the quality
and quantity of labour in each craft. Those controls had already
been challenged by the imposition of pbr and by the equation of
building and civil engineering for the duration of the war.
The question of dilution related essentially to the adjustment
which had already been made to the payment system itself. Was
it possible to organise and negotiate on behalf of the semi-
skilled without undermining the security and status of the
craftsman? If semi-skilled workers were accepted into member-
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ship, what would be the effec6s in regard to training and craft
skills? (52)	 The issue was, potentially a controversial one,
but its implications were not explored by the craft societies
in building production during the years of the war. Like the
Woodworkers, the Painters, who were in competition with the AEU
for paint sprayers in the engineering industry accepted Jack
Tanner's word that these vorkers, who were mostly women were only
semi—skilled and so they abandoned their claim to recruit them
(53). The trend towards a more open recruiLment pattern,
reflected in the wider trade union movement was not accepted by
the building craft unions.
A 'new eminence' 
Whilst the impact of war production threatened the basis of craft
organisation, it also served to strengthen the central trade
union bodies involved in consultation with the government.
Pre—war consultations on defence matters were followed by the
establishment of a number of liaison bodies comprising represen-
tatives of the employers, the building trade unions and the
government. The Ministry of Works and Buildings, which was
formed after the outbreak of war, with Lord Reith as the first
Minister served to further the incorporation of building trade
union leaders into the machinery of government. With Dick Coppock
at the Labour Supply Board at the Ministry of Labour (54) and
George Hicks appointed as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry
of Works in 1940(55), it seemed that the building trade unions
via the Federation would have a stronger voice on government
measures affecting the industry. Conversely the government had
a voice within the Federation and government influence would be
brought to bear more directly where necessary through
the co—option of building trade union leaders into their councils,
The need to maximise output unsured that the trade unions had
an important part to play in the government's building and
defence programme. Central involvement in the government's plans
had its repercussions at site level, where Federation officers
were appointed, by arrangement with the Ministry of Works and
Buildings to oversee important government building jobs (56).
The pooling of organisers by the various unions had often been
suggested as a means of increasing co-ordination between the
building unions, and furthering moves towards amalgamation. It
had previously operated only in dispute situations, for example,
in 1923/4, but it was during the war, under the auspices of govern-
ment,that organisers first worked for a protracted period, with
members of different unions on one site (57). Arrangements for
the scheme were drawn up by February 1942 and by the end of
March, 23 site officers had been appointed. Site officers, who
were wholly financed by the government, were, effectively,
trouble busters.	 They were present to see that any difficulties
or disputes which arose were resolved without undue delay or
disruption to production. As one site officer put it:
'if there was trouble on site, first of all with the Irish boys,
the first in sent for a policeman, if he was no good you sent
for a site officer, if he was no good you sent for the priest,
you know, in that order' (58).
The scheme was a popular one with Communist Party members,
committed, since the invasion of the Soviet Union by Nazi troops,
to the war effort, and the maximisation of output. It was seen
in some quarters as the basis for co-operation between different
unions, and between the body of unions and the government (59).
In practice it was being run down by the end of 1943, since many
of the larger Government contracts were completed (60), and
by July 1944 only 19 site officers remained.	 The number was
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reduced to 10 by 1945, opera'ing mainly in and around repair
work in London (61).
The site officer scheme was designed to ensure the influence of
central government, mediated via the national trade union organi-
sation on sites which were vital for the war effort. With the
example of the first world war less than thirty years earlier,
the threatening potential of shop steward organisation and
initiative were sufficiently important to encourage these appoint-
ments with a view to curbing site militancy (62). Yet the
scheme provided a significant practical experience in inter-union
co-operation at site level. One officer, regardless of his
trade, covered all of the men on site.	 The experiment provided
a rare practical example of 'co-ordination by Federation. It was
also noteworthy because it developed a layer of officials who
had experience of the difficult task of working at site level,
with different trades at a time when the industry was operating
a pbr system with different implications for each trade. Whilst
the job itself was short-lived and whilst it is likely that some
of the men who were site officers left the industry after the
war, some of them remained as lay or full-time officials in the
changed environment of the post-war years. The site officer
scheme did not, in itself go far to tackling the problem of
craft sectionalism, but for a few officials it set the question
of inter-union co-operation into a different context - one in
which they had practical experience (63). Variations in site
conditions, and in the complexity of work necessitated flexi-
bility in the application of government schemes for payment by
results.	 The application of such schemes, was part of the work
of the site officer in conjunction with job stewards and
regional secretaries of the NFBTO. Joint Production Qommittees
were set up to regulate standards and at one time there were
as many as 400 such committe(:3 operating on sites during the
war years (64).
War—time conditions seemed to favour the growth in the number and
influence of shop stewards in the building industry. The high
level of activity and the size of war—time sites combined with
the formal acceptance of payment by results to encourage steward
organisation.	 A Building Trades Stewards Council operated in
London, unde±. the auspices of the London Committees of the various
unions, and early in 1942 an Aircraft Shop Stewards Council was
formed by the London MC of the ASW to bring together shop stewards
from the aircraft industry (65). The problem of organising
in remote areas, often removed from the framework of union
activity which centred on the towns, was as difficult as it had
been during the first world war.	 But the activity of shop
steward organisations, such as the Building Trades Shop Stewards
Council took second place for many militants to joint site
committees concerned with production. This was especially true
after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union (66). The NET,
which continued to be published during the war years, empha-
sised the importance of boosting productivity in response to the
threat to Russia. Shop steward organisation was stressed insofar
as it provided a means to increase output, an objective which
did not, in essence, conflict with the intentions of employers
or of the government. The operation of site committees and of
many shop stewards — at least those who sympathised with Soviet
Communism, reinforced the standing and the authority of the
central trade union bodies, supporting the Government's war
effort, until 1945.
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Welfare questions assumed a rew importance for a government
committed to improving the efficiency of the labour force,
and issues such as holidays, canteen facilities, lodgings and
tea breaks provided a significant addition to the Federation's
responsibilities at national level. During the war innovations
were made to terms of employment on these, and other welfare
questions.
	
In 1943 a scheme for holidays with pay was intro-
duced for the first time. In an industry where casual work
was the rule, and where an employer would give a man a paid holi-
day only in the unlikely event of him staying with the firm for
several years, this move seemed almost revolutionary (67). It
provided for a system of holiday credit stamps, to be paid on a
weekly basis by the employer for all operatives.
The provision for payment against time lost through inclement
weather was introduced in the context of the Uniformity Agree-
ment but was consolidated at the end of the war in new working
rules for the industry which gave a guaranteed minimum weekly
pay packet equal to 32 hours Day (68). The notice required for
termination of employment was also changed, from one hour at
any time, to two hours notice given on a Friday (69). These
moves were designed to provide the worker with a greater degree
of security of employment and a more regular income. Some form
of guaranteed payment had been made during the war years, and
the defects in the new provisions were not immediately apparent.
It seemed for the moment as though Hitler had accomplished what
George Hicks could not. 'Here, probably, is our biggest gain.'
suggested Luke Fawcett. 'We have, for the first time in history,
the guaranteed week.' (70)
Apprenticeship too became a matter for negotiation at national
level, as the shortage of manpower for the industry, for repair
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work and reconstruction bem'e more pressing. Previously
apprenticeship matters had been settled in the regions, often
with individual employers. Now a national apprenticeship scheme
was introduced as part of an attempt to increase the su pply of
skilled labour.	 The scheme was administered initially by a
National Joint Apprenticeship Board, set 111) specifically fort
that purpose, and then taken over by the National Joint Council
for the Building Industry (71). But it was merely a part of
government plans for training in the industry, and,like the
guaranteed week, the concession was made only in return for a
breakdown in customary training arrangements. In this case the
government insisted on an adult training scheme with the object
of supplying 200,000 additional operatives to the industry, after
completion of a six month course.	 The threat of dilution was
met with mistrust by many building workers, but in the context
of proposals for reconstruction, it was suggested that dilution,
like pbr could be 'controlled' by the unions (72). Over—all the
labour shortage had strengthened the relationship between
government and unions, by bringing such issues to national level
for negotiation. In this sense the building trade unions, and
particularly the NFBTO had achieved a 'new eminence' (73).
Conditions of servicepas well as wages, were now firmly within
their province.
The Federation's influence was extended geographically by the
affiliation of a number of unions based in Scotland (74).
Organisation in Scotland was highly developed, and since 1930,
negotiations with the Scottish employers had operated through
a Scottish NJOBI, outside the scope of the National Joint Coun-
cil for England and Wales. 	 It was the Scottish Regional
Council, the largest region in the Federation, which represented
the operatives within this body (75). Although, for the most
part, conditions in Scotland followed those in other regions,
certain differences persisted, and since these favoured the
Scottish operatives they were a disincentive for them to agree
to a merger of the two agreements.	 The Grade A rate had suc-
cessfully been extended to all operations in Scotland during the
early part of the war, whilst the 44 hour week was everywhere
maintained, with overtime operating at time and a half (76).
Matters were complicated by the Uniformity Agreement, since the
agreement in civil engineering, unlike the situation in building,
applied both to England and to Scotland. But it was the attitude
of the Scottish employers, reluctant to implement wage agree-
ments recorded in England and Wales, and resistant to the payment
of the guaranteed week, which did most to encourage the moves
which were however unsuccessful towards the abolition of the
Scottish National Joint Council in favour of unified negotiations.
(77). The trend towards closer relations between the Scottish
and English operatives was marked by applications for affiliation
to the NJCBI from Scottish unions, particularly the Scottish
Painters Society (Ss) and the Scottish National Operative
Plasterers Protective and Benefit Federal Union (SNOPU).
Some English unions were reluctant to see two sections of one
craft represented within the NFBTO. The National Painters
Society for exam ple would have preferred to incorporate the
Scottish Painters Society, than to permit their sepPratr ,.ffilia-
tion to the Federation (78). Yet their application was accepted,
and, together with the merger of the Building and Monumental
Workers Association of Scotland into the AUBTW in 1942, these
developments gave to the Federation a new control of affairs in
Scotland.
In Liverpool, where resistance to the national agreement had
previously proved insurmountable, employers and operatives
were finally brought within Lts scope. lrovisions made at the
outbreak of war for the adjusLment of wages on an exceptional
basis, in response to the pressures of inflation, were not auto-
matically applied in Liverpool (79). Matters were complicated
by the affiliation of the Liverpool Association of Building
Trades Employers to the NFBTE in 1942 (80). This meant that
the operatives could only negotiate with the Liverpool EMployers
through the National Employers' Organisation, but the National
EMployers were precluded by the National Joint Council Agree-
ment from negotiating through other than channels already
established.	 The Liverpool operatives submitted their claim
to arbitration.	 They were concerned to maintain the special
rates which had in the past, given them parity with the tPer
rate' which applied in London. And they demanded that they
should be regarded as separate from the national machinery,
with the right to negotiate under their own local agreement at
least until 18 months after the end of war (81). On the first
point they were successful, for their wages continued to be
based on an addition to the National grade A rate, on the same
lines as wages in London. But on the second point, the con-
tinuation of the local agreement, they were undermined by the
determination of the Liverpool employers. The position in
Liverpool was overtaken by the national machine and on 8 June
1945 it was agreed that the Liverpool and Birkenhead District
should be brought within the scope of the national agreement
(82). Their inclusion finally consolidated the position of the
NFBTO, as the body through which all negotiations on behalf of
operatives in England and Wales were conducted. And it brought
into the Federation some of the best organised and most militant
workers in the country.
The events of the second world war, like those between 1914-18
343
furthered the breakdown of ctstomary arrangements within the
building industry. As in the first world war, housebuilding
reached a standstill, whilst employment on government contracts
provided most of the work for building trades operatives. It
was the intervention of government which pushed the industry
towards the introduction of a payments system which was to prove
irreversible. And in doing so it made changes which ware more
far—reaching than any experienced in the previous war. Not
only was pbr confirmed as an acceptable form of payment for the
industry. Not only was the demarcation between skilled and
unskilled, building and civil engineering broken down. But
the supremacy of the ASW within the Federation, the influence
of the craftsman over the labourer, and of the Woodworker over
other craftsmen, was called into question. The Federation
remained the key body for negotiation at national level or
wages and conditions in the industry, and indeed the scope of
negotiations widened to include a number of welfare issues
which, previously would have been discussed only at local or
regional level. Its influence was extended in Scotland, whilst
Liverpool was brought within the national agreement for the first
time. By the scope of its new affiliations, including the
Association of Architects, Surveyors and Technical Assistants,
the strength of the Federation had clearly grown. In the public
recognition of its role within the industry it had reached a
'new aminence r . And yet the war—time changes, the erosion of
craft practices and the technological innovations which charac-
terised these years represented a turning point in the history
of the NFBTO. It was to remain a powerful force for a much
longer period, yet when Wolstencroft identified the plain time
system of payment as 'the very principle upon which the organi-
sation had been built' he had pinpointed the central feature
of the Federation's organisation. The Federation was founded
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and built on the principle o , a national wage structure with
one craft rate. The acknowledgement of pbr as an acceptable
form of payment was a major break with past practice. For all
of the conservatism which characterised the industry, craft
principles were gradually modified, in the face of industrial,
organisational and technological innovations. Henceforth the
leaders of the Federation were involved in a defensive battle
against the dynamic of this change.
The Federation In Peace—Time
The health and welfare of the population had assumed a vital
importance for government during the first world war, faced
with a chronic shortage of labour. Similar problems recurred
between 1939 and 1945. The fight against fascism depended, in
considerable measure on the availability of a skilled and pro-
ductive workforce, ca pable of turning out the machines and
munitions which were essential to the successful prosecution
of the war.
	
The mobility of labour engendered by war—time
production requirements, as well as the social policies of war-
time government, for example on the evacuation of women and
children from urban areas, lowered the constraints which nor—
mally governed contacts between different classes and engendered
a new awareness of the problem of poverty (83). The experience
of social conflict during and immediately after the first world
war had impressed itself on commentators, and the government
was aware of the need to avert similar upheavals at the end of
the present round of hostilities.
From the turning point of 1941-2, with the invasion of the Soviet
Union and the entry of the US Into the war, attention was given
to the problems of social reconstruction in the approaching
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peace. questions of housing, education, insurance ar rainst ill
health, were matters of central concern and the return to peace
seemed likely to impose new strains on the building industry.
The Uthwatt,Scott and Barlow reports, as well as the Beveridge
report directed attention to potential problems, in particular
the shortage of land, labour and materials.
	
By the end of 1944
the industry had reached a turning point. 	 The main construc-
tional work for war purposes was completed,and labour had been
directed to • ther sectors of employment. Manpower in the
industry was reduced to its smallest dimensions, 327,000 in 1944/5
(84). Social recovery impelled a redirection of resources into
construction -work and a reconsideration of traditional building
processes. And with the return of a Labour Government in 1945,
it seemed likely that central government involvement, fostered
during the war, would be perpetuated.
The provision of housing was a central problem of the post-war
era. The Government planned to provide accommodation by three
methods: the repair of houses damaged by enemy action, the
long-te/an building of permanent houses and the rapid construc-
tion of temporary dwellings to fill the gap until the longer-
term programme could get underway (85). In London, Birmingham,
and Glasgow, Ilymouth, Coventry, Southampton and Bristol the
blitz had left many families homeless, and the acute housing
shortage constituted a real emergency (86). But no matter how
great the problem of housing, the needs of industry could not
be ignored. The development of new towns outside of the major
conurbations could not provide an answer to pressing social
problems if it was not accompanied by the construction of new
factories and centres of employment. And the existence of such
communities must be sustained by the provision of schools,
shops and roadways, all of them demanding an intensive
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imput of building labour and rlaterials (87). There were no easy
solutions to such problems an the establishment of priorities
and the synchronisation of the supply of labour and materials.
A five year National Building and Civil Engineering Programme
was developed by the Ministry of Works, in co—operation with
other government departments (88). Financial provision for
construction under the auspices of local authorities was made
by the Housing (Financial and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act to
subsidise building, both of houses and of flats. It was also
intended to control the prices of materials by the Building
Materials and Housing Act, which provided for the bulk purchase
of materials and the limitation of rent and purchase price of
houses (89).
The severe shortages, both of materials and labour, did much to
undermine the Labour Government's building programme. In the
first six years after the end of the war — from 1945-50, fewer
than 850,000 new houses were completed, although it must be
added that resources were being channelled, at least for the
period immediately following the war, primarily into repair
work (90). Shortages of timber and steel for building derived
in part from the economic crisis of the post—war years, and in
particular from the need to cut imports and increase exports.
By 1951 the steel situation was critical. The rearmament pro-
gramme created an additional demand for steel, whilst output
was declining (91). Shortages - ofiricks and cement jeopardized
the building programme, and workers were hit by the consequent
dislocation of employment opportunities (92). Labour's housing
programme was cut in the summer of 1947, when local authorities
were instructed not to issue any further licences for building
without the consent of the Regional Housing Officer, which was
rarely given (93).
From its low point in 1943/4, the number of operatives in the
industry rose rapidly, such that by 1948, it was not far short
of the numbers employed in 1939 (94). The national a pprentice-
ship scheme, and the government training projects were boosted
by the return to the industry of class B releases from the
forces — that is men whose trade was in short supply and who
were, in consequence, allowed a speedy return to civilian life.
lpprentices who had been in the last year of their training at
the time they went into the forces, were allowed to return to
their trade as fully fledged craftsmen. (95) 	 The increase in
numbers could not automatically guarantee the productive
efficiency of the inter—war years. The demand for craft skills
was high, and the building industry was in competition with
other sectors which made use of the 'building' craftsman.
Activity in shipbuilding for example was intensive during the
later 40's, and although by 1946 some 9,000 joiners were
employed in shipbuilding and shipre pair, additional joiners
were urgently needed to meet the work on hand (96). The supply
of skilled labour was reduced not only by war—time fatalities,
but also by the movement of craftsmen into other industries,
some of them never to return to their own trade. No amount of
recruitment could compensate, in the short—terni f for the loss
of this experience, and it was generally agreed that productive
efficiency had reached a low point unparalleled since the boom
following the end of world war I.(97) 	 It was the employers'
response to the crises insupply of materials and skilled labour
which governed the industry during the years of peace.
The first response of the employers to attempts by the Labour
government to plan and control the industry was to ensure that
restrictive arrangements governing tendering for contracts, as
well as the supply of building materials and components were
operated to their own advantL;e. Building was not, for them,
a social activity designed to respond to the pressing need for
housing and industrial development. 	 Rather, it was a specula-
tive exercise intended to maintain and maximise the profits of
investors who turned to the domestic market at a time when
foreign investment was subject to statutory constraints (98).
The increasing number of small employers and the concentrated
power of the larger firms in the industry intensified the possi-
bilities of competition for contracts and supplies. 	 The
organisation of price rings and cartels was designed to combat
such competitive tendencies (99). Instead of tendering at the
lowest possible price, a contractor might operate, with others,
to maintain price levels, a move which had repercussions not
only on the amount of work which could be undertaken, but also on
the level of rents which would be charged for working class
housing (100).
	
It was a manouevre which was subject to inves-
tigation by the government and by the NFBTO between 1948 and
1950, but neither was able to overcome employer resistance to
a building programme which relied on the initiative of local
authorities to a greater extent than on private enterprise.
House building had never been the most profitable of the activi-
ties undertaken by building contractors and, in a political
climate which they regarded as unfavourable employers responded
by collaborating to maintain profits (101).
The second of the devices used to overcome the shortage of
labour and traditional materials — and again it was nothing
new for the building industry — was the 'industrialisation?
of building techniques. The application of labour saving pro-
cesses is most likely to occur when labour is scarce and its
price is high, and in the context of the shortage of skilled
labour in the post—war years, it is not surprising that
employers turned not simply to the mechanisation of existing
processes, such as had occurred in the thirties, but to the
application of systems which relied to a much greater extent
than previously on factory production. Just as the first world
war hastened changes in techniques by the introduction of pre-
fabricated units, new methods and materials, the second world
war encouraged innovations in the construction process.
'Mechanical excavators and hoists; concrete raft for site;
automatic lifts for shutters; concrete forced into moulds and
vibrated; shutters removed after twenty four hours; no
timber used; light steel frames; concrete carcases; pre-
cast steel shutters; pressed steel stairs; concrete roofs,
pitched; asbestos concrete piping; steel window frames;
metal picture rails and skirtings; composition cupboards;
cork lino flooring on concrete; etc.' (102).
Economic and socialconsiderations influenced design. D.E.
Gibson, City Architect of Coventry, where extensive rebuilding
was necessary following the blitz, stressed the potential advan-
tages of pre—fabrication. It involved dry,construction, and
was less dependent on the weather. 	 The roof could go on the
building on the first working day, so that internal work could
proceed under cover (105). The design of buildings was simpli-
fied to facilitate the use of semi—skilled labour and to reduce
costs and the artistic content of craftsmanship was almost
eliminated. The amount of brickwork in a building for
example was reduced, as brick was used for straight forward
cladding with very little feature or decorative work (104).
Mechanisation was, inevitably a part of the changes which were
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taking place. The introduction of tower cranes and special
trolleys for stacking bricks provide just two examples. Yet it
was the more extensive application of innovations in the building
process breaking completely with traditional building methods
which were most important in the 1940's and 50's (105). As in
the twenties innovation was stimulated by engineering and air-
craft manufacturers seeking alternative products and Messrs
Vickers and Messrs Weir were amongst those who turned their atten-
tion to the manufacture of temporary housing using pre-
fabricated techniques (106). The urgent need for housing could
be satisfied, it seemed, by such methods. 	 The promise of a
speedy answer to the crisis in housing met with the approval of
the Labour government and trade unionists, although some argued
that workers were entitled to good quality permanent accommo-
dation.	 Wimpey's 'No—fines' house was the response to such
critics. It looked like a traditional terraced house on the
outside, coated in pebble—dash, but it involved the application
of industrial techniques, using a concrete pour process.
Techniques of this kind promised an answer to the political pro-
blem of the mass provision of housing and were welcomed by
Labour and the left (107) for this reason. - That they were
developed Qn the scale that they were, resulted more from the
recognition by manufacturers of their potential for circum-
venting the need for traditional craft skills and building
materials which were in short supply.
The third of the techniques utilised by manufacturers to over-
come the restrictions imposed by post—war shortages involved
the more widespread use of labour—only sub contracting, or
'lump' labour from the late 40's. 	 This arrangement provides
for the use of a sub—contractor who is not res ponsible for the
provision of tools or equipment on the job, and who works for
a fixed payment, a 'lump' su 1, made for a specified task.
Arrangements differed between one sub—contractor and another,
between one job and another (108). But it is clear that such
a system, whatever the variations in the method of its operation,
offered to the employer a number of advantages which were par-
ticularly important in the context of the post—war years. Firstly,
LOSC provided for payment for the individual operative — or the
gang if this was how the sub—contract was to be eiTected — to
increase productivity and to finish more quickly wherever pos-
sible. In the context of site operations on which supervision
could not be rigorously maintained, this factor was especially
important to the contractor since it ensured that his labour was
used to best advantage and that the job was speedily concluded.
It has been argued that labour only is more successful than
other incentive schemes, in encouraging efforts to greater
output since its targets are simple, definite arrangements which
enable the worker to assess the return which he can get for his
additional efforts (109). Secondly, it provided for the
'employment' of operatives only as and when they were needed.
Although casual employment was characteristic of the industry,
it was still customary for workers to be recruited for a job
in accordance with a general estimate of needs, rather than for
a specified piece of work. Such employees now had rights to a
guaranteed fall—back payment, to holiday entitlement and to
welfare provision of some sort, if this could be negotiated,
on site. LOSC served further to casualise an industry whose
operations were already casual, since it enabled employers to
recruit and pay men only at the point when a s pecific job
had to be tackled. In doing so they could avoid the overhead
payments which were attached to recruiting workers on a more
regular basis. Thirdly, in the context of the prevailing
shortage of materials, it was convenient for the contractor
to recruit labour at the point when it was particularly needed,
and when materials were available, rather than to have men in
their employment but be unable to proceed with a job because of
a shortage of supplies. Under a negotiated incentive scheme
workers might be inclined to cut output if resources seemed to
be dwindling and unemployment was imminent, rather than com-
pleting the job quickly for whatever bonus might be operating.
It has, additionally, been noted that some forms Of 1030 share
the advantages of specialist sub-contracting, in that a man or
group of men with specialist experience or abilities might be
recruited for a task which they could complete more rapidly and
more effectively than other operatives. In any case men work-
ing together regularly, as they did under some forms of sub-
contract, offered the employer the added bonus of the quality
and efficiency which could be expected from their longer
experience of working together (110).
Labour-only sub-contracting represented a challenge by private
contractors to attempts by the Labour government to 'control'
their activities. Once again Labour's programme made no chal-
lenge to the ownership or control of the industry through
nationalisation. Fundamental to the policies which were operated
was a system of controls which were intended to channel activity
to the areas of greatest need.	 Three categories of building
work were permitted; licensed - that is work undertaken by
private enterprise; authorised - that is work for public bodies;
and direct building for a building department. But the 'controls'
of the Labour Government were unable to restrain the initiative
of the speculative builder and to eliminate black market work.
Valuable materials and labour found their way, unofficidly on
to the jobs which had attracted the interest of the speculative
builder. Although the number of houses being built under
licence was only a fraction of the number being built for local
authorities, the rate of com pletion in the private sector was
much higher than in the public (111). This did not derive from
the essential inefficiency of the public sector as Rosenberg
has argued (112). Rather it is explained by the deliberate .
evasion of government controls by private contractors, to their
own advantage and to the detriment of the public sector.
	 The
private builder relied on a rapid completion and sale in order
to benefit from his capital outlay. The limited capitalisation
of many small builders necessitated a quick turnover and once
a project was begun they would aim for a speedy completion.
When engaged in the public sector their motivation changed.
Local authorities and other public bodies might make advance
payments to private builders engaged in work on their behalf,
so that the incentive to complete in order to obtain the return
on capital was reduced. It was against this background that
labour-only sub-contracting was used to ensure a steady supply
of labour during a period of labour shortage, for earnings higher
than the operative could expect if he was engaged in the public
sector.	 In the context of labour shortage and political res-
traints the 'lump' was designed to attract the requisite number
of operatives at the time when they were needed.
It was not the least of the advantages of LOSC to the employer
that it operated to the detriment of trade union organisation
and worker control, in the industry generally, and on each
particular site where it was worked. Membership of the building
trade unions peaked in 1947/8, and, with the high level of
employment and the post-war demand for skilled labour, militancy
in the industry threatened to reach new heights. Labour-only
sub-contracting provided an ambiguous status for the sub-
contractor and his men. The large number of small firms which
existed, and which still exist today, suggested the possibility
of moving from the position of a worker employed by others to
self-employed status; from being self-employed to an employer
of others.. If the sub-contractor was not required to provide
materials or equipment in order to complete a job, then how much
more easily might such social mobility be realised.
	
The pros-
pects of changing his situation might discourage a worker from
taking up o1 maintaining trade union membership. But more
important than such aspirations was the immediate impact of
ION, divorcing the worker from the pay bargaining carried on
on his behalf by his trade union, and the Federation. Rates
would be negotiated individually, or for the gang in relation
to each particular task, so that the bargaining carried on at
national level by the NFBTO was of no relevance to the operative
working on MSC. Trade union membership would hold few benefits
for the men who regularly worked on the 'lump' and site organi-
sation would be more difficult to achieve with groups of workers
settling their wages with the employer on an individual or a
gang basis.
Trade union organisation might be expected to grow in a period
of high demand for labour. Until the late 40's this was in
fact the case (113). Not only was trade union membership increa-
sing but site level militancy on wages questions pressurised
the leadership of the NFBTO to move on the matter, labour only
sub-contracting was not yet wides pread, and attention was
concentrated on the Federation's negotiations. 	 In April- 1944
an application was submitted to the Employers' Federation for
an increase of 3d an hour on the basic ratepand after protracted
discussion agreement was reached providing for id per-hour on
Nov 1944 and 1d more on July 1st 1945. The building trade
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labourers' rate was adjusted so that, from February 1945 it
was 80 instead of75; 	 the craftsman's rate (114). There
had been a long-standing movement amongst the operatives for
3/- an hour for craftsmen with a corresponding increase for
labourers and when the 1945 wage application was submitted for
2/6 an hour for craftsmen there was strong criticism of the -
Federation leaders from sections of the membership who felt that
the claim was too low (115).
Many workers in London had been earning up to 5/- an hour under
bonus systems, but earnings could not be maintained at this
level, and some workers were down to the bare rate (116).
Matters were exacerbated by the presence of many provincial work-
men in the capital, employed on bomb damage repairwork under
the EWO. The concentration of men in hostel accommodation,
away from their families and living in inadequate conditions
encouraged a lively dissatisfaction with the slow movements of
the negotiating machinery on the wages question. Unofficial
organisations were established in some of the London hostels,
and the support for their activities was sufficiently strong
to cause some consternation within the leadership of the Fede-
ration (117). The extent of support for the wages movement
can be gauged by the demonstrations held in the autumn of 1945,
attracting 59,000 building workers on October 8th and even more
at the next event on November 5th (118). Deputations from the
London Campaign Committee met the President and the Secretary
of the Federation, whilst officials of the AUBTW and the
Painters organised meetings of their members in London to
explain the state of negotiations (119). Clearly some move-
ment from the Federation's negotiators was expected, and at a
time when the ending of war emergency provisions on nbr was
in sight, the most likely direction was towards incentive payments.
The introduction of pbr duri ,ig the war laid the basis for its
more regular a pplication within the industry in peace time.
It was labour militancy on the wages question which ensured its
acceptance. The election of a Labour government went some way
towards smoothing over the ideological inhibitions of the crafts-
man regarding the question of incentives, for production could
now be identified as part of the national effort towards social
reconstruction, an integral part of Labour's programme. Just
as the maxithum exertion could be justified in the fight against
fascism, so it could be vindicated as part of Labour's housing
policy. The agreement which was reached at the end of 1945
stressed the importance of raising productivity and detailed
steps were laid down to achieve this. A Joint Production Organi-
sation was to be established at national level, to work through
special regional or local Joint Committees to remove the
causes for low .output. 	 It was agreed to examine pbr, but the
employers were reminded that no steps could be taken in this
direction unless previous policy decisions were rescinded (120).
It was not until 1947 that agreement was reached on the use of
incentive payments in peace-time, for a trial period of two
years. Application was made during that year for an increase
of 6d an hour for craftsmen, with a corresponding increase for
labourers. No agreement was reached and the matter was refer-
red to the National Arbitration Tribunal for consideration.
The NAT found against the operatives, but, in the face of grow-
ing militancy, a meeting of the Joint Executives was held, and
it was decided to press the claim with the employers, and, if
unsuccessful, to raise the issues with the government (121).
In the meantime the National Joint Production Council had set
up a sub-committee to examine the question of incentiVe payments.
This body decided that a workable system of incentive payments
could be devised, and the qu ostion was referred to the NFBTE
and to the NFBTO for consideration (122). At the annual con-
ference of the NFBTO in 1947 strong dissatisfaction was
expressed at the lack of progress on the wages question (123).
But the operatives faced the threat of government incomes
policy, as well as employer resistance to their claim. In this
context proposals for incentive payments were put to a ballot,
together with provision for an increase on the basic •rate of 3d
an hour. A significant majority in favour of the agreement
rescinded previous decisions resisting pbr (124). The scheme
of incentive payments was an experimental one, subject to
review after two years. It provided for target and bonus rates
to be set by the employer and agreed with the workers, at the
beginning of a job, and barring material changes, no altera-
tion was to take place during its course. Bonus earnings were
expected to be around the 20 level, but no provision was made
for a lieu rate where bonus was not applied.	 The sliding scale
was to continue to operate with reviews reverting to a 12 month
basis, but no alteration was to be made to the standard rate of
wages before Feb 1st 1949 (125). 	 Whilst the agreement met
with majority support amongst the operatives, there were sig-
nificant hesitations on the employers' side regarding its poten-
tial value.
	
There was some feeling that it would operate
against employers working primarily on repair or jobbing opera-
tions, and favour projects which were easier to bonus, for
example new house building. It was recognised too that the
success of the scheme would depend to a considerable extent on
the supply of materials and the opportunity was taken to
castigate the Government for past failures in this respect (126).
The ending of war-time provisions for the industry again called
into question the relationship between building and civil
engineering. The Uniformity A greement continued to opernte
throughout 1946, but by common agreement it was terminate0
on March 31 1947 (127). Fre—war practices, differentiating
between the two were restored from this time, and building and
civil engineering were again worked under se parate agreements.
The question of the two agreements was allied to that of pbr;
since this was already more commonly operated within civil
engineering, and its acce ptance for building could facilitate
the end of the 1934 demarcation agreement.
	
Both questions were
again under discussion during 1949 in view of the impending
termination of the trial period of the Incentives Agreement (128).
It was difficult for the Operatives ? Side to control the intro-
duction and the application of payment by results. 	 The
employers were not obliged to introduce incentives, although if
a scheme was introduced it was subject to the provisions of the
working rule agreement (129). There was nothing in the agree-
ment to compel the employers to make bonus payments and only a
minority of firms actually did so.
	 There was no schedule of
bonus payments as there had been during wartime so that pbr
was applied in a very haphazard and disorganised way. Agree-
ments were reached at site level, and in consequence it was
very difficult for the Federation and the unions at national
level to Monitor the way in which they were working. In many
instances it seems that the payments which were made bore no
relation to production.	 The speed appropriate for any one job
could not easily be assessed since conditions were never the
same from one site to another.
	
The rank and file operatives
were quick to take advantage of the lack of precedents and
expertise on the management side (130). At the official level
some concern was expressed at the absence of information and
control through the established bargaining institutions (131).
The growth of informal bargaining arrangements at site level
encouraged the development and extension of labour-only sub-
contracting. The 'lump' was not of course unknown in the inter-
war years in certain parts of the country (132). But from the
late 1940's, at a time of shortages of labour and materials,
that complaints about abuses associated with this form of sub-
contracting increased in number.	 The men on site had no
guidelines by which to work and the distinction between a bona
fide incentives scheme and an arrangement for a 'lump' sum pay-
ment may sometimes have been unclear. The issue was raised on
the NJCBI under the conciliation machinery, and was referred by
the Council to the various Executive authorities. An informal
conference with the NFBTE was held in December 1948 with a view
to defining legitimate forms of sub-contracting. Representatives
of the NFBTO were concerned to distinguish between incentive
payments, which they had accepted, and the 'pernicious piece-
work system' (133), which they did not. Despite assurances to
the contrary:
'The position now under this new agreement is that sub-contracting
for labour only has been let loose with a vengeance that has
never been known in the building industry before, with all sorts
of evil consequences,' (134).
Sub-contracting had always played its part, but the problem now
was to establish the bona fides of the sub-contractors, and to
prevent its escalation (135). The situation was the more com-
plicated because of regional variations in contracting. In
Scotland for example, main contractors were less common, and a
job was still undertaken by a craft s pecialist who employed his
own men - a system which contrasted with that used in South
Wales, where a major contractor let work out to a sub-contractor
a practice which was also applied in the South and 13Pst of
England (136). By 1951 an agreement was reached with the
employers which was intended to safeguard the situation. The
NPBTE gave public pronouncement to the view that labour—only
was subject to abuses and that, provided bona fide sub—contract-
ing was safeguarded, it should be under more effective control
(137). In view of the difficulties of definition, and the
autonomy of site organisation, even within many of the larger
companies, the agreement cost them nothing.
	 The spread of the
'lump' was by no means arrested.
Labour—only sub—contracting could not have taken a hold on the
industry so rapidly if it did not hold advantages for the
operative as well as the employer.
	 The most telling was
undoubtedly money. With labour in short supply at a time when
building activities were booming, men could take home sums far
in excess of those negotiated by the Federation, even if allow-
ance was made for the prospect of a bonus payment of some kind
(138). With work readily available, there was little risk of
losing money by moving from site to site in search of greater
rewards. The prospect of much greater returns was a considerable
inducement. with independent status, the operative avoided the
payments including tax which were obligatory on a statutory
basis for employees and he would therefore be able to retain
a greater proportion of his earnings for himself. In return
of course, he lost the entitlements of holiday and insurance
credits, but his immediate financial gains far outweighed such
considerations.
	
The other major attraction of labour—only,
as opposed to the more conventional mode of employment was
the relative freedom from supervision which it allowed to the
operative.
	 A worker on the 'lump', set his own pace . in
accordance with his own finEncial considerations, and his
work was less likely to be subject to the attentions of the
site foreman in regard to output. In the words of the Isubby
bricklayer' /As a subby I have the feeling I am working with
the general foreman rather than for him'. (139)
At a time when the high level of employment should have boosted
union organisation in the industry, an increasingly defensive
stance was assumed by activists in the face of the growing
menace of the lump.. After the two year trial period, the
Incentives Agreement was confirmed in 1949 without further
reference to the membership (140), and the 1951 amendments
relating to labour—only did nothing to prevent the extension of
this practice. Complaints at the growth of sub—contracting
for labour—only were a regular feature of conference discus-
sions during the 50 I s and it was argued that, by the constraints
which were laid down on its operation in the amendments of
1951, the NEBTO negotiators had given de facto recognition to
this practice (141). Conditions were particularly bad on some
of the new town projects — where extensive building programmes
were underway. In towns such as Basildon r
 Harlow, Crawley,
Welwyn and Hatfield, organisation generally was at a low ebb,
and no attention was paid to union agreements. 'Sub—contracting
on a labour—only basis was rampant and was rapidly being intro-
duced by almost all contractors engaged. The determining
factor of competition and the economic environment surrounding
incoming forms of good industry standing were such that this
practice had to be adopted in order to com pete successfully in
the scramble for labour as there was little or no local resident
building trade labour available.' (142) Plus rates and earn-
ings were high and added inducements such as the prospect of
obtaining good accommodation were provided (143). The
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employers made no attempt to control their own members in such
situations. Normal industrial discipline did not apply, and it
was clear to all concerned that the sub—contractors involved
were not recognised specialists (144).
Difficulties were especially likely to arise in relation to the
obligations of the sub—contractor and the main contractor to-
wards the operative on the 'lump'.
	 The status of the operative
was by no means clear. As a worker on site he could be employed
on the same type of work, sometimes alongside, the worker who
was more regularly recruited. Yet he was distinguished from
the latter by his relationship to the sub—contractor, from whom
he received payment for the work which he had undertaken. Sub-
contractors, even where they appeared to be bona fide operators,
often went bankrupt or decamped with the money which should
have been paid out to the operatives.
	 They might fail to stamp
holiday or insurance cards, or to pay income tax which was due,
and in all of these instances it was the o perative who suffered.
The informal manner in which labour was recruited for many
jobs, and. the casual basispoften through pub contacts, on which
arrangements were made undermined any attempts which men might
make to obtain their dues in such circumstances (145). Trade
union organisers were negotiating from a position of weakness
when they attempted to ensure that the main contractor took
responsibility for any wages default of a sub—contractor whom
he had engaged. Firms were obliged, in com peting for the
available labour, to offer work to labour only sub—contractors.
As long as such men could operate with virtually no assets, it
remained a constant possibility that their "cash—flow problem"
would provide the imperative for some of them quietly to dis-
appear with the takings. And it was not likely that the
building contractors would volunteer to nick up the bill when
this happened.
The long—term unity of the federation, based on a uniform pay-
ment for all trades and all regions, was also undermined by
the introduction of lieu payments which were granted more
readily to some tradesthan to others. Where no incentive pay-
ment was made it became customary for employers on some jobs
to offer a lieu bonus payment, a practice which was approved
by the YFBTO in 1955 (146). It was the finishing trades who
were penalised by this, for they were not in at the start of the
job when the lieu payment was negotiated, and they frequently
experienced difficulties when trying to ensure that it was
applied for their work.
	 As Coppock admitted
the main contractor does in fact bribe the constructional
trades in the early stages when organisation is developing,
and sometimes there is nothing left in the kitty for those who
come at the end' (147).
The effect seemed )
 at least to some of the painters who were
affected, to be the reintroduction of the differential system
of payment and a breakdown in the uniform rate which had long
been Federation policy (148). Yet within the Federation the
Painters lacked the influence to ensure either the abolition
of lieu payments, or the implementation of all—trades consul-
tation where such payments were negotiated in order to ensure
their equitable application (149). The system of lieu pay-
ments was maintained and with it the distinction between crafts
which the Federation had done so much to break down.
'Industrialisation' in the construction industry, combined with
the effects of labour—only to weaken the standing-of the NFBTO
and its control over wage levels in the industry. The range
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of new technologies has alreudy been suggested. .	 Many
of the undertakings of the post-war era were of a scale to
permit such innovations. Power stations, factories, bridges,
oil refineries as well as house building on a massive scale
provided scope and justification for capital investment.
Taylor-Woodrow for example, a firm which had grown from a small
enterprise in the twenties to one of the largest in Britain
by 1950, was involved in a number of projects involving this
new approach to construction. At Kirkby, in Liverpool, the
first all-welded tubular steel frame factory to be fabribated
completely on site (for Tubewrights Ltd), was completed in
1954. And in the same year the firm was commissioned by the
Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation at London Airport
where it had already been employed on the central terminal area
for work on the three story 'Queen's 	 'lding'.	 The Calder
Hall Atomic Power Station, London Airport and the Festival of
Britain buildings were operations on a similar scale, each
involving new techniques and new -problems (150).
The scale and style of such operations posed severe organi-
sational problems for the craft trade unions. Not only did
the size of the undertakings and the demand for labour impel
the contractors towards the use of LOSC.
	
They also under-
mined the customary distinction between craftsman and labourer,
building and civil engineering. The ending of the Uniformity
Agreement encouraged moves to unify the national agreements
for building and civil engineering on a permanent basis. Fail-
ing this the leaders of the NFBTO decided to claim recognition
from the Civil Engineering Employers to ensure that practices
were no less favourable under the Civil Engineering than under
the Building Agreement (151). The big employers such-as
McAlpines and Wimpeys who had a foot in both camps preferred to
use the Civil Engineering At r'eement wherever possible, since
it imposed no restrictions on overtime working (152). Tho
civil engineer was encroaching on building activities and
craftsmen were affected, to a greater degree than in earlier
years by the Civil Engineering Agreement (153). Three seats
on the Civil Engineering Construction Conciliation Board were
eventually conceded to the craftsmen - one each for the ASW
and the AUBTW and one for Coppock representing the Federation
(134).
The definition of craft work was a continuing difficulty. The
application of new machines and techniques attracted a plus
rate on the labourer's basic rate under the civil engineering
agreement in a way which defied the clear-cut distinction
between skilled and un-skilled workers. 	 The definition of the
newer branches of the trade, such as shuttering which involved
a considerable element of skill posed a dilemma for the crafts-
man. How far could craft boundaries and craft wages be said
to apply? To what extent did involvement within the Civil
Engineering Conciliation Board represent a reassertion of
craft skills, and to what extent could it be understood as
resulting from their dilution? As Coppock put it:
'On the problem of demarcation, what demarcation do we agree
exists between ourselves, and who, when you ap point a demar-
cation committee is going to demarcate for you? When you were
not members of the Civil Engineering Board, it may have been
necessary to demarcate, but what are you going to demarcate
this time? You sit on the Conciliation Board. You sit on
the Builder's Board. We have to have the builders to assist
us in deciding what is what.' (155)
The loss of jurisdictional ,round in the battle between the
two sectors continued to be a matter for concern. The options
available were for a merger between the two agreements, such
that there would be one agreement for the building and civil
engineering industries, or a renewal of the demarcation
agreement.	 The former was an impossibility for the craftsz.
man, since, as it was succinctly put: 'the Civil Engineering
Conciliation Board is in possession of the General Workers'
Unions. They own it. We are only there on sufferance' (156).
So in 1956/7 the latter course was adopted and a Demarcation
Committee was set up.
The concern within the NFBTO regarding the boundaries of the
building and civil engineering industries suggests a shift
in the balance of power on the operatives side. Craftsmen had
always been better and more effectively organised than their
labourers, and this was true in the 1950's as it had been in
the 1930's. But the distinction between the two categories of
operative was blurred with the emergence of the semi—skilled
grades who featured in the new processes of Production of the
1940's and 50's. The encroachment of semi—skilled operatives
on tasks which had, in the past, been performed by craftsmen
was a disturbing feature of the industrial changes for leaders
of the NFBTO (157). The application of the machine tool could
not be confined to civil engineering. For could the break-
down of a craft operation into several distinct sections,
each one undertaken by a semi—skilled worker be prevented.
Yet in the context of such develo pments, officials of the
individual craft unions, as well as the Federation, were con-
cerned to assert the identity of the craft worker, the frame-
work for negotiation for craft interests and the separate
jurisdiction of the building and civil engineering agreements
(158). Representatives of uhe T&GY, organising in civil
engineering could claim that mechanisation had made greater
advance there than in any other industry in recent years.
And it was clear that they intended to reap the benefit, not
only by negotiating for an ever growing number of plus—rated
jobs. Technical and engineering advances widened their scope
for recruitment, without in any way overstepping the boundaries
of the Perth Agreement.	 The balance of power would, in future,
tilt in their direction.
By the 1950 1 s the role of the NFBTO had beenundermined in its
area of central concern, the negotiation of wages for crafts-
men in the building industry. And on .related questions govern-
ing the conditions of employment of its members, there were
some setbacks to the successes of the war years. In particular
difficulties arose over the implementation of working rules
2A and 2B. Working rule 2A provided for the payments of a
guaranteed weekly minimum of 32 hours in the event of time
being lost through inclement weather. Working rule 2B laid
down conditions for the termination of employment, which was
to require two hours notice on either side, to expire at the
normal finishing time on a Friday, after the first six working
days of employment (159). Both measures were intended to
decasualise employment practices, and to offer a more regular
remuneration to the worker. Moral intentions in this direc-
tion were met with the response, amongst certain employers,
of discharging their workers on the Friday following the onset
of bad weather under rule 2B, and thereby depriving the
operative of the payment which was due under rule 2a. Com-
plaints about this manoeuvre — which was not actually in
breach of working rules, were intermittently made during the
50/s (160), but there was little success by the negotiators
for the NEBTO, in remedying this situation. The gains made
during the war years, as part of the package presented to
workers by the government and consolidated in the agreement
at the conclusion of peace, had, in part been undermined.
Employers utilised their right of dismissal under rule 2B to
avoid other commitments to regular earnings.
In other areasothe extension of the National Joint Negotiating
Machinery had proved more successful. The Holidays with Pay
scheme, which applied jointly to the Building and Civil
Engineering Industries was amended and improved. And within
the NJCBI there was joint employer/operative control over all
aspects of national apprenticeships (161). But perhaps the
most important advance made during the 50 1 s was the move
towards the elimination of the lower graded areas and the
establishment of a standard and uniform rate of payment through-
out the country, with the exception of the ! super-grade' areas
of London and Liverpool. In 1948 there were still 501 places
on grade 3; 460 on grade 2; 335 on grade Al and 727 on grade
4 - altogether 1,296 places throughout the country below
grade A (162). The WITH° was founded on the princi ple of a
uniform rate and the elimination of regional differences. It
had, from its inception, the object of raising the wages and
conditions of the lower paid rural areas to the levels applying
in the higher paid towns. Significant progress was made, in
the post-war years, so that this target was achieved by 1960
and with the exceptions of London and Liverpool there was one
uniform rate throughout the country (163).
This Process was assisted by the increasing mobility of build-
ing labour engendered by the experience of war-time, and the
post-war reconstruction. A precedent was set in the Uniformity
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Agreement where men sent fro a higher paid to a lower paid
area received the higher rate. In civil engineering the ton
rate was applied throughout the country by 1951, but of course
civil engineering contractors faced the difficulty of attract-
ing men to projects in remote parts of the country, and civil
engineering work was not, in any case, undertaken in every tOwn,
in the way that building obviously was. Civil engineering was
more uniform in its demands for labour, for it was essentially
large-scale and there was therefore less justification for the
variation which applied on building operations (164). However
the practice in civil engineering had repercussions in the
building industry, particularly at a time when the distinction
between the two was increasingly blurred. Delegates from the
T&GITU, the union most strongly represented in civil engineering,
were active within the NFBTO in pushing for the elimination of
lower grades.
The rationalisation of the wage structure in the building
industry was less of a success than might at first appear.
The introduction of payment by results meant that the rates
negotiated nationally by the Federation were of less signifi-
cance for the man on the site than they had been hitherto.
As the bonus scheme became more widely accepted, so the local
rate became less relevant to take-home pay. There was,
increasingly a gap between the national rate and local earnings,
such that the elimination of the lower grades was of much
less importance to an operative than the ability to negotiate
a good bonus on the job. It is true that the national rate
was important for the calculation of bonus, holiday payments
and the guaranteed week. But as far as the earnings were con-
cerned, it was site organisation and the bonus scheme-which
were significant (165).
	 It was an indication of the problems
besetting the federation, that the achievement of one of its
founding aims should have so little relevance for the building
trades operative. During the inter—war years the negotiations
of the NFBTO had been of considerable importance for the build-
ing trade worker, since, together with the movements of the -
sliding scale, they set the level for his earnings. But that
time was now passed. As the discrepancy between rates and
earnings widened so the activities of the NFBTO, and indeed its
very existence, were undermined.
It was impossible for the NFBTO to resist the creation of new
agreements affecting their members so the extension of public
ownership under the Labour government changed the structure of
collective bargaining in several areas. The nationalisation
of the major supply industries encouraged industrial organisa-
tion and negotiation in areas where the building trades unions
had members. With the establishment of the National Coal
Board for example there was confirmed the central consideration
of questions of wages and conditions in the coal industry.
The creation of the British Electricity Authority centralised
collective bargaining which previously had been controlled, on
the employers' side, by the various electricity departments.
Building trade workers were widely employed outside of the
scope of the major agreement for the building industry, both
on new works and on repair and maintenance. W.S. Hilton,
Research Officer of the AUBTW estimated in 1953 that over
50,000 workers were employed in Direct Labour Organisations
of local authorities alone. The creation of the National Health
Service with its own bargaining structures, the confirmation
of national collective bargaining with local authorities and
within the nationalised railway system removed many building
trade operatives from situations which were directly comparable
with the private sector. Conditions were, in other areas on
the whole more favourable than those which applied in the build-
ing industry, if only because of the greater degree of job
security aasociated with the public sector (166). Although the
building industry agreement continued to be of central impor-
tance to the Federation and its affiliates it was impossible
to argue - as had been argued in earlier years, that the one
agreement should be applied to building craftsmen wherever they
were employed.
In the private sector, in manufacturing industry too, there
were moves to negotiate along company lines, to the detriment
of established conditions for the building industry.
In some large firms which had initiated company agreements,
building trades employees had resisted inclusion in conditions
which were set for process workers. In Imperial Chemical
Industries Ltd for example, wage rates were set in accordance
with the building industry, although working conditions were
negotiated together with the workers on production. In Cour-
taulds building workers resisted the agreement which was set
for process workers. As building trade workers found employ-
ment on the permanent staffs of firms and public bodies, so
the universal relevance of the building trades agreement was
called into question. A fundamental difference existed between
the building industry, where employment was casual and there
was no guarantee of continuity of work, and employment in
manufacturing, with a large corporation, where continuity of
employment was more likely. 	 It was, in this context, increas-
ingly difficult to insist upon the application of the building
trade agreement. A new degree of flexibility was proposed
and there was a shift from the long-held tenets of federation
policy (167).
By 1960, when Dick Coppock's retirement was due, many of the
Federation's targets had been realised. The abolition of -
grading schemes and the application of a uniform wage structure
for the whole country, the implementation of aguaranteed week,
an apprentibeship scheme and provision for holidays with pay
were all accomplished facts. But they had been realised against
the background of changes within the building industry which
undermined them of some of their significance. The introduction
of payment by results had led into the spread of labour only
sub-contracting, a form of employment which threatened, not
only the value of the Federation's negotiated wage rate, but
trade union organisation itself. And its extension was accom-
panied by the application of new technologies, by the break-
down of traditional craft operations with the onset of
'industrialised' techniques and by the erosion of the value
placed on craft skills.	 The impact of such changeswas marked
at the end of the period by a conference on the application of
new technologies, called by the building trade unions who were
suffering directly under their impact. And with this initia-
tive came the renewed demand for structural change on the
union side, for amalgamation to bring about the formation of
one union for the building industry (168).
Pt.3  Trade union structure in the buildin. industry: 1940-60
The rapid war-time changes and the immense tasks of reconstruc-
tion encouraged renewed interest in the adaptation of trade union
structure in Britain. The British trade union movement suffered.
less than that of other countries in Europe from the
oppression of fascism and the disruption of war. Although its
leaders were drawn into the orbit of government, and many of
its traditional practices relinquished, it sustained a degree
of organisational continuity which was unrivalled. In Germany,
France, Greece and elsewhere, trade unions, officials and
many members had perished in the Nazi holocaust. Some Euro-
pean trade unionists had survived the war, in exile, in Britain,
and their contact with their British counterparts, as well as
the involvement of officials from trade unions in Britain in
the re-establishment of the European movement, where they played
a significant part, stimulated a renewed concern with the
domestic questions of trade union structure.
The statutory provisions governing the process of merger were
affected by the introduction in 1940 of the Societies (Kis-
cellaneous Provisions) Act. This provided for merger to be
carried through on the basis of transfer of engagements, where-
by members of one organisation agreed to transfer to another
society on the basis of the existing rules of the society to
which they transferred. In such a situation a ballot would be
necessary only in the society whose members were transferring.
The new arrangements gave recognition to the fact that mergers
were, increasingly, effected by the take-over of a smaller
society by a larger one on the basis of the existing rulebook
of the larger union. And in such a situation members of the
larger organisation would very often be slow to bestir them-
selves to vote. Under the 1917 legislation, fusion might be
prevented by a low vote of the membership, but under the new
arrangements l it was possible to effect amalgamation in spite
of apathy and indifference on the part of some members'. (169).
Transfers still needed the ap proval of 2/3 of the members of
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society unless the Chief Registrar of 7riendly
Societies dispensed with this requirement.
The legislative change encouraged renewed consideration of the
question within the TUC. In 1943 a resolution was passed
calling for an examination of trade union structure and clos'er
unity (170). After surveying some thirty industries, the
General Council issued a report in 1946, entitled Trade  union
structure and closer unity in which amalgamation was strongly
recommended, and some suggestions were made as to the practical
steps which could be taken in this direction. It was apparent
that in the context of the long tradition of trade unionism
in Britain, without the dislocations which had affected many of
their European counterparts, dramatic changes could not be
made. Insofar as the report was based on consultations with
trade union leaders in the various industries, it reflected
some of the problems impeding progress, not least the attitudes
of trade union leaders themselves.
The renewed attention on the part of the government and the
TUC to the shape and function of the modern trade union move-
ment did not lead to changes after world war 2 on the scale
of those which followed the armistice at the end of world war 1.
The established solidity of British unions, the scale of their
membership and operations, as well as the existence of formal
bargaining machinery with the employers induced a resistance to
all but the most limited mergers. It is true that the National
Union of Hineworkers was founded, drawing together the regional
Miners' Federations, which formerly had been linked via the
Niners t Federation of Great Britain. And the Union of Shop
Distributive and Allied Trades Workers was created through
the merger of the National Union of Distributive and Allied
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Iriorkers with the Nat. Amalg. Union of Shop Assistants,
Warehousemen & Clerks in 1947, but elsewhere trade unions
continued to operate in accordance with the pattern which had
been set in the early 20's. Little enthusiasm was shown for
far reaching changes.
	
The TUC accepted in its re port, the
opinions of the leaders of the building trade union leaders
concerning the effectiveness of the Federation (171). It
confined its recommendations to merger between cognate trade
groups in four areas — the trowel trades.; the woodworkers;
plumbers, painters and glaziers; and the labourers. The
ultimate goal might be one union for the building industry, but
its advent was not to be hastened by any startling innovations.
Thus the numerous small craft societies in the building industry
continued: to operate under the weighty influence of the AS'.1.
There was no shortage of resolutions at annual conferences of
the Federation calling for one union for the building industry'.
mostly emanating from the Regional Councils of that body, rather
than from individual union affiliates. 173ut initiatives were
alternately sauashed or diverted according to their wording
and the mood of the Federation's leadership. Pro posals for
the Federation to become a registered trade union, incorporating
the various member unions, met, not surprisingly, with a fair
degree of hostility from Wolstencroft. In the name of demo-
cracy and the rank and file he repudiated a proposal whereby
'those who had no money were prepared to take money from those
who had it.' (172) More seriously, a motion calling for a more
rapid progress on the question of amalgamation and a greater
effort on the part of Executive Councils in pursuit of the
one big union, made in 1944, also met with defeat. With the
exception of Luke Fawcett and Harry Weaver of the AUBTW the
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proposal was uniformly critjcised. None of the unions repre-
sented at the annual conference were willing to sacrifice their
autonomy in favour of a principle of unity which all claimed
to support. Industrial unionism no longer had even a notional
support from the delegates to the Federation. 'Unity' need
mean no more than unity within the Federation, and a motion-in
favour of one union for the building industry, put forward in
1945 was defeated (173). More significantly, the following
year, a resolution calling for t an approach to amalgamation to
be made through the cognate trades' was passed (174), but even
this, limited path towards unity was to be abandoned by the
early 1950's. Whilst pro-amalgamationists, mostly on the
political left, and many of them in the Communist Party, con-
tinued to raise the matter, previous disappointments forced
them to confine their initiatives to movements in favour of
amalgamation of the cognate trades. Weary of the repetition of
previous negotiations in this direction, and suspicious per-
haps of the motivation of the pro-amalgamationists, Coppock
insisted that the Federation had no rights to interfere with
the domestic affairs of the constituent unions (175). Pot even
the more restrained objective of amalgamation on cognate
trade lines could find support in the climate of the early
fifties.
The last years of Coppock's reign were years of crisis for the
Federation. Trade union membership had declined from its post-
war peak in 1948, and the proportion of operatives who were
in unions was declining. The opportunities for employment
were high and yet the unions were failing to tap the potential
which was clearly there.
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Apart from the painters whose membership had dropped alarmingly
the fall was acute amongst the trades where the 'lump' was
most common - that is amongst the bricklayers, the plasterers
and the plumbers, with declines of 7.9, 17.1 and 24.9%.
In the case of the plumbers 'nd the construction engineers the
decline was due to the increased size of the workforce rather
than to a loss in membership. But for the bricklayers and
plasterers the decline in density corresponded to a drop in the
aggregate membership figures. Bricklayers worked in gangs and
it was relatively easy to operate as part of a gang on a
'labour-only' basis. The subby-bricklayer's attitude to the
union was not likely to be sweetened by the advantageous rates
which he mind expect on the 'lump'. 'To most practising brick-
layers the union is a joke 	 They (ie the unions) seem to
refuse to believe that men are motivated by the cash nexus.'
(176)
But amongst carpenters, labour-only had taken less hold. Cer-
tainly there was less impact on trade union organisation and
membership density continued to remain high proportional to
other crafts in building.
	
There was a downward trend in the
density of union membership in other sectors of employment during
the decade under consideration. The figures given by Bain and
Frice suggest a fall in aggregate union density from 45.0 in
1951 to 42.9,: in 1961, a decline which is rather lower than that
for woodworkers, although it must be allowed that the level
of organisation amongst the woodworkers was higher at the outset
than the average figure (177).
In any event it was apparent by the end of Coppock's terms of
office that all was not well although the nature of the crisis
and the scale of the problems had yet to be fully realised.
By 1960 the problems confronting the building trade unions were
sufficiently serious to direct attention again to the possibility
of amalgamation. Although there were few substantial .changes in
inter-union relations in this period, the pattern of governMent
and organisation was, in every case shifting in res ponse to
industrial and political pressures. The consolidation of cen-
tralised collective bargaining, in conjunction with the renewed
political .involvement of the trade union leadership during the
war and the post—war Labour Governments emphasised the impor-
tance of activity at Executive level. This was paralleled, in
political terms, by the commitment to reformism and a hostility
to left—wing and Communist activities. The impact of the
cold war gave a new bite to such tendencies, which were mani-
fest within the building trade unions, by a suspicion of
movements from the rank and file. Conversely, the stress on
pbr and the importance of site organisation boosted movements
for the recognition of shop or site stewards within the rule-
books of the different unions. Since their function now
included the negotiation of site bonus, stewards had a new
importance and their effectiveness could be measured not only
by the degree of organisation, but by the level of take—
home pay. Contradictions between the central and local
officials were not readily resolved, but if they sometimes
seemed to be vying for control of their own organisations
it must also be remembered that they were together engaged in
a defensive campaign, against the non—unionist, labour—only
and the erosion of hard—won rights to organise.
The Woodworkers 
Membership of the ASW peaked in 1947 at 199,597 for the whole
of the UK declining by 1960 to 180,741, a loss of 8,856 members.
The number of carpenters and joiners in employment increased
over the same period, according to the decennial censuses of
1951 and 1961 and the number of•carpenters and joiners recorded
as working on their own account rose over the same period.
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There was a decline in the u,ions financial well-being too,
although this was not immediately reflected in the value of
the union's assets. These increased between 1947 and 1960,
from E1,540,068 to Z1,692,517, but there was a decline over the
period in the surplus of income over expenditure. An important
adjustment was made to the scope of recruitment which was
opened up to 'allied process workers' in 1952. The scale of
building operations after 1945 confirmed the belief that the
innovations'of the war years were not merely temporary. No
longer was the ASW defined by the skilled work of its members
since it now accepted other operatives, including women, who
were engaged in woodworking processes. A s pecial section was
opened up for women members in 1952 hut after so many years of
keeping women out the union was not flooded with applications.
It has been suggested that the union's recruitment was little
affected by this adjustment to rules since branch officials
tended to take in members in accordance with established prac-
tices (178). The building industry was still of primary con-
cern to the ASW and it was in response to developments in this
sector that changes were initiated.
The tension between rank and file initiative and the central
Executive Council was well illustrated through the establish-
ment of the annual delegate conference of the union.
	
The
General Council was, until the end of the second world war, the
effective policy making body of the Society. The need for a
national representative conference had long been a campaigning
point with the left of the union, and in the context of the
militancy on wages during 1944-5, and at a time when building
workers, concentrated in London hostels, were developing
unofficial movements, the campaign snowballed (179). -When the
General Council met, in October 1945, it was faced with
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resolutions from 361 branche', of the union to make provision for
an annual delegate conference (180). The argument for a con-
ference was accepted by the General Council (181) and the first
one was held in 1947 on the basis of one representative per
thousand members sent from branch groupings on an area basis.
Three problems highlighted the battle for control of the union
machinery in the organisation and status of conference. The
first related to the running of the event, since it was decided
by the Executive that l it shall not be in order for delegates
or groups of delegates to hold sectional meetings for the pur-
pose of discussing the business of the conference, or to decide
the attitude to be adopted to any matter placed before con-
ference for consideration or decision. Any delegates adjudged
guilty of such conduct shall be suspended from any further
sittings of Conference, and may in addition be dealt with by
the EC.'
This clause, which gave rise to friction at the outset of the
very first conference, was a clear expression of the fears which
had prevailed in the thirties amongst the unions leadership,
that the left, with their paper, the If Builders  Leader and a
well organised political machine, would use the facilities of
conference to expand its influence, and eventually, to control
proceedings. The Communist Party, it was complained, behaved
undemocratically, acting as a group within the union, and
holding faction meetings to decide policy (182). Whilst
'heresy hunting , was denied by the EC, their manoeuvre was
clearly devised to deal with Communists, but could extend to
any grouping which took initiatives independently of the union's
leadership. Although the clause was not endorsed by eonference
for inclusion in standing oruers, the Chairman reminded dele-
gates that provision existed within the Rulebook for dealing
with members who behaved in an unauthorised fashion. Clearly
the discussion on factions was only a foretaste of the conflict
which might be expected from these contacts between Executive
and General Council members, and rank and file delegates (183).
The second of the issues to be hotly debated was the question
of a Standing Orders Committee for Conference arrangements.
The business of the first conference was regulated by the Execu-
tive Council, and this could be changed only by decision of the
GC at the sexennial meeting for rules revision due in 1951.
The manner in which affairs were conducted was subject to strong
criticism, since the EC t s decisions often appeared to be
arbitrary and to rule out discussion on issues which were of
concern to delegates (184). Resolutions calling for the
election of a Standing Orders Committee were repeatedly sub-
mitted, and when one of them was allowed to remain on the
agenda, at the third annual conference, it was successfully
Passed with only brief discussion. When the General Council
next met, in 1951, it recommended the establishment of a
Standing Orders Committee of five members, two from the EC
and three to be elected from Conference. Henceforth the con-
duct of business was removed from the direct control of the
Executive, with greater leeway for the expression of opinion
from the body of the membership. The influence of the EC
within subsequent conferences should not be under-estimated
as e consequence of this decision. Conference presented them
with ample opportunity to state their opinion on matters
under discussion. Yet the move to allow for greater delegate
involvement in the running of the conference was a significant
move forward in the democratisation of procedure within the
union. The establishment of a forum in which issues could be
debated gave new expression to rank and file opinion which was
confirmed through provision for delegate representation on the
Standing Orders Committee.
Finally the status of the conference was an important clue to
the extent of membership participation in the process of
decision-taking. When the Conference was first introduced, in
1947, it had only advisory powers, and policy making rested
with the General Council. This created an anomaly whereby a
resolution passed at annual conference would still require
ratification by the General Council before becoming union
policy. Yet any branch of the union could submit resolutions
to General Council, which would have the same status, when
considered, as resolutions passed by the annual conference.
By 1950 change.was imminent. The situation was naturally
unpopular with conference delegates, and the adjustment in union
rules was not opposed by the General Secretary or the Executive
Council. when the General Council met in 1951, it was to con-
sider the numerous resolutions calling for annual conference
to be given policy making status in the union, a situation
whereby the GC was required to vote itself out of existence,
insofar as its policy making functions were concerned. This
it did, by a narrow majority of five to four (185). Yet the
EC and the GC had not fully relinquished their grip on the
right to control policy. 	 The new powers of conference were
qualified by the proviso that all decisions should be examined
by a newly formed Joint Committee of the EC and the GC, and
that when matters of 'major importance' arose, they should be
referred to the membership for a ballot (186). It has been
argued that the device.of the Joint Council was introduced as
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a means of retaining some colitrol over conference decisions
(187).
	 The reluctance of the ASW leaders to abandon their
authority to conference delegates was met by a further shift
in authority from the GC to the EC. Previously it was the GC
which in theory at least, was responsible for making policy.
Now members of the EC were jointly involved in a committee which
allowed them a central influence over the implementation of
conference decisions. The issue reflected once again the ten-
sions between the union's leadership and the broader layers of
the membership, tensions which were becoming more pronounced
in the context of post—war adjustments in the industry.
The other aspect of union government which was broached in this
period was the relationship between the Kanagement Committee
and the central bodies of the Society.
	 The first annual dele-
gate conference remitted to the EC the task of pre paring and
submitting to the General Council a plan whereby the district
structure should be revised. A new scheme should be devised
to be financed nationally and given an organisational base at
regional level with the object of Providing an equal service
to members in every part of the country. janagement Committee
functions had been largely usurped it was suggested by the
establishment of Federal bodies which negotiated on behalf of
woodworkers in various sectors, the NFETO, the Confederation
of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions and the Fational Federa-
tion of Furniture Trades Unions (188). Some Nanagement Com-
mittees in the well—organised and geographically com pact urban
areas were often able, through the payment of levies, to maintain
organisers to assist with their work.
	 By contrast other IC's,
whilst having a substantial membership, found that they were
spread over such a wide area that levies to maintain an ade-
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quate orgP.nising service would be intolerably high. The -C
used this inequitable distribution of resources as a justifica-
tion for their proposals to revise the union's structure. Yet
their real motivation derived from the fact that it was the well-
organised urban areas which most often came into conflict with
the EC on policy issues. It was cities such as London and
Liverpool, Manchester or Glasgow which retained a degree of
autonomy in the conduct of their affairs. National organisers
found that their work was in the less well organised parts of
the country, and their presence would not have been welcomed
in the larger towns. Proposals made for the purpose of estab-
lishing regional organisation within the context of a national
scheme to provide a uniform service to members ran head-on into
conflict with Management Committees in the larger towns and
cities.	 The scheme was not intended to undermine KC's as
such. The relationship of the leadership to the MC depended
to a considerable extent on the location of that MC. Conse-
quently it was the rural areas which stood to benefit from the
proposals, whilst in more concentrated centres of membership
the scheme aroused little enthusiasm.
Detailed pro posals were drawn up whereby the EC might be
empowered to tRke over District Offices and funds, to divide
the country into regions, in each of which a regional secre-
tary might be appointed, and to make provision on standard
conditions of service for the employment of organisers (189).
The plans were unpopular amongst the members and were unlikely
to attract the requisite support at the annual delegate con-
ference.	 The question of organisational services was referred
to the Joint Committee and more limited proposals were brought
forward (190).	 Approval was given, at the 1955 conference
to projects for organisational reform, and as a consequence
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Panagement Committees in som nrcas wore merL;cd, whilst in
others, District Committees were set up for the first time (191).
This was in effect a tidying up operation. The 2C recognised
that the main obstacle to further progress was the matter of
finance. The funds which had accumulated in the wealthier dis-
tricts gave the members there a degree of inde pendence in their
organisation and activities, and it was the ouestion of financial
responsibility which particularly interested the leadership.
For this reason attempts were made to curtail the independent
status of the Management Committees and to introduce the
regional structure which would be more amenable to central
control. Yet the organisational base and the influence of the
MC's was by no means sufficiently eroded to allow progress in
this direction. If anything, it seems likely that the role of
the Districts would have been boosted during these years. The
impact of pbr, and the responsibility for negotiation at site
and local level over incentive schemes, together with regional
variations in its method of application suggested a new status
for site stewards and local representatives, which could well
have enhanced rather than undermined the old Yanagement Com-
mittees. Whether or not this was the case there was little
indication, from this layer of activists, of a willingness to
accept an extension of central power End control. Regionalisa-
tion was still some way off, but the proposals, and the failure
to implement them, are a further illustration of the growing
gap between the central body of officials and sections of the
active membership.
Amalgamation was no more than an abstract question for members
of the ASW during this period. Proposals for one big union
at annual conferences of the Federation received little support
from ASW delegates (192). There was a general reluctance to
go over well—trodden ground .-.ad discussions were, in practice,
confined to negotiations with much smaller societies with
membership in the cognate trades. Discussions took place with
the rational Union of Packing Case Makers (NUPCM), a union which
dated its existence from the latter half of the nineteenth
century. With membership of some 5,200, distributed over 46
branches, and total assets of 29,556, it represented an interest-
ing proposition for the ASW.
	
Indeed it seems likely that it
was the prospect of swallowing the smaller society, first mooted
around 1950, which encouraged the adoption by the ASW of a more
open recruitment policy, including women workers, from 1952.
The NUPCM had about 500 women in membership and provision had
to be made for them if the merger proposals were to bear fruit.
Notwithstanding the adjustments in ASW recruitment, the NUM'
was not easily seduced. Although the Executive was sympathetic
to the merger, Sam Reading, the energetic young AGS was not.
He looked forward to becoming GS in 1952 and he had no intention
of renouncing this position in favour of amalgamation with the
ASW. A transfer of engagements required two thirds of the
members to vote.for a merger. It was unlikely as Sam Reading
pointed out to his Executive, that this sti pulation could be
fulfilled without his support.
	 Fegotiations between the two
unions were, for the time being, abandoned. (193).
In other avenues of discussion, there was little success to
report. Hew approaches were made to the Woodcutting Machinists,
but their General Secretary declined to enter into negotiations
without a ballot vote of their members (194). There was
little scope for the advancement of mergers in a context where
each of the woodworking unions had a regular and established
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field of recruitment. And there was little anthusinsm on the
Dart of ASW leaders for moving outside of that sphere of influence
and broadening the areas from which their members were drawn.
The trowel trades 
Aggregate membershi p and financial assets of the AUBTW increased
between 1940 and 1960. In 1940 the union claimed 66,592 mem-
bers, but twenty years later, after two smaller organisations
had agreed to merger, it had expanded to 84,986 (195). Assets
had risen too from nearly £175,000 to over £500,000 (196). As
in other unions membership rose most rapidly during the years
following the war and declined thereafter. But account must be
taken, in assessing trends in membership, of the .impact of the
two mergers, with the B&MWAS in 1942 and with the NBL&C',TS in
1952. The transfer of engagements of the 13811.1L 8 S added over
5,000 members, but numbers declined slightly until 1944, rising
thereafter to a peak of 88,566 in 1947. There was then a steady
decline until 1952, when the NBIJ&CWS added a further 12,343
bringing the AUBTW's membership to a total of 93,362 in 1952.
But it waS clear that this level of membership could not be
sustained. Numbers fell consistently from the mid-50's. Between
1953, when membershi p reached its peak, and 1960 there was a
loss of over 10,000 members — approximately 11 of the 1953
membership.
The situation was the more serious when the union's membership
was assessed as a proportion of its potential members. Accord-
ing to the 1951 Census of Population, there were 148,604 brick-
layers and 22,965 masons in employment in that year — a total
of 171,568, against a trade union membership of 79,545, that is
a ClensIty of 46..V. By 1960 there was a clear deterioration,
for not only had the number of union members fallen during that
_period, but the number ofbricklayers and loa,-onn in employment
had increased substantially to 192,170. Union membershi p bad
risen as a result of the merger with the NBI&CWS, but if
labourers' membership of 10,000 is excluded it is clear tii5t
over—all density amongst craft members had fallen to roughly
38.5,' (197). The decline in density might not have been so
worrying had it not been accompanied by a stee p decline in
aggregate membership associated with the growth of lump labour.
Trade union leaders might be more inclined to concern them-
selves with membership and finance than with density and may
even welcome a decline in density deriving from an increase in
employment opportunities where membership figures are stable and
it is likely in the future that aggregate membership will grow
to match employment.
	 This was not the case for the AUT11*;
during the 50 f s, since the improvement in employment o pportuni-
ties was actually matched by a decline in aggregate union
membership — a serious problem for the long—term stability of
the organisation. As employment opportunities expanded, as
skilled labour was in short—su pPly
 so it seemed the 'lump , was
growing to the detriment of trade union organisation.
Financial losses accompanied the union b membership problems.
Although the mergers boosted the financial assets of the
AUBTW they could not resolve a longer—term problem resulting
from the fact that contributions had not ke pt pace with the
increased cost of living. The lowest rate of contributions
in 1921, made for trade benefits only was at 9d per week, with
the highest level of contributions set at 1/8d for trade,
sickness, superannuation and funeral benefit (198). The level
of contributions was adjusted only slightly during the inter-
war years and in 1946 a partial alteration of rules was agreed
in order to raise contributions. Even co the amountc were only
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1/- Per week at the lowest r te and 1/11d per week
	 the
highest (199). A financial crisis was threatened because of
low contributions in the mid-50's and the Executive 1qInc1ed
a campaign with the objective, not merely of resolving the
immediate financial problems, but also of removing the need to
ballot the members when an adjustment to contributions was
deemed to be necessary. The principle which was ado pted was
that of the sliding scale, with contributions to be adjusted in
relation to Increases in wage rates. A vigorous campaign was
conducted by the union's national officers and in 1956 a
national ballot gave membership approval for the new method of
adjusting contributions (200). The measure was justified by
reference to the union's financial problems as a .necessary
expedient to stabilise income yet it removed an important area
of union government from membership control.
Amalgamations provided the major means of shoring u p the
union's increasingly shaky position. Merger with the B&MAS
had been an objective for George Hicks for many years. But
it was not to be achieved during his period in office. From
1940 his Parliamentary activities removed him from direct
involvement with the union and his place was token by Luke
Fawcett, previously the union's full-time President (281). It
was Fawcett who finalised the arrangements for the transfer
of engagements of the BUTWAS into the AUBTU. The BC,IP,TAS was
based mostly amongst masons in Scotland. Masonry work had
remained More common there than in England during the inter-
war years, bat the union's membership, previously fairly steady,
declined in the early years of the war (202). Masonry work
was increasingly costly and there was a tendency for local
authorities to impose limitations on the use of stonework, to
the detriment of the mason's employment pros pects (203). The
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merger was carried out in accordance with the Act of 1940 as
a transfer of engagements, and no vote was required to confirm
the merger within the larger union. Irovision was made for
the GS and the two full—time officic]s, all of whom operated
within Scotland to be taken onto the staff of the AUBTW (204).
The merger added over 5,000 members and some £18,000 to the
assets of the _AUTITW. . But most important it confirmed the position
of that union within Scotland as the union for the trowel trades.
It was the second merger, with the TIBI&OWS which had the
greater impact on the structure of the AUBTW. The problems of
the latter union were already apparent by 1951. Nembershin was
declining and finances were suffering such that an annual sur-
plus of £20,000 had been turned into a net loss, even after
allowance was rade for interest on investments (205). Whatever
its past ideological claims, the AU 13TW had confined recruitment
to skilled workers. But the new GS, George Lowthian, who
replaced Iuke Fawcet on his retirement in 1951 crossed the
barriers between skilled and unskilled as a means of shoring up
his ailing membership.	 It is difficult to estimate the gains
which were made but it has 'men claimed elsewhere that the
TBI&CWS brought an additional 17,142 members into the AUBTW
(206). It seems unlikely that the real figure was as high as
this, for the last return made by the NBILMS to the Registrar
of Friendly Societies was rather lower — some 12,345 members
were claimed in 1951. Sustaining union membership amongst
builders' labourers had never, been an easy task. George
Iowthian has subsequently suggested that they were as much
of a handicap as they were an asset, since the numbers were
lower than was anticipated, whilst turnover was high.
No attempt was made within the AUBTW to gauge the feelings of
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members on this breach of tilLir Past craft orientation, since
the merger was effected by R transfer of engagements which did
not require their approval. Clearly the move had majority
support within the NBL&CWS where previous proposals concerning
aMalgamatioh into the large, general unions had not been
approved (207). It is not easy however to establish the res-
ponse amongst craftsmen in bricklaying and masonry. Certainly
branch officials, like their counterparts at Divisional and
Executive level, were confronting the problems of declining
membership. In areas such as Coventry and Birmingham, where
building activity was very high in the post-war years, a crisis
in organisation was reported, with a loss of members and a
! general apathy of our members towards Branch life and organisa-
tion. , (208). In many branches George Lowthian claimed, there
was an enthusiasm concerning the recruitment of labourers. But
in view of the predictable difficulty in sustaining the
labourers , membership, there is little practical evidence that
this was the case. It would be surprising if the craft elitism
characteristic of the bricklayers as well as other tradesmen,
had entirely disappeared, although it is possible that the
events of war and the innovations of the post-war years had
encouraged a different attitude amongst the younger members.
In any event the more 'open , pattern of recruiLment, with the
concommitant changes in the structure of the AUBTW were insti-
tuted regardless of approval or opposition from the members of
that union.
It was the first time, amongst the building trade unions, that a
craft union openly set out to recruit amongst unskilled and semi-
skilled workers in the industry. In addition to bricklayers
and masons the AUBTW had members amongst terrazzo workers,
mason machinists, composition floor layers and well and
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floor tilers. From 1952 it catered in addition for labourers,
steel benders and fixers, scaffolders and similar occupations.
A new section was added to the eight already in existence to
cater for the unskilled and semi—skilled members. Contributions
were made at the rate of 8d per week, with an additional 6d to
cover sickness benefit if required. Under the terms of the 1938
rulebook, the election of District Cttees and Divisional Coun-
cils were so arranged as to provide for the re presentation of
the two major crafts within the union, and this principle was
now extended to include the labourers. It was also decided that
it should apply to the EC as well as to District and Divisional
bodies.	 Two representatives of the NBL&CW3 were appointed to
sit on the EC after the merger for a period of three years.
Thereafter labourers' representatives were nominated by the
labourers' section, but elected to the EC by the votes of the
whole of the union's membership (210). These changes provided
a structure which could absorb the new class of members. But
their impact was felt more widely.
7ot least'important of the repercussions of this merger was its
impact on inter—union relations. The general unions had been
admitted into the NITTO on the basis of the Perth Agreement, and
leaders of the craft unions had assiduously maintained their
sole rights to recruit craftsmen. 	 The situation was changed
by the decision of the AUBTW's EC to accept labourers into
membership, for they were now trespassing on the time—honoured
preserves of the general unions.	 This was all the more im por-
tant in view of the impact of new technologies which tended to
facilitate the use of semi—skilled workers within the industry.
The merger of the NBIJ&CWS into the AUBTW cut across existing
barriers which kept the T&GW outside of craft enrollment. But
as craft definitions were, in any case, being undermined by the
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process of industrial change, W ,G officials were able to point
to the activities of the AUDTW with the unskilled and semi-
skilled workers, and justify their own innovations in recruit-
ment practice on this basis.
Painters 
For the painters too the post-war years saw an impending crisis
in membership and income. Membershi p rose until 1947 when it
stood at 69;369, but declined thereafter, sinking to 59,770
by 1960. The union's assets rose over the same period, from
E310,208.7.2d in 1949 to E367,859.4.10d, but for some of the
time it was necessary to draw on reserves in order to meet cur-
rent expenditure (211). As with the AST and the AUBTW, officials
of the National Society of Painters endeavoured to centralise
control over the financial aspects of the union's affairs and
to concentrate trade union membership amongst painters within
their own society lthrough the absorbtion of smaller organisations
in the same trade.
The first.moves towards centralisation came about in 1943 when
a full-time Executive Council was established with powers
to liaise with District Committees and branches and to provide
for closer contact with the union's organisers (212). The five
members were nominated within each Division but elected by the
membership as a whole (as in the &SW) and were subject to re-
election after five years (213). The authority of the new EC
was challenged shortly after its election by the London District
Committee, over the question of payment systems. A number of
painters in London were engaged on pontoon building which was
regarded as outside of the' scope of the building industry, and
they were accepting bonus payments. The ASW had accepted this
and had negotiated an agreement on behalf of their own members
7orJ.2)
on the same job, but this th( Tondon DC of the Fainters refused
to do. The EC ruled that the union's long-standing resistance
to payment by results should not a pply in this instance and
insisted that the LDC should reach an agreement no less favour-
able than that obtained by the ASW. It was only through the
mediation of members of the General Council that the conflict
could be resolved. The London DC was suspended from office but
the suspension was removed by the GC who insisted that the
London Committee make contact with the London Master Builders'
Association and negotiate in accordance with instructions from
the Executive. 	 In the face of such support for the EC's posi-
tion the LDC backed down and agreed to carry out the decisions
of the General Council (214). The authority of the new EC had
been vindicated but only through the support of their own GC.
The co-o peration and collaboration between EC and GC within the
ASW has been suggested elsewhere (215), and it seems that, within
the NSF the same forces were at work, upholding central authority
against initiatives from the districts, and supporting the
tendency to concentrate power within the union in the hands of
full-time officers.	 The introduction of a full-time Executive
was paralleled by an increase in the number of full-time
organisers, covering almost the entire country. Between 1933
and 1955 the number of full-timers at District level in addition
to the EC, rose from 29 to 44, an increase which imposed an
added financial burden on the society's members (216).
Attempts to consolidate the national scope of the union through
the incorporation of smaller societies of painters were not
immediately successful.	 In the early months of 1948 amalgamation
with the Scottish Painters Society was under discussion, with
key issues in the negotiations being the position of full-time
officials in the event of amalgamation. But the I TS:r, unlike
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the AUPTW, was unable to con idrm its position north of the
border, and was obliged to )_ook to internal solutions to the
problems of declining membership and income by the 1950's
(217). Sectional members, that is those paying the highest
contributions, had not had an increase in contributions for
over 20 years, whilst for other sections the increase had been
a mere 1d a week, whilst wages had more than doubled over the
same period. Membership had declined by the mid-50's so atten-
tion to the 'union's income was a matter of priority for the
leaders — GC as well as EC and the GS (218). But the painters
like the bricklayers and masons, failed to respond in sufficient
numbers to permit a rule change in respect of contributions.
In 1955 when the matter was put to the membership, voting was
10,585 in favour of the increase and 7,709 against. The failure
to achieve a sufficient majority forced the EC to resort to more
extreme measures in order to ensure that the rule—change, regar-
ded as essential, could be carried through. The EC summoned
the General Council, who gave them authority to declare a state
of extreme emergency, with the suspension of rules to allow a
further vote on the question of increased contributions to be
taken (219). As in the AUBTW in the same period, leading
officials were prominent in the campaign to ensure that contri-
butions were raised, and their efforts were rewarded when, on
a rather lower over—all vote, there was a much larger majority
in favour of the increased subscription (220). Although there
was nothing like the provision, made by the leaders of the
AUBTW for an automatic adjustment of contributions, it was clear
that the EC of the Painters, like their counterparts in other
unions, were allowed considerable leeway in making adjustments
in this area. If the final decision rested with the members,
the FC had the means, through its publications and visits to
branches and area meetings, to ensure that membership opinion
was swayed in the direction which the EC approved. 	 rid if the
result was not satisfactory at first attempt, then a second
ballot could be held to ensure that the appropriate response
was recorded.
The  Federation: 1940-60
In 1940 the NFBTO was at the height of its influence. Not
only did it negotiate on behalf of the building trades unions
with employers, but its leaders were consulted and courted by
government ministers. The Federation was representative of the
craft interest, which predominated within its membership, and
it was the Woodworkers who dominated the craft unions, both by
the size of their organisation, and by the influence which
accrued from their status within the craft hierarchy. Within
all of the major decision taking bodies of the NFBTO, it was
the ASW who influenced events. On the Federation's Executive
and General Councils, as well as within the Joint Executives,
a body which was not, strictly speaking a part of the Federa-
tion's structure, the ASW was the most influential organisation.
Paradoxically the supremacy of the Woodworkers was jeopardized
when the Federation's influence was at its peak. Government
intervention in favour of payment by results was successful
only because Bevin utilised the existing differences of views
within the building unions and played off the smaller societies
against the ASW. But, with the confirmation of pbr as an
acceptable form of payment and with the return to peacetime
conditions, the role of the ASW within the Federation was
reaffirmed.
By the late 1950's Dick Coppock/s retirment was imminent.
A powerful personality and an astute negotiator, he had domi-
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nated the Federation for nearly 41 years. Together with
Alexander ;Jhite of the NFBTE he was an architect of the joint
negotiating machinery within the industry, and his personal
influence, both with employers and trade unionists, was
unrivalled 'amongst building union officials (221). But Coppock
owed his influence as much to the procedure whereby he was
elected, as he did to force of character. For Co ppock was
elected in the first instance by ballot of the Federation's
membership, comprising all of the affiliated unions (222). &s
a representative of all of the members of all of the unions he
therefore had a standing greater than that of any individual
union leader. Rather as the General Secretary of the T&G
stood above that union's lay Executive, or appointed full—time
officials, so Coppock, within the Federation, in this respect,
outranked any of the General Secretaries of the Federation's
affiliated. It is true that the position of Secretary within
the NFBTO, since it carried with it the res ponsibility of sus-
taining the co—operation of the individual unions, necessitated
government through accommodation. Moreover Cop pock's position
in relation to the broader s pectrum of the trade union move-
ment was weakened by the fact that he was unable to gain a
place within the TUC's General Council. Yet the length of his
tenure of office, together with his ability to mani pulate men
and events,served to strengthen the office of General Secretary
and ensured that Coppock was 'a power within the Federation'.
(223).
It was the leadership of the ASW which curtailed the indepen-
dence of the Federation's General Secretary. Wolstencroft was
a powerful figure within the NFBTO during his period as GS of
the ASW. He was President for many years, but resigned in pro-
test against the government's imposition of pbr in 1941. He
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remained es GS of the Woodwo ,.'cers a)ciety until 1947 when he
was replaced by J.F. McDermott, a less forceful character who
held office for the next twelve years. It was McDermott's
successor, George Smith, who initiated the changes which defined
the election and status of the new GS within the Federation.
Smith was a forceful personality, a former Communist who emariated
from Scotland, and who had played little part within the Fede-
ration before becoming GS of the ASW in 1958. It was apparent
that the position of GS within the Federation was the only one
which could rival his own, although the Federation GS was in
fact 'a chief with no Indians'. Smith moved quickly to ensure
that in future the position should be defined in administrative
terms, and that the new GS should not be allowed the influence
which had accrued to Co ppock during his decades in office.
hen amendments to rule were put forward at the Federation's
annual conference in 1959 he proposed on behalf of the A.T; that
the position of GS be an appointed one, the appointment to be
made by the Federation's General Council, and ratified subse-
quently by annual conference. Other union leaders were not
reluctant-to accept a measure which promised to confirm their
own influence, through the Federation's Executive, at the expense
of its chief officer. The motion WPS passed on a card vote
(224). Men Coppock finally retired in 1961 his replacement was
nominated according to the new rule. Harry Job Owen Weaver, the
new incumbent was a bricklayer by trade. His father and grand-
father before him had been bricklayers and Harry had been a
staunch trade unionist from his youth. He had joined the
Communist Tarty in the early 50's and together with Harry Adams,
a childhood friend, and his own brother—in—law, Jo Roots, had
been active in support for the YET. He had followed Harry Adams up
through the IUBT7 and was President of that union at the time
when he was nominated for the leading position within the 177BTO.
Like many officials in thebilding trade unions he abpndoned
his Communist affiliations and was a Labour Party member at the
time when he was elected GS of the Federation. Harry Weaver
had far less room for manouevre than had been the case during
Coppock's period in office.	 The ballot for the position of
Secretary of the Federation was abandoned in the name of admini-
strative efficiency, with the practical consequence that Smith's
position was strengthened, both as GS of the ASW and within the
ranks of the Federation.
A feature common to all of the building trades unions in the
period was the development of shop steward organisation,
paralleled in the case of the Federation, by an increase in the
number and responsibilities of the Federation stewards. 	 The
introduction of incentives opened up a new and important area
of operations for shop stewards, who took on the responsibility
of negotiations at site level for this vital component of take
home pay. And at the end of the war, when the operation of
incentive schemes was called into question, it was the existence
of stewards amongst the members congregated in London, which
did so much to promote the unofficial movement which flourished,
for a brief period, bringing pressure to bear on government and
trade union officials alike (225). Increased attention was
paid by some full-time officials to the role and functions of
stewards (226) since it was apparent that site organisation
depended in a large measure on their existence and effective-
ness (227).	 In view of the loss of members during the early
1950's the steward's responsibilities for recruitment seemed
particularly important, as a means for stabilising organisation
in the face of the more wides pread use of lump labour. But
measures designed to protect stewards from victimisation and
to allow them greater flexibility in their site o perations were
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resisted by leaders within the Federation, includir f, Coppock
(228). Paradoxically, it seemed that the operation of effec-
tive steward bodies, committed to organising at site level was
a threat to the established structures of the building unions.
Coppock for example, argued that until the Federation was able
•to control its members on site, it should not ask for special
facilities or conditions to be ap plied to the employment of
stewards p although it was clear that, in an industry where
employment was casual, these men were particularly vulnerable
to sackings and the.blacklist. (229)	 The formation of joint
sites committees in London was met with the criticism that
unofficial committees of this type tended to usurp the authority
of official structures (230). The full recognition of shop
stewards within the national working rule agreement may, in
theory have been one of the planks of NFETO policy, but it
was one which Was neglected in practice and stewards organi-
sation and activity remained, to a considerable extent, out-
side of the scope of the joint negotiating machinery.
The fear of initiatives from men on the sites was encouraged
and condoned in the climate of cold-war politics of the late
40's and early 50's. The independent, left-wing movement
within the industry had been gathering momentum since 1935
around the paper the New Builders Leader, inspired, in some
measure, by members of the Communist Party. Russian resis-
tance to Nazi invasion in 1941 reversed the hostility to
Communists at home and whilst the Communist Party's member-
ship reached unprecedented levels its policies were adapted to
the changed situation and its critical allegiance offered
to the British government. 	 Within the building industry,
government measures designed to increase output, formerly
resisted by Communists, were now supported and encouraged,
since productivity was so closely linked to the war effort and
to the defence of the Soviet Union. 	 The role and attitudes
of trade union leaders encouraging production were endorsed
and for so long as the Soviet Union was associated with the
Allies, Communists supported the application of incentive pay-
ments, the site officer scheme and the industrialisation of
production (231).
	
The onset of the cold war and a renewed
hostility towards the Western powers saw a dramatic reversal of
Communist policy at a domestic level, embodied in the industrial
context by resistance to measures which had formerly been
accepted in the name of increased productivity.
	
filthough the
f officialisation f of the unofficial movement of the thirties
was not completely halted, Communist Party members and
sympathisers operated, as they had always done, most effectively
within the building industry at site level. But they were now
opposed by a more organised and articulate right wing, led
by men such as Norman Kennedy and Jack Young. Kennedy under-
stood the workings of shop steward organisation, since he had
been Vice-Chair of the London Shop Stewards Council. An
erstwhile Communist, he was elected to the 7C of the ASW in
1949 and used his position to oppose any increase in the scope
for independent rank and file activity, associated in the
minds of the right-wing with Communist infiltration (232).
The resistance of the ASW's EC to an extension of democracy
through the establishment of a policy-making conference has
already been noted and the fear of creeping Communism encoura-
ged machinations in other unions which tended to remove control
from the grasp of union members and place it more securely
within the hands of union Executives and Officers.
In the AUBTW, a more radical society than the woodworkers, the
same tendencies were a pparer 6. When in 1950 elections for
the Position of General Secretary wore held to re place Tyke
Fawcett who was due to retire the following year, the eligi-
bility of a Communist for the position of GS was called into
question. • The most likely candidate for the post was Harry
Weaver, a Communist since 1934 (and a long—time supporter of
the U-RT). It was against his candidature that Luke Fawcett laid
an unprecedented requirement on nominees for the position of
Secretary.	 Although no provision was made for it in the rule-
book, candidates were required to sign a 'document' delcaring
that they were industrially and politically able to fUlfill the
post of General Secretary.
	 Since the AUBT-J was affiliated to
the Tabour Party, it was argued that Communists would be unable
to function effectively on behalf of the i\UBTT on political
matters.
	 This manouevre not only ruled out the rights of
members of the unionto hold political expression. It also
limited their capacity to control union procedure, since the
'document' was Proposed by Fawcett, outwith the procedure for
changing the union's rules (233). In the Painters Society too
there were allegations and counter—allegations concerning
political activities (234). The conservatism of the craft
trade unionists, which had lacked a political machine in the
30's was encouraged and organised more effectively by the
late 1940's through the intervention of 'Catholic Action' (235).
Whilst their intention was apparently anti—communist, it
tended also to be opposed to any initiative which might extend
democratic practices within the trade union movement.
	 The
credibility of their, apparently incredible position was
probably enhanced by the changes in Communist Party line on
such key issues, to building workers, as productivity and
incentive payments.
	 The willingness of Communists to adjust
their position in the light of requirements from a foreign
power facilitated the extension of right wing influence.
The effect of this political conflict was then, to encourage
existing tendencies to centralise power within the unions
and to undermine the capacity of the members to initiate and
take policy decisions.
Conclusions
In 1959 a resolution was passed at the annual conference of
the NFETO calling for one union for the building industry (236).
As on previous occasions it was o pposed by the ASW, but despite
their opposition it was passed. The support which it achieved
was proof that the climate was changing for trade unionists in
the building unions. The relative security of the late 401s,
with Peak membership throughout the federation/s affiliates,
. had been replaced by periods of crisis, with stagnating or
declining membership and recurrent financial difficulties for
a majority of the unions. Innovations in techniques had posed
innumerable demarcation problems, and threatened in the longer—
term to undermine the rationale for craft methods of production
(237). The recruitment of labour by labour—only sub-
contractors undermined the value of trade union membership
and weakened union control of site o p erations. Even where a
union presence was established, the relevance of negotiations
at national level was of only limited importance to men whose
take—home pay was determined largely by their capacity to
negotiate a good site bonus.
The retirement of Coppock marked the end of an era. Many of
the objects of the NEBTO were achieved whilst he was in office,
yet with the pace of industrial chance, the successes. were
less important than the failures. The develo pment of solutions
to the problems which remairud was tackled slowly Lnd not
too methodically by a leadership which remained committed to
the policies and structures of an earlier period. If the
problems were becoming apparent, the answers to them were not.
CHAPTER 6.
BUILDING TRADE UNIONS IN THE PROCESS OF MERGER,
1960-71.
trade unions in the process of merger, 1960-71.
The 1960's established a 'crisis in industrial relations' !s a
permanent feature of the British way of life. It was charac-
terised for public consumption, by the strike—happy shop steward
vigorously pursuing higher earnings through 'wage drift' and
the 'wild—cat strike'. Formal negotiations through the nationally
recognised machinery for collective bargaining were by—passed,
it was suggested, by the growth of informal bargaining prac-
tices at shop—floor level, giving a renewed impetus to the
creation and credibility of shop steward organisations. The
neater structure of trade unions in W. Germany and Sweden com-
bined with the apparently more peaceful bargaining practices
in these countries to provide an attractive model for employers,
concerned with the problem, as they perceived it, of multi—
unionism. The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers
Associations (the Donovan Commission) was set up to examine the
crisis in British industrial relations at a time when the
number of small, unofficial strikes, whose disruptive effects
on industrial production far outweighed their apparent signifi-
cance, were increasing. Whilst the Donovan Commission gave
little support to proposals for statutory changes to the frame-
work of industrial relations, the decade was marked by the
increased intervention of government in this area. The pay—
pause of 1961-2 was followed by policies which maintained that
increases in income should be kept within the limits of increa-
sed productivity. The return of a Labour government in 1964
promised a new socialist rhetoric for State intervention and
when the Government's majority was increased in a further
election in 1966, incomes policy, one facet of this new indus-
trial relations crisis, was confirmed on a statutory basis.
But increased government intervention was not confined to the
area of pay. whilst the Labour Government's proposals for
reforrA, embodied in their do . mment 'In Place of Strife', :ailed
to win the support or approval of trade union leaders or nem-
bers, legislative innovations governing the employee's status
and rights at work had more success. The Contracts of Em ploy-
nent Act 1963, and the Industrial Training Act 1964, passed by
he Conservatives were followed by the Redundancy Payments ,Ict,
1965. All of these measures symbolised a new government interest
and involvement in industry and industrial relations. By the
end of the decade, the scope for trade union organisation was
modified in accordance with these new possibilities and con-
straints.
It was the engineering industry which provided the paradigun
for the analysis of the Donovan Commission. The problems in
construction were quite different from those in engineering, or
indeed any other area. At a general level, although trade
union density was declining, at least until 1968, aggregate
union membership was still increasing, albeit slowly and rather
unsteadily. (1)
	 In construction however, the aggregate level
of trade union organisation, as well as trade union density,
decreased during this period, and towards the end of the decade
the decline had reached catastrophic proportions. The erosion
of trade union organisation affected the building trade sections
of the general unions as well as the craft societies, and for
all of them it was associated with a financial crisis, where
day-to-day expenditure was met, to some extent from the
reserves accumulated over past decades (2). Whilst trade
unionists in manufacturing, and especially in engineering, were
able to build up shop-floor organisation in response to the
opportunities for informal, localised bargaining, in construc-
tion the- emergence of shop steward organisation was constrained
by the extension of labour-only sub-contracting, whereby work
was undertaken and payments i“le outside the provisions of
the national working rule agraement. If trade unien practice
in manufacturing rested on infolmal negotiations between
stewards and first line supervisors, trade union credibility
and organisation was strengthened in consequence, amongst
members on the shop floor. In building, civil engineering and
ancillary industries 'informality ? was often akin to individual
bargaining arrangements between the operative and the sub-
contractor, the I subbie ? and the representative of the main
contractor.	 The effect for trade union organisation, was
nothing short of disastrous.
Since the crisis cannot be understood without reference to
changes in the process of production, attention will firstly
be directed to this area.
	 The impact of national negotiations
will be considered especially in relation to the credibility
of the machinery for collective bargaining, and the growing
problem of 'wage drift'. Finally the process of structural
change will be discussed in relation to the mergers preceding
and presaging the formation of the Union of Construction =led
Trades and Technicians (UCATT) and the dissolution of the
:TFBTO.
Pt.1.	 The Construction Industry, 1960-71.
There was a steady increase in activity in construction, both
in the volume of investment and in the number of operatives
employed, until 1968 (3).
	 The Tories, during their period in
office, had pursued policies of increasing interest rates on
loans, with low subsidies for house building by public autho-
rities, with the effect of boosting the activities of private
builders and encouraging speculation (4). In the context of
a general acceleration in industrial production against a
backbround of scandal assoc.' _ted with RachmRnism in the 'rivate
rented sector, and with an impending election encouraging an
unwonted interest in the views of the electorate, the Govern-
ment gave renewed attention in 1962/3 to the question of hous-
ing and slum clearance. Targets were agreed with the National
Economic Development Council which, if reached, would expand
output by 20;6 by 1966. Public investment in building too was
expected to increase, whilst the demand for factory and indus-
trial buildings accelerated (5).
The increase in output was continued with the return of a
Labour Government in 1964. The declared objective of the
National Plan, which was published in September 1965 was to
secure an increase in production of 25 between 1963 and 1970
in each industry, and in order to achieve this objective in
construction attention was directed to such issues as the
allocation of contracts and training.
The national housing plan The _Rousing Trogramme 1963-1970 
proposed 800,000 completions a year, divided equally between
the public and the private sector.	 Added to this was demand
for new factory building, for new motorways, reservoirs and
other public projects in the civil engineering field. The
intensive demands made on the industry's resources were linked
to innovations in technique and organisation. The influence
of the public sector increased, but so too did the average
size of contracts put out to tender, and there was a growing
tendency for firms to group into larger units to meet these
changed demands.
The devaluation of the in -November 1967 and the ensuing cuts
in public expenditure had a serious impact on activities by
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cuttirrz demand both for publ . c sector housebuildinr: cud for
other projects which relied on public funds.
	 By 1968 capacity
exceed workload. Building costs had risen substantially
whilst the number of new starts declined (6). This trend
reflected tendencies which were apparent in the economy more
generally, as the rate of inflation accelerated.
	 The cutback
in building was worsened by the successes of the Conservative
Party in the Local Authority elections of 1967. Smaller and
less competitive units were threatened by the contraction in
activity and private contractors complained at the allocation
of work to direct works depts.
	 This led to political pressure
for the closure of many direct labour organisations operated
by local authorities. In some cases, long established direct
works departments were dismantled, whilst in other areas their
rights in respect of new building, as opposed to repair and
maintenance work, were curtailed. In other instances, for
example in the Greater London Council, less work was given to
the Council's Direct Uorks, with a view, in the long term, of
closing them down (7). Generally then the level and nature of
activity in construction Expended through to the late 60's,
with the turning point in 1968. By 1970 many firms had been
run down, whilst employment prospects diminished correspondingly,
and a high level of unemployment was reported - 114,000
unemployed in construction by April of that year (8).
The expansion of the 60/s was associated with a renewed interest
in the potential of industrialised building. Prefabrication
was nothing new, but the important feature of 'systems build-
ing' for craftsmen was the extent to which it eroded the value
placed on craft skills. Industrialised building techniques set
out with the purpose of economising, and dispensing with the
dependence on traditional craft skills. They economised on
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site labour costs, both by : .aducing the total demanC. for
labour and by changing the type of labour which was required.
'Landspan' was typical of the systems which were applied in
this period. It required five workmen, a forman or charge—
hand, a cranedriver and three operatives, or 'assemblers'.
This gang undertook to transport the units to the fixing area
and 1D carry through the various tasks associated with their
assembly.
	 It was estimated that the volume and the value of
construction carried out was far greater than that which could
be achieved by traditional methods in a similar time. (9)
A system of thislype posed a threat to the very existence of
the traditional building craftsman. Firstly there was no need
to employ the usual skilled operative for assembly purposes.
Secondly the 'assemblers' who were employed could be paid at
the labourer's rate, rather than at that of the craftsman.
The change in terminology suggested the extent of changes in
technique. It was not until the 1950's that the term ? con-
struction' becomes 'common in place of 'building' and 'civil
engineering ? . Whilst 'building' implied the gradual process
whereby materials were worked and put together, 'construction'
suggests a swifter and less complex process of assembly, from
a smaller and simpler range of constituent parts. The trend
was towards ? construction', and this fact was clearly perceived
by those leaders of the craft trade unions who were responsible
for organising the conference on new techniques which was held
in 1959.
At a timel.hen the demand for new buildings put a premium on
craft skills, systems building served both to rationalise
the assembly process and to control the industry's existing
labour force. As in earlier decades the acceleration of
demand was accompanied by an increase in the fixed capital
requirement as a proportion of the industry's total capital.
This was manifest both in the scale of o perations, particularly
high-rise buildings, and in the level of technological innova-
tion with which they were associated.
	 The impact on: craft
trade unionism, where each organisation relied on recruitment
in just one, specialised area, was enormous. There was some
complacency within the ASW, which claimed a more diversified
membership than the other craft unions, and a greater variety
of tools. But it was inevitable that demarcation issues would
arise as a result of changing techniques and in some quarters
it was felt that the woodworkers were too ready to appropriate
tools which belonged, traditionally, to other trades (10).
Technological innovation alone could not erode the status and
job security of the craft operative during the 1960's. Just
as the post-war years had been marked both by technological
and organisational changes, so too during the 60's, industria-
lised techniques were paralleled by a continuation and
escalation of the practice of labour-only sub-contracting.
It is not that new technolozy, or systems building, and labour-
only sub-contracting were opposing influences or that their
relative impact on trade union membership could be separately
assessed. Rather they are a part of the same trend in the
evolution of an industry which was relatively under-capitalised.
When the expending market for both new house-building and new
industrial building was combined with an acceleration in the
rate of output of the civil engineering side, a strain was
placed on existing resources, of materials and man power, which
encouraged contractors to innovate, in various ways with res-
pect to materials, techniques and the mode of employment.
Since the construction industry is particularly vulnerable
to political change, and sin e the response to expansion"must
necessarily be a rapid one if a contractor is to derive the
full benefit from an upswing, there is a tendency for periods
of expansion to witness a short-lived frenzy of activity, in
which every effort'is made on the employers/ side to capitalise
on the available opportunities. Technological innovation is a
slow process, which must be associated with planning and long
term programmes if it is to be fully effective. But the use
of alternative modes of employment provides a more flexible set
of working arrangements and a 'labour force' which is amenable
to the application of new technologies at whatever point this
may become desirable, labour-only contributes to the reduction
in labour costs and encourages a fast turnover. So the new
technologies and the use of the 'lump' are inextricably linked.
Both derive from the intense fluctuations in construction
activity, and neither factor, taken alone, can be said to be
wholly responsible for the problems which beset the craft trade
unions during the 60 t s. Together their influence was enormous.
They represented the changing employment context and an
entrenched employer resistance to site level trade union activity
which had serious implications for all of the building trade
unions.
The need for greater flexibility in the labour force and work-
ing operations of construction had concomitant effects upon
training programmes. Craft skills were associated with the
working of particular materials in accordance with fixed and
traditional methods. Where employers were encouraged to
industrialise the building process and to encourage flexibility
as a means of facilitating the introduction of a wide range
of new operations, they encouraged adjusLments in training
practices. Firstly, and most important, there was a decline
•
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in the number of registered apprentices in the Construction
Industry over the second half of the decade. In 1966 there
were 112,000 trainees (all trades), a figure which was to decline
every year, reaching 75,000 in 1970 (11). This drop was indi-
cative both of the low premium placed on apprenticeship train-
ing at a formal level by employers and of their willingness to
use labour-only sub-contracting as an alternative mode of
employment to direct recruitment. Changes in manpower require-
ments and the need for increased flexibility led to a formal
survey of operative skills, carried out by the Building
Research Station, at the initiative of the mini between 1963
and 1966.
	 The survey, which studied workers on new construc-
tion sites, in repair and maintenance and in factories and
workshops, in all some 5,400 operatives, concluded that the
distinction between craftsmen and labourers was already blurred
(12). The decline in the number of registered apprentice-
ships reflected the employers' concern at the adequacy of the
traditional craft apprenticeship to meet the changing require-
ments of the newer forms of construction. Following the pas-
sage of the Industrial Training Act in 1964, the Construction
Industry Training Board was set up to introduce new training
schemes. A training levy was imposed on all firms in the
industry having an annual wages bill in excess of E5,000.
The trend was away from the practical training provided at site
level, which, as the BRS survey noted, often took the form
of 'sitting by Nellie'. Short, intensive courses of construc-
tion were considered to be more economic and efficient.
The particular requirements of any one method necessitated the
development of new skills in relation to the assembly process,
but some preliminary training might be a prerequisite to the
success of such an approach (13). The CITB therefore developed
a programme known as the 'New Pattern of Training' which was
to provide for a reduction i. the number of trade groupinEc,
coupled with a broad base of training within the group, which
was aimed at stimulating greater adaptability within the
labour force in the long term (14). This was associated with
a reduction in the level of specialisation which might be
expected in any one area.
	 It was argued that the apprentice
trained craftsman never used a large part of the technical
expertise which he had acquired. And on this basis a much
reduced apprenticeship scheme would be more appropriate (15).
This took effect in two ways. Firstly there was a reduction in
the length of apprenticeships in 1964 from five years for
most of the building trades to four years (16). Secondly
there was an increase in the supply dt labour trained in
Government Skill Centres, usually on courses of six months
duration (17).	 The Phelps Brown Committee called for an
extension of adult training and recommended that a system of
trade tests should be introduced, as a means of providing
objective evidence about the qualifications of operatives.
Their views in this respect tallied with the growing emphasis
amongst the employers, on fluidity of the employment structure
in specialist occupations.
The erosion of a distinctive category of skilled craft operatives
was suggested then by three aspects of this change in apprentice-
ship training. Firstly there was the decline in the number
of registered apprentices, reflected over-all in the changed
proportion of crafts to non-craft operations. Secondly there
was the decline in the range of skills which might be acquired
by the apprentice in his reduced term of training. And finally
there was an increase in the scope for 'specialist' work,
where the operative might have obtained some abbreviated form
of training, perhaps as an improver, or on a government
training course or with a fi with specialirt reouireren'ts.
The effect, as far as trade unionism amongst crafts= was
concerned was to put an end to any remaining vestige of control
over entry to the trade. In the words of a trade union official
'you can't stand iii the way of a person who's able to do what
the employer requires' (18) and 'there's a lot to be said for
these six month courses' (19). By changing the quantity and
quality of labour requirements the employers were able to
undermine resistance from craft trade unionists to a greater
flexibility in operations. They were assisted in this by two
factors on the trade union side. There was a strong desire
not to appear as 'Luddites', not only among trade union leaders,
but also amongst militants within the Federation's Regional
Councils (20). And the desire to improve output of working
class housing indicated concern with the social implications
of production which was conspicuously absent on the employers'
side. The last factor was especially important during periods
of Labour Government, when many activists felt that union co-
operation was essential for the achievement of Labour's pro-
gramme.
	 The changed approach to training had serious
implications for those unions with craft traditions. In time
it undermined the very foundations of trade unionism, not
least because it was through the apprenticeship period that
new entrants to the trade were imbued with notions of craft
consciousness and craft pride. It was during his ap prentice-
ship that a craftsman would first have contact with the
union, unless his father had preceded him in the trade, as
was often the case. And for many years a pprentices had been
PeEmitted to join the union in a special section at a reduced
rate, transferring to full membership when they came out of
their time.
	 The period of apprenticeship represented an intro-
duction to the union as well as to the trade, and a reduction
in the indentured period mea2 t a reduction in the influence
which the union could exert in the first years of the crafts-
man's working life.
	 The unions concerned recognised that
there were 'difficulties in the recruitment of apprentices
requiring an approach entirely different from pre—second
l iorld ',Tar days.'
	 In the case of the ASW at least attempts
were made through weekend schools and education programmes
to rectify the problems associated with this erosion of the
apprenticeship period. (21)
It has previously been suggested that the relationship, at the
individual level between craftsman and labourer was paralleled
within collective bargaining institutions, by the emphasis
placed upon the building or the civil engineering agreement.
Certainly during the 1960's, with the crisis facing the craft
unions whose interests were most strongly represented through
the Building Industry's Working Rule Agreement, a new momentum
was developing on the craft side for the unification of the
two agreements.
	 The number of plus rates accepted within the
Civil Engineering Agreement increased as industrial change
widened the range of specialist tasks. And employers continued
to prefer the Civil Engineering Agreement because it did not
hamper production by controls on overtime. Commentators on
collective bargaining in construction in this decade were
unanimous in pointing to the failure of the building industry
agreement as a mechanism for deciding pay and conditions on
site.	 The breakdown in the relevance of central negotiations
undermined the organisation of the craft trade unions at the
same time as it reflected their weakness. .ind trade union
leaders were propelled into urgent discussions on structural
reform as the crisis became more apparent.
mt.2: The Crisis in Collect.ve
 Bargaininr,
The Central negotiations in the building industry failed to
maintain building trade wage rates, either in relation to
wages in other industries, or in relation to the take-home
pay of operatives who negotiated their own bonus on the job.
Some progress had been made on the question of working hours.
In July 1959, just forty years after the 44 hour week had
first been conceded in building, it was again ratified within
the industry as the standard working week. There was some
resistance within the NJCBI to any further reduction but as
the movement for shortei working hours gained ground, so the
case was strengthened within the HJCBI. In October 1962 a
settlement came into effect reducing the working week to 42
hours in line with developments in other areas (22).
This concession on hours was not matched immediately by an
improvement in wage rates. The building industry had moved
from 2nd place in the wage rates by industry in 1938 to 12th
place in 1963 (23). With the projected expansion of building
activities the moment seemed right for a further'. wage move-
ment and in January 1963 a claim was submitted for an increase
of 1/6 per hou± (approx. 265) and a 40 hour working week.
It was branded as unrealistic by the employers and the opera-
tives ?
 side of the NJCBI was itself far from united on the
issue. 'Jhen the claim first came before the NJC it was refer-
red to an Ad-Hoc Committee. The agreement reached in Scotland
in November 1962 for the introduction of the forty hour week
in November of the following year embarrassed negotiators south
of the border, and matters were not assisted by a reference to
the rational Incomes Commission which delayed consideration
of the claim by the National Joint Council. From the point of
view of the NJC the most imp.rtant of the FIG recommendations,
which appeared in April 1963 were, that the 40 hour week
should not be conceded: that the difficulties deriving from
the Scottish settlement should be met by a wage increase, or
a long term agreement embodying more than one increase, and
that the figure of 3 — 3 should be a guide to the final
settlement.	 As in the mid 30's when activity in the industry
was accelerating, the employers adhered to the princi ple of a
long—term settlement, arguing that any new wages agreement
should cover a period of two to three years.
	 Two offers were
made on this basis, both rejecting a reduction in working
hours. And both packages were turned down by the representa-
tives of the operatives, who called for strike action in
support of their claim. The first nation wide building strike
since 1924 started on 19th August 1963. It took three forms —
one week stoppages of work on selected sites, bans on overtime
and bans on the working of incentive schemes. The NFBTO
claimed that 200,000 men stonped work during tile course of
that week, but later the Ministry of Labour suggested that the
figure was only 60,000 (24).
The industrial action was ended after just one week, with
agreement on a package settlement which met with a mixed
response from thie. operatives' negotiating panel. The settle-
ment provided for an over—all increase of 91d an hour for
craftsmen to be paid in three installments between Yovember
1963 and November 1965, with a corres ponding raise of 5d an
hour for labourers. The working week was to be reduced on
November 2nd 1964 from 42 to41 hours, and within the period
covered by the agreement, a non—contributory sick pay scheme
was to be implemented. In view of the government's concern
with limiting pay increases to the rise in productivity,
420
consideration was to be givciL to the possibility of relating
future changes in standard rates of wages to t an appropriate
index of national productivity' in place of the existing link
with the Index of Retail Prices. The response from the
trade union leadership to this package was far from unan mous.
The vote taken within the meeting of the Joint Executives, on
the basis of the number of seats held by unions within the
NJCBI, ratified the agreement. by a majority of only three,
with the AUBTW, the TM-WU t the plasterers and the plumbers
against. The terms represented only a marginal advance on
those discussed by the Negotiating Committee before the stop-
page of work.	 The wade increases were still to be phased
over three annual payments, and were a long way from the
original claim of 1/6 an hour increase. The compromise over
working hours was offset by the widening of the differentials
beween craftsmens t and labourers' wage rates. And the agree-
ment prepared the way for the abolition of the sliding scale.
If the agreement met with a divided response amongst the -
Executives of the various unions concerned, it received little
enthusiasm amongst the active members who had been responsible
for organising and implementing the strike decision. There
was some feeling that, although the leadership had asked for
and received support for the stoppage, they had abandoned the
struggle before it had really got under way.
Resolutions to this effect were passed at the union conferences
that year. AUBTW members wanted to overturn the settlement,
although the AS -J was more cautious, stating simply that the
Federation's negotiators had failed to achieve their target
and should go back for the rest. Within the !..malgamated
Society of Painters and Decorators resolutions flooded in from
branches complaining at the erms of the agreement, and the
consensus amongst the membership of other unions, if the
discussion at the Federation's annual conference is any
indication, was that further improvements were necessary. (25)
The economic and political climate for negotiations seemed
good during the mid-60's. Output was projected for expansion
and the government's building programme depended on the co-
operation of labour within the construction industry. Yet the
unions' negotiators were unable or unwilling to take advantage
of these factors in wage bargaining. Again they accepted the
employers deal spanning a three year period. The next settle-
ment, agreed on 25th November 1965 provided for a 40 hour
5 day working week, with the standard rate of wages to rise
by 2d an hour to compensate for the loss of the hour. Standard
hourly wage rates were to rise by 3d an hour for craftsmen and
2:1,,d an hour for labourers on 7 17ovember 1966, with a farther
increase of 3c1 for craftsmen and 21d for labourers on 6
November 1967.	 The most important feature of the settlement
was the abolition of the sliding scale, which was to be dis-
continued after February 1968 (26). The sliding scale had,
over the years, been the cause of considerable dissatisfac-
tion, since it failed to ensure that earnings rose at the
same Dace as prices. It was argued too that its effect was
to reduce the amount which the employers were prepared to 7-Jay.
Yet it had positive advantaes insofar as it ensured that if
the Retail Price Index showed sufficient movement, there would
be some compensating adjustment in wage levels, and periodically
the sliding scale rate was consolidated into the national rate,
thereby affecting overtime and bonus calculation. I:oreover
the sliding scale did not preclude renegotiation of the basic
rates and it might be expected that during a period of
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escalating inflation, it wo id provide a useful adjunct to
central wage bargaining. Its abolition removed an important
safety valve from the workings of the national negotiating
machinery. Henceforth wage rates depended solely on the
abilities of the negotiators to mobilise members and convince
employers of the value of each and every claim. This was a
vulnerable position for leaders of unions whose membership
was declining at an alarming pace.
whilst a long term agreement suited the interests of the
employers, by providing the assurance of steady labour costs
for the forthcoming pei.iod, it had some advantages too for
the operatives who might otherwise have been caught in the
'ages Freeze of 1966. Trade unionists in construction regu-
larly faced the problem that the employers pushed through long-
term wages settlements when the opportunities for negotiation
on behalf of the trade unions were improving, but they did
not wholly lose by the 1965 agreement whichmtablished wage
levels in advance of the 1966 Prices and Incomes Act and which
were merely deferred for six months as a result of this
legislation. The experience under the Tories in the early
1960's had already pinpointed the problems which might arise
where the nationally negotiated rate was held back whilst local
settlements were uncontrolled.	 The Prices and Incomes Act
threatened to augment the disparity between the nationally
negotiated agreement and the amount actually paid out at site
level.	 In the context of a high demand for labour, payments
in excess of the national rate — whether through a bonus
scheme or as a 'lump' payment, were to become more common.
And rates of wages were raised in many areas in spite of the
freeze (27).
The employers noted that the most important long—term conse-
quences of the Government's Incomes Policy was not the defer-
ment of wage increases negotiated during 1965. Rather it was
the impact of site level bargaining arrangements on the central
machinery for collective bargaining. As they succinctly put it:
'Already in the post war period the authority of unions'
national executives has suffered considerably because their
ability to negotiate improvements in conditions has, too often,
proved in practice to be markedly less than that of site
stewards and local union officers. If, as seems likely, cen-
tral collective bargaihing is to be trammelled even more in
the future by the need to take directly into account factors
quite outside the industry itself, other ways may have to be
found of maintaining the authority of the union leaders.
;:hile this is a problem mainly for the trade unions, it is a
problem which employers must not ignore. They often rely upon
the cuthority of the union leaders for enforcing discipline:
if this authority is undermined too much the employers will
suffer in the long run.' (28)
These problems of credibility highlighted the need for renewed
attention to the industry's wage structure and industrial
practices.
The itational Joint Councils' machinery was adjusted in 1964
by the amalgamation of the, joint machineries and agreements
for England and Wales and for Scotland.
	 The size of the
merged Council was increased to make room for representatives
of the Scottish organisations on both sides, although soPe
bodies, in particular the rational Federation of Fainters and
the Scottish Plumbing Emploars' Federation remained out:-side.
The discrepancy in hours between England and Scotland was
eliminated by the 1965 settlement which reduced the working
week to40 hours in England and Wales, without any correspond-
ing reduction in Scotland.(29) A dispute in Scotland during
1963/4 over a claim for parity on weekly wages with England,
which meant effectively a higher hourly rate to compensate
for the shorter working week, was resolved by a phased increase
to be effected between Mar 1964 and Nov 1965. 	 By that date
it was expected that rates and conditions would be equalised
on both sides of the border. (30) 	 Amalgamation of the two
agreements meant that there was less scope for leapfrogging
between England and Scotland, and that the employers
in England were less likely to be upstaged by an agreement
North of the border.
There was a growing attention to the problems of wage bar-
gaining in the building industry, by government bodies as
well as by those who were party to negotiations during the
sixties. But none of the official enquiries or reports insti-
tuted over this period attacked the central problems posed
for collective bargaining in the building industry by labour-
only.	 The Building Research Station's report on Building
operatives' work (31) was followed by the Re port of a Court
of Innuiry (32). And the Kinisters of Labour and Public Build-
ings and Works decided that an independent inquiry should be
made into the question of labour-only sub-contracting, a
question which was central to the problem of the credibility
of national negotiations. This was opposed both by the
ITFBTE and by the FCHU who clearly expected such an inquiry,
under a Labour Government to come out against the practice.
They were to be suitably gratified by the report of the
Ihel3;s-rown Committee which -Tas set up in 1967 to look iiito
the engagement and use of labour in building and civil engineer-
ing with particular reference to the problems of 'the lump'.
In spite of their opposition to its establishment the Phelps-
Brown Cttee seemed to vindicate the employers' viewpoint.
Although it pointed to abuses of the present arrangements, it
concluded that
'The evidence we have assembled leads us to conclude that were
it possible to outlaw labour-only sub-contracting altogether
the present effect on the working arrangements of the industry
would on balance be disadvantageous.' (33)
In industry more generally there was a move away from the
traditional pattern of central collective bargaining, with the
shift in emphasis towards company or plant level agreements.
This trend, which was already underway by the mid-60's was
boosted by a CBI report on Productivity Bargaining. The
Donovan Report encouraged initiatives to remove the dichotomy
between central and workplace levels of bargaining. The pre-
vailing drift was to company level settlements which encouraged
union membership through the application of .check-off agree-
ments.
1.Tegotiations began at the end of 1967 on a claim for 5.17.11.8
for craftsmen and £15 for labourers. Discussions continued
through the early months of 1968, and it seemed likely that a
further long term settlement would be concluded. On Iay 31
1968 Barbara Castle, then first Secretary of State referred the
claim to the Tational Board for Prices and Incomes (34). Once
the reference was made negotiations were suspended whilst both
sides prepared their case for the Board.
	 The task of invest-
iatin: the industry's pay—s . ructure was a complex one, and
the statutory period of three months allowed for the report
had twice to be extended by the government. The previous
settlement was due to expire at the end of October 1968, yet
it became clear dui.ing that month that the report could not be
published before the end of November. 	 The Joint Negotiating
Committee therefore reached unanimous agreement on the need for
an interim pay settlement, until the Board's Report could be
made and assimilated.	 An offer, of 3c1 an hour for craftsmen
and 2,d for labourers was accepted and ratified by the NJC on
24 October 1968, to come into effect from 4 November. However
the interim increases were immediately referred to the Prices
and Incomes Board, with a threat from the government that the
full amount would be frozen unless there was an undertaking
that the PIB's ruling on the 1d an hour interim award to offset
the increased cost of living should be taken into account when
calculating the total increase over the previous twelve months
(35).	 In,Tovember the PIB reported that the 1d an hour cost
of living increase must count as part of the 3% currently per-
mitted under incomes policy. They also reguired l
 that there
should be no further rise for a period of tuelve months, with
an emphasis on the value of productivity schemes, and a revision
of the grading structure.
	 The reports (36) were wholly unaccep-
table to the trade unions, although trade union leaders who
had accepted the logic of incomes policy were caught in a
double bind.
	 The members were unlikely to accept decisions
which singled them out for special attention, although their
leaders were reluctant to lead them into confrontation with a
Labour Government over policies which they personally accepted
(37). Talks of strike action were countered by the Government
with the reference of the interim avx.rd to the =I, and a
standstill order was imposed covering the -whole of the award.
The amrloyers faced with thi threat of a freeze on the full
amount which they had conceded in October made a new, reduced
offer of 2-:(1 an hour for craftsmen and 2d an hour for labourers,
on the rate which was in force before October (i.e. a decrease
of id an hour for all operatives). Reluctant to assume the
vanguard of a direct attack on the government's incomes Policy,
the unions' negotiators agreed. Accordingly from 28 December
1968, rates of pay were decreased by id an hour and building
operatives suffered their first decline in money wages since
1933 (58).
The government's dramatic incursion into industrial relations
in construction did nothing to bolster the credibility of the
trade union leaders who were involved in central collective
bargaining. negotiations over wage rates were of limited
significance to the building worker on site, and for this reason
it would be difficult for the union leadership to mobilise an
opposition to the government's policies.
	 Their own reluctance
to oppose incomes policy made a solution especially difficult,
since the government seemed to have singled out building, civil
engineering and ancillary activities as an example of its
determination to curtail wage increases unless they could be
tied to increases in productivity. To account for their pro-
blems by reference to their role as a political football was
no answer to the decline in membership and the collapse of
trade union organisation. :_nd it was little consolation to
know that trade union members in other industries were able to
circumvent the implications of statutory incomes policy with
reference to productivity deals. The problems of the opera-
tives' side of the NJCDI was that they could not challenge the
government. Tor, since their negotiations did not relate to
the diverse work situations ja construction,could they find
a way around its policies. Their collective face was saved
only to the extent that the employers were willing to inter-
vene with a reduced offer, which meant a cut in money wages
for building tradeS operatives at a time when inflation was
accelerating.
	 Their humiliation was symptomatic of the crisis
in trade unionism in construction.
It was not until 1970 that the wage claim subtitted in 1967
was actually met. In a comprehensive agreement effective from
2 Feb 1970 the standard rates were raised to.-c.:17.11.8 for
craftsmen and 2,15.0.0 for labourers, with provisions for further
increases to E20.0.0 for craftsmen and Z17.0.0 for labourers
by-June 1971.	 In return there were concessions regarding the
flexible use of labour and entry into the industry. The old
emergency disputes procedure was abolished (the 'Green Book')
and all disputes were brought within the ambit of the -1;JCT3I.
General guidelines were established for incentive and produc-
tivity schemes and provisions made for payments adjustments for
apprentices (39).
This agreement could not disguise the fact that the history
of central bargaining over -ay during the 1960's was a
disaster for the credibility of trade union organisation in
construction. The problems could not be resolved immedir,tely
or easily, and they laid the basis for the massive wave of
discontent and militancy expressed by building workers during
the 1972 strike. Collective bargaining was reformulated in
the 70's and a new line established between the building and
civil engineering agreements. But for so long as the independent
unions maintained their separate and distinctive identities,
there was no solution to thp crisis.
c.'ge drift wa4 not of course pcculiPr to tho buildirL;
civil engineering industries. But its implications for trade
union organisation were markedly different than in for example
engineering, where the diminishing si gnificance of national
collective bargaining was paralleled by the strengthening of
shop floor organisation in the putsuit of improved piece work
earnings. Collective organisation was only one method avail-
able to the operative in construction as a means of improving
take home pay. And even on those larger sites where the level
of unionisation was high the influence of central trade union
bodies might be insignificant (40).
when the membership voted to accept payment by results in 1947
they did so in the expectation that normal constitutional prac-
tices would be observed. It was expected then that the trade
unions would exercise control over this aspect of pay in the
same way as they had over plain time rates. But it was pres-
cisely the absence of collective control which undermined trade
union organisation.
	 The absence of any unifolm scheme, pro-
viding a range of target and bonus payments weakened the possi-
bilities of controlling bonus from national level. This
problem was recognised within the AUBTW and an attempt was
made to confront it by the publication of a booklet giving
guidelines for the operation of bonus schemes (41). 7hilst
these guidelines were not accepted by the employers, they
provided at least a framework of reference for stewards who
were involved in negotiations on bonus questions. Leaders of
the &T.1, and George Smith in particular, were reluctant to
accept any wider attempt, within the Federation to establish
such guidelines.
	 Craftsmen faced varying problems in relation
to the assessment of bonus payments, and Smith argued that these
would be more complex for woodworkers than for bricklayers or
plasterers. ':aestions of in . entive tErgets raised Cifficulties
in respect of the application of new techniques and new materials,
Ds well as the measurement of output. There was no likelihood
of the U$ 1,1.
 leadership surrendering their autonomy on policy
matters of this kind in the interests of a target bonus scheme
which might not in any case, carry any weight either with
operatives or employers. In 1961 a resolution was Passed within
the =TO, against the opposition of the ASW representatives,
to the effect that a 'uniform structure of bonus schemes should
be formulated by joint agreement with the employers, and that
although the actual stipulation of targets and bonus payments
is not necessary at thiS stage ... an early move towards control
and co—ordination is imperative.' (42)
The acceptance of incentives had split apart the labour force
in construction. Within the trade union movement there were
two sets of members — those on incentives, and those on basic
rates, and the gap in between the two was constantly increasing.
The official estimate of members on incentive payments was very
low: 14 in 1962 rising to some 179 by 1966 (43). But a larger
proportion received some kind of lieu rate or plus payments,
mostly unrelated to productivity. And in the public sector, in
local authorities and the health service, payments were made for
the most part at, or only slightly above the nationally nego-
tiated rates.
	 The differentials which emerged between crafts-
men, especially in the application of lieu payments was noted
in the previous chapter and it is not surprising that it was
the leadership of the woodworkers, best able to benefit from
this dog eat dog situation, who opposed the introduction of a
standardised and uniform framework for bonus.
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The most divisive effect of icentive payments was the enbourage-
ment given to the growing independence of site settlements, itself
associated with the spread of labour-only.
	 The extent of
IOSC by the mid-60's can only be estimated, but it was apparent
that its use was widespread. 	 The Phelps Brown Committee of
Inquiry based its comments on surveys carried out by the NFETE
snd the FCEC which included questions on the sub-contraction of
vork on a labour only basis. As regards private house building
it was estimated that in the aggregate, one quarter of the whole
annual payments for labour were made to labour-only sub-contrac-
tors. However amongst the largest finis, that is those building
500 or more houses per year, the proportion was more like one
third.	 The 'lump , was more widespread in the South than in
the North, whilst it was virtually non-existent in Scotland.
On a craft basis, it was estimated that it was most commonly to
be found amongst bricklayers, carpenters and joiners and
plasterers. _Imongst general builders and contractors and local
authorities, the proportion was rather lower, and according to
returns made to the FCEC, it was still less _significant within
civil engineering (44).
The introduction of Selective Employment Tax in 1966 encouraged
the use of 'the lump' throughout the industry. The tax
intended as a means of reducing overmanning, by levying a per-
centage tax amount on the payroll for all employees who worked
for twenty hours or more in any one week. Clearly the impli-
cations of the tax would be very different for the contractor
who utilised the services of sub-contractors for labour only,
than for a contractor with a large number of employees. SET
had a disastrous effect in construction as far as the unions
were concerned, since it encouraged building employers to dis-
pense with the services of those operatives who were directly
employed in favour of those .ho were 'on the lump' (45). Opera-
tives who had resisted working on this :basis in the past were
finding their employment opportunities reduced (46). And the
development of labour—only holding com panies, which supplied
labour made the problem still more difficult (47). The men
might be paid by the agency or the firm, but in the latter case
with the payment of a fee from the contractors to the agency.
With either method the effect was to encourage contractors to
seek operatives on a 'lump' basis (48).
The introduction of SET, and the establishment of labour—only
agencies could not on their own create the problem of the
'lump'. Rather, it was the intensification of the demand for
skilled labour, combined with the recurrent shortages of
materials, both of them features of the cyclical pattern of
boom and slump, which encouraged employers to seek a mode of
recruitment which undermined the collective resistance of
labour.	 Attempts on the part of the unions to discipline their
members met with a singular lack of success. From the AU=TI:
national office, a leaflet was sent out to all members telling
them that if they worked for sub—contractors they could not
expect the protection or the assistance of their union when in
difficulties.	 The move merely served to hasten the downward
trend of the membership figures: (49)
	
Attempts to carry a
constitutional amendment to the working rule agreement to elimi-
nate abuses associated with IOSC had received support from the
Phelps Brown Report, together with recommendations for legis-
lation. It is a mark of the weakness of trade union organisation
that this move represented the collective union response to a
trend which threatened to decimate them (50). The Labour
Government was interested in the question because of the pro-
blem of tax evasion, and a bill to regulate labour only sub-
contracting WE0 introduced i,
 to the Tiouse of Common': in T)ril
1970 (51).
	 This followed the proposals of Ihelps 2rown inso-
far as it aimed to establish the registration of all 'contractors'
who could prove that they were proper employers of labour. But
it was also proposed to levy contractors employing unregistered
sub—contractors up to 20,6 of the labour content of the sub-
contract sum. Eoreover a contractor would be obliged to with-
hold 325 of the labour sum in lieu of income tax payable by the
operatives.	 The Bill fell with the ending of Labour's period
in office in 1970. The prospects of a simple, legislative
solution to the problem of the 'lump' were never auspicious.
And by 1970 more radical initiatives were necessary if trade
union organisation in this sector was to continue to have any
meaning. Legislative constraints on labour—only were directed
primarily at tax evasion and could not, in themselves, suffice.
The problems of devising and working incentive schemes,
together with the impact of labour—only, contributed to the
growth of militancy on particular jobs, especially in London
and Liverpool.
Strikes in construction during the 60's tended to be small
scale — affecting only a few workers and lasting only for a
short period of time. The number of strikes however was fairly
high, since bonus and conditions had to be fought for on each
new site.	 During the period 1961-70 there was an average
number of 67 strikes a year in construction, slightly higher
either than transport or vehicle production, with annual
averages of 262 and 256 respectively (52). Only in mining and
quarrying and in metals, engineering and shi-Dbuilding was the
average number of strikes higher over the same period, although
in both cases the figure was considerably in excess of that for
construction (701 and 939 re-Tectively). But if the number
or scale of strikes is estimated in relation to the size of the
workforce it has been shown that construction ranks lower than
industrial sectors which have fewer strikes (53). It seems
likely that strike statistics for construction may be under-
estimated, firstly because DE records exclude strikes involving
fewer than ten workers or which do not involve the minimum
of 100 strike days.	 Secondly it seems probable that many
strikes in the industry might be unreported simply because site
management dealt with the question without recourse to higher
authority and no formal record of the incident was kept.
It was only on the larger sites that a high level of organisa-
tion was a serious possibility. 	 The scale and the duration of
the works in progress defined both the nature of labour recruit-
ment to the site and the efforts of trade unionists to get it
unionised. An employer claimed that some of the large firms
would be more likely to use direct employment on the large,
prestigious projects, because of the recognised advantages in
attracting better and more competent tradesmen, precisely the
kind of person who, through training and skill would be more
likely to belong to a trade union. Workers might be engaged
under labour—only, as well as direct employment, and firms
were careful to avoid recruiting active trade unionists to their
sites (54).
	
Where a site was fairly small there was less
impetus for organisation, both from officials and from the
men on the job. Attention was concentrated on the larger
operations and it has been noted that where this was successful
in building effective trade union organisation, there was likely
to be a spin—off effect to other, smaller sites in the same
locality (55).
	 Shop stewards' committees were fairly rare,
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for even if there was a unio presence on site it niht come
from one, or at the most two unions, with workers in other
trades remaining unorganised (56). 	 Federation stewards were
recognised by the employers ?
 side only from 1964, but even
then it was unusual for a full committee to be established with
a Federation steward in office (57).
The difficulties of organising on site against victimisation,
the blacklist and the lump, and within a casual labour market
were illustrated in two large and protracted disputes during
the sixties — at Hyton i s site at the Barbican and at the
Ninistry of Iublic Buildings office works in the Horseferry
Road, London.
	 A detailed account of such disputes is outside
of the scope of a study of trade union structure, but it is
importnt to note the view, which was increasingly widespread
Emongst tae active trade union members who were largely res-
ponsible for sustaining trade union organisation on the bigger
sites, that there was little being done for them at national
level within their own unions. Not only were the rates negotia-
ted at national level irrelevant to the earnings which such
workers expected. They also argued at times that there was
little interest from, or contact with union officials. It was
often difficult for activists who became blacklisted to find
work and the external situation encouraged the independence
and self—reliance of operatives in dealing with their own situa-
tion. It may indeed by the case that the industry attracts
men with those qualities, but Whether or not this is true, the
operative on a building site must first of all look to the
regulation of his own problems. It has been suggested that the
characteristics of the industry help to explain why it is
that when a site is well organised, this has often been achieved
by political activists - paxicularly Communist Party members
(58). And the extent of their influence has been evidenced
by the strength and longevity of unofficial, or rank and file
organisations.	 Although the TBI had died in the 1950's, this
tradition of grass roots activity had by no means disappeared.
The London Joint Sites Shop Stewards Committee was noted by
Cameron for its 'subversive and mischievous' influence in bring-
ing about the disputes at the Barbican and the Horseferry Road,
and at least two of its leading members, Jack Henry and Lou
Lewis, were known to be members of the Communist Party (59).
As unofficial activity built up during the latter part of the
sixties it was to be cohsolidated around the paper the Building
Torkers Charter which was published from 1970. Communist :arty
militants cannot create unofficial action in a haven of peace-
ful and well-regulated industrial relations.
	 They are able
to extend their influence most effectively where there is
already a climate of discontent.
	 The reasons for this hove
been variously suggested - the casual nature of employment and
tough working conditions, employer resistance to trade union
organisation and the operation of the blacklist.
	 The 'trouble-
makers' identified by Cameron were merely articulating the
problems of a workforce subjected to arbitrary management
decisions, and it is for this reason that they could find
support both on the Barbican and the Horseferry Road sites and
elsewhere.
nilst unofficial organisation and activity on site may
widen the rift between operatives and their own trade union
officials, the effects were not the same from one union to
another, or indeed between one layer of officials and another.
The procedure for giving official su pport to a strike differed .
between unions, as Cameron noted (60). This power 1,Ts in the
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hands of the EC, both in thc 	 and in the
	 'Jut in the
case of the AU3T7 official recognition and support for a sto p
-page could be authorised by any full—time officers of the
union, although the ratification of the EC was subsequently
required.
	 This difference may account for the greater willing-
ness of the AUBTU to extend recognition to the strikes at
Barbican and Horseferry Road, whereas the S7T leadership
appeared to be reluctant in both cases to give the union's
formal backing to the strikers.
	 The prevailing political
attitudes within these bodies will also have had some effect,
since the EC of the AST, with its right wing political machine
was generally out of sympathy with the aims and operations of
the site activists. As far as the dispute at the Barbican
was concerned, the EC of the _,SW at no time gave official
recognition, and in fact Iou Iewis was warned not to involve
ATT members in any stoppage.
	 The AUBTW, by contrast, initially
paid strike benefit although this was later withdrawn. The
T&G7 too gave support for a brief period, and it is possibly
a reflection of ASW influence that, following that union's
example, the recognition extended by other unions at the out-
break of the dispute was subsequently withdrawn. However at the
Horseferry Road all three unions gave official support for the
strikers in the beginning, but the 23 .1 withdrew this after a
short interval and complained at the failure of others to
follow their lead.
	 As George Smith put it: (and the comment
was aimed at the T&G-.1) 'the situation arose out of the desire
of particular unions to prove that they were more militant
than others'. (61)
The District Officials of the ATI were associated in the main
with the position taken by their own full—time Executive
Council.	 Visits of the District Organiser to the Larbican
site took place in order to instruct members to end the Iiicket-
ing.	 And although the AS'.:'s District Organiser initiallLr
recommended support for the strikers in both instances, he
does not seem to have been associated subsequently with the
strikers opposition to the manoeuvres of their Executive (62).
Within the AUBTW there was a greater difference betwean the
position of national and district or divisional officers.
Some of the members who had been associated with the Mytons
dispute felt that the national officers had been prepared to
negotiate with Mytons at a time when that company would not
honour existing obligations to hold talks with District Officers
(63). And in the gapbetween the 'national people' (in this
instance the part-time executive) and the District and Divi-
sional officers, there was a split which was representative of
two conflicting views of the union and its function. On the
one hand there were the advocates of 'better industrial
relations'. And on the other there were those who pushed for
better site organisation, with a tougher and less compromising
attitude towards the employers (64).
The relations between national officers and district level
officials of the various unions differed according to the
timing and context of the issues which were in question.
London was in many ways atypical, because of the size of some
of the sites and the concentration of workers, and for these
reasons the number and intensity of disputes was rather
greater than in other areas. Yet it was in London that the
contradictory features of building trade unionism wore most
apparent. Labour-only sub-contracting was more common in the
capital than in the provinces. Yet Iondon held soLle of the most
militant workers in the industry, res ponsible for some of the
best organised sites (with 'ae possible =option of livcrlool).
-5y the late 60 t s the major craft unions had shifted their head-
quarters to London, and yet it was there that national influence
was most attenuated. 	 Not only was trade union control, at
national level eroded by the loss of members, as an ever—
increasing pro portion of operatives opted for the dubious
advantages of labour only. It was also weakened, even where
trade union membership was high, by the very strength of site
organisation which provided its best defence. So far as the
73arbican was concerned, Cameron concluded that the unions'
national officials had lost control, and that, for all practi-
cal Purposes it was thd works' committee who were in control
at site level. And although there were few disputes of the
scale or importance of the Barbican, it is nonetheless the
case that the influence of trade unionism, from the national
level, did not increase in proportion as membership on a
particular site rose. If the existence of labour—only sug-
gests independence and self—reliance amongst building opera-
tives, so too does the attitude of many active trade unionists.
And the latter were no more likely than the fozmer to bolster
the flagging image of the unions' national. negotiators vis a vis
the employers. Not only was trade union membershi p in the
industry, as a proportion of workforce employed, on the wane.
But the influence and control of the unions amongst their own
members was seriously eroded.
Trade union strategy in construction during the late 60's
evolved in response to this Problem.
	 The loss of control over
workers on site provided an important incentive for union
negotiators to participate in company agreements. These had
the potential to curtail the decline in mmbership in two ways.
Pirstly, if the employer could be persuaded to negotiate on
F. conany basis, he might Li. id an interest in encouraging
trade union membership, since it would facilitate closer joint
control of industrial relations.
	 And secondly, by being seen
to do something about pay at a level whichwas relevant to the
worker on site the company agreement might be expected to give
a boost to membership (65).
	 Three important agreements had
been concluded by the time of the Phelps Brown Report — with
Tersons Ltd., with John Laing Construction Ltd. and with
Yuill Ltd. of Hartlepool.
	
The problem of relating corn—
;y agreements to the existing national agreement was recog-
nised, especially since the number of small employers in the
industry precluded the abolition of the national agreement as
a means of setting the standard rates of pay. Dut it was
argued that the larger employers, many of whom retained staff
in a personnel capacity might be willing to formalise relations
with the unions at company level, and the prospects of conclud-
ing check—off arrangenents represented an attractive means of
stabilising membership (66). It has been suggested that
employers might favour check—off to the extent that, with such
an arrrngement they would be less bothered by trade union
officials visiting their sites, and it was seen, by some officials,
as the first step in a move towards tho closed shop (67).
Despite the conclusion of the company agreements mentioned
hove, the employers were notrbly reluctant to depart from the
-.:rinciple of national negotiations which they had upheld for so
long. It served their interests well to establish the basic
rate in accordance with the interests of the numerous small
employers in the industry, and the union t s interest in check-
off and the closed shop provided little incentive ibr them to
change their views when they could use labour—only sub—contracting
as a means of curbing labour nilitance (63).
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It WPS in the public sector uhat the most stble trade union
organisation was to be found. Of the 409,000 building workers
outside the building and civil engineering agreements in the
late 1960's the vast majority — some 130,000 for England,
Scotland and - iales were employed by local authorities. In
addition there were some 18,000 employed in government depart-
ments, 14,000 in the National Health Service and nearly 25,000
in nationalised industries including the waterworks. These
workers did not confront the enormous problems which restricted
trade union organisation in the private sector. Permanent
employment in local authorities and other public undertakings
facilitated organisation and a disproportionate number of union
members were found in these areas. Although unit size of under-
taking was relatively small the attitude of employers to trade
union organisation was less obstructive than in private employ-
ment and there had been a more effective defence of trade union
rights against the incursion of labour—only sub—contractors.
(69) Pay of the building operatives in the public sector was
generally related to the national agreement for the building
industry, even if this was not actually specified. But earn-
ings in the public sector tended to be rather lower primarily
because a large proportion of the work which was undertaken was
in the field of repair and maintenance, where incentive schemes
were less easy to apply and less readily adopted by the autho-
rities concerned. 	 Trade union organisation was steady, but
stewards had less authority concerning pay issues because
money from incentive schemes was less important to earnings
over—all than with the private firms.
	
The exceptions were
as in the private sector in the largest centres of employment,
cities such as Kanchester and Sheffield where there were large
direct works departments (70). Boom conditions brought the
number of directly employed ublic sector building worker to
a peak in 1967 but in-the context of public exDenditure cuts
nd the political counter-attack of Tory controlled local autho-
rities from 1968 the numbers were reduced. And since union
members were disproportionately to be found in the public sector,
the cuts reinforced the downward drift in union membership.
Shop steward organisation, both in the public and in the private
sector was still rooted at the end of the sixties in craft
organisation. A steward represented workers in his own trade,
and did not automatically assume responsibilities for men in
other trades. In principle a site was organised by the first
union member who was taken on who became steward to his trade
until there were a sufficient number employed for elections to
be held (71). The trade steward received his credentials from
his own trade union and was responsible to the District Com-
mittee of that union to whom he should, in principle submit a
quarterly report. His responsibilities on site were to his
own union members. His two most important functions related
to organisation and to negotiation of bonus rates. Only if an
active steward or stewards were elected was there any likeli-
hood of the 'lump' being challenged on that site.
	 And with a
transitory workforce it required an active steward to carry out
regular card Checks to maintain the organisation on which his
authority finally rested. The central task for the steward,
in the eyes of his members was negotiation of bonus. Incentive
payments varied between trades and the operation of bonus
required a steward from each trade to negotiate on behalf of
that trade with the site agent or foreman. Different trades
were concentrated on site at different stages of the job.
Bricklayers and carpenters for example, might be employed in
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larger numbers at an earlier ‘tage in a job than painters or
plumbers. So that the timing of negotiations over incentive
payments for the various trades would vary according to the
stage which the job had reached. Agreements were often
informal and unwritten and it was unlikely that trades would
co-operate over negotiations on bonus unless the job was
especially well organised or sufficiently larger for an over-
all bonus scheme to be applied to all craftsmen (72). Although
the duties of stewards related primarily to their own trade,
they were not prohibited from participating in joint committees
with other trades, although the organisational difficulties out-
lined above militated against it where operatives were not directly
employed - that is where employment was on a casual basis.
It was through unofficial organisation that the most positive
steps were taken to link trades on site, and to link stewards
across sites encompassing the public as well as the private
sector. Reference has already been made to the rift between
activists on site and national officers of the building trades
unions. The unusual longevity of rank and file papers and the
strength of the unofficial movements boosted union organisation
in a way which was vital to its survival, although such bodies
continued to be a 'thorn in the flesh' of union leaders. In the
words of Les Wood, GS of UCATT from 1979,
"the unofficial groups injected into the broad membership the
kind of fighting spirit that is necessary when one is set on
a course of battle ... As groups designed to exert pressure
it has to be acknowledged that their efforts were not without
achievement, even though they caused considerable chagrin to
the official leadership." (73)
Unofficial liaison had long been maintained between shop stewards
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from the public and the priv te sectors in the throuLfh
the medium of quarterly meetings, convened by the District
Kanagement Committees in certain areas. At these district
delegate meetings as they were known, stewards would report
on the state of organisation on their particular jobs. In the
well-organised centres such as London, Liverpool, Kanchester
and the North East of England meetings might be held on a
regular basis, although attendance would devolve on the most
active and committed stewards, frequently those who were
politically active, often within the Communist Party. The
meetings in themselves had no powers to make policy. They were
convened for the purpose of discussion, but they certainly
provided an important venue for the exchange of ideas and the
develoiment of organisation.
	 They provided a forum for poli-
tical activists through which campaigns could be built and it
is likely that the rank and file movements which were success-
fully sustained for such lon g
 periods were based essentially in
this regular contact between active stewards at District level,
within the trade. Similar meetings or councils of shop stewards
as they were known were held within the ASPD, at least in the
larger centres. In places such as Liverpool,. London and the
Forth Th,st meetings were regularly held and in a city the size
of Sheffield there was an attendance of around 30 stewards (74).
The unofficial movements of the sixties were founded with the
object of uniting trades and crossing organisational barriers,
on each site and within each locality.
	 The London Building
Forkers Joint Sites Committee was formed in 1964 and rapidly
made contact with similar bodies in other areas - in Liverpool,
1,1anchester and Fewcastle (75). The earliest campaiEms of the
movement in the 1930's were for unity - between trades and
between craftsmen and labourers, with the emphasis on activity
on site. In the 60's stewar , a were still struggling Egainst
the boundaries between trades, defined by the very structure
of national organisation. The divisions between trades encoura-
ged by separate negotiations over bonus were challenged by
claims for collective bonus, with a view to breaking down the
distinctions within the craft hierarchy which operated, over-
all to the detriment of unity (76).
	
From the individual move-
ments in the larger cities — the London Joint Sites Committee,
the Merseyside Building Workers Movement formed out of the
Liverpool Joiners Unity Movement and the Building Workers Forum
in Manchester a new national rank and file paper was launched
in 1970 — the Building Workers Charter.
	
The paper, edited by
-Lou Lewis of the ASW was, during its brief existence, one of
the most successful rank and file papers produced since the
war.	 The founding conference of the 'Charter Group' attracted
over 250 delegates and at a time when the unions which were
rooted in craft organisation still produced the Monthly Journals 
which were part of their tradition, the Charter provided a
readable publication in tabloid format which claimed sales of
10,000 Per issue in its first year of publication (77). The
undoubted successes of the Charter — highlighted in the national
strike of 1972 should not be allowed to disguise the serious
Problems confronting trade unionists in the buildin g industry
in this period.	 It was certainly the case that organisation
at the national level was seriously undermined.
	
The rank and
file movement flourished to the extent that its supporters
could boost the organisation and enthusiasm for combatting the
'lump'. It took off at a time when difficulties concerning
central wage negotiations were accentuated by the im pact of
government incomes policies. And it found supporters in
centres which had not in the past been the main focus for
militant building trade unionism (78). In an industry where
fewer than ono third of the orkers were organised, Lnd whore
many organised workers did not have sho p
 stewards rezzesenting
them, claims concerning the strength and the extent of a rank
and file movement of shop stewards must be cautiously made.
The Charter was based in three main centres, in London, Liver-
pool and Nanchester.
	
But in two of these, that is in London
and Eanchester, it was only the largest sites which were well—
organised and only in Liverpool has it been claimed that trade
union organisation was effectively sustained (79). The Charter
was weakened by the weakness of trade unionism in the industry
itself. If it attracted a high proportion of activists, it
did so in an industry where shop steward organisation was thinly
spread. IThilst national officials opposed the extension of
rank and file organisation in the major disputes of the 50's
and 60's, they were equally prepared to use the Charter where
it promised to reinforce organisation at the national level.
As George Smith put it:
If it is expected in the present situation that we have an
attitude of amnesty about the Charter group or the Liaison
Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions and so on, let me
say we do not mind where the support comes from as long as it
is on our conditions (80).
How far can it be claimed that it was the Charter which led to
a 'form of industrial unionism'? (81)	 ',Tas it the agitation
of the Charter group, or its predecessors which paved the way
for the structural changes involved in the formation of UCI:w?
Like the FBI the Charter stood for 'industrial unionism' in the
building industry in its programme and industrial unity, in
practice, on the sites. Its emphasis on unity in action had
real implications for militants concerned to organise and con-
front the employers at site level, but the auestion of structure
in the nation-1 arena was a 'ess pressing concern.	 with
the F:31 it was the campaign on wage issues which was the vital
ingredient in its programme. In an industry which was
notoriously tough, the movement built its support around a
campaign which did notevade the problems of organisation and
employer resistance.	 The question of structural adaptation
was a topical one during the second half of the 1960's, but it
was less effective as a campaigning issue than questions of
wages, bonus, or the lump.
	 It had been apparent throughout
the decade that some measure of change was impending. By
1967 it was clear that this could no longer be postponed. The
rank and file movements wereoperating within a climate where
structural adjustments seemed to be inevitable. 	 The loss of
members and the extension of IOSC I the erosion of control of the
national officers and the growth of the unofficial novements
themselves were symptomatic of a crisis in trade union organi-
sation.	 It was a crisis which was too serious to allow of
further prevarication. Only the shape of structural changes
remained to be decided.
7-t.3: Structural Change
As in Past decades, the rationalisation of trade union structure
was encouraged by initiatives from the TUC. In 1960 there were
183 affiliated unions with a total membershi p of some 8,299,000
and the concern with multi-unionism was such that in 1962 a
resolution was passed calling upon the General Council to
examine the possibility of reorganising the trade union move-
ment (82). The matter was referred to the F&GPO and in 1963
they reported that instead of attempting to draw up comprehensive
plans for structural change, they would make ad hoc arrangements
to assist the piecemeal mergers which were more likcly to bc
effected.	 Technological changes had blurred craft distinctions
across Dany industries and c nferences were held of union
representatives within industrial groupings wherever it ws
felt that there was a possibility of reducing the nunber of
unions (83). As far as construction was concerned initiatives
went no further than the arrangements of conferences for unions
in cognate trades. The resolution passed at the NFETO confer-
ence in 1959 in favour of a review of structure had already
turned attention towards the possibilities of merger and interest
from the TUC served toEncourage developments in this area.
The need for a legal framework which would facilitate the
rationalisation of structure was part of the dilemma facing
trade unions at this time. ITew legislation was introduced in
1964 to this end. It provided that, where merger was to be
carried out on the basis of amalgamation only a 'simple majority
of the votes recorded' be required from each amalgamating
union (84). Elaborate provisions were made for the procedure
governing amalgamation, and the general intention was to encourage
mergers which might have failed to satisfy existing legal require-
ments. 72,ut merger was more often carried out by transfer of
engagements than by a full amalgamation, and.here too the
Trade Union (Amalgamations) Act of 1964 simplified matters.
';here previously two thirds of the merging union were required
to vote and to produce a majority in favour now only a simple
majority of those voting was required. Erocedural arrangements
similar to those governing a full amalgamation were laid down.
The effect was to concentrate attention on merger discussions,
since their outcome, if the question went to a ballot of the
members, was more likely to be attended by success (85).
The interest of TUC officials in the rationalisation of trade
union structure and the legislative initiatives which have been
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described reflected a wider c pncern with the probleD posed for
managerial control by multi—unionism. The immutability of
British trade union structure was contrasted with the enormous
changes carried through in other parts of Europe and not un-
commonly was identified by the press of the time with the
problems of British industry. The Donovan Commission recognised
the difficulties which would be associated with the c omplex task
of completely restructuring the British trade union movement.
Its recommendations followed those of the TUC insofar as they
confined proposals to a limited tidying up operation, and
rejected the notion of industrial unionism in the British con—
text (86). There is evidence that outside interest in trade
union structure generated some suspicion amongst trade union
leaders, that it was intended to undermine the strength of their
organisations.
the subject of "rationalisation" of Trade Union organisation
has been exploited in the rress by so many "industrial relations
experts" that by this time we should be convinced the only
possible development for the future will be the _conversion of
Trade Union organisation into a pale imitation of an Insurance
Company'. (87)
Yet officials within the building trade unions accepted by the
1960's that a reduction in the number of unions in that sector
was inevitable in the near future. ilecognition of the need for
mergers was encouraged by the climate of opinion in which multi—
unionism, joint shop stewards committees and unofficial strikes
seemed to be inextricably associated. The number of unofficial
stoppages as a proportion of all stoppages in construction was
high, although the number of workers involved in each stoppage
was fairly low.	 And the industry had had its share of large,
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well--)ubliciscd unofficial Erikes in which union di:cipline
had been called into question. (88). So, for those who were
intent upon reasserting the authority of central control and
of giving new life to the national machinery for collective
bargaining, merger arrangements could seem to be advantagcous.
And they were encouraged in this view by the Donovan Commission,
which singled out construction, together with engineering, for
special comment in respect of potential mergers. In both
areas, it was stated, there had been significant amalgamations
in recent years. But
'a number of mall but relatively powerful organisations have
chosen to stay aloof. It seems to us that it would be prac-
ticable as well as useful to work towards the goal of one or
at most two craft unions for the great bulk of craftsmen in
both industries.' (89)
Discussions on rationalisation within the building trade unions
were balanced by the moves toward centralisation on the part of
the employers.
	 Discussions within the UPT3TE from the early
1960's took in questions of technical and research work as well
as the administrative and negotiating machinery of that organi-
sation. (90)	 Dy 1964 consideration was to be given to the
formation of a single, unified body on the employers' side,
and a working party was set up to consider possible changes
in structure and organisation (91). The outcome, in 1969 was
a document entitled Plueprint 1969 which pointed the way for
modifications in structure which were introduced early in the
1970 1 s (92).
	
The awareness amongst union representatives of
discussions on the employers' side on this issue provided a
further incentive towards moves ontheir own behalf in regard to
structural change.
External influences may have —eighed heavily with trcle
leaders in respect of merger, hit it was the crisis in their
own membership returns which made rationalisation, at soro
level, inevitable.	 A major freoccupation for general secre-
taries of building trade unions over this period was the need
to arrest membership decline and stabilise finances. In report
after report the crisis in mcmbershin is outlined and although
its effects may not have been spread uniformly between unions,
it WE'S apparent in nearly all of them.
It is impossible to estimate accurately the im pact of this
decline in membership oh union density because of the diffi-
culty of cleaning the number of workers T emnloyed ! in each
trade in construction over this period. 	 Figures for wor'z.force
size in each trade have teen taken from the Census of :Population
for earlier decades, and are based on the 10Y sam ple from the
censuLes of 1961 and 1971.
	
In view of The sensitivity of the
question of 'labour—only' and the tax evasion associated with
such activities it is uncertain how reliable these figurer: are.
Yet it is clear that however inaccurate the following details
nu he, the general trend which is apparent from them was
fundamental to considerations of merger. In almost every
case trade union membership Fnd density declined (9D).

















Painters 2 71,981 335,850 21.4C'
Plasterers 3 16,890 47,340 35.7
Plumbers 52,161 167,980 31.0
Constr. Eng. 28,618 43,820 65.3J
_
-;lood. Mach. 27,477 58,560 46.9
1	 It is assumed that 10,000 members of the AUBTW are
labourers.
2 Joint membership of the Hat.Soc. Painters and the Scottish
3 Joint membership of the NAOP and the SKOPIT.
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1	 Total craft section of building trade group of Texer;/ was 1
13,192, including YAOPe:Scottisli slaters. :Lssuming slaters
remained static at pre-verger fig, of 2,000 then Plasterers
had over 11,000.
2. -Pigs supplied by C. Lovell, GS of Plumbers section of EE=.
3. Figs supplied by FTAT.
Accurate estimates of the size of the 'lump' cannot be gauged
for the construction industry as a whole, so they cannot be
proferred in terms of its effects on individual trades. It was
frequently noted that the bricklayers and the plasterers were
earliest and most seriously affected by labour—only, but this
does not mean that the other trades were exempt (95). By the
mid-60 , s George Smith vias emphasising the problems of member-
ship decline.	 The scope and intensity of merger discussions
was stepped up as officials endeavoured to confront the erosion
of their organisational base with adjusLments in union struc-
ture (96).
The financial situation of two of the three unions paralleled
the crisis in membership. ';ithin the AUBTCI and the .1. = the
instability of the union was mirrored in the deficits from year
to year.	 The AUBTW consistently operated at a deficit for
the first half of the decade. In 1966 the situation was recti-
fied and a small surplus was reported, but the advances wore lost
in 1967 when the deficit recurred. 2,.t the 40th. l'ational Del.
Conf. the union's auditor warned that there was an lunheclthy
financial situation'. In order to remedy the' situation a7treme
measures were taken during the following, year. The Kational
Delegate Conference was cancelled and was not reconvened until
1970. The education progranne of the union was abandoned and
officers and staff who left the service of the union were not
replaced. Despite all of this the union recorded L surplus for
1968 of a mere :34,400 — a measure of the crisis in their
operations. The iainters w120 in r. similarly scrim- rioT,itior
for their assets in Dec 1968 were smaller than they had bcen
at the end of the 1950's - falling from f,393,324.5.0 to
S584,055.0.10. The loss was greatest at the beginning of the
decade but there was a measure of stability after the merger
with the Scottish Painters Society, which could not however
lift the Iainters back to the level which they had Echieved in
1959. -lithin the Woodworkers the crisis was less marked.
There was a deficit of some Z25,000 in 1963 but a new contri-
bution rate was introduced in order to strengthen the financial
position.	 Between 1964 and 1969 this was reasonably healthy
and a surplus was repoiqed of income over expenditure in every
year. It is apparent that the Bricklayers at least could not
envisage the perpetuation of their individual existence for
financial reasons alone, whilst for the Painters financial
considerations were likely to be significant. By the end of
the 60's two of these major unions in construction could not
afford to pay the price for craft autonomy. (97)
Discussions on amalgamation saw three distinct phases during
the decade. Firstly there werecesultory negotiations follow-
ing the initiatives within the ITFIff0 on the ouestion of
structure. Secondly there were talks between unions recruit-
ing in cognate trades. And finally there 'ler° the discussions
at the end of the decade which ended with the division of
trade unionists in construction into two broad cam ,-)s - on
the one hand the craft based unions which were drawn into
UCATT FLA T and on the other, the general unions, which had
long-standing rights of recruitment in the building industry,
and who succeeded in attracting to their number a couple of
the smaller, craft based societies.
Genera discussions on stru 1;ural change took piaci, bete-rson
1960 and 1962.	 Following the resolution passed aL the
ITILTO's annual conference in 1959 a working party was set up
to study the problems and to re port back to conference.
Four meetings were held between 1960 and 1962 and it was
agreed that the existence of so many unions recruiting within
an area covered by one industrial agreement led to inefficiency,
and a dissipation of valuable resources through duplication of
efforts. The need for unification received, as it almost
always did, widespread support, but there was considerable
difference of opinion as to the way in which it should be
achieved. The negotiators agreed amalgamation was a long-term
aim, rather than an immediate possibility. 	 In a decision
which was reminiscent •of many past discussions it was estab-
lished that the most practical approach would be via d iccus-
sions amongst cognate trades (97). The similarity between this
and prst decisions was no accident. It was clear that George
Smith of the LF_;'i clung to the policy of his predecessors who
had for many years countered proposals for 'one Big Union' in
the building industry with the need to pursue mergers between
organisations recruiting amongst kindred trades, and had not
changed. Ostensibly this derived from the fact that 'at least
one third of our membershir) finds its employment outside the
construction industry' (98). In Practice it had more connec-
tion with the fact that the major woodworking unions repreen-
ted a bigger and richer catch for the P C' , than the other
tradesmen in construction (99).
	
Three groupings were set out
as the basis for discussions; the woodworkers, the building
section (comprising the painters and the general 'iorkerr),
and the metal trades. Extensive negotiations were pursued
within the first two groups and their ramifications were
important in moulding the sh 7Te of the 'one big union' which
finPlly emerged.
The Voodworkin Unions
There were three major organisations drawn together within
negotiations on merger for the woodworking unions — the
ASW, the AS ,ATI and the 'TUFT°. Additionally there were four
smaller societies; the Union of Basket, Cane and Fibre Furniture
Makers, the Coopers !
 Federation, the United French 'Polishers
Society and the Yational Union of Packing Case Makers. The
first merger which was concluded linked the 7UPCM to the ASW.
Sam Reading had been U.S of the NUPOM for over 10 years and
during that time he had, confronted the difficulties of sustain-
ing a small organisation.
	
The union was facing financial
problems and its Annual Report for 1965 indicated that !once
again ! there was a drop in total assets.	 The union's super-
annuation fund and the full—time officers ! pension fund both
showed a deficit and there seemed to be little prospect of
reversing the downward trend. George Smith offered to take
over the 5 full—time officials of the YUPCM, allowing permanent
appointments to Sam Reading and his AGS. The YUPOK were to be
allocated a position within the delegations to the TUC, LP and
major negotiating bodies.	 The offer was too good to refuse
and Reading hastened to transfer engagements into the AS':.
The merger was conducted under the _Act of 1940, during 1964
and so a two thirds vote in favour was required of the member-
ship. Some 5,294 ballot papers were issued and 2,196 !yes!
votes were needed in return.Ko closing date was stipulated and
Rea0ing successfully pulled in 2,118 votes — just 73 short of
the statutory two—thirds. Finally he concluded that the vote
could not be achieved. He appealed to the Registrar to allow
the merger to be concluded despite the shortfall in the voting.
Permission was duly given and the transfer was made on 1
Rnuary 1965 (100).
A first meeting of the larger woodworking group was held early
in 1963, but because of the major dis pute of that year it was
not followed up, in any serious way, until a meeting was celled
under the auspices of the TUC in Iarch1964,.(101)	 At thEt
meeting George Smith, GS of the ATI, indicated that his union
had, for many years, favoured merger with cognate trades. It
was apparent at the outset that the other two large woodworking
unions were not ready to abandon their autonomy in favour of
merger along these lines. Indeed the AS ,Ild leadership claimed
to be bound by a resolution of their own annual conference in
1961 opposing amalgamation in any form, and it was clear from
their contributions to discussions th f3,t they were unwilling to
be assimilated in any take—over bid which might be made
Ceorge Smith.	 The GS of the :UFTO
	
Tomkins indicated 3
reluctance to accept merger via a transfer of engagements, although
he suggested that proposals for merger into a new union would
meet with a more Positive reception (102).
The three unions were divide0 by fundamental . nuestions of
structure and political outlook. The
	
was the only one of
the three to have a full—time T1Kecutive, and despite modifica-
tions to its district and management committee structure, it
retained in essence, the form of organisation which it had
adopted at its inception in 1921. By contrast the	 had
a structure and political outlook more akin to the IUDTW than
the J.S. It had a lay Executive of seven members, each one
representing a geographical district, elected by the membership
of that district for a period of three years. The supreme
authority of the union was jointly vested in the EC and the
annual conference, whose delegates were elected from the
districts. Elections took r_'_ce by ballot within foe bra-aches
and like the AUSTW they were a more radical body than the %:=;T
(103).	 The rUFTO was divided both into trade groups and into
geographical areas. Its lay C of 18 members was elected
according to trade groups within a particular geographical area
for a period of three years.	 The GS and the two assistant
GS's were elected every five years by ballot of1he whole of
the membership. Organisers were elected both within trade
groups and within the union's fourteen districts, outside of
Iondon, where district organisers were elected from within
trade groups.
	
The union's supreme authority was its biennial
delegate conference, to - whichcklegates were sent from branches.
Otherwise voting was undertaken by postal ballot, with the
ballot slip sent direct from the individual member to the
scrutineer. The NUFTO's general secretary, f lf Tomkins had
held office since 1942 and although in political outlook he
was far from radical, his adherence to the structure of the
1UPT0 was not likely to assist the process of merger. 	 further
meeting on trade union structure With respect to the wood-
working trades was held at Congress House in Lay 195 to con-
sider the General Council's recommendation that the three
main unions be asked to consider the possibilities of forming
a single union. It was agreed in princi ple at that meeting
that merger of the three bodies was desirable.
	
But this
went nowhere near to reaching th3 prctical arrangements which
were necessary if the principle was to become a reality (104).
Central to the problems regarding the projected amalgaroetion
was the role and attitude of the 7eneral secretaries of the
three organisations. George smith, 7.; of the "SI seems to
have been committed to the notion of al paga:lation between
woodworking unions. Yet his manner and style of operation,
especially	 relation to
	 r_Llomkins of the : -UPT0,1 1.:.y not
always have been such as to further progress in that direction.
It	 not simply that a Per;-:onality clash could disrupt talks
on merger. Rather it was the longer—standing rivalry beti,.lecn
Smith and Tomkins which meant, at the outset, that the two
men, both of them ambitious and capable of being blunt to the
point of rudeness, were unlikely to trust each other in such
a situation. Their past rivalry in respect of a seat on the
General Council of the TUC (which was won by Smith) had
soured relations, and there was nothing in the merger proPosals
which was likely to sweeten them (105). Smith, the younger
man, could expect, as leader of the largest of the three
unions, to assume the position of GS of any merged society
which might be brought into existence. But Alf Tomkins,
although, now past retirement 	 shoed no signs of retiring —
and indeed the rules of the T7UFTO did not • set a retirement
date for any of its officials (106). It was altogether unlikely
that he would agree to a merger in which he took second place
to Smith. Personality problems were less severe in relation
to the GS of the AS'.11•1, Charlie Stewart. A Scotsman, like
Smith, he was on reasonably friendly terms with Smith._'_nd sincet
AM.11.1 required that its officials retire at the age of 65,
Stewart's retirement was due in 1972 not too far distant and
the moment might then seem to be suspicious for talks of
fusion. But like the other General. Secretaries Stewart Irra
not immune from considerations of personal status and security.
Lis position on the BC of the ITFBT0, which was held with voting
support from the 	 the larg-est society in the .?cderation
carried certain prestigious trips and financial inducements,
and Stewart must have been aware that negotiations with tile
11117TO in preference to the :_S"." might alienate this support from .
the Woodworkers. Moreover it was well known that Stewart
intended to return to Edinburgh on his retirement and it was
likely that he would favour merger arrangements which would
facilitate this move at an earlier date (107).
From 1965 until 1967 negotiations took place on a tripartite
or a joint basis between these organisations. At some points
all of them were meeting together, whilst at others discussions
took place between two of the three parties. The responsibility
for merger arrangements rested very much with the general
secretaries of the three unions, often through informal meet-
ings (108). The fact that there were three societies represen-
ted in the talks complicated matters, since it was apparent
that any two of those unions, once consolidated, would represent
a bloc against which the position of the third would be
weakened. Both Tomkins and Smith pushed merger proposals which
were likely to strengthen their own positions through the con-
solidation of their respective unions. And both of them put
up proposals designed to capture the heart and the membership
of the ASWM. Tomkins never moved far from the existing
NUFTO rulebook which, because of its trade group structure,
seemed to provide for the equitable representation of the
different sections of a merged organisation (109). Moreover
since Tomkins was already elected by all of the membership,
the structure did not threaten his position, whilst it would
work against a man who was known and supported from within
only one or two of the trade groups. Smith was ready to accept
a trade group structure provided it gave full weighting to the
woodworkers which was warranted by their numbers - a move which
would lend support to the continuation of his own position
within the new union. The amalgamation was seen as the means
to revisions to the internal organisation of the ASW which
could not hitherto be achieved. The scheme which was drawn
up by Les Wood AGS of the ASW provided for regional organisa-
tion and the abolition of the District and Management Committee
structure — moves which had failed in the bid for approval by
the ASW membership in the early 50 1 s. It was intended that
methods advocated by the right wing of the ASW could be incor-
porated into the pattern of government of a merged society —
postal ballots (which already operated within NUFTO) and the
appointment of full—time officials (with the justification that
this was necessary if all of the trades were to be represented
at all levels) (110). -
The NUFTO general secretary made more headway than Smith over
the early period of negotiations with the ASWM, that is from
the meeting at the TUC in May 1965 through until April or May
1967. The principal points concerning amalgamation were set
out for consideration by February 1966 (111). By the end of
that year negotiations appeared to be approaching a successful
conclusion. A Trade Group for woodcutting machinists was to be
established within the merged union, including all NUFTO
machinists as well as existing members of the'ASWM. The trade
group was to have its own National Committee and National
Secretary, and the existing ASWM EC would be added to the
existing EC of the NUFTO, so that the new Executive would total
25 members. The ASWM had secured priority for their members
in access to employment and generally the NUFTO GS indicated
a willingness to compromise in order to assimilate the smaller
organisation (112). It seems likely that Smith intervened to
put an end to the proposals. As negotiations advanced during
the summer of 1966 renewed initiatives on amalgamation were
made from the ASW towards the NUFTO. This was done in two
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ways. Firstly, through the offices of the TUC attempts Were
made to revive the tripartite discussions on merger. And
secondly the ASWM (prompted most likely by the ASW) contacted
the NUFTO EC to indicate that they would be willing to attend
a joint meeting of - representatives of all three unions (113).
It seems likely that the GS of the ASW would be concerned,
either to win one or both of the other parties for a larger
merger, or at least to put an end to a merger which would ex-
clude the ASW and thereby weaken their position for future
amalgamation discussions in this direction. Provided that a
merger between the NUFTO and the ASWM could be prevented the
options for the ASW were still open. In view of the position
of Charlie Stewart, as an EC member of the NFBTO, supported by
the ASW, he was vulnerable to pressure from that quarter if he
was to maintain his position. This it has been suggested is
the explanation for the action of Stewart in curtailing negotia-
tions in the Spring of 1967.
The consolidation of the Woodworking Unions was a priority for
the GS of the ASW. It did not preclude a merger with unions in
the building trades. But in view of their. long standing pro-
blems within the AUBTW, amalgamation with the ASWM and the
NUFTO took precedence over merger with the Bricklayers. There
was little progress made on amalgamation between woodworking
unions in the mid-60's. The most notable success was the
transfer of engagements of the National Union of Packing Case
Makers into the ASW on January 1 1965 (114). Otherwise the
protracted discussions seemed to have reached an impasse. By
1967 the membership crisis could not be ignored. Its effects
were more widely felt than within the woodworking unions alone,
and in response to the threatened collapse of organisation in
this sector, more wide—ranging and urgent talks were initiated.
The Building Unions 
following the recommendations of the NFBTO's Working Party on
Amalgamation that discussions should take place between unions
recruiting in kindred trades, meetings were called of unions
in the building and-trowel trades. Seven unions were brought
together — the AUBTW, the Amalgamated Slaters and Tilers
(ASTRO), the Amalgamated Union of Asphalt Workers, the NAOP,
the Scottish Slaters, Tilers, Roofing and Cement Workers, the
Scottish Plasterers Unions and the National Society of Street
Masons, Paviars and Roodmakers. The Amalg. Soc. of Painters and
Decorators, who were represented at the first meetings were
reluctant to be involved-in this grouping, although they declared
themselves to be generally in favour of amalgamation and so
negotiations were confined to those unions listed above (115).
Of these the AUBTW was by far the largest. With a membership
of some 78,000 it numbered more than all of the others put
together, and the major difficulty which it encountered was the
feeling amongst representatives of the smaller unions that the
discussions were about take—over rather than merger.
Iowthian, GS of the AUBTW was concerned to absorb within that
union as many of the smaller societies as could be persuaded
to accept amalgamation. The consolidation of the trowel trades
promised to strengthen his bargaining position in merger talks
with the ASW or the Painters and although initially an 'indus-
trial union' was out of the question because the last two
societies would not participate in negotiations, he proposed
that a 'general union for building workers' could be established.
This formula was loose Enough to Extend to the Woodworkers or
the Painters if required, although it was raised at first in
the context of discussions between the trowel trades (116). As
a means of placating the sensibilities of the leaders of the
smaller societies, who might feel that the interests of their
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members would be ignored in he 'general union' it was pilo-
posed that trades groups be established. 	 The main objectives
during the months preceding the passage of new legislation on
trade union amalgamation in 1964 seems to have been to con-
tinue discussions. ' Proposals to farm a 'holding union' into
which other unions might transfer were unlikely to reach
fruition, when by a simple majority ballot in the smaller
society a merger could be effected via a transfer of engage-
ments from one society to another. It was clear that leaders
of the AUBTW had no serious intention of renouncing their
identity as the largest of the trowel trade unions in favour
of a structure which would allow disproportionate weight to
the views of other trades. As President of the TUC in the
year that the statutory changes were made, Lowthian was clearly
aware of their import. And from the time that they were
passed the emphasis by AUBTW representatives within negotia-
tions reverted to the question of a transfer of engagements,
by the smaller unions into the AUBTW (118).
It was the Plasterers who were the most attractive of the
smaller societies, as far as the AUBTW were concerned.
Although their membership had suffered a drastic decline since
the second world war, they still had some 11,844 members in
1965, and as such were the largest of the building group,
apart from the AUBTW. Yet no agreement could be reached with
them concerning arrangements for a transfer of engagements.
The major problem was the right to representation on the EC
of the AUBTW. The Plasterers claimed the right to three seats
within a merged society, but the EC of the AUBTW offered only
two. The national officers of the AUBTW were prepared to
concede the point, but the union's Executive, especially
Communist Party members on the EC, were reluctant to change
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the number and political balance of their society to this
extent (119). The officials of ths AUBTW pursued the matter
with the NAOP until August 1967, but by that time the dimen-
sions of negotiations had been dramatically altered by the
intervention of the T&GWU (120).
In the meantime the Scottish Plasterers Union had agreed to
transfer their engagements to the NAOP from 1 Jan 1967 (121).
The merger of the Scottish JCBI into the NJCBI for England
and Wales encouraged the rationalisation of trade union struc-
ture within the three countries. The Scottish Plasterers
Union was not large - they claimed some 3,960 members in
1965, but the transfer of engagements resulted in an enlarged
organisation, covering England, Scotland and Wales, with a
membership of around 13,000. The GS and the three full-time
officials of the aPU were taken over within the merged
society (122).
The reluctance of the Plasterers to subsume their identity
within the AUBE,/ was not shared by the other small societies.
Both the Street Masons and Paviors and the .ASTRO merged into
that union on the basis of transfer of engagements. In the
case of the Street Masons and Paviors a ballot vote failed to
produce the required majority in favour, but as a consequence
of an enquiry held by the Registrar of Friendly Societies, a
special dispensation was granted to allow the transfer to
proceed. It was finally effected on 1 Jan 1967 (123). They
were followed, on 31 Mar 1969 by the ASTRO, taking in an
additional 2,000 members (124).
The Painters remained outside these discussions, since their
departure from the group in 1964. They had argued then that
they were in the wrong group, since their interests were far
closer to the woodworkers than to the trowel trade (125).
Both the ASW and the ASP&D had a substantial proportion of
their membership in ship-building and repair. The Painters
had a tradition of allegiance to, and alignment with the ASW.
It was the painters who had benefited most from the Federationts
old policy of one rate for the building industry, since it
was they who were most likely to receive a lower rate. And
it was the painters who most needed to assert their identity
as craftsmen, who lined up beside the woodworkers whose craft
status had not, in the test been called into question. A.
Austin, GS of the Painters, could, on the one hand, declare his
union's support for the principle of industrial unionism - a
form of organisation which would draw together craftsmen and
labourers into one, all-embracing union for their industry.
And on the other he could cite the building trades group as
inappropriate for his members, since it comprised unions
recruiting labourers (126). The distinction between negotiating
groups for woodworkers and for building, or trowel trades was
a matter of concern insofar as it threatened to divide union
members within the craft unions in construction into two camps,
and on this basis the painters would not participate in the
early round of discussions on amalgamation between cognate
trade unions in the building and trowel trades. Austin was
not enthusiastic about relations with George Smith, whose atti-
tudes both personally and politically he found unattractive
(127). But he was in any case precluded from opening serious
negotiations with the ASW at this time because of their involve-
ment in discussions with the NUFTO and the ASWM. The ASW EC
would be unlikely to jeopardize negotiations with other wood-
working unions to associate itself with its poor relations
in the ASP&D (128).
It was during this period that the ASP&D was successfully con-
solidated throughout England, Wales and Scotland. The Scot-
tish Painters Society had retained their separate existence,
and a membership of 12,000 until 1 January 1963 when they
transferred engagements to the Amalgamated Society. Under the
partial alteration to rules which was associated with this
move the Scottish Executive Council assumed the status of
Divisional Council within the merged structure. And the Scot-
tish Society was allocated a seat on the Painters EC for the
provisional period of one year after which their member, Danny
Crawford, was successfully re-elected (129). The General
Council too was enlarged to 11 members, providing 2 additional
places for former members of the SPS (130). Politically the
two societies were not dissimilar, since both had a small
OP presence, represented within the Scottish society by two
members out of ten on the union's lay Executive Council. And
practically, affairs were facilitated by the degree of
autonomy which seemed to be allowed to the Scottish Divisional
Council. Difficulties arose after the merger, since there
was inadequate provision made for relations between the
Scottish Divisional Council, who were sensitive at the loss
of their former position as an EC, and the Area Committee (131).
But affairs were smoothed over by the liaison of the Divisional
Committee and the national Executive, and in practice there
was little that could be done by the Scottish leaders once
the merger was completed. The enlarged society went on to
absorb local organisations in Liverpool and Southport (132).
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The schemes for amalgamation which were set in motion by
initiatives from the NFBTO and the TUC in the early 60's
were not conspicuously successful. Of the two major groups
which have been considered here, there had, by 1967 been
only partial successes within the building/trowel trades group,
whilst the major societies within the woodworking group seemed
to be as far apart as ever. If the period was important at all,
it was in defining the problems of amalgamation. After the
1964 Act, General Secretaries of the various organisations
had enormous power to set out and arrange support for alliances
which required only a simple majority of members voting to
cast their ballot in favour, in the case of the smaller society.
Yet as long as there was no major decision taken, the situation
remained fluid and parties to negotiations were reluctant to
commit themselves to structures whichlhey had so painstakingly
set out on paper. The changes of this period did no more
than consolidate the existing scope of organisations. The
breakdown of the rationale behind craft organisation was
threatened. But leaders of the craft societies were not about
to commit personal or organisational suicide. It was inter-
vention from another quarter which brought _about their speedy
demise.
One Big Union?
It was the attentions paid to craft workers in construction
from the T&GW's national headquarters at Transport House
which pushed craft unions in that sector towards their hasty
marriage of convenience. The threat of encroachment by the
large general unions had been recognised from their inception
and the Perth Agreement was concluded in order to provide for
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jurisdictional arrangements between the craft and the general
unions. The absorbtion of the NBL&CWS by the AUBTW in 1952
had jeopardized existing arrangements and was resented by
officials of the T&GWU who felt that the craft unions were
trespassing on their preserve. The breakdown of skills blur-
red the edges of craft distinctions, whilst the emergence of
new specialised occupations widened the scope for recruitment
into the general unions. By the early 1960's fears were
expressed that the general unions might devour the craft
organisations and a sense that the T&GWU in particular was
looking for expansion in their direction concentrated the
attention of craft officials on the matter of structural change
(133).
The impetus for expansion, both through increasing membership
and via mergers was boosted within the T&GWU by the arrival
of Jack Jones at Transport House in 1963, when he assumed
office as Assistant Executive secretary. From the days of
Bevin the T&G had thrived on the policy of expansion through
mergers, and the process was understood and encouraged by
Jones during his time in office. Within the Building Trades
Group, Les Kemp, the Group Secretary was an energetic character
who worked to build the T&G's empire through two, parallel
policies. Firstly recruitment within the craft area was
stepped up and secondly approaches were made to a number of
craft organisations in construction with a view to their trans-
fer of engagements into the T&GW. (134) Within the EC of the
ASW there was some concern at the moves by the T&GW into the
field of craft organisation in competition with their own
society (135). And there was a growing awareness that the
difficulties facing the smaller societies would impel them
into amalgamation however much they might dislike the fact.
'Should this situation develop it will be the General Unions
who will be coming to the rescue'. (136)
The decisive move was made by the leadership - and particu-
larly by Albert Dunne, the General Secretary, of the NAOP.
By the gamer of 1967 it was apparent that talks between the
NAOP and the AUBTW had made little progreJs. Approaches had
also been made by the ASW and the Plasterers' Executive agreed
to meet officials of the ASW for further discussions (137).
Relations between Dunne and members of the ASW EC had been
soured by events at the NFBTO conference in 1966. The death
of Hugh Kelly, Gen. Sec. of the Plumbers Union, had left a
vacancy for the position of Vice-President of the NFBTO. Two
nominations were made for the position - Glyn Lloyd of the
ASP&D and Albert Dunne of the Plasterers. Dunne was, at
this time, the senior members of the Central (formerly the
Executive) Council, but he failed to receive a majority in
the election, and in consequence the post fell to Glyn Lloyd
(138). Dunne's humiliation was completed by the election
for the Federation EC. There were just 8 candidates for the
7 places, with Dunne the senior member of the retiring
Executive. Clearly one of the candidates had to be defeated
and it was Dunne who was at the bottom of the poll (139).
The votes cast by the various unions are not recorded in the
printed accounts of the Federation conference, but it seems
that Dunne expected to receive the support of the ASW and
that, as a result of machinations within their EC, this was
not forthcoming (140). It is likely that his view of the
craft organisations - and of the ASW in particular, was jaun-
diced by this event. Members of the ASW Executive suggested
that his disenchantment enccuraged him to respond to initia-
tives from the T&GW regarding the establishment of a craft
section within their Building Trade Group (141). The Plasterers
could not hope to retain their autonomy for much longer in
view of the severe financial problems from which they were
suffering. By 1967 it was apparent that payment of the super-
annuation benefit to all of those who were currently members
of that group might have to be suspended (142). The union had
suffered especially badly from the effects of labour-only,
and membership and financial stability were eroded as a result.
It is not therefore surprising that when approaches were
made by the T&GW concerning closer relations between the
two organisations, they received a positive response from the
Plasterers' Executive (143). Discussions proceeded rapidly
and every effort seems to have been made, by T&GW officials,
to bring them to a successful conclusion. Prank Cousins and
Jack Jones personally met the Plasterers lay EC and promised
to honour the payment of superannuation benefit and funeral
benefit for widows of former members - a liability which, over
the ensuing 10 years, was likely to be far in excess of the
Plasterers' existing assets (144). Albert Dunne was made a
national secretary (145) and it can be assumed that satisfactory
arrangements were made for his retirement which was not too
far off.
The outcome of the negotiations was the transfer of engage-
ments of the NAOP to the T&GWU in 1968. The move was an
important one for the T&GWU since it gave them for the first
time a toe-hold within the craft ranks of construction. It
represented a final breach with the principles of the Perth
Agreement in that a Craft Section was set up within the T&G's
Building Trades Group and henceforth that union formally
claimed the right to recruit imongst the skilled as well as
semi-skilled and unskilled construction workers. It threw
panic into the craft unions, where the new development was
anything but welcome.	 If one craft organisation could accept
a place within the largest general union - and the Plasterers
Union was by no means the smallest of the trade societies - what
would happen to the rest? Discussions were intensified in a
bid to prevent complete capitulation to the T&GW. In the
words of Jim Mills, President of the NFBTO in 1968:
'there is much more activity in this field than for some
time ... events are taking place so quickly that it is very,
very essential that we should close our ranks, and I am saying
to this conference, will you please do all you can to see that
we get closer together ... It does not need much vision on
the part of the delegates present to see what the'trend is.;
at the moment, and the trend at the moment disturbs me con-
siderably.' (146)
The trend was followed very rapidly by the Scottish Slaters,
a small society (with only 2,250 members) which recruited more
widely than their name suggested. Tommy McAlmont, their General
Secretary, was a particularly able man, and it is not impos-
sible that he was attracted by the prospects of improving his
personal position with a society in which promises could be
made regarding future appointments in a way in which they
could not in an organisation where official position was
achieved, at least in the first instance, by election (147).
T&GW officials were busy canvassing other unions with a view to
picking off the smaller societies and isolating the ASW.
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Approaches were made to the A STRO and to the other union
which had been involved in negotiations with the AUBTW (148).
The AUBTW Executive, concerned at these developments, approached
both the ASW and the ASP&D and the NUFTO asking for informal
discussions on the - question of closer unity to counter the
initiatives from the T&G (149). It was clear that the T&G-W
was widening the scope of its recruitment in an attempt to
build its craft section and disputes between unions connected
with appropriate spheres for recruitment were taken to the
TUC disputes machinery as a consequence (150).
Matters were complicated by the political differences which
prevailed within the craft unions. Leaders of those unions
were unlikely to seek a home within the ranks of the large
general unions. For the general secretaries whose retirement
was not imminent, there was a reluctance to accept the loss
of status which might be involved in a move to a union which
was so much largthr than their own. Communist Party members
revised their views on amalgamation in response to the 'left
face' taken by leaders of the T&GWU. The repudiation of the
'black circular' which prohibited members of the Communist Party
from holding full—time positions with the organisation encoura-
ged the view that a move to the T&GW might be advantageous,
but attitudes varied according to the prevailing outlook of
the union in which Communist Party members were located. A
merger with the T&GW was a different proposition for a Communist
member of the AUBTW than it was for Communists within the ASW.
Further attention will be given to the influence of political
attitudes on the process of structural change within the
mergers which went to make up the UCATT. But it is apparent
that, as far as the T&GW were concerned, the identification of
Jones with the 'left' was a factor which encouraged a new
interest from that direction in amalgamation into the T&GW.
Jack Jones also hoped to win over the Constructional Engineer-
ing Union, a body which retained an unusually stable membership
by contrast with the other building trade unions. The two
unions had been in direct competition for scaffolders for many
years, and amalgamation would have resolved the conflict over
recruitment in this area (151). It was partly because of that
conflict that leaders of the CEU preferred to negotiate with
the AEUF. An agreement was reached which provided formally for
amalgamation but which allowed the CEU to retain a considerable
measure of autonomy in the conduct of its affairs. The Foundry
Workers had already been associated with the AEU in a similar
arrangement and in 1970 the CEU was attached to the AUEF as a
distinctive grouping known as the Construction Section. This
was only a semi-merger and the CEU retained a substantial
measure of autonomy. Politics played a part in the merger for
the leadership of the CEU were on the left, and favoured a
merger with the AEU where Hugh Scanlon was then General Secre-
tary. But insofar as the choice was between two unions both of
which claimed a left leadership, the issue was decided with
reference to past hostilities between the CEU and the T&GWU.
(152)
Just before the CEU transferred engagements into the AUEF, the
Plumbers Trade Union merged with the Electrical Trades Union to
form the Electrical Electronic Telecommunication and Plumbing
Union. Both the ETU and the PTU were on the fringes of the
building trades, with a substantial proportion of their members
in other areas. The first moves towards amalgamation had taken
place in 1963, when informal discussion were held between Dave
Fraser, an Executive member of the Plumbers and Frank Chapple,
of the ETU. The PTU was a craft-based organisation, which had
opened up membership to labourers, only in the 1950's. Like
other craft-based unions in construction the Plumbers organisa-
tion had been undermined by the 'lump' and rates negotiated at
national level had ceased to be relevant to earnings. They were
affiliated to the NFBTO on the basis of roughly 30,000 members
and their GS, Hugh Kelly had for several years been its Presi-
dent. The Plumbers had two seats on the NJCBI and like the
other building trades they were committed to the principle of
one craft rate (153).
The ETU had abandoned that principle, following internal up-
heavals which led to the Communist dominated Executive being
ousted in the early 60's for ballot rigging. The new, right-
wing leadership confronted the chaotic situation within the
electrical contracting industry by reformulating bargaining
arrangements and wage structure, creating three grades of skill
each with its corresponding rate (154). Amalgamation with the
ETU meant for the Plumbers, acceptance of the right-wing political
orientation of that union and endorsement of the new approach
to wage bargaining which broke with the longstanding principle
of the one craft rate. Both unions had a full-time EC, with
5 members in the PTU and 11 members in the ETU. Merger was
effected on the basis of a full amalgamation, requiring a ballot
of members of both unions and the creation of a new rule-book.
The new union provided for an enlarged Executive comprising all
of the former Executive Councillors of the ETU as well as the
GS Charlie Lovell, and two EC members of the Plumbers, other
members of the EC of that union having retired. All EC members
were to be full-time officials and held office for a period of
five years. The provisions of the new union were designed to
centralise control and authcrity and to create a body of full-
time officials which owed its allegiance essentially to the EC.
A novel feature of the amalgamated union was the provision that
full-time officers - organisers and officials at national and
area level should be appointed by the EC after September 22
1969. Previously officials in both unions had been subject to
election and to regular re-election (155).
	
Chapple had
consistently advocated the appointment of officials and the
amalgamation provided him with the opportunity of implementing
this change. The rules incorporated the existing provision of
the ETU rulebook that full-time officials should not be members
of the Communist Party.- Not surprisingly the left was opposed
to a merger which promised to place power firmly and per-
manently with the right-wing leadership of the ETU. Although a
measure of autonomy was allowed for trade purposes through the
medium of a national Electrical Committee and a national Plumbing
Committee it was clear that it was the ECof the EETPU, led by the
GS which would have authority on key issues of government and
policy. The amalgamation was opposed by the left in both
unions. The Communist Party was influential in certain dis-
tricts within the PTU - in London, Glasgow, Dundee and Liverpool,
although the right wing could count on support from Yorkshire
and East Anglia.	 In the ETU the left had suffered major set-
backs only a few years earlier b ecause of ballot rigging by
Communists, hat there was still a strong left-wing base from
which opposition to the merger could be sustained. In practice
the leadership had only to win a simple majority of those voting
for amalgamation to proceed - not a difficult proposition for
a union leadership which had all of the publicity machinery of
the organisation at its disposal. A sizeable majority in favour
of amalgamation was recorded within the PTU, but in the ETU
the amalgamation was approved, by only a slim margin (156).
The large vote against amalE-mation was fundamentally a 'tote
against the impending centralisation. Nevertheless the statu-
tory requirements had been observed and amalgamation could
proceed. The EETPU came into being in June 1968 with a total
membership of over 350,000. The PTU continued its affiliation
to the NFBTO until 1971, but subsequently adjusted its bargain-
ing arrangements in line with the precedent set by the ETU.
The new union was founded on the basis of a right—wing political
identity and an internal machine which vested power in the hand
of the leading officials and Executive members. Its bargaining
practice broke with the traditions of the one craft rate. The
electricians and the plumbers had consolidated their position in
a way which set them apart from the building trade unions.
The Painters made the first significant move towards a wider
amalgamation. Following the declaration of their GS that they
did not wish to participate in merger discussions with the
Bricklayers' group in 1964, informal talks were initiated with
the ASW (157).	 The leadership of that union was preoccupied
atthis time by negotiations with the other woodworking unions,
who represented a far richer catch than the Amalg. Soc. of
Painters and Decorators.	 Negotiations proceeded in a desultory
fashion through 1966 and the early months of 1967. A joint
meeting of thetwo Executives was held in April 1966 in which
it was agreed that closer unity or fusion of the two organisa-
tions was possible, and this was followed up with a further
joint meeting in which a more detailed comparison of the two
rulebooks was made (158). It was not until the breakdown of
talks between the woodworking unions, and the initiation of
talks between the NAOP and the T&GWU that attention was concen-
trated, within the ASW EC, on the possibilities of concluding
a merger with the painters. Between June 1967 and May 1968
several meetings were held and consideration was given to the
detailed matters which must be decided before fusion could
be effected (159).
	
The progress of negotiations by 1968 was
reflected by the presence of A. Auatin of the Painters on the
platform of the ASW conference and by the end of the year a
statement of intent had been agreed for publication (160).
The ASP&D transferred its engagements to the ASW on 1 Jan 1970.
This meant that the ASP was assimilated into the ASW on the
basis of the Woodworkers' existing rules, with alterations
merely to provide for the incorporation of the administrative
machinery of the smaller union. The ASP&D was to hand over its
entire assets to the Woodworkers, and the whole of its member-
ship would be transferred to that union. Members of the ASP&D
could opt to continue paying their existing contributions, or
they could accept payment and benefits on the basis of the
provisions of the ASW rulebook, but this decision had to be
made within one year of the transfer. Thereafter entrance
could be solely on the basis of the ASW rulebook. All members
of the ASP&D, on transfer, would have credited to them their
membership of that union, such that they would not be disadvan-
taged by the transfer. It was accepted that branches of the
Painters and Decorators would continue to function, although
wherever it proved administratively practicable small groups
of painters and decorators might be accepted into branches of
woodworkers. The ASW guaranteed that the Painters would con-
tinue to be represented on such bodies as the NFBTO, the TUC,
and at the Labour Party conference. It was also accepted that
full-time officers of the Painters would continue to function
after the tansfer on terms no less favourable than those on
which they were currently evDloyed, their numbers to be adjusted
over time by natural wastage. Key office staff were retained,
and the ASP&D Trust Deed Pension Fund was to be honoured, where
this was preferred to the ASW's Retiring Allowance Fund. (161)
As regards provision for the ASP&D on the governing bodies of
the merged society, it was established that the five members of
the full-time EC of the Painters at the date of transfer should
become members of the EC of the ASW, but that they should not be
replaced until the number of painters on that body was less than
• three, as a result of retirement, resignation or death. The
General Secretary of the ASP&D was to hold office as secretary
of the Painters and Decorators Section of the ASW, to be
followed on his retirement by the Assistant General Secretary
(162).
Both structurally and politically, the transfer of engagements
of the ASP&D into the ASW was straight forward. Both unions
had full-time Executive Councils; both were subject to deci-
sions of policy making conferences (163); and both had an
existing structure of area or district and management committees.
The ASP&D was well endowed with officials, but numbers would diminir
through retirement.	 Officials of the Painters' union were
unlikely to suffer by the process, firstly since they could
expect their pay and conditions 41-1. be brought into line with
their more affluent colleagues	 the ASW, and secondly because
the ASW pension scheme was superior to their own (164). A.
Austin, the General Secretary, was on the brink of retirement
and so there was no contestant from the Painters for senior
office within the new union. And it proved possible toexpand
the General Council to include both Woodworkers and Painters.
The Painters had always pictured the joiners as being stronger
industrially, than they were themselves, and there was no fear,
amongst the leadership of that union that they could not get
the deal accepted. Its success depended, ultimately, on the
fact that it did not operate to their personal disadvantage.
Yet George Smith and the leadership of the ASW took the oppor-
tunity to revise their structure in accordance with past propo-
sals for constitutional reform.	 This move had nothing to do
with the amalgamation as such, and everything to do with the
consolidation of power in the hands of the union's Executive
Council. Regionalisation had long been the aim of the ASW's
general sec, and EC. It preceded Smith and his colleagues, but
it had been adopted by them as a means of undermining the auto-
nomy of the Management Committees whose independence was often
maintained at the expense of the union's central authority.
New proposals for a regional structure, reminiscent of those
which had been brought forward in the late 40's, were put to the
membership late in 1969. They were not approved and George
Smith decided to hold a second ballot, to include members of
the ASP&D who had, by now voted to transfer engagements to the
ASW. (165)	 The second ballot went in favour of regionalisation
by 16,237 votes to 14,175. The effect was to abolish the old
district and management committees, which provided an alternative
power base for activists from the sites. In their place were
established twelve Regional Councils, which were to meet only
once every six months, elected from divisions within the
region. A Regional Committee was elected from the Regional
Council to meet on a monthly basis. Biennial conferences were
to replace the union's annual delegate conference, and a
regional conference was to alternate with the full delegate
conference. Regional secretaries were to be appointed by the EC
(166).	 Insofar as the proccss of regionalisation was associated
with the amalgamation of the Painters and the Woodworkers, mem-
bers of the ASW were given no opportunity to counter the propo-
sals, or the inclusion of painters in the ballot, since the
merger was carried out on the basis of transfer of engagements.
And voting on the transfer by the painters had, in any case
been completed before the second vote on regionalisation (167).
The Regional structure strengthened the hold of the EC over the
activists at local level, through their influence with regional
secretaries.	 Their influence with regional organisers too
was strengthened, since the latter were permanently confirmed
in their position after theirsecond election to office and
were therefore less reliant on the membership. The new struc-
ture carried with it, as it was intended to do, the means of
weakening the influence of activists on site, whose power base
had been located in the District and Management Cttees. And
in doing so it gave a new boost to the central authority of
the union's Executive Council.
Politically the new structure, both the incorporation of the
ASP&D and the associated process of Regionalisation, asserted
the influence of the right wing.	 The EC of the Painters, like
that of the ASW were solidly on the right although the CP were
an established presence within the London DC. There had been
differences of opinion within the Painters, which had resulted
in a number of legal battles with the Communist Party and it is
not surprising that the CP members in the ASP&D provd unen-
thusiastic about the merger. The prospect of transferring
engagements into the ASW was contrasted with the possibility
of merger into the T&GWU. Justifications were made by
reference to the lower contributions and the more efficient
services provided by the T&GW (168). But behind the arguments
lay an awareness that merger with George Smith and the EC of
the Woodworkers promised to create a coalition of right wing
forces which might make the voice of the Communist Party almost
inaudible. The question of regionalisation was already under
considerationduring the summer of 1969, when the fusion of the
ASP&D and the ASW was being negotiated. There was some aware-
ness of the implications, in terms of the erosion of the
influence of district - or in the case of the ASP&D„ Area
Committees. And this encouraged the feeling that the merger
would represent the coming together of two union bureaucracies
at the expense of the members (169). Most important to the
attitude of Communist Party members within the ASP&D was the
prevailing feeling within the OP that Jack Jones, together
with Scanlon, represented the progressive face of British trade
unionism. For OP members, the desire to ally themselves with
progressive elements was stronger, at this point in time, than
rhetoric in favour of unity of the building trades unions, and
attempts were made to resist the movement towards the ASW,
both by campaigning at the union's conference, and through legal
consultations designed to show up defects in the procedure
adopted for balloting members (170). Neither method was
successful and on 1 Jan 1970 the ASP&D transferred engagements
to the ASW.
At the same time as the members of the Painters and Decorators
Society were balloting on the question of merger with the ASW,
so were those of a much smaller, professionally based society,
the Association of Building Technicians. The ABT was founded in
1919, as the Architects and Surveyors' Assistants Professional
Union, an organisation for salaried, architectural and survey-
ing staffs. A relatively specialist society, it had particular
problems concerning the mainl .enance of members and organisation.
Firstly it recruited in offices employing only a small number
of eligible staffs, so that recruiting was difficult and servic-
ing the membership proved costly (171).	 There was no central
body of employers with whom the Association could negotiate,
and it proved impossible to represent members in their diverse
employment situations, with the limited resources which were
available. The TUC had shown concern at the number of unorgani-
sed salaried employees in construction, and it was argued that
merger with the ASW might encourage their recruitment. It was
proposed to the ABT that they transfer engagements to the ASW
to provide a special section within that union catering for
professional and technical workers in construction. The existing
GC and EC of the ABT would retain their position within the
section, which would have a considerable measure of autonomy.
Essentially the ABT was to retain its corporate existence within
the larger union and would be responsible for its own affairs,
with the exception of administration and finance (172). The
General Secretary of the ABT, as the officer responsible for the
Section, would attend meetings of the ASW's EC, in order to
provide close links and co-ordination between the two, and it
was agreed that he should be paid at the same rate and afforded
the same facilities as EC members, including membership of the
ASW Retiring Allowance Scheme. Members of the ABT were
eligible to be represented at the Society's Annual Delegate
Conference on the basis of one representative for each 5,000
members (173).
	 These proposals received the necessary endorse-
ment from the members of the ABT and in 1970 that organisation
transferred its engagements to the ASW.
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As rumours and reports of th. involvement of the Plasterers
with the T&GW were circulated during the summer of 1968,
so general secretaries and Executive Council members of the
construction unions reviewed the pattern of past negotiations
on the question of amalgamation. It was in this climate that
the General Secretary of the AUBTW was instructed by his EC
to write to the ASP&D, to the ASW and the NUFTO requesting
informal conversations on the question of closer unity (174).
As far as the AUBTW were concerned, the major problem in their
connection with the ASW was a decision as to what types of
merger should be discussed. George Smith made it clear at the
outset that he favoured a transfer of engagements. Whilst he
was prepared to conduct further and wider discussions, 'because
of decisions being taken elsewhere speed in carrying through
a merger is of vital importance.' (175)
	
The strength of
craft identity and the need to allow a degree of autonomy if
amalgamation was to be successfully-concluded were recognised,
but Smith's opening offer of a ratio of two full—time officials
of the AUBTW to five full—time officials from the ASW on a
national Executive Council (this of course is prior to the
conclusion of merger with the Painters) was hardly designed for
its instant appeal (176). The ASW proposals for a transfer
which were brought forward in October '68 were unacceptable to
the EC of the AUBTW and there followed two years of long and
complex negotiations.
The merger of the AUBTW and the ASW was hindered both by the
structure and the prevailing political outlook within the two
organisations. The ASW, with its full—time Executive, its lay
General Council and District and Management Committees, had
very different traditions from the AUBTW. That union's lay
Executive and Divisional Councils and District Committees could
not readily be assimilated i tto the organisational frameilork
of the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers. Proposals and
counter-proposals were necessary if some degree of compromise
between the conflicting patterns of government were to be
found. In July 1969 the EC of the AUBTW submitted proposals
in which they claimed three seats on the Executive Council, as
a permanent proposition, with the AUBTW's GS included in an
advisory capacity on that body, and the method of election to
be determined by the EC of the AUBTW. A National Trade Group
for bricklayers was to be set up, following the existing
divisional pattern of the AUBTW, with a considerable degree of
autonomy in recruitment and policy (177). But the pattern of
negotiations was changed by the prospective merger of the
ASW with the ASP&D. And the political differences between the
ASW and the AUBTW lent a new dimension to negotiations on the
aims and mechanics of merger.
There was a strong Communist Party presence within the EC of
the AUBTW which was not to be found to the same extent in other
unions. OP members in the AUBTW, like their comrades in the
Painters were suspicious of a merger with a union such as the
ASW, dominated by a right-wing, ex-Communist. It was felt in
some quarters that George Lowthian, their own GS, was seeking
allies against the left in his own union by talking merger with
George Smith (178). OP members were more inclined to favour a
transfer into the T&G where the shift to the left promised them
a more receptive home. In accordance with the best traditions
of merger campaigns, they mobilised, not around the question
of whether or not a merger with the ASW should proceed, but of
the terms on which such a merger ought or ought not to be
conducted (179). Firstly, it was argued that transfer of
engagements was not an appropriate means of pursuing merger,
since it removed the democreuic rights of expressions of "mem-
bers of one of the unions involved. Moreover it threatened
to abolish the framework of organisation on which the AUBTW
had been built and which had proved relatively amenable to the
presentation of 'progressive policies' (180). It was from the
branches and the districts, and especially through the National
Delegate Conference that their campaign was launched. In July
1970 a circular opposing the merger was sent out from Barking
and Dagenham branch, where OP influence was strong. And at
the National Delegate Conference in the same year, a resolution
was moved and successfully carried supporting amalgamation, but
stating that it must be effected
t in such a manner as to ensure the highest possible degree of
membership participation and democracy and the preservation of
the best traditions of the merging parties. Conference there-
fore opposes current negotiations with the ASW as the terms
of reference for the transfer of engagements by the AUBTW to
that body'... (181)
But attitudes towards the amalgamation, even within the CP,
were not uniform. They were defined by the varying trade union
situations in which members found themselves, and the result
was a conflict within the CP over the question. Many Party
members within the ASW and the ASP&D were in favour of the
merger with the AUBTW, since they recognised that it would help
in the fight against the right wing in their own unions (182).
Within the AUBTW however, there was sharp opposition, although
even here . a minority gave support. Resistance to the merger
from the left within the AUBTW - especially within that union's
EC, prolonged negotiations as they spelled out the political
implications of structural change. All of the EC members of the
AUBTW had an interest in ensuring that their organisation was
well represented within the .X of the merged societies, not
least because some of them could expect to take up full—time
office as a result. For the Communist members there was the
additional concern that, for political reasons, they should be
amongst those who were appointed to the new EC. By September
1969 George Smith and the ASW representatives within negotia-
tions had conceded that the AUBTW should have five seats on
the EC of the new organisation (the increased number corres-
ponding to arrangements made for the Painters), but required
that three of these should be taken by the GS, the AGS and
the President, none of whom were Communists (183). The AUBTW
responded by claiming that of the five seats, only the President
and the GS, of existing officers, should be included with three
members of their existing EC (184). This was agreed by the ASW,
but it did not resolve the thorny problem of who, out of the
existing EC should be selected. Opposition to the merger was
sustained, by CP members, outside of the EC throughout 1970,
whilst within it the battle was fought over who was to move to
the new Executive. Within the Communist Party there must have
been some bad feeling on the question, since politically it
made sense to choose younger members, whose retirement was not
imminent. On these grounds a man such as Bill Smart, who had
been active since the early days of the NBL, could not expect
to be included. The selection of the AUBTW representatives
on the new EC was made by ballot of the existing EC members
and two of the three incumb ts — Hugh D'Arcy and Albert Williams,
were members of the CP; the third nominee being Doug Sanderson
(185). On the GC too the Communist Party was represented —
Bros. Lowe and Smart were selected, both were from the CP,
together with Bro. Cassidy.
	 The Communist Party presence
within the EC of the AUBTW had ensured that merger could not
proceed without concessions being made in their direction. If
the transfer of engagements of the AUBTW into the ASW&P (as
it was known after the merger of the Painters) appeared as the
consolidation of right wing elements within all of the unions
involved, it could not proceed without significant concessions
being made to the left in terms of their representation on the
new Executive.
It was in the light of theseconcessions that the merger could
be concluded against a background of opposition from rank and
file activists. The decision of the AUBTW National Delegate
Conference in 1970 to dppose amalgamation with the ASW on the
present terms was given no further consideration, since Lowthian
insisted that the matter was one for membership decision, and
that resolutionsIi conference could not resolve the issue (186).
A key factor in swinging the membership towards the merger was
the personal interest of full-time officers. Wages of these
officials in the AUBTW were low relative to other organisations
and they had smaller cars. Although the AUBTW had a pension
scheme for its officials which was as good as that which was
operating within the ASW, they were told that more generous
provisions would be introduced after merger. The Divisional
Secretaries, who were top men in the existing structure, could
not expect a similar status within the new union,. yet they
would be well compensated by their increased income (187).
Almost without exception the Divisional Secretaries opted to
support the amalgamation - and their support through meetings
and personal contact was key to winning the vote for a transfer.
It was only in one region, in the Eastern Counties, that the
Divisional Secretary, a man who 'thought AUBTW T , opposed the
transfer. And it was in this region alone that an adverse vote
of the membership was recorded on the question (188).
When UCATT was formed in July 1971 it took over the funds and
the membership of the AUBTW, although there was an option, for
AUBTW members, of continuing to pay existing rates, for the
existing benefits of the AUBTW, as opposed to transferring to
the ASW table of payments, the decision on this matter to be
made within 6 months of the transfer being completed. All
members of the union were to have their period of membership
credited to them for benefit purposes and branches were to
continue to function, although arrangements were to be made
for the amalgamation of branches and for the entry of brick-
layers into existing branches of woodworkers. The fundamental
differences in branch administration necessitated retaining
the existing system of administration of AUBTW branches for an
interim period until adjustment could be made to a single,
centralised procedure. Provision was made for the representa-
tion of the AUBTW on any outside bodies to which they were
already affiliated - for example on the TUC and the Labour
Party, and it was agreed that District Cttees and Divisional
Councils should continue to function for a period of not less
than twelve months, but Divisional Offices of the AUBTW were
to be closed as soon as possible after the amalgamation, and
full-time officials were to be based at the offices of the
ASW. As with every transfer of engagements it was laid down
that no full-time officer was to suffer a deterioration in
his condition as a result of the merger. It was confirmed
that five seats were allotted to the AUBTW on the EC of the
new organisation - two seats to be taken by existing national
officers of that union, although Lowthian left his position
for the ASS, Bill Lewis, and opted instead for a position as
secretary of the national sc, otion for the remainder of his
period in office. It was further agreed that the two national
officers would not be replaced and it was expected that within
five years the AUBTW's representation on the Executive would be
reduced so that ndt less than three seats would be allocated to
them. Provision was made for an Administrative Committee for
the section for the ensuing five year period, to comprise the
existing EC members of the AUBTW, and a compensatory payment
was to be made to them, in proportion to their period on the
EC, for loss of office. Three seats were allocated to the
AUBTW on the General Council. Branch officers were protected
from a loss of income by the provision that payments would con-
tinue to be made on a basis not less favourable than that
which already applied. (189) Significantly there was no
provision made for AUBTW representation within the new Regional
Structure. Voting on this question had twice taken place -
the first time within the membership of the ASW, the second
time within the members of both the Woodworkers and the Painters'
Societies, and there was no move made toinvolve the AUBTW in
a decision of this kind, most probably because their members
might be expected to swing the vote against the project for
regionalisation. AUBTW members were incorporated into a
structure on which they had expressed no opinion and it is
interesting to note that no special attempts seem to have
been made, by the AUBTW's negotiators on amalgamation to
ensure that this structure should subsequently provide a forum
for the expression of their opinions. Concern was concen-
trated on representation at Executive level, and by comparison,
craft representation on regional bodies was neglected.
The ballot on the transfer of engagements was successfully
concluded early in 1971; and the Union of Construction Allied
Trades and Technicians came into being on . 1 July 1971 (190).
The formation of UCATT consolidated craft interests in con-
struction. It drew together the three largest craft unions
under the umbrella of the ASW Rulebook as a means of consoli-
dating the financial interests of all of these bodies. 'It
wasn't a marriage of love, it was a marriage of convenience'
(191) and arguments over the dowry were cut short by the threat
of a rival suitor in the person of the T&GWU. The new union
followed the logic of the existing pattern of trade union
organisation in construction, to the extent that its member-
ship was concentrated in occupations with a craft tradition.
This was achieved in defiance of political differences which
separated the AUBTW from the ASW and the ASP&D. It could be
achieved because of the ability of George Smith and the right
wing in these unions to split the political unity of the left,
and to win Communist Party members in leading positions within
the AUBTW over to arguments about OP & AUBTW representation
within the EC of the merged society, and away from concern
with 'democratic procedures and
	 progressive policies' (192).
The long-standing antipathy between the ASW and the AUBTW had,
finally,been submerged. George Hicks' aspirations towards a
greater amalgamation were realised. Merger between the
Woodworkers and the Bricklayers vindicated the long-standing
identification of the AUBTW with the t one big union'. Yet it
was clear that industrial unionism was no longer a realistic
objective and Lowthian at least was aware that the new organi-
sation could not be easily classified in this way. The 'one
big union' did not have the significance which its advocates
had attributed to it in earlier years. Where the rhetoric of
industrial unionism was employed during the ballot on merger
this was intended merely to smooth the path for a speedy con-
elusion to negotiations. Advocates of merger were obliged to
counter the equally entrenched hostility to the Woodworkers
which prevailed amongst members of the AUBTW. This hostility
was as much a part of the radical tradition within the AUBTW
as was support for an industrial union. The leadership of the
Woodworkers stood for a conservative, closed craft approach
to trade unionism. Opposition to the Woodworkers and resistance
to their influence within the NFBTO was identified with the
views of the political left. Such divergent views could be
reconciled in practice only by a change in the leadership of
the ASW. This was not of course the basis on which the transfer
was effected, and in practice no such reconciliation was
possible. Whilst Lowthian and other supporters of amalgamation
could draw on the progressive and syndicalist traditions to
support their case, their opponents could draw on the continued
hostility to the conservative attitudes of the Woodworkers.
The amalgamation of these three major craft organisations
in the building industry suggested that the leadership of the
ASW had abandoned their long allegiance to the principle of
amalgamation between cognate trades in favour of merger with
other building trade unions. It would perhaps be more accurate
to suggest that George Smith had revised the existing policy
of the ASW, in the light of membership and financial problems,
towards amalgamation of building and woodworking unions. The
continuation of Tomkins as GS of the NUFTO, and his acrimonious
relations with Smith, precluded advances in that direction,
but negotiations were pursued with the ASWII until 1971.
For a brief period, in the Spring of 1971, it seemed as though
Smith might consolidate his position as GS of an enlarged
union of building and woodwoLkers. Despite a deterioration
in relations between his own EC and Charlie Stewart, in
relation to ASW support for Lowthian's - as against Stewart's
potential candidature for the position of Vice President of
the NFBTO in 1969, negotiations between the two societies were
pursued through 1970 and by January 1971 a sub-committee was
established to finalise details of a merger (193). Once again
the GS of the ASWM was using the rival attentions of the NUFTO
and the ASW to increase the bidding for his union's favours.
And as soon as it seemed that negotiations with the ASW were
nearing a successful conclusion, the news was leaked to the
NUFTO, who promptly responded with a renewed offer (194).
The involvement of the ASW with the ASP&D and the AUBTW did
not increase its attractions for Stewart and his Executive. The
financial difficulties of the two last-named organisations
were well known, and for the ASWM, itself a relatively wealthy
organisation, the move may not have seemed advantageous. More-
over it was unlikely that the ASW would make concessions to the
ASWM, comparable to those already made to the Painters and
those offered to the Bricklayers. They were offering only one
seat on the merged EC to the ASWM, compared with the five
already allowed to the ASP&D. Tomkins then came up with an
offer which the ASWM could not refuse. The whole of the ASWM
EC would be incorporated into a new EC in a merger with the
NUFTO. There would be a Trades Group for all Woodworking
machinists, with the existing GS of the ASWM as secretary and
all NUFTO woodworking machinists transferred into this group.
Satisfactory arrangements were made for the imminent retire-
ment of Stewart, and on this basis agreement was reached in
May 1971 for the ASWM to transfer engagements to the NUFTO (195).
By this stage the ASW leadership was caught within the frame-
work of the existing mergers. An alliance with the Painters
and the Bricklayers permitted the formation of UCATT as a
union for almost any tradesman within the field of construc-
tion. But the size and scope of the new society made it
correspondingly difficult to incorporate the much smaller
ASWM, without encouraging the feeling amongst the leaders and
members of that union, that they were yet one more string to
the ASW bow.
The demise of the  NFBTO 
The xenewed attention to amalgamation from 1960 ensured that
interest in the structure and functions of the NFBTO was
revived. The government of the Federation had not changed
significantly in the post-war era, hit in the context of the
impending financial crisis in its affiliated unions, critical
glances were cast on that body's expenditure and activities.
The retirement of Dick Coppock removed an almost insuperable
obstacle to change. Whilst Weaver was a competent and con-
scientious general secretary he lacked the stature which
accrued to Coppock, by virtue of his age and personality.
Moreover he was constrained by the amendments which had been
made to NFBTO rules in respect of his own election and he was
less able to resist the erosion of his own, and of Federation
power.
It was the general secretary of the ASW, George Smith, who
was responsible for initiating changes in the organisation
of the NFBTO. The reasons for his moves in this direction
were three fold. Firstly he was concerned to establish that
he, and not the GS of the NFBTO was the decisive influence in
trade union affairs in the construction world. Secondly it
continued to be apparent that the ASW was the largest source
of income for the NFBTO, and the crisis in membership and
finance which affected the ASW, like the other unions,
encouraged its leaders to look around for areas of expenditure
which might be cut. Finally he was concerned to ensure that
in the context of changes in technology and government policy,
where control of the membership was slipping away from the
Federation leaders, that it was ASW policy which remained para-
mount (196).
Moves for a revision of the constitution were brought forward
at the annual conference of the NFBTO in 1964. Four major
proposals were made. Firstly it was suggested that the General
Council be replaced by a Control Commission, comprising the
joint Exectiltives of affiliated unions, which should meet
quarterly in order to take decisions and give instructions to
the Executive. 	 Secondly that the cost of sending delegates
to this body be borne by individual unions, and not by the
NFBTO. Thirdly, in line with past suggestions of the ASW
(197) that instead of the existing affiliation fees there
should be a graduated scheme with a basic minimum payment
which should be met by any organisation. And finally it was
suggested that one quarterly meeting of the new Control Com-
mission would be designated the Annual Conference, for the
purpose of carrying through the election of the EC, of
Federation Officers and the Standing Orders Committee (198).
These provisions were designed to adjust the structure of the
NFBTO to the realities of ASW authority within the Federation.
As George Smith pointed out there was no provision within the
constitution of the Federation for the meetings of the Joint
Executives which for many years had taken the key decisions.
These meetings had been held under the auspices of the
Federation, and were organisnd and financed by that body.
Indeed Coppock had used his control over financing and expenses
through the Federation to expedite business and enhance his
personal influence over the decisions which were reached (199).
Since the ASW was the major contributor to Federation funds
George Smith was able through revision of these arrangements
to economise on those funds and at the same time to reduce the
authority of the Federation. If unions were responsible for
payment of expenses to their own delegates control over the
rate at which expenses were claimed might be tighter, and,
for unions with a large Executive and a small membership, the
relative cost would be high. Moreover the personal incentive
for attendance - that is over-payment on expenses was under-
mined. Formally the Central Council of the Federation provided
a forum for meetings of the EC's of affiliated societies. In
practice there was less incentive for individuals to attend
and its authority as a forum for reaching decisions was
reduced when compared with that of the Joint Executives (200).
The provision for adjusting contributions too was designed to
make the Federation cheaper for the ASW, and to shift some of
the burden of expenses to their smaller associates. On the
final amendments, concerning the procedure for the Federa-
tion's annual conference, Smith was not wholly successful. It
was proposed to remove from Regional Council delegates, some
of whom were rank and file operatives, the right to attend
the annual conferences of the Federation, and to limit atten-
dance to members of the Joint Executives. Clearly this would
have consolidated power within the Federation in the hands of
Executive members. Since, on balance the ASW was the most
powerful of the Federation's affiliates and since it had a
full-time EC,it would have strengthened the hold of their
officials, which was already considerable, whilst removing
any responsibility, other than through their own conference,
of answering to the rank and file. The move was, not un-
naturally, unpopular with representatives of the Regional
Councils at conference, and it was not endorsed by many of the
officials of other unions. When the matter was put to the
vote, it was lost on avery close card count, by 207,000 in
favour to 208,399 against - to the intense irritation of George
Smith who insisted that there must be some mistake: He
was obliged to accept the decision, but the impetus for ASW
control was by no means ended (201).
The predominant influence of the ASW within the Federation had
long been evident. It was based on the size and craft status
of that union, and in the context of the erosion of the member-
ship of all of the construction unions, leaders of the Wood-
workers were impelled to revise Federation procedures in order
to ensure that their power was not undermined. The creation
of new alliances and the renewed threat of take-overs by the
T&GW, encouraged Smith, who was no enthusiast for Federation,
to review its operations, and finally to bring about its
demise. The question of Regional Council representation within
the NFBTO annual conference was revived only one year after
the major rules revision. The question of representation
related, not merely to the rights of rank and file members
of the unions to send along their delegates through their
Regional Councils. It was a question of the status of the
Federation's conference, which, in the opinion of Smith,
should not be regarded as a policy making body, since policy
emanated from the Joint Executives and resolutions which
were passed at conference had little or no impact on the issues
which were finally negotiated. Yet Smith was no more
successful at the 1965 confel.ence, in adjusting Federation
structure in this way, than he had been in the previous year
(202).
	
The fact that the proposals for constitutional revi-
sion were not accepted, did nothing to increase the value
placed on the Federation by the GS and EC members of the ASW.
Yet the Federation provided a means for the assertion of ASW
control of site militancy through the revision of procedure
within the trade union organisations, for the recognition of
a dispute. In 1966 Smith brought forward an anendiRent to the
existing rule to the effect that, in the event of a dispute
involving members of more than one union in a stoppage, NFBTO
affiliates should give full operation to the Conciliation and
Disputes procedure. At the request of an interested union,
the Federation Secretary was to convene a meeting of national
representatives to consider a dispute. Individual unions were
to give official recognition only after the fullest consulta-
tion with other unions whose members were involved. The
motivation for this amendment lay in the events at the
Barbican and the Horseferry Road, where officials of other
unions had proved more willing to give official recognition
than had the ASW. The ASW leadership were concerned to prevent
the recurrence of a situation in which the more amenable
attitude of officials of other unions towards the strikers,
undermined their own resistance to provision of official backing.
The Federation's membership and financial strength was under-
mined by the problems affecting its individual member-unions.
As trade union membership declined, there was a corresponding
drop in the numbers on which each union affiliated. Between
1957 and the mid-60's there was a slow but steady decrease in
total affiliations, and attelipts to offset the loss in income
by increasing fees were counter-productive, since they encoura-
ged each union to reduce the numbers affiliated (203). In
1923 it had been decided that, in order to meet federation
obligations it was necessary to have a working balance of
some £20,000. It was estimated that, in order to maintain an
equivalent working balance in 1965, a sum of around £60,000
would be required. In fact the sum available was a mere
£17,000, which was completely inadequate for the purpose.
Fee increases for affiliation had been recommended in 1965,
but no further action was taken, so that in 1966 the situation
was severe (204). It Was a mark of the Federation's weakness
that its General Secretary was obliged to go cap in hand to
his affiliates, in order to maintain the balance of funds which
was essential to the running of his organisation. Further,
it was a practice which did nothing to raise the standing of
the NFBTO in the eyes of officials of the member-unions.
The authority of the NFBTO was further undermined by the
decision of the ASW in 1968 to make dramatic cuts in their
order for the Builders Standard, the paper.of the NFBTO.
The Standard had been published regularly for several years
and it had provided an important means for encouraging and
publicising the joint interests and activities of the con-
struction unions. The arguments adduced by Smith for ceasing
to support the paper reflected his profound dislike of the
Federation.
'Some part of the paper' he said 'had obviously flowed out
of the kind of thinking to which the ASW had consistently
objected, where the Federation was trying to act as a union.'
H e argued, probably correctly that the ASW did not sell many
of the copies which it was currently taking, and pointed to
his union's membership outside of the building industry,
where members could not be expected to support the paper.
It was as a consequence of this decision that the Federation
EC recommended to the Central Council that the paper should
cease publication (205). ASW support was essential for a
Federation newspaper, as it was for the Federation itself.
Without it neither could survive.
By 196 it was apparent that changes were imminent. Over the
preceding four or five years there had been attempts to
revamp the Federation. - A Working Party had been set up, and,
inevitably documents were produced. The modest amalgamations
between kindred unions during the mid-60's did not require
any corresponding amendments to Federation structure, but by
1969, with mergers crossing craft boundaries and the process
of structural change altering, both in pace and dimensions,
it was clear that the Federation could not survive in its
present form. In a private session of the Federation's
annual conference in that year, the name was changed to the
National Federation of Construction Unions. And the title
of the EC was altered to the Finance and General Purposes
Committee. The change of title reflected the altered tech-
nical and industrial location of the Federation's members.
It suggested too a growing awareness of the need for a re-
evaluation of the distinction between 'building' and _
'civil engineering' — between 'craft' and 'labourer'.
For all that the Federation's influence had been eroded,
there was by no means unanimous feeling in favour of its
abolition. Yet it could not be salvaged by a name change
alone. It was the union leaders who were most resistant to
the ASW's universal take-over, who haunted their colleagues
with the spectre of life without the Federation. Alf Tomkins
became an ardent advocate of NFBTO somewhat late in his -
and the Federation's - life. And George Lowthian, less
critical of the policy which was being pursued by Smith, none-
theless saw advantages in the retention of the Federation
(206). The most valuable feature of the Federation's
activities had, from its inception, been the medium which
it provided for the presentation of a co-ordinated policy to
the employers. The TUC had, by 1970, set up a Construction
Industry Consultative Committee, but there was resistance to
the suggestion that this body might take on the responsibility
for negotiations. It was in this area that the lack of con-
fidence in future developments was most apparent. For
although by 1970 it was apparent that the Federation could
not last much longer, it was not clear what if anything, George
Smith intended to put in its place.
The demise of the Federation was slow, and painful. It
involved dismantling a machine which had been evolving for
over fifty years, and which had been central to bargaining
procedures. It resulted from the establishment of direct
control by the ASW of the smaller organisations - by 1971
they controlled some 70% of the membership in construction -
in place of the indirect influence which had been wielded
courtesy of the NFBTO. It was associated with the sense that
'they are going it alone anyway' (207). As Jack Youngs stated,
on behalf of the ASW 'we do represent a few members in the
industry; we do add some support to the NFCU as we did to
the old Federation, and we do feel that sometimes we would
like people to listen to us.' (208) What he wished people
to hear and to understand wa Q that the leadership of the ASW
was no longer prepared to tolerate the independence of much
smaller and less influential bodies. By the NFOU's 2nd
annual conference in 1971, discussion was centred, not on
whether the Federation was to be disbanded, but on how it
was to be disbanded. Two major practical problems existed,
the Regional Secretaries, who were full-time officers, and
the composite section. The first difficulty was surmounted by
the preparedness of the ASW, to take over a number of the
Regional Secretaries, in some cases offering them comparable
positions within their new, regional structure. Those who did
not wish to take up such offers received redundancy pay. The
Composite Section posed more problems, since it was not an
easy task to divide its members and allocate them to their
respective organisations. Moreover the Executive of the
Composite Section represented a small vested interest in the
perpetuation of the NFOU and they were by no means amenable
to their own dissolution. The issue was an occasion for
overt conflict between representatives of the ASW and the
T&GW, as both unions vied for the remains of the Federation's
independent membership (209).
	
The demise of the composite
section ended the final vestige of Federation authority in
the field of construction organisation. The way was now clear
for a new style of organisation.
Building trade union mergers, 1960-71
UCATT was established on 1 July 1971 with a membership of
262,600 - the tenth largest union affiliated to the TUC.
Its creation seemed to fulfil the decade of discussion on
one union for the building industry. Yet it was created with
the minimum of reference to, or consultation with the member-
ship of the unions involved. The mergers were effected, in
every case on the basis of a transfer of engagements,
requiring only a simple majority of the smaller union to
express its approval in a ballot vote. So members of the lar-
gest union which was involved - the ASW, were never called
upon to express an opinion on the changes whichlere to affect
their trade union lives.
General secretaries of all of the unions seem to have had an
inordinate influence, both on whether and with whom to discuss
merger. Their hands were strengthened by the fact that nego-
tiations were often inititated in a casual, and informal con-
text, and it was only if there seemed to be some prospect of
serious discussions that they were shifted on to a more formal
basis. Consequently the general secretary might be in a
position to select priorities and to make concessions, with
a considerable measure of independence of his own Executive
and membership. Personal relationships between one GS and
another would be influential in governing the progress of
negotiations, but this factor by no means determined the out-
came of each round of talks. Relationships at a personal level
might be amiable, but a merger would proceed only if it offered
advantages to the GS or other members of a negotiating team.
Significantly mergers were timed to coincide with the retire-
ment of General Secretaries, and it was a fortunate coincidence
that Lowthian, Austin and Harry Weaver were all due to retire
around 1970. This meant that a general secretary of one
union was not obliged to accept a subordinate position for
any length of time, in a unified structure. It ensured that,
with adequate provision for retirement, these men were not
likely to oppose the changes which led up to the formation of
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UCATT. In the case of George Smith the process of regrouping
was designed, not only to consolidate the influence of this
union, but also of his own position. Each move which was
made - from the challenge to the role of the NFBTO, through
discussions with other woodworking unions, to the merger of
unions of building trade workers, was designed to reinforce
his own standing, vis a via leaders of other construction
unions, as well as in the trade union world generally.
The UCATT derived its rules and its structure from the ASW,
but it was clear that Smith would be prepared to adjust these
rules where it might consolidate his own position internally
within the new union. This was evident in discussions with
other woodworking unions during the mid-60's, where the appoint-
ment of officials was justified by the ASW leadership, as a
means of giving adequate representation to all trades (Clearly
it was possible to reach this end without using this means).
The appointment of officials would strengthen the hand of the
EC, or appointing body, as against the District or Management
Cttees. The imposition of a regional structure proved possible
only through the merger with the ASP&D. Since ASW members had
no vote on the transfer of engagement of the Fainters, and
since the vote on regionalisation was then extended to mem-
bers of the Painters' Society, the decision on the regional
structure circumvented the direct control of members of the
ASW. Regionalisation provided a structure in which membership
control would be eroded in favour of appointed regional
secretaries and regional organisers who were confirmed in
office after their second successful election.
Although each transfer required corresponding alterations to
the rules of the ASW, this did not involve an appeal to the
membership for their approval. The alteration of the
ASW's rules, in accordance with the arrangements agreed with
another body for the transfer of its engagements required
only a formal resolution by the EC of the ASW, following
which the Registrar would approve the altered rules concur-
rently with his approval of the Instrument of Transfer (210).
If the general secretaries of the various unions showed con-
siderable independence in their scope for discussions on
merger, they could not carry a vote - where this was necessary,
without the support of key elements amongst their own officials.
In the case, both of the Painters and the AUBTW, officials were
motivated to support amalgamation by the prospects of improv-
ing their own situation. Divisional Secretaries were a key
element in Lowthian's support for merger into the ASW, and
this almost certainly would not have happened without the
improvement in pay and conditions which they could expect.
In view of the division within the EC of that union in respect
of amalgamation proposals it is unlikely that arrangements
could have proceeded without support from this quarter. Within
the ASP&D, EC officials could expect to improve their situation
where they were transferred to the merged EC of the new
union, and officials at Area or Management Committee level,
like the Divisional Secretaries in the AUBTW, could expect to
gain through pay increases, as their conditions would be
brought into line with those prevailing in the ASW. Pension
arrangements were a matter for widespread concern, since the
ASW pension scheme was supported from general funds, and was
not regarded as actuarially sound. And for full-time
officials, as for general secretaries, the promise of satis-
factory conditions for retirement were an integral feature
of merger arrangements (211).
The friendly benefits, which had seemed so important to past
generations of trade unionists, were relatively unimportant
in the discussions which led up to the formation of UCATT.
It is true that arrangements had to be made to assimilate the
various patterns of contributions and benefits of the AUBTW
and the ASP&D into the different sections which existed for
members within the ASW. But inflation had whittled away the
reallalue of the benefits which accrued and feeling on this
issue was much less strong than it had been 50 years earlier.
Their perpetuation was a mark of the conservatism of craft
unionism, for, as Lowthian said:
'we were running unions in the 1950's and into the 60's on
an outlook and administration of the latter half of the nine-
teenth century.' Not only had the real value of the benefits
declined, but the provision of various benefits had, to a
considerable extent been superceded by State welfare provi-
sions, especially in the post-war years.
	 The elimination of
sickness, tool and other friendly benefits was one of the
first moves of the new union in an attempt to effect economies,
and this is an indication of the relatively low importance
which was attached to them, by the majority of the members
as well as by officials.
The amalgamation3which led up to the formation of UCATT con-
solidated craft trade unionism, as against those general
unions which relied, for the most part, on unskilled or semi-
skilled workers in construction. The amalgamation of the
NBL&CWS into the AUBTW had been the first step across the
line which divided the craft unions from those recruiting
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labourers. It left T&GW officials in particular, less willing
to accept the boundaries which had operated in the past. The
election of a Labour government committed to expanding the
output of new housing coincided with a boom in construction
work to give a boost to innovations in technique during the
50's and 60's which were certain to erode the importance and
influence of the craftsman. It encouraged the practice, which
was already common in the late 40's and early 50 1 s, of a form
of wage contract - lump labour, which was inimical to trade
unionism. As trade union membership was eroded it was the
craft unions which suffered most seriously. So that the oppor-
tunities for the T&GW to expand its influence were ripe. Struc-
tural change of some kind was inevitable by the mid-60's. It
was necessary as a means of rationalising the organisation
and services of trade unions for a diminishing membership.
It was essential if trade union leaders were to combat the
loss of members through the increased use of 'lump' labour
and consolidate their influence with their own activists who
were disenchanted by the failure of their unions either to
function effectively in negotiations at national level, or to
provide them with support for dis putes on site.
Two, rival influences were at work in negotiations on the form
which the new structures were to take. The first was the
logic of craft identity - the allegiance which had been built
up between craft unions within the NFBTO over past decades,
whatever their other differences, in the face of the general
unions, especially the T&GW, within the arena of building
trade unionism. The second was the division between left and
right within the craft societies - a division which operated
both on inter and on intra-union relations. It was the first
factor which impelled the craft societies into closer relations
as the threat from theT&GW b came more apparent. Whatever the
realities of craft sectionalism - and it had certainly not
been abolished by the innovations in the construction process -
the craft societies shared common assumptions about the form
and practices which should under-pin their existence. They
were led, almost without exception, by men who were themselves
time-served craftsmen, and were committed to a form of trade
union organisation which was exclusive to men sharing a com-
mon occupation, or group of occupations. It was this commit-
ment which could lead into discussions of the apparently
contradictory notion of a 'general union for the building
industry' (212). Inherent in this commitment was the resis-
tance to incorporation within an organisation such as the T&
GWU. The boundaries between crafts had been eroded by Changes
in building materials and technique. The form of organisation
which emphasised friendly benefits as a central feature of
the union's services to its members had ceased to be relevant
to workers in construction in the 1960's. But many of the
attitudes from which the craft identity was derived were
perpetuated by union leaders who shared a background in this
craft tradition.
Political allegiances were no less profound than craft iden-
tities. They were at their most acute where one was reinforced
by the other - for example where the 'progressive' AUBTW came
into conflict with the 'conservative' ASW; or where the
'conservative' painters allied themselves with the 'conservative'
woodworkers, as a means of strengthening their industrial
position. Amalgamation assumed a simple logic, in the latter
case, where the EC's of the two societies shared a common
outlook as well as a similar framework for their organisations.
And if the left within either organisation objected to propo-
sals — as did Communists wit ;Iin the ASP&D, their influence
was sufficiently limited that it did not threaten the outcome
of negotiations. The merger of the PTU and the ETU Provided
another example of merger between unions of like political
outlook. Where political and craft identities conflicted the
situation was more complex, and the resulting strategy for
amalgamation was consequently less coherent. This was the
case for members of the Communist Party in respect of the pro-
jected merger of the AUBTW into the ASW&P. Craft was divided
from craft and EC members from the rank and file activists,
depending on whether craft or political allegiances were
made the priority. The- attractions of the 'left , image of the
T&GW, under the general secretaryship of Jack Jones conflicted,
for members of the AUBTW with the craft identity of their
own organisation. And they were consequently weakened in
their resistance to an amalgamation which they identified as
an alliance of conservative forces.
The formation of UCATT resulted from the crisis of trade union
organisation in construction. It was a crisis in membership
and in the financial standing of the unions; a crisis in their
role within the central bargaining machinery of the industry
and on the sites. It was a crisis in which the craft socie-
ties could preserve their identity only by the apparently
contradictory procedure of submerging it into a larger craft
society. It was a crisis in which the leadership of the ASW
moved from an indirect to a direct control over the members
and organisers of the associated craft unions, as a means of
blocking the progress of the T&GW within the construction
industry. The t one big union , had finally been established,
but not on the basis of the initiative and enthusiasm of the
members. It was on the autl . ority of the various general
secretaries and EC members who were involved in negotiations
that the new union was created, with the minimum approbation
of the membership.
CONCLUSION
UCATT:  'One Big Union'?
UCATT was formed on 1 June 1971 with a membership of 262,600,
and assets worth £2,650,528. Its creation seemed to vindicate
William Bradshaw's assertion, made in 1920 that the NFBTO
would pave the way for theEstablishment of 'One Big Union' for
the building industry. Yet many of the activists of the
intervening years might have argued that it was the Federa-
tion, with its domination of the bargaining machinery and its
own body of officials, which precluded earlier progress in the
direction of amalgamation. Moreover UCATT might be the largest
of the unions representing workers in the field of construc-
tion, but it could certainly not be claimed that it was the
only union in that field.
	
The longstanding distinction
between craftsman and labourer was reflected by the presence
of the T&GWU and the G&MWU on the NJCBI. For as long as the
general unions confined their recruitment to labourers and semi-
skilled workers they posed little threat to the craftsmen.
As long as the Perth agreement was observed craft could con-
template merger (unhurriedly) with craft and debate the
question of 'industrial unionism' with scant reference to the
merger of craft with labourer. Once the general unions had
established their base in building and civil engineering, it
was not likely that they would lightly relinquish it to the
craft unions to further the improbable cause of industrial
unionism. Since the general unions had formally established
their rights to recruit and negotiate within this field over
the previous half century, there was no question that they
could now be removed, however unsatisfactory this might be
for the belated move towards unity. Indeed it was the general
unions - and especially the T&GWU - who were making much of
the running, since the abrogation of the Perth Agreement left
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the way free for thew to recruit amongst tradesmen as well
as amongst the semi-skilled and unskilled workers in con-
struction.
If UCATT could not clearly be identified as the union for all
building workers, nor could it make unchallenged claim to
recruit operatives engaged on all woodworking processes, since
the merger of NUFTO pnd the ASWM to form the Furniture,
Timber and Allied' Trades Union had established a major rival
in this area, which, like the UCATT was affiliated to the
NJCBI. Not only were the majority of labourers and semi-
skilled specialists outside of the ranks of UCATT, but amongst
furniture and woodworking operatives - some of whom had voted
to merge with the ASC&J as early as 1916 - a separate society
had been consolidated.
If UCATT was not the 'One Big Union' which had been envisaged
over fifty years earlier, it was nonetheless the largest con-
centration of building trade unionists. It was too the only
union which recruited primarily amongst construction workers,
and to this extent claims could justifiably be made that it was
'the union for construction workers'. Leaders of its consti-
tuent parts had anticipated that it would tap a wider support
than could be claimed, in aggregate by the old craft societies.
Perhaps this was a self-fulfilling prophecy, since their own
commitment to the new organisation - and their awareness of the
problems which must be overcome if survival were to be ensured,
meant that they worked to achieve that wider support (1).
For whatever reason, it does seem to be the case that the
UCATT, in its early years, was able to improve on the member-
ship and support which could be claimed by its predecessors.
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If UCATT did not at its inception take the form or the philo-
sophy projected by industrial unionists before 1914, it did
nonetheless represent the logical conclusion to the movement
which connected the local craft society of the 19th century
with the broad membership base and the centralised national
structure of construction trade unionism today. Two periods
stand out, in the twentieth century, as years when advances have
been made in this direction. From the end of the first world
war until the failurd of amalgamation talks between. the ASW
and the AUBTW in 1922/3 the question of structural change was
central to the develo pment of building trade unionism. The
mergers which were effected, and the organisations which were
created during this period survived for half a century, and
in many respects it could be argued they laid the basis for
the second major round of mergers between 1968 and 1971. But
there was no simple dynamic which moved inevitably to the
formation of one large construction union.	 Broader industrial
developments, the iypact of political affairs, the pattern of
projected changes and their interpretation, both by the
members and leaders of the union concerned provided the frame-
work for structural change. Whilst the mergers of 1919-21 may
be viewed as part of a continuum, leading to the more unified
structure of 1971, they must also be seen in a context which is
historically specific and which relates to the impact of war
and industrial change on trade unions and their members.
The following aspects of the problem have been given detailed
attention in the historical account. Firstly consideration has
been given to the relationship between trade union democracy
and structural adaptation. How far does amalgamation affect the
rights of union members to decide and control the policies of
their own union. And indeed who controls the amalgamation itself?
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Secondly the question of trade union structure was related to
the process of industrial change. Finally consideration was
given to the form and classification of the trade unions which
have evolved.
The object of this concluding chapter is to summarise the major
themes which have been outlined and to assess their implications
for the analysis of trade union structure in building production.
Trade union structure and trade union democracy
No account of the earlier period of merger can be given without
reference to the impact of syndicalist ideals which served to
popularise the rationalisation of trade union structure. It
is true that the amalgamation of all of the building trade
unions could not attract a high proportion of union members to
vote in its support in 1912 (2), but the question of amalgama-
tion of cognate trades - a more limited aim, with more imme-
diate prospects of realisation was a popular cause, both with
members of the larger and the smaller building trade societies.
Whilst 'one big union' proved to be a subject for dissent
between right and left, a more limited merger between kindred
trades could be favoured by both as a means to greater efficiency
and unity. The point was proved by the success of the unions
concerned in satisfying the requirements of the Trade Union
Amalgamation (Amendment) Act of 1917, which although more
moderate than the standards imposed by earlier legislation,
required nonetheless a high level of participation by union
members in the ballot (3). Members were concerned by and
involved in the decision to amalgamate and to this extent the
formation of the ASW and the AUBTW were defined by a popular
commitment to structural adjustment.
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The formation of UCATT, by contrast cannot be construed as re-
sulting from popular pressure, either at a general level or on
the specific proposals for merger which were brought forward at
the end of the sixties. It is true that the ideological com-
mitment on the left to l one big union/ had been retained. It
was built into the objectives of the New Builders Leader and
The Building Workers Charter and it continued to be cited by
members of the Communist Party when questions of amalgamation
were raised., But its inclusion as one of the tenets of the
left is not evidence in this case of a commitment to the prin-
ciple. Political kinship and personal ambition were the real
keys to amalgamation discussions, and communists in the building
trade unions, other than the ASW, were inclined to support
transfer into the Trans port and General Workers Union, once
Frank Cousins and Jack Jones had shifted the political identity
of that union to the left.
	 The problem within the ASW was
slightly different. As the largest of the building unions it
was the least likely to subordinate its identity within a
general union. And since the AUBTW had always been character-
ised as 'left/ by contrast with the Woodworkers, Communists
within the Woodworkers ,lould adhere to the principle of
amalgamation between the building trades unions and at the
same time feel that they were furthering their own political
ends.	 The consequences were twofold. Firstly there was no
clear perspective within the Communist Party, on the orientation
of amalgamation during the 1960/s and none was forthcoming
from any other direction. Secondly the theory of industrial
unionism which had retained a formal status within the objec-
tives of the left, had diminished value for political practice.
If it seems from the above that /popular pressure/ is being
equated with the left, and particularly with the Communist
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Party, this is because it was only from this quarter that a
coherent view was expressed on trade union structure. Amal-
gamation was, for most trade unionists in the 60 I s an issue
which was far removed from their daily working lives. It could
be that the ritual references to amalgamation had served only
to diminish interest in an issue which was so regularly discus-
sed but which produced so few results. But it seems more likely
that for trade unionists in construction the activities of the
officials and leadership and conference discussions on. ques-
tions of structure had little relationship to the site level
experience of the members. The gap which existed between mem-
bers and officials was not conducive to membership involvement
on this question.
	 Schemes for amalgamation originated from
the Head Offices of the unions involved, rather than from the
members at branch or district level. They may have lacked the
momentum behind the earlier amalgamation movement, but they
benefitted from the division amongst the political left, who
were the only element to give any expression to an alternative
perspective on the realignment of the trade union movement.
If the reformulation of trade unions was an issue which could
arouse interest and support before 1914, and if by the 1960's,
this had ceased to be the case, this is merely an indication
of the changed significance of structural adjustment over the
course of the century. The industrial unionist favoured that
type of organisation primarily because its existence was
assumed to pose a challenge to the existing relationship between
employar s and operative. Concern with the industrial union
before 1914 was not a fetishism of the organisational form,
but an assumption that if amalgamation along industrial lines
could be brought about, it would change fundamentally the
517
nature and meaning of trade unionism. The industrial unionist
was a critic of the trade union official, whom he regarded as
collaborating with the employer to reinforce the subordinate
position of the operative. Yet he wanted to strengthen his
trade union organisation, to build its power base, not in order
to strengthen the official element, but to challenge the role
which it had hitherto assumed.
The formation of the Communist Party of Great Britain in 1920
provided an alternative organisational focus and attracted many
of the syndicalists who had been active before 1914. Revo-
lutionary expression demanded a political form, not least
because the revolution in Russia seemed to pose a model which
could be emulated in the West. Questions of industrial organi-
sation as a means to revolution were by-passed by the reasser-
tion of the primacy of political action and political organi-
sation. Whilst the objectives of the syndicalists were never
wholly abandoned, they played a lesser part in the trade union
life of the Communist militant in the 1930's than they had done
for his syndicalist counterpart before the first world war.
Assumptions concerning the significance of l one big union' were
never seriously challenged within the builders rank and file
movements of the inter-war years - a fact which is surprising
in the light of the formation of both the Transport and General
Workers Union and the General and Municipal Workers Union
during this period. Amalgamation along industrial lines remained
one of the tenets of the movement around New Builders Leader,
but there was little attempt to reconcile the theory with the
practical problems posed by the existence of the general
unions and their presence within building production (4). It
was through opposition to craft sectionalism at site level
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that the values of industrial unionism could most effectively
be related to the changed circumstances of the inter-war
situation. And it was in this area that supporters of the
EMI carried out some of their most effective campaigns.
If the question of trade union structure was of diminishing
significance for the rank and file activist, it was increas-
ingly important for the leadership of the building unions.
With the formal ratification of pbr after the second world war
the authority of the national Executive of building unions
suffered, both from the ability of some site stewards and local
officials to negotiate high bonus rates, and from the presence
of 'lump' labour paid rates well in excess of those which
resulted from central collective bargaining. Mechanisation
and innovation in the building process combined to diminish
the importance of craft skills, posing a serious threat to the
long term survival of the craft form of organisation. Whilst
there was little popular demand for the
building labour to meet this threat, leaders of the building
trade organisations were unable to ignore indefinitely the
dilemma posed by a decline in membership and financial crisis.
The mergers of 1970/71 were essentially defensive in character,
for they derived from the crisis in organisation in construc-
tion, a crisis which undermined the capacity of the craft
societies to maintain their separate and autonomous existence
(5).
A contrast can be made then between the mergers of 1920/21
which were effected on the basis of a long campaign among the
membership in favour of amalgamation, and the creation of
UCATT in 1970/71 as a result of the serious long-term crisis
of trade unionism in construction. The situation of the unions
rationalisation of
prior to merger can be most sharply contrasted by reference
to the membership figures in each case. The vitality of
trade unionism during and after world war one is reflected in
the steady expansion of the building craft organisations,
whilst it is the crisis in membership which highlights the
problems of the 60 1 s, providing a rationale for amalgamation.
But in making this distinction important not to ignore
the role played by the leadership of the major unions during
both mergers. Negotiations around the question of amalgamation,
like other central negotiations were initiated and conducted
by the leadership — meaning the General Secretaries and some
executive members. Whatever the feelings of the members on the
question, it was only through this medium that contacts could
be established at national level with other unions, and plans
drawn up for the implementation of merger. Pressure could be
brought to bear from local level through the establishment of
joint union committees or local federations, but no decisive
move was possible on the issue of national unity.
	 Questions of
personal status and power played an enormous part in every
serious round of merger discussions.
	 General Secretaries of
larger unions might anticipate that the incorporation of smaller
rivals would consolidate their own leading position. Their
counterparts in the smaller societies would be less sympathetic
to merger proposals precisely because of the potential elimi-
nation of their own position and associated status. Merger
between two smaller unions might seem more attractive to their
leaders than take over by one, much larger society — as in the
case of the projected merger between the OSM and the MUOB.
Tripartite negotiations raised the possibility of playing off
one rival against another — as in the case of the Woodworking
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unions during the sixties. The role and attitudes of the
General Secretaries of the building unions were frequently
cited es a significant element in the progress of amalgamation
negotiations during the sixties, and in this respect the later
round of merger talks is merely a restatement of the problems
of the earlier period. Popular pressure was of no avail if a
projected merger did not accord with the vested interests of
the leading officials within the union in which it was pro-
posed. John Batchelor and George Hicks of the OBS were un-
doubtedly sympathetic to the movement for industrial unionism;
but their sympathy was certainly tinged with the awareness
that as leaders of the second largest building trade union,
they were in a favourable position to contest the leadership
of any merged society. Hicks's reluctance, in the early 201s
to accept the NFBTO as an established feature of the trade
union world reflected the limitations which it posed, both to
projects for amalgamation between the ASW and the AUBTW, and
to the extent of his influence within the existing organisa-
tional framework. If amalgamation was a popular cause around
the time of the first world war, its po pularity was mediated
by the interests of the key trade union officials in that
_period. Whether or not the question of structural change has
wide acclaim amongst the membership the attitudes of officials
must be reckoned as central both to the extent and the form
of its implementation.
The question of ballots on projected amalgamations has received
attention in this account of structural change and it is clear
that legal requirements must be satisfied before amalgamation
can proceed. But even here the influence of officialdom is
felt insofar as members can be encouraged to participate in a
ballot by a convinced and convincing official. Decisions as
to the way in which the vote shall take place, the period
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which is allowed for its completion and any recommendations
which are made by the union executive are likely to be key
points in facilitating or blocking the successful conclusion
of a proposed amalgamation. Legal changes in respect of trade
union amalgamation allowed a significant development in this
respect, for whereas the formation of the ASW and the AUBTW
could be accomplished only by a ballot of all of the members
of all of the unions concerned, the formation of UCATT was
successfully-accomplished without any vote being taken of the
members of the largest of the unions, the ASW, from which it
was derived.
	 The decision to effect merger via transfer of
engagements in the latter case ensured that, once a decision
was taken by leaders of the respective craft unions, the
legal requirements on membership involvement could easily be
satisfied. But it was a decision which was taken at the cost
of membership involvement.
	 The transfer of engagements, a
method of merger favoured by the leaders of the unions con-
cerned, precluded an expression of opinion from within the
ASW. And it was from this quarter that the expression of
opinion was most likely to be unfavourable.
It has been noted elsewhere that questions of trade union
structure and trade union government are inextricably linked
(6). This is evidenced within the building trade unions to
the extent that membership opinion has been used to validate
decisions already taken on the subject of merger. The
relationship between structure and government has been most
clearly reflected in the extent to which changes in structure
are used by the leaders of the bodies concerned to centralise
and concentrate power in their own hands. It was the General
Secretary of the merged organisation who was the prime
beneficiary. His standing, both with his own members and
in the wider trade union movement was certainly enhanced by
effective mergers.
	 The larger his union the more effect he
could have within the NFBTO, the NJCBI, the TUC and the
Labour Party. But his position within the union depended less
on the equation between size and power and more on the shift
in balance of influence between active members at site and
district level, and the central administrative machinery of
which he was the leading figure. The casual nature of building
production meant that the site level activist - the man who
was prepared to risk his own jobio organise on site - was of
paramount importance to trade union organisation. But national
organisation was based on central control, particularly in
financial issues concerned with strike action. The ensuing
tension did not automatically pit the union leadership against
District or Management Committees, where shop steward opinion
found expression, for in the more rural areas it was likely
that leadership opinion would be endorsed and supported. It
was the well organised urban areas, Liverpool, London, Man-
chester and Glasgow for example where the body of trade union
opinion was most militant that District and Management Com-
mittees were most likely to conflict with the leadership of
their own organisations. And it was because of the assertion
of independence from such areas that succeeding General Secre-
taries built and sustained a central base of support for their
own policies at national level.
	 The expression of local
militancy was countered by the creation of a body of full-
time opinion within each union which owed some allegiance to
the views and policies of the General Secretary.
Since the discussion of amalgamation was closely associated
with comparisons of the forms of internal organisation of each
society, and since those discussions took place very largely
at the behest of the General Secretary in each case, it is
not surprising if he used the opportunity to remould the inter-
nal structure of the emerging union to his own advantage.
Exponents of trade union amalgamation claimed that its realisa-
tion would lead to a reduction in numbers and a rationalisation
of the organisation of trade union officials. Yet the opposite
proved to be the case in some instances. For if the leading
official was concerned to reinforce his position he was likely
to favour and encourage the creation of new posts, in which
office holders would share and support his views against those
of the dissident Districts.
	 The creation of the full—time
Executive in the ASW is perhaps the best example of this pro-
cess, but it is also reflected in the creation of a body of
full—time Divisional Officers within the AUBTW, and in the
assertion of increased central financial control over appoint-
ments made at District level in both unions. The formation
of UCATT saw the creation of new positions (although they
reflected the structure which had existed within the NFBTO)
at Regional level, where officials would be more removed from
the attitudes and problems of site level activist. Although
the long term trend was towards a reduction in the number of
officials in this case, largely because of the financial
strains which beset the new union, a central imperative in
the rules revision which accompanied the merger of the Painters
into the ASW was the appointment of officials within the
context of a regional structure.
Full—time officials of the building trades unions never
enjoyed the security of tenure which was allowed to comparable
positions insome other unions (17).
	 They were elected and have
been required to stand for re—election every three to five
years. This ensured that they were never wholly free from
the obligation to direct their attention to the views of rank
and file members, especially where those views were given
organised expression at District level. Whilst it has been
argued that members in such a situation are generally reluc-
tant to deprive a sitting official of his position, the fact
that they could do so may deter an official from ignoring a
clear expression of membership opinion. Yet at the senior
levels officials espoused values and policies which 2onflicted
fundamentally with those of the advanced sections of the
members. Executive Council members of the ASW had, through-
out the history of that union, the right to authorise and end
the financial commitment of the union to strike action. Based
at the union's headquarters in Manchester (for most of the
period) they were removed from the overwhelming difficulties
of organisation on site. Their primary commitment, through
the NJCBI was to the constitutional procecures established at
national level and if procedure did not always accord with
the pressures of the site situation, their allegiance was
likely to be to procedure. 	 At the policy level, their focus
was on the levelling up of the bottom grades in the national
wage structure, so that the differential between rural and
urban areas was redliced and eventually eliminated. So at the
policy level too conflict with the better organised urban
areas seemed inevitable. The tensions between central Execu-
tive control and the autonomy of local shop steward organisation
in such district's was confirmed within the union by the
establishment of the full—time Executive.
If the Executive commitment to centralised control was modi-
fied only by their position as elected officials, the situation
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at District level was more ambiguous. District officials
were also elected, but were more directly answerable to and
in contact with the men who elected them. They were funded
to some extent by their own locality, so their wages were
dependent in some measure on the organisation and income
which was maintained. They were sometimes responsible for
initiating movements to organise,by moving militants on to
unorganised sites, so that the struggle to sustain trade unions
in_ building production was a part of their experience as
officials. In some ways the District Official appeared as the
updated version of the 'Walking delegate', yet the District
Official had a standing at national level which was never
accorded to his nineteenth century counterpart. As a full-
time official with status in the national rules, and backing
from central funds, he was part of the network of centralised
control of union affairs, at the same time as his position
derived from and gave support to the struggles of the locality
in which he was based.
If the structure of the ASP&D reflected that of the ASW,
after the creation of the full-time Executive, that of the
AUBTW did not. The existence of a lay Executive and the
focus of organisation around Divisional and District Com-
mittees suggested less tension between central and local levels
and allowed militant opinion to be channelled through formal
and official positions at every level within the union. As
full-time officials, the Divisional Organisers owed allegiance
to the General Secretary, yet they were based in the Division
for which they were elected and were in regular contact with
lay officials, both at District and Divisional level. Like
the District Officer within the ASW (or ASP&D)their position
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was ambiguous, although within their own Division their
influence was unparalleled. Whilst their position reflected
the pressures to develop a unified structure at the national
level, it was mediated by theirgeographical location and their
contact with the membership.
Questions of power were central to the operation of structural
adjustment. Power depended not only on the size of the unions
concerned. It was also gauged by reference to the internal
relations which defined the mode of government within each
society.	 If the Management Committees, the key organisation
within the better unionised areas in the ASW, could be weakened,
so it seemed the central authority of the union's Executive
could be expanded. The policy of regionalisation advocated
by the leadership of the ASW for more than twenty years
derived from this philosophy and it was on this basis that
UCATT was constructed. 	 The elimination of the Management
Committees promised to relieve George Smith and his Executive
of the power base, used by militants.
	 The abolition of the
FFBTO eliminated the only position - that of GS in the Fede-
ration, which could rival that of Smith, and brought unions
with a craft tradition in building production' under the direct
control of the leadership of the ASW.
To what extent can it be claimed that the structural changes
within the building unions were characteristic of the pro-
cess of structural change within the British trade union
movement more generally? A detailed comparison with other
unions is not feasible within the present study, since atten-
tion has been directed primarily to the building trade unions.
Yet certain points can be made in this connection to high-
light both the similarities and the peculiarities of the
construction unions, by contrast with other bodies.
Firstly it is clear that the general unions, and especially
the Transport and General Workers Union, were founded and
built on the principle of amalgamation. The ASW and the
AUBTW, for all of the successes of 1920/21, did not embody the
open and positive approach towards expansion by merger which
characterised the larger general unions. Amalgamation was
fundamental to the existence of the T&GWU and its value was
never forgotten, by Bevin or by his successors. The formation
of UCATT has been cast as essentially defensive in character,
yet it would be wrong to forget that both the T&GWU and the
GUIWU were created in the midst of a trade depression, when
unions were losing members. The value of amalgamation in such
a context was almost unquestionable and it was passed on as
received wisdom within the T&GWU where the inherent advantages
of being the largest single trade union were quickly appre-
ciated. The structure of the union was itself designed to
facilitate the incorporation of smaller bodies and to over-
come the inhibitions formerly posed by craft or occupational
boundaries. And the size of both of the large general unions
precluded fears within them of 'takeover' which were common
within the smaller unions when questions of amalgamation were
under discussion.
The formation of the T&GWU provides further evidence of the
power of trade union leaders to fashion their union's struc-
ture according to their own preferences. Ernest Bevin,
as Assistant Secretary within the Dockers' Union was in a
good position from which to effect the formation of a new
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amalgamated transport union in 1920/21. The amalgamation was
achieved, very largely because of Bevin's commitment to the
principle. Proposals for an amalgamation between the Dockers
Union and the National Union of General Workers, made in the
months after the conclusion of the first world war, were
defeated primarily because they failed to attract Bevin's
support. There was little opposition to the scheme, but a
majority of members in the Dockers Union did not bother to
vote, and the number of abstentions in Bevin's own area araund
Bristol was extremely high. Inevitably it must be concluded
that the failure of these amalgamation proposals derived from
his own lack of enthusiasm for the scheme. (7) Amalgamation
with other transport unions was a more attractive proposition
for Bevin, since the Dockers Union would be the lynch pin in
the new organisation, whilst in the projected merger with the
NUGW it was merely a smaller partner. Bevin has long been
recognised as the architect of the amalgamation which resulted
in the creation of the T&GWU but he was also the principle bene-
ficiary of the structure which_he designed. He deliberately
excluded his opponent and former general secretary, Ben Till,
from a position of influence within the new union, and he
reserved for himself the post of general secretary. Personal
rivalries were acute yet the conflict generated between Bevin
and Tillett, is but one example of the personal jockeying for
position which accompanied most trade union mergers. At every
step the amalgamation was jeopardized by personal interests,
and in his determination to bring the negotiations to a
successful conclusion Bevin 'showed a wise respect for vested
interests leaving it to time to reduce the anomalies' (8).
He inherited, as a result, a form of union organisation which
permitted him almost unparalleled power. The general secretary
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of the T&GWU was the only full-time official permitted a
voice within that union's lay Executive. Elected, like them,
by the membership, he claimed an unrivalled influence in the
running of union affairs. Bevin used the opportunities pre-
sented by amalgamation as a means tolarthering his own
influence and authority within the new union.
The creation of the National Union of General and Municipal
Workers Union in 1923, like the formation of the T&GWU derived
from the impetus within the largest of the amalgamating
unions, to broaden its membership and standing within the
trade union movement. The National Union of General Wor-
kers was by far the largest constituent of the new union, and
its General Secretary, Will Thorne and its President, J.R.
Clynes, were able to use the occasion of the merger to streng-
then their own position and authority, retaining their posts
within the new union after the amalgamation with the National
Amalgamated Union of Labour and the Municipal Employees
Association. Thorne was already a power within the TUC, so
the merger was less significant for his personal situation,
than was the creation of the T&GWU for Bevin. The new union
was based fundamentally on the rulebook of the NUGW, so the
changes in the internal democratic structure were less marked
than within the T&GWU where thelhormation of trade groups pro-
vided a new dimension to the pattern of trade union organisa-
tion (9).
It is clear from these examples that the trends apparent in
the context of structural adjustment within the building
trade unions are not confined to that area. It seems likely
that the power relations which were so important in defining
changes in the building trade unions have been similarly
530
significant in moulding the shape and style of other trade
unions.
Questions of trade union government have been fundamental to
the experience of structural alteration in construction as
elsewhere. This is not to suggest that it is only at the point
when amalgamation or merger is under consideration that moves
are under way to amend or revise constituional procedures
with a view to their centralisation. This process has
its own dynamic for constitutional amendment is on-going.
But amalgamation has provided the occasion for some of the
more far reaching amendments in the field of trade union
government and questions of government have been in the fore-
front of considerations of trade union amalgamation. Indus-
trial logic is a vital ingredient in the mergers which have
been described but decisions are taken through prescribed
forms of organisation whose leaders have the perpetuation of
their own power as a central consideration.
Trade union structure and industrial change
Central to the development and activities of the early trade
societies was their craft identity. Craft skills were decreed
either by the completion of a recognised apprenticeship within
a certain trade, or by the ability to earn the recognised
rate for the job after a certain, prescribed period working
with the tools. A trade might be defined by reference to
work with certain materials with which the tradesman would
be adept - brick or stone for example; it might assume a par-
ticular end product made from that material - for example in the
case of a cabinet maker. It might span a range of industrial
locations, according to the work which could be accomplished
with a particular material - as in the case of a carpenter
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employed on board ship compared with the carpenter engaged
in house building. But in every case it would be associa-
ted with exclusive rights to a particular piece of work as
a result of special training and expertise. A major difficulty
involved in the definition of the terms 'craft', 'trade' and
'skill' is that their meaning and significance varied, both
between different occupations and over time within the same
occupation. What is common to the three major crafts which'
have been considered - and to others which have been men-
tioned, is their longstanding status within building manufac-
ture. At the beginning of the century manual dexterity was
associated with the application of hand tools on procedures
which seemed to offer little potential for mechanisation, and
assertions concerning 'skill displacing technological change'
must be made with caution in this area if they are to have
any significance.
In many ways it is the continuation of craft skill in building,
rather than its elimination which is most striking. Many
small employers and self-employed are engaged in building or
repair work and this means that work is often undertaken by
firms with low and often inadequate capitalisation. The
variety of the work undertaken by building concerns is a
disincentive to investment in plant and equipment. And whilst
building production is relatively labour intensive, high
labour costs are minimised by the casual nature of the indus-
try. The centralisation of capital has meant the growth of a
few large concerns, but this has not necessarily been
at the expense of the smaller undertakings. Their survival
has beenguaranteed both by the continued importance .of the
small job market, which is of little interest to firms such
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as Wimpeys or Costains, and by their role in a sub—contract
capacity on larger jobs. The consequence is that the rationa-
lisation and standardisation which have featured in other
sectors of employment have been modified in their effects on
building and construction work. 	 Traditional skills have
retained a place within the labour market, so that the long
survival of a trade union form of organisation which was
associated with craft skills must be related to their continued
relevance and to the slow pace of innovation.
Yet the process of structural change in union organisation has
to be related to the adaptation and modification of the labour
process as employers sought to reduce labour costs and to
raise control over output. Mechanisation provides the simplest
example — whether in respect of the application of power to
hand tools, used by skilled workers, or in the development
of earth moving machinery which could reduce the requirement
for unskilled labour. Innovations in respect of the product
which was to be created were fundamental, insofar as they
challenged the use of existing materials, and correspondingly
the right of the craftsman to work with those materials in the
customary way.	 The experience of two world. wars — both of
them creating a slump in the house building market contributed
to the development of and application of new materials and
new products in a way which threatened to revolutionise many
of the accepted craft processes in construction. And during
the post—war years the vogue for industrialised system build-
ing eroded the value which had formerly been placed on crafts-
manship in many areas of production. 'Skill displacing tech-
nological change' was not confined to the years before 1914 —
if anything it was during both wars and in the years follow-
ing world war 2 that it proceeded most rapidly. But it is
important to recognise its limitations, as well as its effects
if the survival of craft organisations — albeit in a modified
form — through to the late 1960 1 s is to be understood.
Technological innovation was a slow and uneven process in the
field of construction. The smaller sites and the smaller jobs were
less likely to be affected — for many of the processes would
be viable in their early stages only if economies of scale
could be effected. On the larger jobs moves in this direction
would depend on the particular problems which were to be
encountered on that site, or for that piece of work. An
employer might experiment — for example with the use of pre-
fabricated components — on one site in response to an archi-
teetYsrequii'ements, only to return to more traditional
methods on a later job. And for the craftsman employed on a
casual basis, the extent to which the range of skills might
be deployed would depend on his movement from large to small
site — from the industrialised to the traditional forms of
building. Questions of craft control were blurred by the
transient working life of the building craftsman, as well as
by changing job requirements.
It has become a commonplace to assert that demarcation pro-
blems were not widespread in construction in the post—war years.
Yet it was the shortage of craftsmen which was in large
measure responsible, for the ready availability of alternative
and lucrative employment undermined the will to challenge the
use or distribution of new processes of work. Industrial
innovation was implemented against an inadequate supply of
skilled labour and whilst the consequences may not have
threatened directly the employment prospects of the individual
craftsman, they went some way towards revising the boundaries
between skilled and unskilled, or between the craftsman and
the specialist.
i Deskilling , was of particular importance to the traditional
crafts. Attention has been directed particularly to the trowel
trades, to the carpenters and joiners and to the painters. In
every case it is apparent that the scope and the content of
craft work was limited, over the period under consideration,
by innovations in method and technique. The elimination of
much masonry and brickwork through the use of concrete, the
development of pre—fabricated components especially joinery,
the use of ready—mixed paints and paint sprays were all a part
of this process. Industrialised building, with its use of
steel and glass further reduced the role of the skilled opera-
tive. And if the craftsman was not threatened with elimination
on new building of this type (for systems never worked exactly
and a craftsman was always needed to adapt components) he was
required to exercise a narrower range of skills, with some of
the most exacting tasks replaced by new materials or com-
ponents. However uneven the process of change, the trend,
taken over the period as a whole was towards a lowered demand
for craftsmen with the requirement of a narrower range of
craft skills.
The application of new technology is as likely, it has been
argued, to lead to the evolution of new skills as it is to
eliminate the role of the skilled worker. To what extent
has this been shown to be true within the field of building
and civil engineering? How far do the innovations which have
been made lend themselves to the development of specialisation?
And if this is the case what are the implications for trade
union organisation? It is apparent in a number of areas that
specialist occupations have grown up in response to the chang-
ing requirements of the construction process. Steel erectors
were necessitated by the steel framed building; shuttering
hands were required as concrete became more widely used; as
steel replaced wood in scaffolding and as buildings became
higher, so the work of the scaffolder became more complex and
employment in this area becams more s pecialised. System
building required general skills relating to assembly rather
than the particular trade associated with working in one
material or group of materials in the traditional way. And
if the training was shorter and the range of work undertaken
by each operative more limited in the specialist trades, this
was because they fulfilled a different role,often on different
sites to the majority of skilled craftsmen.
The craft response to the emergence of the specialist occupa-
tions was to build this difference into the wage structure of
the industry. The craftsman was not, on the whole, concerned
to assert his right to the new classes of work which were
evolving. As long as craftsmen were in short supply and the
specialist trades were not threatening their preserve, there
seemed to be little reason to lay claim to the tasks which
they were undertaking. Fundamental to the craft approach
within the building trades was the assertion of the difference
and distinction which should be made between the skilled and
the unskilled worker. The specialist trades — however impor-
tant their contribution to the construction process — were to
be ranged on the side of the unskilled. And if the implica-
tions for their pay were modified by the application of plus
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payments to the unskilled rate, their position was nonetheless
defined by this decision. The major exception was the elec-
tricians whose trade union base was essentially outside of the
construction industry. They increased dramatically in numbers
during the period under consideration, 	 and were able to
establish themselves as a recognised trade with full skilled
status. But otherwise the traditional crafts evinced a conser-
vatism in relation to their status which accorded with the
slow pace of industrial change.
The distinction between the craftsman and the specialist was
that between apprenticeship training and a shorter and perhaps
less formal system of learning. Although the period of time spent
on an apprenticeship has gradually been reduced, and despite
the fact that the craft occupations were not exclusively com-
prised of men who had served apprenticeships, the craftsman
was more likely to have received a formal training — and the
training period would be longer than in the specialist field.
The specialist worker may have acquired a particular exper-
tise but this would not involve the range or the complexity
of operations associated with craft skill. This is apparent if
attention is turned to these areas of work which were trans-
ferred over time, from the site to a factory.	 In joinery,
where manufacture of window frames and doors was already
common at the be ginning of this period, standardisation and
simplification of processes allowed the a pplication of labour
which was unskilled and untrained. The encroachment of women
• onto aspects of work which had previously been the prerogative
of the craftsman was an indication of the extent to which the
deskilling process could be carried. Specialisation in this
area cannot be equated with t reskilling f , although for parti-
lar workers in certain firms it may have had that conse-
quence. The difficulty of definition and generalisation is
that the process was a dynamic one in an industry where for
the most part the location as well as the method of production
was constantly shifting. But the application of a historical
perspective suggests that craft played a more restricted part
within the industry during the decade preceding the formation
of UCATT, than it had in the earlier years of the century.
Innovations in the construction process were an integral part
of the breakdown of craft trade unionism.
Other commentators highlighted the influence of labour-only
sub-contracting in undermining the effectiveness of trade
union organisation in construction. There has been an asso-
ciated assumption that shifts in technology had little part
to play in the breakdown of craft organisation and that the
'lump ,
 as a form of engagement was solely responsible for the
diminishing membership returns and weakening vitality of the
craft societies.
Clearly it would be mistaken to underestimate the anti-trade
union influence of labour-only and the effects which its use
has had in the post-war years. Labour-only has operated to
by-pass trade union organisation, to substitute the individual
for the collective contract, to define the operative as self-
employed rather than as an employee and to encourage tax
evasion as a means of relieving pressure for higher wages.
For the fly-by-night and the 'cowboy' who are after quick
returns it has proved satisfactory. For the trade unionist in
constrUction, faced with the tough, recurrent problems of site
organisation, and with the blacklist as a penalty for his
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activity, it has been a disaster. High returns made to
labour-only men make the nationally negotiated rate seem
derisory. The safety and health of all operatives on site can
be jeopardized by the few who are concerned only to finish and
move on to the next job. And the collective issues of welfare
on site are of little concern to the lumpers for whom a tea-
break means only time and money lost. Those who approve lump
labour and who stress its collective identity in gang work (10)
fail to comprehend that the lumper has no means of relating
to the broader identity of men employed on one site or in one
town. Their presence serves to casualise an industry which is
already casual, and to weaken the precarious collective organi-
sation in a sector in which the employers have proved to be
consistently and virulently anti-trade union.
For all these reasons LOSCis a form of engagement which has
been used and encouraged by the employers. It is the modern
day form of the 'document', an anti-trade union declaration,
developed after the second world war in the context of skill
shortage and intense building activity. Its use has been most
common during periods of Labour Government, when employers
have been concerned to evade regulations concerning their
access to and responsibility for the employment of skilled
labour. Stress is often laid on the operative's commitment
to a 'fiddle' which ostensibly works so much in his favour.
Independence and a spirit of free enterprise are sometimes
cited as fundamental to the lumper's approach to work, but it
is important not to lose sight of the fact that this form of
engagement has been accepted and survives within the industry
because the employers see that it works primarily to their
own advantage. Its use has fluctuated within recent years, not
because the acquisitiveness of the operative Liles been modified,
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but because the level and nature of building activities had
declined in response to broader changes in economic and
political life, and the requirements of the employers have been
adjusted accordingly.
Questions of new technology and innovation in building proces-
ses are fundamentally related to the application of labour only
sub-contracting. In other sectors of employment it has been
accepted that systems of work and the division of labour are
integrally related to the types of technology which are applied
(11). But as far as construction is concerned labour-only
has been treated as a se parate factor from the division of
labour and the level of technology of site operations (12).
On the employers' side there was little need for 'scientific'
methods of job organisation or evaluation if labour could be
persuaded to tackle and complete a job with the maximum pos-
sible speed.. It might be argued that the high cost of labour
for the period when it was on site would offset any gain to the
employer. But it is important to recognise the degree to which
labour disputes could disrupt a programme of building operations,
through disruption of deliveries which would put back schedules
of work. The cost of labour-only might be offset if strikes (so
common in the construction industry) could - be avoided, but labour-
only had further implications at a time when 'industrialisation'
of Building formed a theme for speeches by politicians,
employers and trade union leaders. If technological innova-
tions were expensive, a rapid turnover - implying cost-effective
use of labour could compensate for a failure to innovate. The
maximisation of output - often, it has been asserted, at the
cost of quality - with its concommitant reduction in labour
costs per unit, was the employer's objective. And it could,
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to some extent be satisfied by the application of labour—only,
a simpler and more flexible means of reducing costs than
experimentation with new methods and mechanisation. Conver-
sely as an anti—trade union form of labour recruitment, the
'lump' allows the breach of demarcations which are accepted and
upheld by trade union organisation. Whilst new materials may
present problems for job allocation if trade union practices
are observed, they are less likely to provide the focus for a
dispute where lump labour is used. Labour—only sub—contracting
varies in its mode and form of operation. It embraces both the
individual workmen, engaged individually and the man 'employed'
by a subbie as part of a gang.	 The flexibility allowed by
LOSC was its major advantage to employers in a sector where the
industrialisation of techniques proceeded both slowly and
unevenly. LOSC was fundamentally hostile to the craft tradi-
tion, both in respect of the ouality and the range of work which
could be allocated to the individual operative. It could be
applied both to the older trades, where it encouraged the pro-
cess of deskilling and to the newer processes designed to super—
cede the traditional skills. But wherever it was applied its
utilisation was contrived to undermine craft processes and craft
organisation.
The Building Trades and Trade Union Structure
Discussions of trade union structure have tended to focus on
the classification of types of organisation — the craft, occu-
pational industrial or general unions being the types which
are most commonly identified (13). Commentators have recognised
the difficulties associated with allocating a union to a parti-
cular category and those difficulties.are well reflected in the
account which has been presented of trade union organisation in
the building sector.
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In all of the building trades, unions of the craft ty pe emerged
before 1914. The ASE provided the paradigm of the craft, 'sound
amalgamated' principles of operation, with a relatively cen-
tralised control of finances. The model was followed by many -
although by no means all of the craft societies which were in
existence during the nineteenth century. The ASC&J was .struc-
tured by Applegarth in accordance with the principles operated
by the Engineers (14). And the major organisation of painters -
the National Amalgamated Society of Operative House and Ship
Painters and Decorators, was formulated in 1886 along similar
lines (15). But in the trowel trades - amongst the Masons and
the Bricklayers, 'amalgamated principles' were not endorsed,
and although the trend was towards the central control of finan-
ces, branches or lodges retained a greater degree of autonomy
than persisted with the major organisations of carpenters or
painters. If craft unions are defined by their exclusive
characters, by their ability to control entry to the trade and
the supply of labour, then reference must be made not only to
the formal provisions of the union rulebooks, but also to the
degree of organisation and relative strengths of the trades
which were organised. Craft unionism was modified, not only
by the inclusion of 'amalgamated principles' , in its rulebook,
but by the standing and degree of exclusivity associated with
the craft on which it was based.	 The 'Amalgamated' principles
of the ASE rulebook derived from the importance of the engineer
in British industry in the mid 19th century - they both reflec-
ted and reinforced the standing of the craftsman. The formal
similarities between the 'amalgamated principles' of the ASC&J
and the NASCH&SP&D were in sharp contrast to the craft status
of the carpenter and the painter.
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H.A. Turner has noted that the use of craft or occupation to
classify a trade union is limited by the fact that crafts and
occupations are liable to change (16). As products are varied
and new materials introduced so the boundaries of craft are
shifted with processes incorporated into or excluded from the
orbit.. of an individual craft. The shift in industrial produc-
tion during wartime (1914-18) highlighted the extent to which
craft processes might be redefined. As the delineation between
crafts became blurred within the building trades,„ so there was
a reassertion of craft status against the encroachment of the
unskilled or the semi—skilled worker. Kindred trades drew
together, not because they had abandoned their craft identity,
but because it was threatened. And if the reformulation of
rules and organisation seemed to posit a more open approach to
questions of organisation, this must be understood in the light
of wartime subversion of craft processes and status. The
amalgamatiomof the period 1920-21 were mergers between kin-
dred trade unions, working in the same or similar materials.
But whilst they involved a reassertion of craft status, they
involved a clear and significant move towards a form of trade
union organisation defined in reference to general occupation,
although set within a craft tradition. Whilst the AUBTW
was formally more receptive to the semi—skilled than the ASW,
the weight of craft tradition was felt in both cases.
It was craft identity as much as industrial logic which defined
the formation of UCATT in 1971. The regrouping of construc-
tion unions during the 1960's followed the major demarcation
established between craft and non—craft workers. It was around
the major union which derived from the earlier craft societies —
the ASV, that the new organisation was formed. And it grouped
together, with few exceptions (notably the NAOF, the Plumbers
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and the Scottish Slaters) those unions which shared craft
origins in building production. The dynamic of industrial
and political change had forced a wider pattern of recruitment
on the unions concerned. In opening of the ranks to tallied
process workers' to women and - in the case of the AUBTW to
the unskilled through the take-over of the NBIJ&CWS modified
recruitment patterns although the attitude and leadership of
a craft elite tended nonetheless to predominate. Such Changes
were made late (by comparison say, with the engineers) and with
little expressed enthusiasm for broadening the basis of organi-
sation. Membership figures within the AUBTW where an unskilled
section was established suggest that priority was not accorded
to the recruitment and retention of unskilled members. UCATT
was formed on the basis of a membership which was predomi-
nantly craft based. Regrouping came about in accordance with
the prevailing organisational framework which tended to divide
craft from non-craft workers. The distinction was blurred in
practice by the emergence of the wide range of specialist
trades whose work attracted plus payments on the labourer's
rate. But it remained fundamental to the choice made by
leaders of the unions which claimed a craft tradition to remain
outside of the orbit of the general unions.
It was the general unions which provided the alternative frame-
work for union organisation in building production. The
Transport and General Workers Union in particular was designed
to allow growth by assimilation as smaller bodies were drawn
into its field.
	 The national Trade Groups provided a simple
structure within ehich to reconcile the sectional interests
of a particular trade with the class identification of the
union as a whole. The absorbtion of the Workers' Union in
and the Builders' Labourers permitted its clear identification
544
as the major union recruiting amongst unskilled building wor-
kers. The philosophy of its leaders was oriented towards ex-
pansion and the redfinition of building processes assisted in
this direction without directly challenging the rights of
unions with a craft tradition to their established sphere of
recruitment. The impact of technological innovation, taken in
conjunction with LOSC forced the pace. The Perth Agreement had
formalised the distinction between craft and non-craft workers
so far as the question of trade union organisation was concerned.
And the breakdown of this agreement symbolised not merely the
blurring of the distinction between skilled and unskilled. It
signified too the imminent restructuring of a union organisa-
tion which was founded on the handicraft work of an earlier
era.
The classification of unions according to the scope of their
recruitment has recognised limitations, which are as valid for
building production as they are for other areas. The variations
within the form accorded to the craft union have already been
noted, and as unions have abandoned the principles which
governed recruitment in their earlier stages, so the application
of such terms must prove less satisfactory. Alternative cri-
teria have been suggested as a means to evaluating trade union
structure (17). The 'open' trade union does not impose res-
trictions on entry into the occupations amongst which it
organises. It is likely to collaborate with management to
establish itself within a plant and wage questions are funda-
mental to its operation.
	 It is concerned with jurisdictional
issues and adopts the form of the post-entry closed shop. It
is the larger type of union and the Transport and General
Workers Union undoubtedly provides the model of this type.
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The 'closed' or smaller union, by contrast is based on the
capacity to control the supply and price of labour in a parti-
cular occupation. For this reason there would be a concern to
reserve certain jobs for its members, and to employ restrictive
practices.
Yet the smaller union can be more open and the larger one more
closed — as in the case of the ASC&J and the GUC&J prior to
their amalgamation. And just as wider economic and social
changes affected the scope for control over labour sup ply by
a particular craft — and called into question the validity of
the term itself, so those changes force a concomitant adjust-
ment if the union is classified as ? closed' but adjusts to
changes in the labour market by structural alterations which do
not conform to its past pattern of operations. The difficulty
with any classification of structure which fails to allow for
the dynamic of historical change is that the classification will
inevitably be bypassed by the effects of that change. Attempts
to evolve a descriptive terminology which conveys the complex
recruitment patterns of the larger organisations which now
dominate the British trade union movement — 'hybrid', 'greater
unionism' (18), have done little to remedy the defects of past
forms of classification, which remain helpful at leastto the
extent that they indicate something of the origin and evolution
of the trade unions which they describe.
The importance of a historical dimension to an understanding
of union structure has recently been stressed:
? Union structure is not a fixed phenomenon but a process, the
historical outcome of the interdependent but not purposefully
integrated strategies of a variety of fragmented employee
groups. Throughout the process of structural development,
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two contradictory forces have operated: on the one hand
towards breadth, unity and solidarity; on the other towards
parochialism, sectionalism and exclusiveness.' (19)
The open and closed unions represent an abstraction, which
contrasts the conflicting tendencies to breadth and openness
on the one side, and to a closed exclusive character on the
other. In the case of the building trade unions this has
been evidenced in its most acute form by the contrast between
the Transport and General Workers Union and those building
trades' unions with a craft tradition which went to form UCATT.
On the side of the T&GWU there was a breadth of organisation
which was founded in general recruitment limited only by their
Agreement with the craft societies.
And in the latter case, there was a tradition of exclusivity
which, whilst it was modified over time, remained fundamental
to the membership base on which UCATT was formed. The attitude
towards the recruitment of women was symptomatic of the distinc-
tion which has been made, for the T&GWU recruited women from
its inception, whilst the building craft societies always
resisted recruitment in this area, des pite the incursion of
women into aspects of building production during the years
of theEecond world war.
Notwithstanding the contrast with the T&GWU and also the G&MWU,
the building trades organisations widened their sphere of
operations over time - although the movement was slow and
apparently reluctant. The relaxation of requirements concern-
ing apprenticeship and years at the trade were matched only at
a comparatively late stage by a willingness to recruit amongst
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allied process workers. Whilst the AUBTW differed from the
other trades in respect of its positive commitment to indus-
trial solidarity, it was similarly restrictive in many of its
recruitment practices and showed little determination to raise
the level of its unskilled membershi p after the merger with the
NBL&CWS. But it must be recognised that the building unions
which have been considered were constrained by the existence and
claims of rival organisations in many spheres of their o pera-
tions. The separate existence of the NUFTO and the ASI1M in
woodworking, the claims of industrial unionism in the mines,
where the NUM consolidated trade union or ganisation from 1948
and the formation of the FUPE recruiting at an 'industrial' level
in the local authorities and hospitals undermined areas in which
the 'closed' craft societies had assumed a certain presence.
The short—lived 'industrial' union, the BWIU had little impact in
this respect, since it generated only a tiny membership in the
10 years of its existence but its presence certainly encouraged
the leadership of the existing craft societies towards a more
'open' and flexible view of their own role, from fear of its
possible encroachments on their established territory.
Perhaps the most striking feature of trade union structure in
building production was the existence of the YFBTO, one of the
largest and most effective trade union federations. Brought
into being in 1918, it survived for over fifty years and was
superceded only by the formation of UCATT. For more than half
a century it succeeded in Providing a forum for the disparate
organisations which recruited building trade workers. It was
founded and led by the unions with craft traditions — notably
the ;:oodworkers and the AUBTW, but it drew under its umbrella
the general unions, unions of builders' labourers and unions
which represented workers in related sectors, such as furniture
manufacture, having only a small minority of their members in
building. In some ways it seemed reminiscent of the Operative
Builders' Union of the 1830's. That body had been founded upon
existing trade societies lAlich were not merged, in the full sense,
during its brief life. Similarly the NFBTO was founded by and
relied on the affiliations of the existing trade unions in the
field of building production. By its very success in reconciling
the different and sometimes conflicting interests of its affilia-
tes, it assured its standing and continued existence, precluding
for many years the possibility of wider amalgamation. Within the
framework of Federal activity the smaller craft societies were
able to jdustify their separate and autonomous existence through
co-operation on the key question of national, regional and local
collective bargaining. And if collective action at this level
seemed to undermine the value of their independence, they could
refer to the se parate representation of individual unions,
additional to the representation allowed to the ITFBTO, on the
FJCBI. Federation allowed the perpetuation of different ranges
of contributions and benefits; and it permitted the luxury of
craft identification and pride to unions which could not afford
isolation in their relationship with the employers. G.D.H.
Cole, writing before the formation of the FFBTO suggested that
the real test of a Federation is whether or not it will add to
the collective bargaining power of the union (20). Kost fede-
rations are unable to satisfy this test, but the =TO, with
its key role within the TJCBI was an important exception.
The Federation provided a simple and effective solution to two
major problems which beset the industrial union in building
production. The first problem involved the difficulty of defini-
tion. ihat was the building industry and where were its
boundaries? To what extent could workers in the mines, on
the railways, in steel or the shipyards be defined as build-
ing workers? And how far could an industrial union extend
its claims if building production was a feature of such widely
differing industrial locations? The structure provided by the
NFBTO was suffiently loose to avoid the direct answer to this
question which would have been necessitated by industrial
unionism.. The early period of national wage negotiation
through the NW&CC was beset by difficulties associated with
the extent to which the building trade rate should be applied
to building trades operatives who were maintenance craftsmen
in other industrial sectors. Since the building trade rate
was, in that period higher than the rate for some other
industries — for example engineering, but operatives working
in those industries' might not experience the disadvantages
associated with building work — especially casual employment
and poor working conditions, there was an incentive for them
to claim the building rate. The flexible structure provided
by the NFBTO allowed such questions to be decided in accordance
with each particular case and unions could adjust their affilia-
tion to the Federation in accordance with the estimated numbers
of members who were in building production, without any
attempt to define the situation of the individual operative.
Secondly whilst a move from the shipbuilding to the house—
building sector might have involved a change of union if
industrial organisation provided the basis for trade union
structure, this was not necessitated by the arrangement which
allowed a craft worker to maintain his card whatever the
industrial location in which he was employed (21).
If the Building Industry Agreement provided the main focus of
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concern for the NFBTO, it was by no means the only national
agreement in which the Federation was implicated. A major
feature of the post-war Labour Government was the expansion
of the public sector as a result both of nationalisation and
the establishment of the National Health Service. The NFBTO
had its part to play in negotiations in many areas in which
its affiliates could claim members (unlike the TUC's Construc-
tion Committee which succeeded it). It was involved in nego-
tiations in the steel industry,on the railways, in, the health
service and in companies where company bargaining was estab-
lished - as at ICI and Courtaulds. Whilst in practice these
negotiations largely involved individuals from particular unions
for the NFBTO never developed an extensive staff at national
level - it was done in conjunction with the Federation's
GS, and through the medium of the Federation. The conduct of
industry-wide collective bargaining was the staple business
of the Federation.
The NFBTO was essentially the vehicle for the defence and
regulation of craft interests. It included the builders'
labourers and the general workers only because they had been
successful in establishing a separate body to deal with the
related field of civil engineering, and in so doing had
jeopardized the craft control which was a necessary pre-
requisite for the effective operation of the YFBTO. They were
the Trojan . Horse, capable, in the context of economic and
technological changes, of threatening the power base occupied
by the craft societies. The consolidation of a se parate and
distinct arena of activities in bivil engineering paved the
wey for a challenge to craft organisation and policy through-
out the field of construction activity.
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If the NFBTO was primarily designed to re present craft interests,
some attention must be given to the 'balance of power' between
the different crafts. The diversity of organisation was matched
by variety in size and one union — the ASW dominated the Fede-
ration, with only two, serious contestants in the craft field —
the AUBTW and the Fainters, representing 66 and 505 respec-
tively of the AS/'s affiliated membership (1965 figs.). The
problem did not replicate that within the CSEU where the AEU
was by far the largest union. In that case arrangements were
made from 1948 to scale down the Engineer's votes at the annual
conference of the Confederation, so that the AEU did not hold
an absolute majority (22). The problem did not arise in the
NFB910 since although the ASW was the largest affiliate it rep-
resented under a third of the members. Its numerical superio-
rity meant that in practice its views were most likely to
prevail, for it could generally count on support from the
majority of smaller craft societies. But support of this kind
was not automatic — it required cajoling and threatening,
using the ASW vote to support and maintain likely candidates
in key positions within the Federation. And on some issues —
where the craft unions were split on a problem, it was possible
for the general unions, acting together to use the division in
• craft ranks to their own advantage — the most notable occasion
being the defeat of the ASW on the question of pbr. The ASW —
or its predecessor the ASC&J — had called into being a
Federation which was usually, but not always a vehicle for the
individual, craft based interests which it espoused. It com-
manded the official positions within the Federation more fre-
quently than any other union, and in consequence proved able
to keep
 a finger on the pulse of Federation activities. Just
as the balance of forces within the TUC could not be discussed
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without reference to the influence of the T&GIal, so within
the NFBTO account must be made of the predominant influence
of the ASW.
It was the decision within the AST to dispense with the Fede-
ration which propelled its affiliates towards'. amalgamation.
The moves from the ASW were in fact preceded by the merger
of the TAOP into the T&GWU, within the broader context of the
crisis of craft.organisation which was apparent by the 601s.
The importance of the ASW rested not only on its size, but
on the pre—eminent position of its members within a craft
hierarchy. However dramatic the impact of industrialised
techniques and systems of work, they could not entirely by-
pass the controls associated with craft organisation in wood-
working. But the threat which was Dosed was a serious one,
and although ',Toodworkers suggested that their union was not
affected to the same extent as others by the crisis, they had
been allied to the other trades for too lon g to be unaffected
or unconcerned by their decline. Moreover the evidence sug-
gests that although the crisis in organisation hit them later
than other trades, it hit them nonetheless hard.
	
If the
example of the Plasterers and the Scottish Slaters was not
to be followed by other societies with a craft tradition, then
that tradition had to be modified across craft lines. The
unity of Federation could be preserved only by abolishing the
form of Federation itself. Amalgamation, finally, was to
replace federation.
The formation of UCATT was only one of a number of trade union
mergers which marked the decade following the TUC's renewed
initiative in 1963 in the field of trade union structure.
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The successful amalgamation of the ETU and the PTU, the expan-
sion of the AEU via the attachment of three unions recruiting
in related areas — the Draughtsmen, the Constructional Engineers
and the Foundry Workers, and the formation of the FTAT are
just a few of the mergers which were effected. It is apparent
that in this period, as in earlier years the state of the law
in respect to reouirements placed on amalgamating trade unions
has been a key factor inhibiting or encouraging discussions
and, implementation of changes to trade union structure. There
is clearly little point indulging in lengthy and complex
negotiations regarding amalgamation if, at the end of those
negotiations, change is precluded by legal requirements which
cannot easily be fulfilled. Conversely it is only if dis-
cussions which have seemed promising to-their participants have
failed to reach fruition for this reason hat pressures for
change in the law are likely to be forthcoming.
Statutory requirements have been considerably eased since the
Trade Union Act 1871 laid down that the approval of two thirds
of the membership of each society was necessary before amal-
gamation could proceed. The instigation of a new form of
merger — the transfer of engagements was designed to encourage
smaller societies to accept amalgamation into the larger
unions, without any requirement within the larger union for
a ballot on the subject. The consequences of such a move
are interesting in the case where the size of a smaller union
is sufficient to swing: an undecided vote on a key question
within the larger union with which it is merging. And there
are important consequences for union democracy if a union
can more than double its numbers without any reference to its
own members. Voting need take place only within the union
which is transferring engagements. But there is nothing sacro-
sent about the transfer itself. Special arrangements which are
allowed at the time of the transfer need not be upheld in per-
petuity. Adjustments to the forms and constitution governing
organisation are subsequently inevitable and at the time when
they are pending members who have transferred in will find them-
selves in a minority in o pposing changes which counter their
position as agreed at the time of the transfer. The changed legal
requirement — to be amended by a provision for reimbursement
far the cost orballots on amalgamation in the Employment Act,
1980, reflect the shift of view amongst employers on the subject
of trade union structure durin g the course of the century. Whilst
industrial unity seemed before 1914, to pose a threat to their
industrial and social control, it has been clear, at least since
the first world war, that there is no necessary equation between
the size of a union and its militancy. It is now em ployers, at
least as often as trade unionists, who de plore the consequences
of multi—unionism, and the question of a reduction in the number of
trade unions has become a reference point as part of a projected
solution to the 'crisis in industrial relations' in recent years.
One of the most widely Quoted statements concerning trade union
structure has been George Woodcock's assertion the 'structure is
a function of purpose.'(23) It has been argued that this statement
has more relevance to the nineteenth than to the twentieth century.
The Purpose of trade unions may be to maintain and improve con—
ditions of work for its members as the .'ebbs suggested, but it is
the method by which that end is pursued which is important to
the evaluation of Woodcock's statement. The early craft union
adopted a method. of unilateral regulation which sought to
impose standards of pay and conditions of work for its members
who were, for the most part, apprentice—trained craftsmen.
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”The aim of the traditional craft union could be seen as the
fashioning of a single massive work group co—terminous with
the trade, its authority dependent on the united action of its
members in imposing standard terms on the trade, and its unity
supported by the equal treatment and protection they received
from the union. This method dictated union structure." (24)
But as unilateral regulation was by—passed by the development
of collective bargaining involving the joint regulation of pay
and conditions by employers and unions together,„ so tthe unions'
method of controlling pay and conditions became less signifi-
cant as the defining feature of union structure. The union
could effectively control conditions without maintaining a
form of organisation which was co—terminous with trade.
Several different trades could be recruited by the same union,
whilst the joint regulation of pay and conditions could be
pursued through a variety of organisational forms. It would
seem then, from this account, that structure was a function of
purpose for as long as craft unions pursued their objectives
through the unilateral regulation of conditions, but that with
the development of collective bargaining, the purpose of trade
union organisation ceased to define the shape of that organi-
sation.
The craft origins of building trade unions have proved funda-
mental to the subsequent form and adaptations of structure
as well as to their shape in the 19th Century. It is not
only that the early development of the craft societies was defined
by the unilateral regulation of conditions within each trade.
It is also that each craft had an identity and a craft pride
which survived the impact of industrial changes, moulding the
form and the outlook of trade unions which operated in the
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changed bargaining arrangements which followed the first world
war. Unilateral regulation was effective for the building
trades, insofar as it relied solely on the capacity of union
members to organise and impose their standards.
	
Collective
bargaining was less so, for it relied on the ca pacity and
willingness of employers to co—o perate in its implementation,
and both have been shown to be lacking.
Conclusion
The 'One Big Union' erected so carefully in the literature of
building trade unionism bore little relation, when finally it
was created, to the aspirations of industrial unionists.
Doctrines concerned with the reformulation of trade union
structure envisaged that this would occur, in defiance of the
general secretaries of the craft societies, rather than through
their support. But just as the Operative Builders Union, con-
trary to the account supplied by the ;:ebbs, had not really
challenged the autonomy of its affiliated craft sections, so
UCATT, on its formation, did not challenge the traditions of
craft organisation embodied in its major constituent unions.
The ! One Big Union' may, on occasion have been the 'vision
which inspired! but it was not the consideration which informed
negotiations on amalgamation in the 1960's.
It was not that ideologyplayed no part in discussions of
amalgRmation. Iolitical sympathies and allegiances were
fundamental to negotiations and in the absence of other major
considerations might impede or encourage their successful
conclusion. Jolherents of a political philoso phy which paid
lip service to the notion of industrial unionism were more
likely to oppose than to support an amalgamation with a union
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which had more conservative traditions, and a right wing
leadership. And so, on occasion the 'vision which inspired'
served to separate rather than to unite trade unions within
the building industry. George Smith, like his predecessors
as GS of the .P_SW, looked for allegiances which would strengthen
the conservative tendency for which that union was known. But
political considerations were balanced, finally, by the logic
of craft organisation as the barriers were broken down by the
m&G•1r.
It was this same .question of political identity which defined
the approach to the issue of government within the individual
unions. leading officials were concerned to perpetuate and
strengthen their own influence within the democratic machine.
The priorities of union organisation, when the question was
viewed from national head office, were very different from
the priorities of the activist concerned to organise on site.
Questions of finance and administration were central to the
national official, whilst for the militant it was the question
of boosting site trade union organisation against the blacklist
which took priority. At one level it is apparent that there
was no fundamental conflict of interests, for the union relied
on the activists to recruit and to renew membership. But at
another level it is clear that the perspective of national
officials was governed by their emphasis on the smooth—running
of the organisation. Control of policy and of finance was
their objective and the long—term adjustments which they pro-
posed were designed to foster that control. The political
machinations of left and right tended then to the capture of
positions which could enhance their influence. If amalgamation
could strengthen this process, it was used to that end.
NO one factor, taken alone can provide a sufficient ex plana-
tion of the pattern of mergers which has been described.
Political identities, the ambitions of officials, the impact
of new processes of production or labour—only cannot, in
isolation account for the nature or sco pe of the mergers which
were finally effected. The loiic of Political decisions, of
the conscious actions of leading officials within each of the
unions concerned, must be balanced in the final analysis by
reference to the over—all context in which those actions and
decisions were taken. The construction process itself is cen-
tral to an understanding of the form assumed by the trade
union movement within it. The survival in the second half of
the twentieth century of a form of trade union organisation
which might not have seemed out of place a century earlier
can be explained only by reference to the slow pace of change
in building production, both in technology and in the divi-
sion of labour. The reality of craft operations was paralleled
by the survival of craft organisation in an industry where
innovation was inhibited by the limited advantages of capital
investment and the long survival of small—scale units of
production. It was Connelly,rather than Postgate or Hilton
(cited at the beginning of the introduction), who made the most
realistic assessment on the question of trade union structure.
In 1959 carpenters and joiners were not ready to end their
century old organisation. The craft tradition still played a
part within the trade union movement. The changes in the
construction process, the 'industrialisation , of the building
industry and along with it the application of labour—only
as a means of facilitating labour supply had not finally
broken down the barriers between woodworkers, bricklayers
and painters. The changed environment for trade union
organisation in construction was an essential pre-requisite
for a reformulation of trade union structure.
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APPENDIX A. Hourly wage rates in building, compared with
the engineering industry.
It is intended in this appendix to compare hourly wage rates
in the building and the engineering industries during the 20th
century. National collective bargaining was effective in both
industries from the first world war, although some variation
according to district was sustained for much of the period in
each case and a 'super-rate' is still maintained within the
building industry agreement, today.
A presentation of wage rates in the two industries does not of
course illustrate the relationship between earnings in building
and engineering. Payment by results has been an accepted
feature of payments within the engineering industry throughout
this century and although not all workers in engineering are
paid on this basis, pbr or lieu payments represent an important
component of earnings for many. Payment by results was accep-
ted within the building industry only in the years after the
second world war, so that wage rates for the earlier period
may be taken as a reliable indicator of the basis on which
earnings were constructed. Many employers have been reluctant
to implement pbr schemes in the building industry and if 'lump'
workers are excluded from the calculations, it is probable that
only a minority of building workers were in receipt of a pay-
ment additional to the nationally negotiated rate at any time
during these years.
The regularity of employment is an important factor affecting
comparisons between the building and the engineering industries.
The casual nature of employment within many parts of the
building industry meant that an operative could not expect that
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his earnings would be based on his hourly rate multiplied by
the number of hours in the normal working week. The suscep-
tibility of operations to disruption by inclement weather
increased the likelihood that earnings would be based on some-
thing less than the full number of hours. Even after the
introduction of the guaranteed week during the second world
war the number of hours guaranteed was less (32) than the num-
ber of hours in the normal working week (around 44).
Although wage rates*in the building industry are shown to be
consistently higher, on an hourly basis than those in the
engineering industry, this conclusion cannot be extended to
earnings. The New Earning s Survey, 1968 showed earnings in
building trades to be consistently lower than in engineering
trades. Whereas at this time 66.4% of painters and 63.1% of
bricklayers sampled earned less than E24 p.w., the proportion
of engineering fitters and turners earning under this figure
was much lower. Only 37.6% of maintenance fitters and 41.5%
of production fitters earned less than E24 p.w.
	
Of the tool-
room men only 34.2% were below this sum, by contrast with 59.1%
of carpenters. Whereas approximately one third of bricklayers,
carpenters & painters received less than E20 p.w. only 12.6%
of maintenance fitters, 18.3% of production fitters and 8.1%
of toolroom fitters were below this level.
*Wage data presented in this appendix was extracted from the
British Labour statistics:  Historical abstract, 1886-1968.
The figures for the engineering industry were there presented
on a weekly basis and the hourly figure has been calculated
on the assumption that the weekly rate represented the payment
for the normal number of hours in the basic working week. Figures
have been calculated to the nearest farthing in each case.
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Rate Hours Rate Hours fitters' rate
1900	 Jan 0.10d 51 0.8:1 54 121.2%
1906	 Oct 1 0.9d 51 0.7id 56i 126.7%
1910	 Oct 0.9id 51 0.7d 56i 122.6%
1914	 Oct 0.10id 50 0.8d 56i 120.0%
1920	 Dec 2 2.4 44 1.11id 47 119.1%
1924	 Apr 1.7id 44 1.13d 47 147.1%
1926	 Apr 1.8d 44 1.2id 47 137.9%
1930	 Apr 1.8d 44 1.4d 47 125%
1938	 Apr 1.8id 44 1.6d 47 113.9%
1945	 Apr 2.2id 44 2.1id 47 104.0%
1950	 Apr 2.10id 44	 (41i
winter)
2.6id 44 114.0%
1955	 Apr 4.0d 44	 If 3.7id 44 110.3%
1960	 Apr 4.11id 44	 If 4.6id 42 109.7%
1965	 Apr 6.6id 40 5.3d 41 124.6%
1968	 Apr 7.8id 40 6.5id 40 119.7%
1906 figs, for building industry for October, for engineering -
January.
1920 figs, for building industry - December, for engineering -
April.




Rate Hours Rate Hours fitters , rate
1900 Jan 0.9id 54 0.8-,1d 53 115.2%
1906 Oct l 0.9id 54 0.8d 53 115.2%
1910 Oct 0.9d 54 0.9-•d 48 102.7%
1914 Oct 0.10id 54 0.8id 53 123.5%
1920 Dec
2 2.4d 44 1.9id 47 128.7%
1924 Apr 1.7id 44 1.2,-Id 47 136.8%,
1926 Apr 1.8d 46i (& 44
winter)
1.23d 47 140.4%
1930 Apr 1.7d 46i	 II 1.2-1d 47 128.8%
1938 Apr 1.7id 46i	 II 1.4i-d 47 116.4%
1945 Apr 2.1d 46-	 n 2.0d 47 102.0%
1950 Apr 2.10d 46i	 II 2.51d 44 117.9%
1955 Apr 4.0d 46i	 II 3.6id 44 112.9%
1960 Apr 4.11id 44 4.5-1-d 42 111.7%
1965 Apr 6.51d 41 5.2d 41 125%
1968 Apr 7.81d 40 6.5-1d 40 119.7%
1 1906 figs. for building industry for October, for engineering —
January.
2 1920 figs. for building industry — December, for engineering —
April.








1900	 Jan 0.10d 50 0.8-d 54 117.6%
1906	 Oct 1 0.10d 50 0.8id 48/54 107.7%
1910	 Oct 0.10d 50 0.9d/10d 48/54 105.0%
1914	 Oct 0.11id 50 0.9d/10d 48/54 115.0%
1920	 Deo 2 2.4 d 44 1.11d 47 121.7%
1924	 Apr 1.8d 44 1...3id 47 129.0%
1926	 Apr 1.9id 44 1.3id 47 138.7%
1930	 Apr 1.8id 44 1.4d 47 128.1%
1938	 Apr 1.9d 44 1.6d 47 116.7%
1945	 Apr 2.2id 44 2.1i-d 47 102.9%
1950
	 Apr 3.0d 44 2.6id 44 118.0%
1955	 Apr 4.1id 44 3.7Zd 44 113.1%
1960	 Apr 5.1d 44 4.6id 42 111.4%
1965
	 Apr 6.7d 41 5.3id 41 124.9%
1968	 Apr 7.10d 40 6.5i-d 40 121.7%
1 1906 figs. for building industry — October, for engineering —
January
2 1920 figs. for building industry — December, for engineering —
April.
Liverpool: Wage Rates (Hourly)
Bricklayers Fitters Bricklayers
as % of
Rate Hours Rate Hours fitters' rate
1900 Jan 9id 49i 0.8id 53 115.2%
1906 oct l 9id 49- 0.Eq-d 53 115.2%
1910 Oct 10d 46i 0.8d 53 117.6%
1914 Oct 11d 46i 0.8d 53 125.7%
1920 Dec 2 2.4d 44 1.9d 47 128.7%
1924 Apr 1.9d 44 1.2id. 47, 144.,8%_
1926 Apr 1.9d 44 1.2+d 47 144.8%
1930 Apr 1.9d 44 1.2id 47 142.4%
1938 Apr 1.8id 44 1.4d 47 122.4%
1945 Apr 2.1d 44 2.0id 47 102.0%
1950 Apr 3.0d 44 2.5id 44 122.0%
1955 Apr 4.1id 44 3.6id 44 116.5%
1960 Apr 5.1d 44 4.5i-d 42 114.6%
1965 Apr 6.7d 41 5.2d 41 127.4%
1968 Apr 7.10d 40 6.571d 40 121.7%
1906 figs. for building industry for October; for engineering —
January.
1920 figs. for building industry for December; for engineering —
April.
APPENDIX B. Unemployment in construction, 1900-1939.
The intention in this appendix is to indicate seasonal and
cyclical fluctuations in employment in construction in the
United Kingdom between 1900 and 1939. The percentage of the
insured who were unemployed is detailed for the months of
January and July in each year. The information was extracted
from the Board of Trade Labour Gazette subsequently The
Ministry of Labour Gazette.	 Industrial definitions were
adapted and developed over this period so that the form of
the information and the degree of detail varies over the
period under consideration. 	 The data provides nonetheless
a basis on which the impact of unemployment can be assessed.
It is particularly detailed for the inter-war years when the











Jan	 Jul	 Jan	 Jul
1902	 1903
Carpenters & Joiners	 5.6	 2.9	 6.5	 3.3
Plumbers	 5.8	 6.5	 6.4	 6.7
1904	 1905
Carpenters & Joiners	 7.7	 5.7	 11.6	 6.5
Plumbers	 9.3	 10.5	 10.9	 10.1
1906	 1907
Carpenters & Joiners	 10.1	 5.3	 8.2	 5.0
































Carpenters & Joiners 1.7 2.4 1.1	 1.2
Bricklayers 5.3 2.4 1.9	 1.3
Masons 7.0 2.6 2.7	 1.4
Plasterers 10.5 3.1 5.5	 2.8
Painters 12.8 1.8 6.6	 0.8
Plumbers 2.1 1.5 1.0	 0.6
Labourers .2.7 1.2 1.0	 0.7
Other skilled occs. 1.5 1.0	 0.6
Navvies 0.8 0.4	 0.4
Total 4.5 1.7 2.0	 0.9
1917 1918
Carpenters & Joiners 0.64 1.03 0.41
	 0.24
Bricklayers 1.14 0.80 0.26	 0.20
Masons 2.00 1.07 0.80	 0.49
Plasterers 3.31 2.16 2.34	 0.72
Painters 3.94 0.52 2.41
	 0.40
Plumbers 0.42 0.61 0.24
	 0.41
Other skilled MO 0.59 0.46	 0.32
Navvies 0.38 0.72 0.48	 0.82
Labourers 0.77 0.83 0.68	 0.75






Carpenters 3.31	 '5.38 1.16 0.37
Bricklayers 8.4	 8.72 1.05 0.23
Masons 9.21	 14.92 4.03 1.01














Total 6.22	 8.64 5.04 2.19
1921 1922
Carpenters * Nos only	 8.57
are given
9.9 8.6
















Plumbers period.	 8.34 10.6 10.7
Other Skilled occs. 10.77. 27.8 21.0
Navvies 15.78
Labourers 22.50












Masons 10.2 CMo 4.1 2.5
Slaters & Tilers 15.8 oil1-..
6.6 6.1
Plasterers 16.7 .4m 4.5 3.2























Carpenters 3.1 2.0 7.1 4.9
Bricklayers 2.0 1.2 4.9 3.2
Masons 4.4 2.4 10.1 7.5
Slaters & Tilers 4.3 4.6 10.6 5.5
Plasterers 2.3 1.4 3.2 1.8
Painters 27.7 8.6 30.1 9.3
Plumbers 5.6 5.9 8.0 9.6
Labourers to above 12.1 8.9 15.9 12.1
Other 26.7 21.3 16.1 13.4





Carpenters 8.6 3.2 13.5 6.6
Bricklayers 7.2 1.7 12.6 5.9
Masons 11.0 4.4 13.7 6.5
Slaters & Tilers 10.6 4.0 10.7 8.4
Plasterers 5.0 1.7 19.2 9.5
Painters 29.3 8.3 30.6 9.0
Plumbers 9•4 7.2, 7•9 9.3
Labourers to above 15.9 9.5 16.8 12.5
Other 16.3 11.3 17.2 14.6
Total 15.2 7.5 17.4 10.5
1929 1930
Carpenters 11.9 4.1 13.6 10.1
Bricklayers 15.8 2.6 12.9 6.8
Masons 17.2 4.6 10.9 7.2
Slaters & Tilers 18.5 9.4 11.5 15.0
Plasterers 18.5 4.2 22.6 10.9
Painters 33.7 7.8 32.0 14.5
Plumbers 10.5 7.1 11.4 15.8
Labourers to above 21.0 11.3 17.9 14.9
Other 19.9 13.1 19.1 19.3






Carpenters 23.7 17.6 29.5 25.3
Bricklayers 21.3 11.2 28.1 25.2
Masons 21.2 12.5 25.7 21.8
Slaters & Tilers 27.7 18.9 28.8 31.0
Plasterers 26.8 18.1 30.2 29.8
Painters 46.1 22.5 52.6 28.1
Plumbers 20.8 21.3 26.0 26.5
Labourers	 to above 25.1 19.4 50.2 27.2
Other 25.2 20.6 31.4 30.5
Total 27.0 18.9 32.8 27.6
1933 1934
Carpenters 31.2 15.3 17.7 9.3
Bricklayers 39.8 10.3 14.3 5.0
Masons 37.8 17.6 23.7 14.9
Slaters & Tilers 35.5 16.7 23.6 15.8
Plasterers 45.5 12.5 14.7 6.8
Painters 51.1 22.3 42.3 16.5
Plumbers 28.4 18.3 17.8 13.7
Labourers to above 56.0 22.0 25.4 17.2
Other 36.4 28.8 32.3 31.0






Carpenters 15.3 6.9 13.4 4.4
Bricklayers 15.0 3.2 . 26.3 3•3
Masons 23.0 10.9 26.9 6.3
Slaters & Tilers 23.9 14.1 32.1 9.9
Plasterers 20.5 5.8 30.2 4.4
Painters 37.8 14.1 38.8 9.9
Plumbers 15.8 11.0 12.1 8.2
Labourers to above 24.0 14.8 27.1 11.3
Navvies & Gen. Lab. 40.0 32.6 46.1 27.2
Other 25.8 23.9 27.5 21.2
Total 25.1 15.0 28.1 12.0
1937 1938
Carpenters 8.5 5.4 10.7 6.8
Bricklayers 7.5 4.4 10.9 6.9
Masons 12.1 6.2 12.1 7.2
Slaters & Tilers 11.7 9.6 18.7 11.2
Plasterers 10.6 6.3 14.8 9.2
Painters 31.9 10.2 35.6 13.8
Plumbers 9.5 7.7 10.0 9.1
Labourers to above. 15.0 10.2 15.2 12.0
Navvies & Gen. Lab. 30.9 23.7 32.4 29.7
Other 23.1 19.5 23.7 21.8











Labourers to above 18.6 9.2
Navvies & Gen. Lab. 40.4 23.7
Other 30.2 20.4
Total 23.9 11.3
Comparable figs. not available during war years.
It was announced in Ministry of Labour Gazette 1940 that
statistics relating to the no. & % of insured persons unemployed
in particular industries was suspended.
APPENDIX C.	 MEMBERSHIP OF THE MAJOR BUILDING TRADE UNIONS
IN GREAT BRITAIN, 1900 — 1970.
ANALG. SOC. OF CARPErTERS & JOINERS
	 alg. Carpenters, Cabinet
Makers & Joiners (1918)	 (G
1892 37,588 1918 102,069

























AMALGAMATED SOCIETY OF WOODWORKERS (GREAT BRITAIN)
1920 124,526 1951 179,421
1921 124,831 1952 179,686
1922 115,395 1953 179,008
1923 103,993 1 954 178,628
1924 102,012 1955 180,832
1925 107,056 1956 180,855
1926 107,658 1957 181,060
1927 109,604 1958 177,274
1928 108,609 1 959 174,148
1929 109,909 1960 175,390
1930 108,861 1961 177,439
1931 106,217 1962 177,452
1932 999709 1963 175,215
1933 93,871 1 964
1934 94,760 1965
17734,95266331
1935 102,839 1966 170,816
















NAT. AMALG. (HOUSE & SHIP) PAINTERS & DECORATORS (GB)
1892 4,194 1923 47,752
1893 5,927 1 924 42,999
1894 6,528 1925 39,423
1895 6,754 1926 37268,
1896 7,690 1 927 36,366
1897 8344, 1928 34,879
1898 9,166 1929 35,290
1899 10,185 1930 35,304
1900 10,448
1931 34,398 7,935 33,270
.1932 30,3731901 10,833 1936 37,166
1933 28,0631902 11,185 1937 39,711
1903 1 1,077 1934
30,138
1938 42,588
1904 16,056(1) 1 939 43,524
1905 16,542 1940 39,441
1906 16,519 1941 38,803
1907 17,377 1942 40,763 
1908 17,462 1 943 41,953
1909 16,619 1944 41,326
1910 14,909 1945 46,245
1911 16145., 1946 63,876
1912 21,595 1 947 . 69,369
1913 30,158 1948 71,133
1914 29,796 1 949 71,576
1915 28,293 1950 70,473
1916 28,728 1951 68,240
1917 31,029 1952 66,576
1918 37,502 1953 65,123
1919 62,147 1 954 64,264
1920 73,478 1955 63,818
1921 61,984 1956 63,100
1922 51,692 1957 61,631
578











(1) Following the merger of the London and Manchester societies.
(2) Plus Scottish Painters Society'






























































AMALGAMATED UNION OF BUILDING TRADE WORKER	 (GB)
1921 75,779 1951 79,545
1922 64,175 1952 93,362
1923 59,131 1953 95,205
1924 57,410 1954 94,709
1925 58,520 1955 94,758
1926 59,202 1956 94,652
1927 59,434 1957 90,772
1928 55,926 1,958 84,627
1929 55,839 1959 85,211
1930 54,281 1960 84,986
1931 54,760 1961 83,954
1932 51,095 1962 80,412
1933 49,228 1963 80,218
1934 50,043 1964 78,126
1935 53,238 1965 74,207
1936 57, 1966 70,564















APPENDIX D: Trade union density in construction, 1901-71.
Woodworkers (GB) 
No. in
TU Membership	 employment Density
ASC&J	 61,222
GUC&J	 7,301	 Total
1901	 79,826	 301,993	 26.43%
Ass. C&J of S*	 8,785
Amalg. Cab.	 2,518

























There are difficulties in estimating density in woodworking
because the membership of the ASW includes tradesmen employed
in shipbuilding. Woodworkers in shipbuilding are not included
in the fig. for workforce size and the consequence is that
density is consistently over-estimated.
No allowance has been made for 1961 and before of the member-
ship of the NUPCM. This union merged with the ASW in the 1960's









Total Bricklayers 114,146)	 Total






Total Bricklayers 99,549) Total






) 81,270 Bricklayers. 87,574) Total
B&KWAS	 5,491) Masons 34,015)	 121,589 66.83%
1931
Bricklayers 120,000) TotalAUBTW	 761
B& MWAS	 554,,199
59,959 Masons 44,5115	 164,511 36.44%
1951
AUBTW	 79,545 Bricklayers 148,603) Total
Masons 22,965)	 171,568 46.4%
1961
AUBTW	 83,954 Bricklayers 233,860) Total
Masons 19,360)	 253,200 38.5%
1971
Bricklayers 57,172 Bricklayers 98,300) Total










1901	 AHD&P (London) 5,380 19,241 159,285 12.0%
Scottish Painters 3,028
ASP&D 16,145)
1911 ) 19,079 175,520 10.9%
Scottish Painters 2,934)
ASP&D 61,984
1921 69,255 152,167 45.5%
Scottish Painters 7,271 -
English Painters 34,398)
1931 ) 41,163 20,,905 19.7%
Scottish Painters 6,765)
English Painters 68,240)
1951 ) 81,908 247,033 53.2%
Scottish Painters 13,668)
English Painters 59,869
1961 71,981 535,850 21.4%
Scottish Painters 12,112




ABT	 Association of Building Technicians
AC&JS	 Associated Carpenters and Joiners (Scotland)
AGS	 Assistant General Secretary
ASC&J	 Amalgamated Society of Carpenters
and Joiners
ASCC&J	 Amalgamated Society of Carpenters, Cabinet Makers and
Joiners
ASHD8/3	 Amalgamated Society of House Decorators and Painters
ASP&D	 Amalgamated Society of Painters and Decorators
ASTRO	 Amalgamated Slaters, Tilers and Roofing Operators
ASW	 Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers
ASWM	 Amalgamated Society of Woodc utting Machinists
AUBTW	 Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers
AUCM	 Amalgamated Union of Cabinet Makers
B&MWAS	 Building and Monumental Workers Association of
Scotland
BWIU	 Building Workers Industrial Union
CF	 Communist Party of Great Britain
CEU	 Constructional Engineering Union
DC	 District Committee
EC	 Executive Council
ETU	 Electrical Trades Union
FTAT	 Furniture Timber and Allied Trades Union
GC	 General Council
G&MWU	 General and Municipal Workers Union
GS	 General Secretary
GUC&J	 General Union of Carpenters and Joiners
LBTF	 London Building Trades Federation
LP	 Labour Party
MC	 Management Committee
MUOB	 Manchester Unity Operative Bricklayers
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NAFTA	 National Amalgamated Furniture Trades Association
NAOF	 National Association of Operative Plasterers
NASOH&SP&D National Amalgamated Society of Operative House
and Ship Painters and Decorators
NB	 National Builder
NBL	 New Builders Leader
NBL&CWS	 National Builders Labourers and Constructional
Workers Society
NYBTE	 National Federation of Building Trades Employers
NFBTO	 National Federation of Building Trades Operatives
NJCBI	 National Joint Council for the Building Industry
NSP	 National Society of Painters
NUFTO	 National Union of Furniture Trades Operatives
NUPCM	 National Union of Packing Case Makers
NW&CC	 National Wages and Conditions Council
OBS	 Operative Bricklayers Society
OSM	 Operative Stonemasons Society
PTU	 Plumbing Trades Union
UBLU	 United Builders Labourers Union
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Abbreviations: Publications
AR - Annual Report
HMM - History of the Ministry of Munitions
MJ - Monthly Journal




TO - Trade Circular
LOSC - Labour-only sub-contracting
Sources
The construction industry is particularly rich in surviving
records of its various trade unions many of them preserved in
The Modern Records Centre, University library, Warwick. The
wealth of detail, both of printed materials and of manuscript
records more strictly defined, means that the student is con-
fronted with an embarass_ement de richesse. Minute books,
accounts, correspondence, printed reports and other papers
survive from many of the organisations which ammentioned in
the text of this Thesis and it has been impossible, in the time
available, to make more than a preliminary survey of many of
the materials which are extant. In some instances a 'sampling'
approach was adopted, taking records for alternative years
or months in order to obtain an understanding of a particular
organisation and its operations. More attention has been paid
to the records of the ASW and its predecessors than those of
the other unions because of the size and significance of that body.
No use has been made of the surviving correspondence files of
the ASW since at the time when this work was undertaken this
voluminous collection was not indexed. Records of other trade
unions were used less frequently, although access was gained to
the archives of the T&GWU including material from the NAOP.
Some 1960's minute books from the NUFTO were loaned by Huw
Reid who is working on a history of that union.
The wealth of 'official' materials from the building trade
unions is balanced by the survival of 'unofficial' sources,
especially in relation to the publication The New Builders
Leader which was published from 1935 for nearly twenty years.
589
Records of the National Federation of Building Trades Opera-
tives, housed in the Library of the University of Manchester
Institute of Science and Technology provide an ample supple-
ment to the records of the individual unions. Printed reports
of the National Wages and Conditions Council' and the National
Joint Council for the Building industry are also held there.
Unfortunately this collection too was not indexed, but it
promised to be a rich source if this work is undertaken.
Mr. Ken Price,, formerly a Regional Secretary of the NFBTO, now
an officer of ne National Federation of Building Trades
Employers holds surviving papers from Richard Coppock, but these
were not available for use during this research.
The NFBTE issues its own published reports, and these too have
been deposited in the Modern Records Centre at Warwick Univer-
sity, although unpublished records are still held at The
Federation's headquarters atFew Cavendish Street,London. Many
of the larger construction firms have issued their own 'official
history', providing some background on their growth and develop-
ment. Company records are generally less accessible than
those of the trade union movement and it was deemed expedient
at the 6utset to concentrate on the trade union records which
were available, rather than to chase the company and employer
records which were not.
Documentary sources were supplemented by interviews with past
and present members of the Executive Council of UCATT, itá ton-'
stituent. unions and other related organisations. These proved
invaluable in stimulating and encouraging the work which was
in progress, as well as being in themselves a resource for the
590
research. I must once again record my thanks to all of the
people who agreed to co-operate with my work in this way,
both for their patience in the face of my questions and for
their kindness in assisting me.
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Amalgamated Societ of Car enters and Joiners
Min. bk. re amalgamation with the GUC&J, 1919-20.
General Council Mins, c.1890's - 1921.
Monthly Reports/Journals 1914-20.
Rulebooks 
General Union of Carpenters and Joiners 
Annual/monthly reports, 0.1890's-1920.
Imposed terms of amalgamation with the Amalgamated Society of
Carpenters and  Joiners, Manchester, 1920.,
Amalgamated Society. of Woodworkers 
EC Minutes, 1915-66.
GC Minutes, 1922-68.
ASW Minutes re amalgamation with the Amalgamated Society of
Woodcutting Machinists, 1922..
Annual/monthly reports/journals, 1921-71.
Annual delegate conference reports, 1947-70.
Rulebooks, 1921-65.
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Operative Stonemasons Society (MRC)
OSM Journal, 1911-20.
London building trades dispute, 1914; printed Report and
financial statement with minute book of the OSM London
Disputes Cttee, 1914 and London District Committee
minute book, 1916-20.
Rulebook / 1907.
Manchester Unit . 0 erative Brickla ars.
Executive Committee Minute Book, 1918-26, including corres-
pondence re the amalgamation.
Quarterly Reports, c.1886-1918.
Operative Bricklayers Society
Annual Moveable General Council: minutes of proceedings, 1905-14.
Printed Monthly Reports, c.1890-1920.
Min. bk. of Cognate Trades Amalgamation, 1919-20.
No.1 Div. Council Min bk, 1919-20.
Corres. file re disposal of union funds on amalgamation.
Rulebook, 1918.
Amalgamated Union  of Building Trade Workers -
EC Minute books, 1920-71.
Annual/Quarterly Reports (Trade Circular and General Register)
1921-65.
National Delegate Conference (Printed) Re ports 1922-70.
Balance Sheet, cognate trades amalgamation, 1920-21.
Minute book re amalgamation with the 'Altogether Builders'
Labourers, 1923-27.
Minute book re amalgamation with the Building and Monumental
Workers' Association of Scotland,
No.3 (Eastern Counties) Div. Council Mins, c.1919-51.
Coventry District Committee Mins. c.1945-50.
AUBTW Rulebks, 1921-55.
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Amalgamated Society of House Decorators and Painters (London) 
Minute book regarding amalgamation with the Manchester Alliance,
c.1903-04.
Rulebook 




National Amalgamated Society Operative House and Ship Painters




Rulebooks 1960 & 1966.
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National Federation of Building Trades Operatives 
Minute book of joint trades, 1914-18.
Emergency Committee Mins/EC Mins 1922-37, 1938-71.
Volumes of minutes and related. documents re schemes of
amalgamation and confederation, 19201s-30's.
Minutes of 1924 Building Trades Dispute Court of Inquiry.
National Federation of Building Trades Employers
Annual reports, 1936-72.
Collected histories of member firms.
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INTERVIEWS. (Yo attempt has been made in the list which follows










SPS EC, later ASP&D & UCATT EC.
AUBTW EC,, later UCATT EC.
GEORGE HENDERSON - SCOTTISH PLASTERERS UNION, later NAOP &
T&GWU.
FRANK JACKSON - 	 ASCWASW ACTIVIST. ALSO MENBER BWIU.
COMMUNIST PARTY INDUSTRIAL ORGANISER.
JULIE JACOBS -	 COMMUNIST PARTY INDUSTRIAL ORGANISER.
JOHN LEONARD -	 AUBTW PRESIDENT.
WILLIAM LEWIS - 	 AUBTW AGS, later UCATT NATIONAL ORGANISER.
GLYNN LLOYD -	 ASP&D EC, later UCATT EC.
CHARLES LOVELL -	 PLUMBING TRADES UNION, EC, later EETPU.
GEORGE LOWTHIAN -	 AUBTW GS.
WILL MARTIN -	 ASW. EC.
RICHARD MILES -	 AUBTW EC.
JIM MILLS -	 ASW & NFBTO PRESIDENT..
LAWRENCE FOUPARD - AMALGAMATED SLATERS, TILERS & ROOFING
OPERATIVES, GS, later AUBTW & UCATT.
SAM READING -	 NATIONAL UNION OF PACKING CASE MAKERS, GS,
later ASW & UCATT.
WILLIAM SMART - 	 AUBTW EC, later UCATT GC.
ARTHUR UTTING -	 UCATT EC.
ALBERT WILLIAMS -	 AUBTW EC, later UCATT EC.
NORMAN WILLIS - 	 T&GWU, later TUC.
LESLIE WOOD -
	
ASW AGS, UCATT GS.
JACK YOUNGS -	 ASW, EC.
HARRY WEAVER -	 =TO, G=1
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Foocrotes: Introduction
1. R. Postgate, The Builders History, NFBTO, 1923.
2. W.S. Hilton, Foes to Tyranny, AUSTW, 1963.
	
3,	 R. Postgate, 1923.
4. S. Higenbottam, Our Society's History, ASW, 1939.
5. T.J. Connelly, The Woodworkers, 1860-1960. ASW, 1960.
6. W.S. Hilton, 1963.
7. B. & S. Webb, History of Trade Unionism, 1894.
8. Postgate, 1923.
Hilton, 1963.
G.D.H. Cole, Attempts at general unions: a study in
British trade union history, 1818-34. Macmillan, 1953.
9. B. & S. Webb, 1894 (Longmans& Green, 1950 ed. p.124)
10. Making Parts Book OSM. MSS 78 Modern Records Centre.
R. Postgate, 1923.
11. S. Harrison, Poor Men's Guardians, 1974 p.89.
12. R. Postgate, 1923.
13. G.D.H. Cole, 1953.
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1) In favour of accepting the employers
offer of id	 13,462
Against
	 104,001
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Against	 32,483
86. Rept. Cmd 2192.
87. AUBTW TO Nov 1924. NW&CO Special meeting: 25 Apr 1924.
Rept. on Liverpool. Rates then prevailing there were
Joiners, machinists, painters
	 1.8i








Joiners receive 4d per day tool money in addition.
Grade lA t
 rate =	 1.7d per hour
88. ASW MJ Sep 1924.
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or are we to revert to a policy of local settlement?
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fought its own battle."
89. Cited in T.Austrin 1979. Ch.1.
90. ASW MJ Sep 1924.
91. See 87. above.
92. RSW Davies — The Liverpool LP and the Liverpool working
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99. NFBTO Joint EC's Mins Aug 1 1924.
100. ASW NJ Sep 1924 National terms of settlement of building
trade dispute.
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Rept. of Nat. Joint Cttee on time lost through inclement
weather in NFBTO Vol. of mins, 1925-26 T.68.
103. AUBTW 5th AR 1925.
104. A questionnaire submitted to representative building trade
employers in Oct 1920 gave the following returns.




Masons (Wailers) 	 22.4
Masons (Hewers)	 14.4
Slaters	 25.0	 (Table continued..)




Carpenters 8c joiners	 5.3
Plumbers	 3.7
Navvies	 18.0
AUBTW 2.22t. of 12th Nat. Del. Conf. Jul 1936. Historical
review. Lost time.
105. NFBTO ACP 1925 President's comment.
106. NFBTO merg. Cttee Mins Jul 14-15 1925.







108. ASW NJ Jan 1926. Proposed NJOBI Rept. of discussions of
May 28 & Oct 1 1925.
109. NFBTO ACP 1926.
110. NFBTO Mins of meeting of Joint Execs. 13 Jul 1926.
111. NFBTO ACP Jun 1928.
ASW MJ's Mar-Apr 1930.
112. ASW NJ Mar 1930. Br. resolutions and Ittrs. See Appendix A.
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169.
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171.
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Bill Smart, who received it from G. Hicks.
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184. ASW GC Mins of Special Meeting Jul 16 1925.
185. ASW GC Mins of Special Meeting Jul 16 1925.
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191. AUBTW TC Jun 1926. Rept. of EC Sub Cttee appointed in
connection with the General Strike.
192.	 IT	 T1	 11
193. ASW MJ June 1926. EC .ddress.
194.
195. NFBTO ACP 1928.
196. NYETO ACP 1929. •
197.
198. NFBTO Chester Conference, 1930,	 Printed _11221.
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Net Profit	 £92,460	 £127,895	 £119,514
Taylor Woodrow was involved over the war years in the
construction of Mulberry Harbours & airfields. John
Laings was noted for work on aerodromes.
18. Problems of the building industry.	 Issued by Marx
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1958 82 83 83 84 8 3
1959 85 87 88 90 88
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1968 117 123 123 122 121
1969 114 123 120 117 118
1970 110 117
Manpower : see below.
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1954 347,605 90,346 26.0
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14. Norman Grummitt The need for stability in Construction.
News 2(3) (Mar 1976)
15. G. Iowthian: Interi„Lew - On changes in technique &
apprenticeships.
16. T. Austin: Thesis, 1978.
17. L.Wood & J. Youngs: Interviews.
18. G. Lowthian: Interview.
19. J. Youngs: Interview.
20. NFBTO ACP 1963 eg Speech by Leo McGree.
21. J. Connelly, 1960.
22. NFBTE AR 1960; NFBTO EC's AR 1959-60 & NFBTO ACP 1961.
23. ASP&D NJ Sep 1963.
24. The account of the 1963 strike and settlement is based on
the NFBTO ACP 1964 and the EC's AR 1963-4; The NFBTEls
86th AR 1963, the AS/ NJ 1963 and the ASP&D NJ 1963.
Also J. ColcloughThe Construction Industrz of G.B. PP.
131-2.
25. ASP&D NJ Nov 1963 & NFBTO ACP 1964.
26. NFBTO LCP 1965 & 1966 & EC's AR 1965/6. Also R. Miles,
AUBTW, EC. Interview.
27. NFBTO EC Mins 11 Oct 1966.
28. NFBTE 89th AR 1966.
29. NFBTO &CP 1965.
30. NFBTO ACP EC's AR 1963/4.
31. Min. of Tech: BRS: Buildin operatives' work. 2 Vols.
HMSO, 1966.
32. At Barbican & Horseferry Road, Cmnd. 3396, HMSO, 1967.
33. Rept. of the Cttee of Inquiry_under Irof. E.H. Phel ps-
Brown into certain matters concerning labour in buildin7
and civil engineerin cr. ( Cmnd. 3714) HNSO, 1968.
34. NFBTO ACP 1969. EC's AR 1968-9.
35. Ii	 IT	 IT
36. NBPI Reps. 91-93. A separate agreement existed for
ancillary industries. The report of the KBPI on this
(Relit.no.53) quesioned the logic of separate nego-
tiations if the pay ond conditions of the building
industry were to be applied in any case.
57.	 George Smith for example supported the Labour Govt.s
Incomes policy.
38. NPBTO ACP 1969 & EC's AR 1968-9.
39. NFCU ACP 1970.
40. M. Gagg in R. Fraser (Ed.) 1969.
41. NFBTO ACP 1961.
42.
43. NFBTO ACP 1962 & 1966 EC's AR 1965/6.
44. :Phelps Brown Rept. Para.327-8.
45. NFBTO ACP 1967 & 1969: & L. Woods: Interview.
46. NPBTO ACP 1964.
47. U 11	 P I
48. Phelps-Brown. Re pt. Para. 380.
49. =TO ACF 1964.
50. YFBTE 91st AR 1968.
51. NPBTE 93rd AR 1970. The Construction Industry Contracts
Bill.
52. Strikes in construction From J.E. Cronin - IndustriP1
conflict in modern Britain.
1961 286 1966 265
1962 316 1967 256
1963 168 1968 276
1964 222 1969 285
1965 261 1970 337
53. Hyman, 1972. P.30.
54. R. Staines. Personnel Kanager Costain's UK Ltd.
Interview.
On recruitment of labour:
"It is a sensitive area and it is dealt with formally.
A lot of screening is carried out. L:e don't take on
bother boys, put it like that.' The operation of a
blacklist is well—known in the industry and it is reported
to be difficult for anyone who has held a steward's card
to find subsequent employment.
55. T. Austin, Ph.D. Thesis. Organisation in Liverpool.
56. R. Staines, Interview.
57•	 11
58. J. England op cit. P.4.
59. Report of a Court of Inquiry into trade dis utes at the
Barbican and Horseferry road  construction  sites in 
London. (Cmnd. 3396) HMO, 1967.
60. Para.24.
61. NITTO Central Cttee Nins 14 Dec 1966.
62. Cameron, op.cit.
63. J. Roots Del. from No.1 (London) Div. AUBTW 40th Nat.
Del Conf. 1967.
64. AUBTW 40th Nat Del Conf. 1967.
65. S.J. Dimmock — John Laings Company Agreement. 1:arwick
MA, 1970.
66. Phelps Brown, Rept. op cit Paras.490-492.
67. S.J. Dimmock, Thesis, op cit.
68. The advantages of the closed shop to the employer have
been given attention elsewhere, but in the construction
industry it was labour—only sub—contracting which was
used to control the independence of workers at the grass-
roots.
69. NBPI Rept no.93 & Building with direct  labour: local
authority building and the crisis in  the construction 
industry. CSE Housing Workshop, 1978.
70. NBPIRept.no .93 Indicates that on local authority earn-
ings reported average figs. conceal a substantial area
of low earnings in the smaller authorities.
71. The AST rulebook stated simply that stewards should be
elected by a majority vote of members on each job, shop
or site (ASW Rulebk 1970). The Rules of the LSP&D made
no formal provision for the election of stewards.
72. There is enoiwous variation in the operation and conduct
of bonus schemes. The attitude of the main contracting
firm, the size of the job, the nature of the undert-king,
the degree of responsibility allowed to site management
and the level of unionisation and the attitudes of the
workforce all play a part. Some large companies - for
example Costains- UK Ltd. now have an Incentives Depart-
ment which examines the Bill of Estimates to see the
price allowed for labour and to work out on a detailed
basis the bonus payment which could be made. But this
was established only at the end of the 60's and prior to
its formation the decision rested with line management
(Interview R.Staines Costain UK Ltd.). Firms such as
Taylor 'Joodrow & John Laings had operated bonus schemes
since pre-world war 2 (ie before it was formally accepted
in the war). See P. Jenkins & R. Coad. In practice it
seems there was considerable leeway for the settlement of
rates on site in the 60's, depending on the attitudes of
site management and the willingness of the operatives to
put up a fight.
73. L. Wood, 1979 op cit. P.38. These comments were made with
particular reference to the 1972 strike but feature as.
part of a general discussion in 'who leads the union'.
They are equally appropriate to the second half of the
60's.
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74. L. Wood — Interview. It seems that there were no com-
parable gatherings of stewards within the AUSTW. Rept.
of ASP&D Conference 1967/8.
75. Re t.	 into dis utes at the Barbican & Horseferry
road. (Cmnd.3396). T. Austin — Ph.D. Thesis; H.
Mathiesson — M.A. Thesis.
76. T. Austin, Ph.D. Thesis, Ch.8.
77.
78. K. Rooke — NA Thesis — On Nottingham. Describes devt.
of Charter Group in Nottingham, but acknowledges its
rapid demise after the 1972 strike.
79. T. Austin, Ph.D.-Thesis.
80. L. Wood, 1979, op cit.
81. T. Austin, Ph.D. Thesis Ch.8,
82. IRRR 180 (Jul 1978). ASW Rept. EC Rept on Amalg. 1964.
83. TUC Rept. 1964.
84. Grunfield 1966. Kodern trade union law.
85. " Elias, Industrial Law  Journal, 1973.
86. Rept. of the Royal Commission on Trade Unions and
EmPloyers Associations (Donovan Commission).
87. NUFTO Report on amalgamation talks. "Extract from the
GEC Rept. to	 the Biennial Conference of the Union,
Kay 1965.
88. For example the Barbican, Horseferry Road, Shellmex
Building and Fiddlers Ferry.
09.	 Donovan Commission, Para.682.
90. NFBTO ACP 1962.
91. YFBTE AR 1964.
92. YFBTE AR 1970.
93. These figs. are taken from the returns made to the Reg.
of Friendly Socs. for 1961-66 and from union reports
thereafter. Figs. in union reports tended where comparisons
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I rere made for the sam ,
 year to be slightly higher than
those submitted for official record so this table may
understate the decline in union membership during the
60 1 s.	 No allowance has been made for the fact that the
ASW was increased by assimilation of the Nat.Union of
Packing Case Makers in 1964 with 3,182 members. And the
size of the AUBTW was increased by merger with the
Street Masons & Pavers in 1967 with 1,037 members and
the Slaters	 Tilers with some 1,500 members so this is
further reason to assume that the case is understated.
The figs for the NAOP for 1970 is estimated on the basis
of the craft section returns for the Building Trade
. Group within the Te<GW. Figs. for the Plumbers for 1968
and 1970 following their merger with the ETU were
supplied by Ch. Lovell GS of the Plumbers Section of the
merged unions.
94.	 Bain & Price BTIR 14(3) (Nov 1976) show a decline in
overall union and density between 1948 and 1966 and a
rise thereafter:







By contrast they show a consistent decline in union density
in construction 1948-1974 from 45.3;.; to 27.2, which bears
out the assertions made above concerning decline in
density by trade.
95.	 Since some declared 'self—employed' were genuine self—
employed it is impossible to use this category to quantify
the trend towards 'labour—only' during the 60 1 s. Estimates
varied enormously — L_tween 250,000 Lnd 500,000
workers were engaged on the 'lump ' after the introCuc-
tion of SET it was suggested.
96. •FBTO :_CP's 1960 & 1962; NFBTO EC Mins. 1960 Oct. ,-1962
Jan comr)rising reports of the Working rarty on Amalgama-
tion.
97. ASW AR's 1962-9; ASI&D PR 1969; AUP71 1R's 1964-9.
On
,O.	 ITFBTO ICI' 1962 Statements by representatives of the 1SW.
99. XSWE. & NUFTO memb. & finance.
100. 3. Reading Interview: NUN': JR 1963 & PTJTCII Rulebk 1962.
2 files of corres. re trransfer of engagements of
NUFCI4 to ASW.
101. UFDTO EC Mins Feb 5 1963. TUC: TU structure Woodworking
Trades: Rept. of conference of representatives of
woodworking trade unions, Mar 17 1964.
102. 7:
103. S. Lynch, MA Thesis. :a.rwick 1971.
104. TUC Trade Union Structure. Woodworking trades Reprt. of
meeting , Nay 1 9, 1965.
105. W. Martin: Interview.
106. S. Lynch, MA Thesis.
107. A. Black & J. Leonard E. G. Lo/;:thian: Interviews.
108. FUFTO G=t -3C Meetings Nov 19 1965.
ASW :EC Nina Oct 1965, 1229/65.
109. GEO on !Jmalg. NUFTO 1965. Biennial Del. Conf,
110. ASW suggested new structure to absorb other societies.
Devised by Les Wood then AGS of the
111. "TUFT GEC Nina Feb 18 1966.
112. S. Lynch MA Thesis.
113. EUFTO GEC Nina 18-19 Aug 1966. A lttr was rec'd from the
GS oz the ASU, indicating that they would be prepared to
attend a joint meetin_, of re presentatives of the
NUFTO & themselves. A, letter was also received from
the TUC proposing a joint meeting with the AS
114. ASW AR 1964. Of the other small woodworking unions,
the United French Polishers transferred into NUFTO in
1969. The Union of Basket, Cane and Fibre Furniture
Makers and the Coopers Federation remained independent,
even after the formation of UCA TT
 FTAT.
115. HFBTO EC Mins: Mins of meeting of reps of some affiliated
unions, Dec 13 1962 & Mins of meeting Lar 18 1964.
116.
117. AUBTW EC Mins 27 - Jan 1966.
118. AUBTW EC Mins Sep 21, 1966.
119. G. Lowthian Interview nor. Rept. '71 Dec 1967.
Dunne GS of the :FLOP 'I believe that the Fatione.1
Offices of the union (ie the AUBTW) tried all they
knew to bring their own EC round to a point of ac;reement.
120. NAOP EC Mins 16 -q 7 Luc 1967.
121,
	
NFBTO CC Mins Sep 22 1966.
122. George Henderson: Interview.
123. AUBT-J EG Mins 3 Aug 1966.
124. 1. Foupra-d: Interview.
125. I. Fouperd. Notes on amalgamation.
126. ASP&D: Rept of Proceedings of GC Meetings 8-11 Jun
1964 e; Jun 1966.
127. As Austin put it on one occasion GC I:ins June 196C
'As things are going at the moment, I do not feel
inclined to talk to the Secretary of the )1 SW about any-
thing.	 That is my personal view, but that must not
take precedence over the general desires and aspirations
of the members as a whole. Personalities have to be
sunk in this direction, but the behaviour of the IT:
GS leaves a lot to be desired.'
128. Negotiations were opened at the beginning of 1966.
ASP&D IO Mins 22-23 Feb 1966.
129. D. Crawford: Interview & W. Austin Interview.
ASP&D EC Kins 1962,
Joint Meeting of EC & Scottish DC 20 Feb 1964.
130. ASP&D Rulebk 1966
131. Aspap Joint Meeting of EC & Scottish DC 20 Feb 1964.
132. ASP&D NJ Jul 1964.
133. ASP&D Rept of proceedings of Gen. Council, June 1964.
Comment by A.Austin.
134. N. Willis; Interview & G. Lowthian; Interview.
135. ASW GC Mins 24 Mar 1966: Min 566/66.
136. Les Wood: Amalgamation Document: Suggested new structure
to absorb other societies. c.1966.
137. NAOP EC Nins 16-17 Aug 1967.
138. G. Lloyd - 228,417
A. Dunne - 184,493
NFBTO AC]? 1966. The way in which unions cast their
votes is not recorded. -
139. L. Poupard: Notes on amalgamation.
140. W. Martin: Interview.
141. 1. Poupard: Notes. This view was put by every person
with whom the issue was discussed esp. Martin, ASW;
& Lowthian, AUBTW.
142. NAOP AR 1967.
143. NAOP EC Mins 13-14 July 1967.
144. G.Henderson:Interview & NAOP Re pt. Dec.1967.
145. G. Henderson: Interview.
146. NFBTO AC]? 1968 Presidential Address.
147. D. Crawford: Interview.
148. L. Poupard: Interview.
149. ASI&D Rept of proceeC:.ngs of 5th rational Conference
(1st ennual policy making conference) May 1968.
150. AUBTI EC Mins 29 Apr 1968 & 31 Jul 1969.
151. N. Willis: C. Lovell. Although the CEU were affiliated
to the NFBTO they were not parties to the NJCBI. It was
opposition from the T&GW which kept them off.
152. W. Smart: Interview.
153. C. Lovell:	 "
154. IDS Brief 169 Nov 1979.
155. ETU 1965 Rulebk; PTU 1963 Rulebk.
156. C. Lovell Interview. Figs supplied by C. Lovell.
In fe-,vour Against Majority
PTU 10,699 4,645 6,054
ETU 45,452 42,621 2,831
157. ASW EC Hins 15-16 Dec 1965. 1494/65.
158. ASI&D Rept of proceedings at the 4th Nat. Biennial
Conf. 25-27 Apr 1967.
159. ASP&D Rept of proceedings at the 5th Nat Biennial
Conf. (1st Annual Policy Making Conf.) May 1968.
160. ASW NJ Jan 1969.
161. AS'.! & ASP&D: Transfer  of enmgements; statement of
intent.
162. ASW NJ Jan 1970 Transfer of engagements of the ASP&D
Consequential alterations to the ASW i s General Rules.
163. The ASP&D held its first policy making . conf. in 1968.
164. The question of pensions was an important inducement
for members of the EC of the Painters to accept the
transfer although it was to be realised that the scheme
which was operated within the ASU was not actuarially
sound and new arrangements were made.
W. Austin & D. Crawford/Former DC Painter.
165. J. England BJIR 17(1; (;:ar 1979) & D. Crawford:
Interview.
166. AS';! (incorporating the ASP&D), Model constitution for a
Regional Council and a Regional Committee.
167. D. Crawford: Interview.
168. ASP&D Rept of proceedings of 6th Nat. Conf.
(2nd Annual Policy making conference), May 1969.
169.
TI
170. & W. Massey (ASP&D) Corres. with Gaster, Vowles,
Turner & Loeffler, solicitors, Dec. 1969.
171. According to an RIBA survey of over 3,000 private
architects' offices, 94;,; employed 20 or less archi-
tectural staff.
172. ABT Circular to all members Oct 1969.
173. ASW Consequential alterations to the Society's General
Rules effective from the date of agreement of transfer
of engagements of the ABP.
174. ASP&D Rept of proceedings of 5th Nat. Conf. 1st Annual
policy making conf. Lay 1968.





It should be noted that
the first contacts between these organisations had
taken place rather earlier, but it is not until the
summer of '68 that there is any indication that these
questions are being taken seriously.
177. AUBTW EC Mins 31 Jul 1969.
178. R. Miles: Interview.
179. AUBTW Nat. Del. Conf. 1970.
180.
181.
182. A. Utting OP member & UCATT EC.
183. AUBTW EC Nina 10 Sep 1969.
184.	 None of the 3 officE2s, the GS George Lowthian,
AG Bill Lewis & President John Leonard were in the
OF, so that this would have weighted AUBTU represen-
tation heavily against the CP.
185. AUBTW EC Mins Jan 1971.
186. AUBTW Nat. Del. Conf. 1970.
187. A. Williams: Interview.
188. G. Lowthian: Interview.
189. AUBTW ASW Transfer of. engagements, 1970.
190. Voting papers were issued in Dec. 1970.
191. A. Utting interview.
192. These were themes of a speech by Br. Fawbert of London
Div. Co. at the 1970 Conference. They were taken up
by some CP'ers at grass—roots level where CPers were
present esp. Barking ex Dagenham br. where opnosition
was continued. OP members on the AUBT-J EC gave priority
to their representation on their merged EC.
193. S. Lynch, MA Thesis.
194.
195.
196. ASW AR 1960. G. Smith denied charges that he was
attacking the Federation and argued that 1) The AT.'
was the largest single contributor to the NPBm0.
The 1960 fees accounted for 6 of total ATI expenditure
and 14 of trade management. 2) That the ASW made the
greatest input; to the NFBTO in terms of manpower at
district and branch levels & 3) that the AST' s own
organisational services were so extensive that they
relied, to a smaller extent than other unions, on the
services of the NFBTO. It was on this basis that he
argued at the NFBTO GC Ueeting Sep 1960 that there
1970 Iroceedings of private session.
11
should be 'a radical recrganisation of the structure of
the Federation.'
197. eg The NITTO AC? 1962.
198. NFBTO AC? 1964.
199. Attendance was invariably paid at the rate of 3 days
ex 2 nights expenses away although business was often
concluded in a day. This enhanced Coppock's control
over business since delegates were anxious not to stay
for longer than a day and tended to accept decisions
taken by him unless there were serious reasons to the
contrary.	 Expenses were charged to the Federation.
J. Young: Interview.
200. J. Young: Interview.
201. NFBTO &CP 1964.
202. NITTO AC? 1965. The voting on the resolution concerning
regional representation was:



























204. NFBTO Central Council mins 14 Dec 1966.
205. NFBTO Central Council meeting mins 19 Sep 1968.
206. rFou A,CP 1970.
207. Harsden CEU. NFOU ACT
208. J. Youngs	 11
209. NFCU ACP 1971 & NFCU Central Council mins e: Nov 1971
& Special meeting of central co. 15 Nov 1971.
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210. Report to the Joint i ttee (	 on Trrnsfer of enolgements).
211. L. Wood indicated that pay for all officials had to be
levelled up to AS standards & this was a considerable
addition to the wages bill for the new union.
212. Trowel trades discussion c.1963/4. Lowthian i s plan.
Conclu:Aon: 7ootnotes
(1) Jo England BJIR 17 (1) (Mar 1979).
(2) Supra Ch.1.
(3) Grunfield, 1966.
(4) NBL Aug 1936 Letter from a member of the T&GWU
'Why not one union?' deals with the theme of amal-
gamation without ever referring to the problems
involved in creating an industrial organisation which
resulted from the structure of his own union.
(5) R. Undy, unpublished paper on mergers.
(6) eg R. Hyman11975.
(7) H.A. Clegg, 1954.
(8) A. Bullock, 1960.
(9) H.A. Clegg, 1954.
(10) D. Lamb, 1974.
(11) H. Braverman, 1974.
(12) J. England BJIR 17 (1) (Mar 1979), R. Undy, unpublished
paper.
(13) J. Hughes, 1968.
(14) R. Postgate, 1923.
(15) tt
(16) H.A. Turner in McCarthy (Ed), 1972.
(17) H.A. Turner, 1962.
(18) J. Hughes, 1968, J.D.M. Bell - Industrial unionism:
a critical analysis in McCarthy (Ed), 1972.
(19) R. Hyman, 1975. P.41.
(20) G.D.H. Cole World of Labour, 1913.
(21) An exception was the NUM which claimed bricklayers and
woodworkers in the pits. The NUR was less successful
in eliminating building craft members from railway
workshops.
(22) A. Marsh, 1965.
(23) H.A. Clegg, 1976.
(24) 11 6°0
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